

UNIVERSITY OF EDUCATION, WINNEBA

**VOTERS' RESPONSE TO VOTE BUYING:
A CASE STUDY OF THE SHAMA DISTRICT**

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DECLARATION

Candidate's Declaration

I, Frank Lord Baidoo, with student identity number 815014008, declare that this thesis which has been completed solely in fulfillment of Master of Philosophy in Social Studies Education of University of Education, Winneba, with the exception of quotations and references contained in published works which have all been identified and acknowledged, is entirely my own original work, and it has not been submitted, either in part or whole, for another degree elsewhere.

Signature.....

Date.....



Supervisor's Certification

The thesis has been supervised and approved as meeting the requirements of the School of Research and Graduate Studies, University of Education, Winneba, Ghana.

Supervisor: Prof. Augustine Yao Quashigah

Signature.....

Date.....

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my dear family: Mrs. Rose A. K. Baidoo, my heart desire and wife; and my two wonderful daughters: Naana Aseda Baidoo and Joy Nyameyie Baidoo.



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Gratitude is the least of virtues, but ingratitude the worst of vices- a proverb. In writing this thesis, many publications were consulted and, so, I am highly indebted to all the authors whose works were quoted either directly or indirectly.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CDD: Centre for Democratic Development

CODEO: Coalition of Domestic Election Observers

CAPF: Coalition for Accountable Political Financing

EC: Electoral Commission

NCCE: National Commission for Civic Education

IDEG: Institute of Democratic Governance

ILAPI: Institute for Liberty and Policy Innovation



ABSTRACT

Each election year and in almost every local and institutional elections, the issue of vote buying surfaces. Vote buying has almost become part of every election in Ghana. While the menace is on the increase, it is unclear whether votes bought translate into votes for the buyer or the buying party. This work sought to investigate whether the incentives given to voters affect voters' decisions at the polls. It also looks at whether Ghanaians are conversant with the laws and legislations on elections and for that matter vote buying. The mixed method design was used for the study. Data from questionnaire was triangulated with interviews. Non-probability sampling method was used to select the sample of district, communities and respondents for the study. The Pearson Chi-Square was used in finding significant differences. The *p-value* is the probability for showing differences and a critical *value of alpha*=.05 was adopted for sig differences in the statistical analysis. The study revealed among other things that: (a) Items that are used to buy votes include silver pans (basins), cloths, gas cylinders, laptops, money, outboard motors, and wellington boots; (b) Incentives used to buy votes influence the decisions of 27.3% of voters and (c) During vote buying, conditions are not actually attached to the incentives except where there are doubts that one wants to take the incentive without reciprocating with his/her vote. Enforcing laws on vote buying by all stakeholders including the police, the judiciary, the Electoral Commission of Ghana (EC) and resolving to fight corruption among leaders who also use all means to make money to engage in vote buying would go a long way to solve the menace.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

One of the pillars that support every democracy is elections. Elections seem to have become a major factor in the stabilization and democratization of emerging democracies. It forms an important pillar that places the power to govern with the people. To Bofo-Arthur (2006) elections are important to a nation's construction and the electorates since it performs the role of a litmus test for democratic institutions. It ensures that democratic pillars including rule of law, ballot secrecy, separation of powers, independence of the judiciary and many more are strengthened.

Elections therefore allow citizens to take part in governance. Thus, elections give the citizens the opportunity to select their leaders. Electorates use elections to evaluate how leadership or governments have excelled in all facets of national life such as education, economy, agriculture, corruption, standard of living and others. It is therefore a cardinal process through which power is allocated, and representative democracy is actualized.

Elections and more specifically voting are important mechanisms for selecting leaders for political offices in every democracy. They aggregate preferences, help select better public officials, and provide incentives for politicians to act in the interest of the voters they represent (Persson & Tabellini, 2000) since it is through elections that candidates are able to appeal and explain their intended policies to electorates are voted into power.

Chazan (1987) identifies two main functions of elections in the world and particularly in Africa; that is whether to change a regime and its leadership or to seek approval from the

electorates to enhance democratic and constitutional transition. Clear examples are the 1969, 1979 and the 1992 elections in Ghana which were conducted with the sole aim of making changes in the government and the regime as well, while the 1960 and 1978 elections were conducted to seek the acceptance of the electorates to enhance a shift in the constitution.

Several countries in the world currently select their national leaders through multi-party elections. However, in some developing countries especially in Africa, the quality of elections still varies widely as elections have been plagued with problems such as ballot fraud, intimidation, multiple voting, low voter education, snatching of ballot boxes, violence, giving out of electoral incentives or buying of votes and others. (Stokes, 2005; Schaffer, 2007; Vincente, 2008; Kramon, 2009)

Just as democratic elections have spread across the globe since the early 1970s, so has electoral incentives and buying of votes. Vote buying has been widespread in many countries that have continued along the path towards democracy. In the words of Vicente (2008), vote buying happens frequently in many parts of the world.

Indeed, vote buying which in some literature is referred to as clientelism has a long history. The use of electoral incentives to buy votes has been a frequent practice during electoral campaigns and elections in several developing and developed countries. It was prevalent in the Roman Republic (Yakobson, 1995), Britain and the United States (O'Leary, 1962) and the phenomenon still remains common around the world (Schaffer, 2007b). Scholars have documented widespread use of these campaign strategies in countries such as Nicaragua (Gonzalez-Ocantos, Jonge, Mel'endez, and Nickerson 2012),

Argentina (Brusco et al., 2002; Stokes, 2005), Taiwan (Wang & Kurzman, 2007), and Lebanon (Corstange, 2010), as well as African countries like Sao Tome and Principe , Nigeria (Bratton, 2008; Vicente, 2008) Kenya and Ghana (Kramon 2013).

For example, Hicken, Leider, Ravanilla and Yang(2017:9) account from their paper “Temptation in Vote-Selling: Evidence from a Field Experiment in the Philippines” that

“Typically, each voter in a household will be offered a packet with their name on it, and campaigns track who accepted and who did not. Candidates may also engage in a second round of vote buying if they learn that a challenger is offering more money than they are. Campaigns seek to ensure that voters clearly associate the gift with their candidate. For example, the candidate's flyer may be stapled to packages of food handed out to voters or cash may be attached to flyer or letter from the candidate. Most commonly, candidates distribute money attached to a sample ballot, and encourage voters to take the ballots with them to the polls as a guide. The sample ballot includes not just the candidate's name, but also allied candidates from other races up and down the ticket.”

Vote buying appears in different forms in every society. It may take the form of direct payments to voters. To Schaffer & Schedler (2005), vote buying in its literal sense, is a simple economic exchange. Candidates “buy” and citizens “sell” votes, as they buy and sell apples, shoes or television sets. He adds that the act of vote buying is a contract, or perhaps an auction, in which voters sell their votes to the highest bidder. Parties and candidates who offer material benefits to voters may generally aspire to purchase political support at the ballot box in accordance with the idea of market exchange.

Other forms may include offering of employment before elections, giving out of gifts, provision of social infrastructure to communities on the “last minute” and conditional promises to individuals upon the election of a candidate. Kramon (2009) is of the view that political parties employ certain strategies to buy the votes of electorates. The strategies may focus on demobilizing active opponents or on mobilizing passive

supporters. The former is often described as “negative” vote buying or “abstention buying;” while the latter may be considered as “participation buying.” These strategies may be intended to refrain electorates from casting their votes or ensure a high turnout but how the parties choose amongst the strategies when offering electoral incentives or buying votes remain a great question.

During the distribution of these ‘goodies’ or ‘freebies,’ political parties and politicians target or consider two specific issues. One of these two major factors political parties consider in buying votes is the type of voter one is. Cox and McCubbins (1986) identify three types of voters; core supporters, swing voters and opposition backers. Thus, in every electoral system, these three major groups of voters can be identified and they form the persons that are targeted during vote buying. Schaffer & Schedler (2005) identify the second factor as they assert that, vote trading propositions may target either electoral choices or electoral participation. They may be intended to persuade individuals to vote in certain ways, or to vote or not to vote in the first place.

Existing literature and theoretical perspective have identified three dominant arguments to explain the foundations of vote buying in elections. First it is argued that socio-economic factors, especially poverty, unemployment and illiteracy, play a major role in promoting the market for votes in democracies. Second, it is argued that the voting methods in a particular electoral system may also guarantee the predominance of vote buying during elections. The third explanation is predicated upon the belief that vote buying is a product of the nature of partisanship and party organization in a particular state (Onapajo, Francis and Okeke – Uzodike 2015).

Vote buying is frowned upon in every democracy. It raises questions about the quality of democracy. Neeman and Orosel (2006) identify three types of arguments that are usually made against the practice. First, they argue that because vote buying gives wealthier individuals an unfair advantage, it violates the principle of equality. Second, they sometimes argue that votes belong to the community as a whole, and should therefore not be alienable by individual voters. Third, there is a concern that votes buying may promote inefficiency. This is because the interests of some voters are bought by parties before the election, and their needs or interests may therefore be ignored by political representatives after the election. Buying of votes is also frowned upon in most economies. This is because once a nation becomes user-friendly to vote buying and vote selling; it ceases to be in the best books of foreign multinational companies seeking to invest in developing countries.

The occurrence of vote-buying, understood as incentives or gifts given to voters before elections in exchange for their votes is a corrupt electoral practice. The phenomenon seems to obstruct democratic processes, yet remains pervasive in many developing democracies. Vote buying is a threat to the conduct of quality elections. According to Akwetey (2016), electoral fraud, corruption and unfair practices bring the reliability of the electoral process into question. It affects the legitimacy of the elected officials. He adds that the practice often leads to mistrust, violence and conflicts, while robbing citizens of their need for expected peace and development.

Africa has not been an exception to this phenomenon as scholars and election monitors document extensive gift giving in many African elections. A study conducted during the 2007 election campaign in Kenya found that parliamentary candidates spent an average

of 40 percent of their budget on the distribution of material benefits to voters before the day of election (CAPF, 2008).

There is a widespread sense that many African elections have not been centered on issues or policy accountability, with possible marked consequences for economic development but normally done through the giving out of electoral incentives. In a democracy, an election campaign is supposed to be a peaceful and open discourse of persuasion. Ideally, candidates compete for popular support by presenting reasoned arguments about why they are most qualified for election to office. They stake out rival positions about programs of public goods, all the while being tugged towards the median voter at the center of the political spectrum (Downs, 1957). Voters then choose the contender whose policy positions most closely resemble voters' own set of preferences.

Ghana as a democratic country returned to democratic rule in the year 1992 after years of military rule. A number of political parties have cropped up since then and a number of elections have been conducted in the fourth republic. Two major types of elections are held in Ghana. These are general (presidential and parliamentary) and district assembly and unit committee elections. Every four years Ghanaians go to the polls to elect a president and members of parliament for the various constituencies in the country. Upon the death or resignation of a member of parliament, bye-elections are held to replace a member of parliament in the course of the four year mandate. Again, elections are also organised two years after the presidential and parliamentary elections to elect assembly members and unit committee members. All these elections have been fraught with allegations of distribution of electoral incentives that aim at buying the votes of

electorates. Vote-buying seem to have become the norm of the day both in national and internal party elections because of Ghana's high rate poverty status. Since ballots are meant to be secret, voters can simply take the incentive and vote as they wish, thus generating a difficult commitment problem between a vote seller and vote buyer.

While the party system is relatively institutionalized, Ghanaian elections are competitive and reports of vote buying (the issuing of electoral incentives to voters) surface in every election including internal party elections. Kramon (2013) recounts that cash and other types of handouts, which are often referred to as "chop money", are common to political campaigns in Ghana. There are ample evidence that vote buying is real and not imagined in Ghana, The phenomenon is so widespread in Ghanaian politics that from schools, universities to local internal party elections the practice is very common to the extent that some voters sometimes receive gifts from multiple parties. Hicken cited in Kramon (2011) opines that the greater the extent to which voters receive multiple gifts, the lower the expectations of political support in return might be.

Again, civil institutions and stakeholders of elections in Ghana such as the Ghana Centre for Democratic Development (CDD, Ghana), Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) and Coalition of Domestic Observers (CODEO) through workshops and reports from pre-election surveys towards the 2012 and 2016 general elections have provided evidence on vote buying and warned of the threat the phenomena poses to Ghana's democratic process since each election year, politicians and political parties are accused of distributing electoral incentives to voters.

It is alleged that in Ghana, politicians sometimes attach conditions to these acts of vote buying. There have been reports that indicate that voters who benefit from the electoral incentives are sometimes made to swear in the name of a deity in order to compel voters to honour their part of the agreement. It is also alleged that some voters are also asked to disclose the candidate they voted for with evidence of taking a photo of their ballots before they are paid for compliance. These acts undermine ballot secrecy as enshrined in electoral laws and the constitution of Ghana.

Over the years the country's democracy has been under serious threats due to illegal activities by politicians to buy the votes of electorates. It is widely believed that politicians allocate public resources in ways to maximize political gains. Politicians face intense pressure to provide gifts in exchange for votes. Ghanaian politicians face pressure to allocate private benefits to voters, often at great personal expense. Nugent (2007) notes that "voters expect to be showered with gifts as evidence that the candidate genuinely does have the interests of the local people at heart." However, failure to do so sends a negative signal to voters.

Political parties in the nation have one way or the other offered incentives to buy votes from electorates. Evidence from pre-election surveys conducted by CDD Ghana towards the 2016 presidential and parliamentary elections as well as other elections in Ghana suggest that a great deal of vote-buying occur in the days and weeks leading up to the elections. Allegedly, the electoral incentives range from contracts, employment, community projects (such as roads and schools), vehicles, gas cylinders, cash, building materials, outboard motors, motor bikes, laptops and others. It is unclear where the funds

for these incentives come from but it is perceived that governments use state resources to purchase these incentives and buy votes hence, the high expenditure that exceed government's planned budget for election years.

Vote buying does not just occur; sometimes electorates demand for the incentives from politicians and sometimes politicians also give to the electorates from their own will. For instance, in Ghana, a group of people might be compelled to ask or request for "chop money" from a visitor (candidate) or someone who visits and declares his/her political ambition and asks for their help or support from the people. Again, opinion leaders, chiefs and elders of localities and communities may take advantage and outline the problems or challenges the community or locality faces such as drinking water, poor roads or school from a candidate for his/her assistance. On the other hand, in other instances in Ghana, visiting an elderly person with a gift is a cherished value. It signifies acceptance and opens doors of acceptance for the stranger or visitor. A visitor presenting a gift to a person or a group of people is a sign of welcome to the visitor. Hence, visiting a person for the first time and presenting him/her with a gift allows the visitor to be given face. It is upon this premise that sometimes politicians want to present electorates and communities with incentives.

Vote buying carries different meanings to different people. These meanings can vary not only by class, but also by religion, ethnicity, levels of education, and the like. In the view of Schaffer (2008), they can lead to unhappy consequences.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Ghana practises the universal adult suffrage which allows all qualified adult citizens of sound mind and having attained the age of eighteen years and above the right to vote in all general (presidential and parliamentary) and district assembly and unit committee elections. Leading up to these elections, it has always being alleged that Ghanaian politicians distribute incentives and gifts including motor bikes, construction materials (especially roofing sheets and bags of cement), outboard motors, mobile phones, t-shirts, food items and cash to electorates. Certain communities also benefit from “last minute” projects which allegedly include roads, school buildings, electricity and toilet facilities. This practice which is usually called “vote buying” and meant to coerce voters to vote or not vote for certain candidates and political parties is assuming an alarming rate.

Despite the prevalence of this phenomenon, understood as the exchange of incentives for votes before elections, it is unclear whether these actually translate into higher votes for the distributing candidate/party or whether there is a relationship between vote buying and the decisions and choices of voters although there has been ample evidence from pre-election surveys conducted by Centre for Democratic Development that candidates do target certain voters with gifts and incentives. This has necessitated this study to investigate the relationship between vote buying incentives and the decisions and choices of electorates during elections in the Shama District of Ghana.

1.3 Purpose of the Study

The thrust of this study sought to find out whether there is a relationship between vote buying incentives and the decisions and choices of voters during elections.

1.4 Objectives of the Study

The objectives of this study sought to:

1. Investigate the range of incentives used to buy the votes of electorates
2. Examine the conditions politicians give to electorates when buying votes.
3. Analyse the relationship between vote buying incentives and voters' decisions or choices during elections.
4. Assess voters' knowledge on the laws on vote buying

1.5 Research Questions

The following questions were formulated to direct the study

1. What is the range of items used as incentives to buy the votes of electorates?
2. What are the conditions politicians attach to vote buying incentives?
3. What is the relationship between vote buying incentives and voter decisions or choices?
4. What knowledge do voters have on vote buying laws in Ghana?

1.6 Research Hypothesis

1. There is no significant difference between sex and the distribution of vote buying incentives
2. There is no significant difference between income and vote buying incentives.
3. There is no significant difference between vote buying incentives and voters' decisions.

1.7 Significance of the Study

This study shall be of great significance to all stakeholders of elections in Ghana: It shall again provide useful information to government, parliament and the Electoral Commission of Ghana (EC) and other civic organisations such as Institute for Domestic Governance (IDEG) about the dangers of vote buying to the country's democracy.

It would also provide information to political parties about the relationship between vote buying incentives and voters' behaviours.

Besides, it shall provide information to all stakeholders of the law enforcement bodies about the threat the practice poses to the nation's democracy and to find ways of curbing the menace.

Last but not the least, it shall provide valuable information to state agencies and other stakeholders in charge of electoral education such as the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) on the level of voters' knowledge on the laws on vote buying in the country.

.Moreover, it shall form a baseline for other researchers who may wish to do further research into this area.

1.8 Delimitation

The researcher restricted himself to the Shama District instead of covering all voters in all the twenty-two (22) districts in the Western Region for wider coverage. The researcher limited the study to one district because the researcher would want to do qualitative work to unveil the situation on the ground with regards to voters' response to electoral incentives and vote buying.

1.9 Organisation of the Study

This study was organised into five chapters. Chapter one took a look at the introduction of the study which provided the background to the study, statement of the problem, purpose and objectives, research questions, significance of the study, limitations and delimitations of the study. Chapter two reviewed related literature, focusing on the concept of vote buying; perceptions about vote buying; who is targeted in vote buying; strategies for buying votes; ballot secrecy and monitoring and legislations against vote buying in Ghana. Chapter three described the methodology used for the study. This included the research design, population, sampling techniques, procedures and instruments used to collect the data, validity and reliability of instruments as well as methods used to analyse the data collected. Chapter four dealt with the analysis of data, the presentation of findings and discussions while chapter five summarized the findings; highlights some implications for Ghana's democracy, conclusion; recommendations; limitations to the study and suggested possible areas for further research.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

This chapter reviews related literature on major themes in the study, namely: the concept of vote buying; perceptions on vote buying incentives; who is targeted in vote buying; strategies used in buying votes; ballot secrecy and ballot monitoring and legislations against vote buying.

2.1 The Concept of Vote Buying

Several attempts have been made by writers and researchers to define the concept. This is because vote buying carries different notions in different countries depending on the country's historical, cultural, political aspects and its election models (Schaffer, 2007: 25).

One of the most cited definitions on vote buying is from Etzioni-Halevy who defined vote buying as “the exchange of private material benefits for political support” (Heidenheimer, Johnston & LeVine 1989: 287). The definition stresses on gaining private material benefits by voters in return for their political support. In other words, it is about giving voters some benefits in the form of gifts or incentives for them to reciprocate with their votes by voting for the giver or the candidate. In effects, voters are given items for their private use and they are expected to return this gesture from candidates or political parties by voting for them. She sees this act as an exchange in the sense that the materials are given to the electorates in anticipation that the electorates would consider the gift received and vote for them.

Similarly, Fox sees vote buying as “exchanging political rights for material gains”(Fox, 1994:151). His focus is on the right of a person to exercise his/her franchise. His definition, also stresses on an exchange which is also seen as a transaction. Thus, selling one’s right by accepting a gift, incentive or benefit to vote for a candidate or a political party. To Fox, the aspect of exchange between the material benefit and the political support is more significant than the objective of the exchange.

Bryan (2005: 4) also defines the concept as “the use of money and direct benefits to influence voters.” While the first two definitions did not actually focus on the use of money, Bryan specifically includes money in his definition. His definition, unlike other existing literature does not restrict vote buying to only money but includes other materialistic items like food. In this instance, electorates are given money and other direct benefits to manipulate their decisions. Thus, they are given these items to influence their decisions or choices at the polls. Again, voters are also given these direct benefits and may be expected to abstain from voting. Thus, to vote in a particular way or not to vote.

Brusco, Nazareno and Stokes (2004) also explain vote-buying as a transaction whereby candidates distribute private goods such as cash and gifts in exchange for electoral support or higher turnout. The focus here is for voters especially party supporters and swing voters to turn out in their numbers and vote for the party. In this case, they see vote buying as the giving out of cash and other material items such as building materials, food, and liquor, for electorates especially party supporters to go out in their numbers and vote for the party. Effectively, electorates are paid solely to turn out and vote for the distributing party. The number of electorates who turn out to vote for a candidate is

important in understanding people's political participation. This definition sees vote buying as a transaction (where there is a bargain and an agreement) or a trade. In the view of Schaffer and Schedler (2005), the logic of trade demands that;

(a) the actors involved (buyers and sellers) engage in effective exchange of money for goods or services. In the absence of mutual exchange, if buyers don't pay or sellers don't deliver, the act is not considered as trade but instances of fraud or robbery. To them, the logic of commercial transactions further demands that;

(b) buyers and sellers understand what they are doing: that they enter a reciprocal relationship of exchange. In other words, if voters accept the money, but vote as they had planned to do anyway, they do not take part in an act of exchange. They are not selling their votes, but earning unilateral gains. In their view, voter turnout gives the election management body an idea about the image of the authority in the eyes of the electorate. "It can give it cause to assess its election processes to eliminate steps that hinder turnout and improve its organization of elections with the introduction of other workable measures to lure eligible voters to the polling centers during elections."

Again, Schaffer and Schedler (2005) posit that if we embrace a literal understanding of the term anchored in the world of economic exchange, we may define the purchase of votes in the electoral arena as a market transaction in which parties, candidates, or intermediaries pay (in cash or kind) for "electoral services" delivered by individual citizens. They identify the electoral services to be either a favourable vote or a favourable abstention. They see vote buying as a market exchange and in their view; the commodity that changes hands in the acts of vote trading carries a well-defined institutional meaning. To them, in the vote buying transaction, electorates can be engaged to offer electoral

services. These services may require supporters and swing voters to go out in their numbers and vote for the party while they are rewarded for the services. The services may also target opposition supporters by paying them to refrain from voting. To them, votes are formalised expressions of preference by individual members of decision-making bodies.

They identify two types of barriers that may impede the buying of votes. Thus, objective and inter-subjective barriers. With objective barriers, seller compliance is uncertain, since vote buying is an illicit business and as such does not take place within a “normal” market protected by social and legal norms. On the inter-subjective side, the electoral practices that are described as “vote buying” may carry different meanings in different cultural contexts (Schaffer & Schedler, 2005).

Schaffer (2007) shares a similar view when he explained vote buying as a situation in which small material goods such as money or food are distributed to voters right before an election in the hopes of receiving their vote. To him, “a vote buying incentive has a monetary value.” Again, he does not see vote buying to involve only money but other materialistic items. In this wise, electorates are enticed with or are given money, food or other items to vote for a particular party or candidate. From his definition, one receives the incentive before the person performs his/ her part of the contract. This is given to the voter before going to the poll.

The ACE Encyclopaedia (2012) on the topic Electoral Integrity, gives a broad definition of the subject. They identify basic elements to be considered in defining vote buying. These elements are;

Promising, offering or giving;

Money, goods, services and/or other inducements (such as promises of employment or special favours or treatment);

To voters and/or others, including voters' families or communities;

In the run-up to an election, after an election has been announced or during the campaign;

By a political party, candidate or others (agents) operating on their behalf;

In a way which is intended, or reasonably could be expected, to influence how voters cast their vote, or would be likely to do so.

To them, vote buying in a broad sense is a promise, an offer or the giving of money, goods and services including employment, special favours or treatments to voters and their families by a political party or candidates in the run up to an election, during campaigns or after an election to influence how voters vote.

In this instance, they describe vote buying in three forms; as a promise, as an offering or giving. This promise may be honoured only when the elections are over and the promising party had won the elections. They also extend the giving of the incentives to a voter's family which means that a voter may not personally or directly benefit from the incentive since the incentive goes to the voter's family members.

In the nutshell, while some cultures and literatures restrict vote buying to the handing out of cash for votes, others also extend vote buying to the distribution of materials for votes.

As Schaffer (2007) puts it, "political operatives frequently hand out not just cash, but also a wide range of goods and services such as bags of rice, chickens, whisky, clothing, soccer balls, Viagra, haircuts, and teeth cleaning"

Again, while other literatures see the concept as payments made before one goes to the poll, others define the concept in terms of “a reward” which is usually given to the person after going to the poll. Thus, in some instances, a voter receives the incentive before going to the poll while in other instances too, a voter only receive the incentive after he s/he has gone to the polls or performed his/ her part of the contract.

Besides, vote buying is usually targeted at the poor class of electorates and the incentive is usually given to a voter to participate in voting by voting in a particular way or abstaining from voting. Thus, a voter may be given an incentive to vote for a particular candidate or abstain from voting.

From the aforementioned definitions, vote buying can therefore be explained to be the use of monetary or non-monetary materials or items to influence the decisions or behaviours of voters in an election. It is thus; any reward given to a person for voting in a particular way or for not voting. Vote buying does not only involve money but also other materialistic items.

2.2 Perceptions on Vote Buying Incentives

A vote buying incentive may or may not carry the same meaning for a giver or a recipient (Schaffer, 2002). Voters may have different interpretations for vote buying incentive. This is because some distributors may not directly tell a receiver the purpose of giving the gift or the incentive. In the light of the above, an incentive intended by an operative as binding payment may be understood by the voter as non-binding gift (Schaffer & Schedler, 2005). Nugent (2007) asserts that voters’ knowledge on vote-buying is based on their views or perceptions about vote buying practices.

It is therefore important to explore the range of meanings vote buying incentives or gifts may hold, not only to givers, but to recipients as well.

The giving out of vote buying incentives conveys a positive message to some voters. On the other hand, the lack of it sends a negative signal to others. Nugent(2007) is of the view that the failure to distribute material resources while on the campaign trail is perceived that the candidate (whose wealth and lifestyle are often different than his constituents) is out-of-touch and does not understand the needs of the poor constituents. Indeed, failure to buy votes in this setting is a dominated strategy when others are doing so.

Kramon (2011) in his paper “Why do Politicians buy votes when the ballot is secret?” posits that vote buying signals a willingness and capacity to deliver small private goods which tend to be more highly valued by poor voters. In other words, politicians buy votes because of the information it conveys to voters about their credibility with respect to the provision of targeted, particularistic, or patronage goods to poor voters. He sees vote buying to signify credibility as a patron for the poor and as a candidate who understands the needs of poor constituents. He adds that a candidate who is willing and able to finance widespread vote buying during a campaign is perceived to be more likely to provide poor constituents with targeted benefits in the future.

Bratton (2008) in his paper “Vote Buying and Violence in Nigerian election campaigns” asserts that vote buying enhances partisan loyalty. Parties may offer incentives or benefits to core supporters during elections to sustain electoral coalitions. This is explained from the fact that the distribution of incentives to party supporters is a recognition and

affirmation of their membership to the party. This stabilizes the support base of the party, by ensuring that party supporters do not defect to or vote for the opposition as Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter (2009) put it, “unless operatives provide particularistic benefits, supporters may become swing or opposition voters during the next election.”

It also encourages them to turn out on election day to vote for the party. In other words, it eliminates apathy among supporters. In effect, parties may distribute rewards to voting supporters to prevent the erosion of partisan loyalties over time.

Consequently, Schaffer and Schedler (2007) outline a number of interpretations voters or recipients may hold for a gift or an incentive received from a politician. According to them, voters have different perceptions for monetary and non monetary or material incentives. Among the perceptions for material incentives are enumerated and explained below

2.2.1 As a reparation. Vote buying incentives may be considered by voters as something given as amends for wrongs done in the past. Banégas (1998, 78-79) states that “in Benin, for instance, offers are seen by many voters as opportunities to get back money that politicians have stolen.” Kerkvliet (1991, 231) expressed similar view when he said villagers in the Philippines see offers as “practically their only opportunity to get anything from people in government”. Thus accepting an offer is, in other words, “a way to stake a rightful claim to the resources of those occupying political positions.” (Kerkvliet, 1991, 231)

Similarly, Ibana (1996, 130-131) sees it as an arrangement that allows the voter not only to gain materially, but also achieve a measure of dignity. “It is a momentary opportunity

for the ordinary citizen to transform unequal, sometimes coercive, relationships into something more equal and just.”

2.2.2 As evidence of winnability: This is a signal that the candidate is confident that s/he will win. In Nigeria “citizens who wish to support a winner will view the payment as evidence that the candidate is very powerful or has the support of powerful forces” (Van de Walle, 2002: 16). Such information is of great value to voters in so far as backing a loser might result in a loss of access to state resources.

2.2.3. As a sign of virtue. Schaffer and Schedler (2005) opine that not all payments are part of a quid pro quo. He adds that citizens may understand material offers less instrumental than in expressive terms. The practical utility of goods and services are less important than their informational value. Citizens may take them as pieces of information that reveal the positive personal qualities of the giver, such as generosity, politeness, responsiveness, and respect. Rigger (1994: 219) seems to share a similar view with Schaffer et al (2005) when he posits that in Taiwan for instance, “gift-giving demonstrates respect for the recipient; to give someone a gift is to give that person face.” Schaffer et al (2005) again emphasizes that the dispensation of gifts may thus lead citizens to believe that the candidate is good or worthy.

2.2.4. As a sign of vice. To Schaffer et al (2005), if voters, by contrast, dislike the gesture of giving out cash and goodies, they may take the electoral largesse as a sign not of virtue but of personal defect on the part of the giver, such as arrogance and disrespect. The offer (which may or may not have been accepted) may send a signal to voters that the candidate is morally wrong, politically dumb, or the like. Schedler (2004, 81 and 85) cites

that in rural Mexico, “citizens described efforts to buy their votes as deceptive, manipulative, and exploitative.”

2.2.5. A sign of strength. Again, to the man offer can be taken as a signal that the candidate is confident of winning. They add that the public display of wealth creates expectations of electoral success. Van de Walle (2002, 16) does not seem to disagree when he says that in Nigeria, “citizens who wish to support a winner will view the payment as evidence that the candidate is very powerful or has the support of powerful forces”. Schaffer and Schedler (2005) are of the view that such information is of great value to voters in so far as backing a loser might result in a loss of access to state resources. The effect is circular, as in many games of expectation: candidates win because voters expect them to win.

2.2.6 As an affront: In their view, Schaffer and Schedler (2005) observe that vote buying incentives may again be considered as something that causes offense. Thus, to accept the offer would damage one’s self-respect. Schedler as cited in Schaffer (2002) is of the opinion that many rural poor voters in Mexico perceive the sale of political rights as an attack on personal dignity. In another instance, Schaffer (2002a) acknowledges that some poor urban Filipinos similarly see accepting electoral incentives as “surrendering one’s right to vote” or “selling one’s principles.” In a study of elections in Benin, for example, Banegas (2002) makes a similar argument that distributing vote buying incentives during campaigns provides information to voters about a candidate’s willingness to provide targeted goods in the future.

Historical and ethnographic accounts reveal that what scholars, journalists, reformers, and sometimes participants habitually call “vote buying” carries different meanings in different historical and cultural contexts. For instance, English voters in the 1830s, spoke of selling their votes as a "birthright" (Hoppen, 1996: 564). Research on electoral politics in San Isidro, a village in the Bataan province of the Philippines, found that:

“Vote buying and vote selling can be understood no longer as an economic transaction between those who sell their freedom and those who buy them in the hope of regaining their investments when they get into power....From the standpoint of ordinary people, elections are the times when equality and justice are temporarily achieved as their patrons fulfill their financial obligations to support them in times of need.” (Ibana, 1996, 130-31 as cited in Schaffer, 2002).

Schaffer (2002) in a paper on “Trading political rights: The comparative politics of vote buying,” at an International Conference, organised at the Center for International Studies, MIT, Cambridge recounts the argument of a student of Taiwanese politics that:

“Vote buying hold is more than a mere economic transaction; instead it is a combination of economic exchange and social ritual. Taiwanese custom requires a guest to greet his or her host with a small gift. A tiau-a-ka [vote broker] usually makes the pitch for a candidate during a visit to the voter's home; candidates also visit potential tiau-a-ka. In both situations, it is easy to see how political hopefuls might have found themselves caught between the demands of ‘clean’ elections and good manners. In most parts of Taiwan, local convention proved more powerful, and the presentation of gifts as part of the campaign visit became the norm.”

In the light of the above, gift-giving also demonstrates respect for the recipient; as Rigger (1994: 219). Puts it, “to give someone a gift is to give that person face”

In a nutshell, while vote buying incentives may be perceived to be a negative practice other voters may see the same practice as positive.

2.2.7. As a threat. According to them, voters can perceive an offer as a threat. In this sense, an offer cannot be refused. Declining the offer generates fear of retaliation from a candidate or his or her operatives. They cite an example from Metro Manila, that money offered as a gesture of goodwill comes with implicit pressure to accept it, lest the recipient be branded as someone defiant (Schaffer, 2002a).

Where the incentive is monetary, voters or recipients may hold the incentive as follows:

2.2.8. As a payment. Voters may perceive an incentive as a “quid pro quo” or exchange of goods for votes, or business transaction. In this wise, a voter or recipient may choose either to honor or not.

2.2.9. Gift or favor. Voters may also see a vote buying incentive as something that comes without strings, that does not generate an explicit obligation to reciprocate at the ballot box. They believe that this offer may or may not produce feelings of gratitude or obligation.

2.3.0 As a wage. This is something earned for services rendered. Voters or recipients of vote buying incentives may see an incentive or gift as an earning for services rendered to political parties or their candidates. Schaffer was of the view that this may or may not produce feelings of gratitude or obligation to the candidate.

In conclusion, the meaning(s) recipients attach to an offer or incentive most probably have an impact on the how successfully a giver can influence their electoral behaviour. All other things being equal, it is conjectured that a voter who views an offer as an expression of caring or benevolence will be more likely to vote for the designated

candidate than a voter who views the same offer as amends for previous wrongs, or a voter who sees the offer as an attack on her dignity.

Second, there can be significant diversity in how members who live or work in a community view the same actions of a giver.

2.3 Strategies for Buying Votes

Vote buying is done systematically and strategically. Politicians employ numerous distinct strategies during the sharing of electoral incentives or when buying votes. Parties can reward individuals for switching their votes, showing up at the polls, or even staying at home on election day. In the views of Schaffer et al (2005), vote trading strategies may target either

- a. electoral choices or
- b. electoral participation.

Thus electorates may be persuaded to turn out and vote in certain ways. The focus here is on the choice of candidate a voter makes. Since a party is paying for ones' vote, the voter is expected to vote for the distributing party or candidate.

Electoral participation refers to whether to vote or not in the first place. In other words, whether a voter should turn out and vote or abstain from voting.

Nichter (2008) identifies five strategies used by politicians to buy votes. The strategies are classified into two main categories which are positive vote buying and negative vote buying. The first four types discussed below explain positive or participatory vote buying while the last one discusses negative strategies.

2.3.1 Vote buying: They explain this strategy as the rewards politicians give to opposing or indifferent voters for switching their votes. They add that this strategy can increase votes for the buyer and decrease votes for the opposition. In other words, this is a strategy used by politicians to buy the votes of supporters of the opposition party.

In their view, this strategy typically requires parties to have at least some ability to monitor specific vote choices. Otherwise, opposing voters could simply accept rewards and then vote for their preferred candidates. Stokes (2005: 315) offers a formal model and empirical tests to suggest that the Argentine Peronist party engaged in vote buying, using its deep insertion in voters' social networks" to monitor voters. Similarly, Cornelius (2004) provides strong evidence of vote buying in Mexico, and finds that lower income individuals in urban areas are most likely to be targeted.

2.3.2 Turnout buying: In this strategy, parties distribute rewards to passive or unmobilised supporters in exchange for showing up at the polls (Cox, 2006; Nichter 2008). This strategy which is sometimes referred to as "participation buying" is used by political parties for their own supporters to go out and vote. In this case, supporting non-voters are rewarded for showing up at the polls. The propounders of this strategy identify it to increase votes for the machine. Unlike vote buying, this strategy does not require monitoring of specific vote choices. Instead, turnout buying requires monitoring whether rewarded individuals turn out to vote or not. In other places, targetable incentives or goodies are used to secure victories by turning out loyal voters." In addition, Dunning and Stokes (2008) provide evidence from Argentina and Mexico that parties engage in both turnout buying and vote buying.

2.3.3 Double persuasion: This strategy may be used to target and reward indifferent or opposing nonvoters for turning out and voting for the party. This strategy is employed to influence the choice of voters and also to induce participation. Double persuasion MAY require monitoring of both turnout and voting decisions. Literature suggests many individuals have little in the way of ideological preferences or reasons to vote, outside of the material reward structures set up by parties and candidates. During campaigns, parties can employ double persuasion to obtain these individuals' votes. Unlike the swing voters often targeted with vote buying, indifferent non-voters will not show up at the polls without incentives. Unlike the unmobilized supporters targeted with turnout buying, they do not inherently prefer the machine on ideological grounds. Nichter (2008) points out that studies on electoral rewards tend to ignore double persuasion, and highlights the need for more research focused on this important strategy. This strategy can increase votes for the machine but a recent paper by Dunning and Stokes (2008) actually suggests that double persuasion is a “perverse strategy.”

2.3.4 Rewarding loyalists: This strategy seem to offer incentives or rewards to supporters who vote for the party even without rewards. Political parties offer rewards to supporters who would vote anyway. It is believed that parties offer particularistic benefits to core supporters during elections to sustain electoral coalitions. It is also suggested that parties distribute rewards to voting supporters to prevent the erosion of partisan loyalties" over time. Nichter (2008) is of the view that unless operatives provide particularistic benefits, supporters may become swing or opposition voters during the next election.

This strategy does not require monitoring. Scholars have made considerable advances in providing explanations for rewarding loyalists but the result is uncertain although it is acknowledged that parties in some countries do indeed engage in this strategy.

Finan and Schechter (2009) are of the view that politicians in Paraguay are more likely to distribute rewards to reciprocal individuals, and these recipients are in turn more likely to vote for the rewarding party.

2.3.5 Negative turnout buying: This strategy is similar to turnout buying, but only requires monitoring whether or not rewarded individuals go to the polls, not actual vote choices. This strategy alters turnout and focuses on demobilizing active opponents. It is referred to in other literature as “negative” vote buying, or “abstention buying (Schaffer & Schedler 2005).

The strategy proliferated at Maryland and rural New York in late 19th Century (Argersinger, 1987) after the introduction of the secret ballot in the United States. Schaffer (2002) posits that the strategy generates “instrumental compliance” as voters are paid to abstain from voting altogether, hence, preventing them from casting ballots for one’s opponent. The strategy is used to reward opposing or indifferent voters for not voting. In other words, it targets voters who are likely to vote for one’s opponent to abstain from turning out to vote. This strategy can decrease votes for the opposition. It has been used in Guyana, where agents campaigning for the ruling party in the 1997 election bought voter identification cards of the opposition's supporters. In the Philippines, party workers hire buses to take voters on out-of-town excursions on election day, or pay registered voters to disqualify themselves from voting by dipping their index fingers in indelible ink, as voters are required to do after casting their ballots (Schaffer,

2002b). Similar practices have been reported in Mexico (Cornelius, 2002, 7) and Venezuela (Kornblith, 2002).

Empirical evidence suggests that parties do not solely engage in one strategy when distributing rewards during elections. For example, data from Argentina suggests that the Peronist party engages in both turnout buying and vote buying (Nichter, 2008: 29; Dunning & Stokes 2008).

A final point to mention is that such strategies - whatever mix is chosen - may or may not in the final analysis, be effective. Sometimes an offer will have no impact at all on the voting behaviour of the recipient. Sometimes the offer may dissuade the voter from casting a ballot for the candidate on whose behalf the offer was made. The offer (which may or may not have been accepted) may send a signal to voter that the candidate is morally wrong, politically dumb, or the like.

2.4 Who is Targeted in Vote Buying.

The central question that arises with respect to the targeting of vote buying is whether vote buyers target specific individuals who are expected to vote or not vote in a certain way or whether vote buyers distribute incentives in a less discriminatory manner in which the returns to each individual transaction are less well-known.

While Hicken (2011) cited in Kramon (2011) gives examples from his study in Kenya to prove that the buying of votes is non targeted, several writers including Kramon (2011); Schaffer (2007), Nichter (2008) and Stokes (2005) have provided enough evidence to prove that the distribution of vote buying incentives is highly targeted.

There are good reasons to suspect that political parties do not distribute their vote buying incentives randomly across the electorates. Theoretical priors suggest that vote buying

parties systematically target specific groups in the electorates based on their socio-economic characteristics. Every society is made up of social classes; the rich, the middle income earner and the poor. In money politics context, the financial condition of the voters is considered to be one of the crucial factors. Again, societies are also made up of the educated and illiterates. Usually, politicians target a class in the society during vote buying. The practice seems to be a more prevalent strategy when targeting low-income voters and in areas where political parties are better able to monitor voters' actions. Stokes (2005) in documenting on the distributional patterns of those who receive material gifts in Argentina seems to share a similar view with Kramon when he opines that electorates with low incomes were the likely target during vote buying. Voters may accept the vote buying practice because they do need the fund. He again identifies electorates who are mildly opposed to the distributing candidate as the beneficiaries of the vote buying incentives.

Bratton (2008) asserts that the poor are likely to be victimized by vote buying because their limited means makes them susceptible to material inducements, including offers of basic commodities or modest amounts of money. For him, people with limited education may be unaware of individual political rights and may fall prey to vote buying. Poverty in particular has been emphasized as an important source of vote buying that enables political parties to exploit the material needs of deprived voter groups by trading rewards for votes (Stokes, 2005)

Kramon (2009) seem to agree with Stokes as he also found similar results in Kenya where swing voters and those with low-incomes were identified to be more likely to be

targeted for mobilization purposes. “The poor people might be more vulnerable to vote buying practices.”

Brusco et al. (2004) and Calvo and Murillo (2004) express similar views when they also provided evidence that political parties target low-income individuals. Similarly, Cornelius (2004) provides strong evidence of vote buying in Mexico, and concludes that lower income individuals in urban areas are most likely to be targeted and this appears to be similar to Dixit and Londregan (1996) findings when they said vote buying starts at the bottom, not the top, of the income distribution.

Cox and McCubbins (1986) identify three groups of electorates; core supporters, swing voters and opposition backers. They seem to have contrary view as they argue that politicians feel it is more reliable to target core supporters than swing voters and opposition backers hence; they would target the core supporters during vote buying than the swing voters and opposition backers.

They predict that risk-averse candidates trying to maximize electoral support will deliver redistributions first and foremost to their core voters. Political parties or politicians target the distribution of electoral incentives towards specific groups to weaken the support of their political rivals and to mobilize their own supporters.

Stokes (2005) also hold a differing view as she posits that weakly opposed voters and indifferent ones are the targeted during vote buying because in her approach only them can credibly threaten to vote their conscience if they do not receive the incentive. In her findings, she concludes that politicians should focus on opposition backers than swing and core supporters as one can be sure that they would vote for the party that gives them

vote buying incentives. She adds that a party that exclusively targets swing voters will not be viable in the long run.

From the above, it can be concluded that political parties or election contestants tend to exercise vote buying practices among poor voters and also in the relatively low socio-economic communities. In other words, swing voters, or opposition backers or party supporters can be targeted during vote buying depending on the situation that prevails in a particular society.

2.5 Secret Ballot and Ballot Monitoring

The ability to vote without one's choices being revealed to others is considered an essential characteristic of legitimate democratic systems (Franck 1992: 64). In this wise, balloting in democratic countries are required to be secret. The secret ballot system of voting is used in elections in several countries including Ghana. The secret ballot is a voting method in which voters' choices in an election are anonymous, forestalling attempts to influence the voter by potentially buying his/her vote.

Secret ballots are used in many voting situations in order to ensure privacy and anonymity. For instance, in Ghana the manual system of balloting is used. A place is provided with voting screens for a person to thumbprint in secrecy. The place is so arranged that a person can be seen but nobody will know whom s/he voted for. Voters then fold the ballot paper and drop it in a ballot box. The placement of the screen is of much concern to both voters and the Electoral Commission yet politicians invest in monitoring the ballot of those they target.

In Ghana, persons who assist voters with disability who may not be able to cast their vote independently are required by law to keep the ballot of the person secret. Voters who are visually impaired were also provided with a tactile jacket in order for them to vote independently in the 2016 presidential and parliamentary elections. (Electoral Commission of Ghana, 2016). All these are meant to achieve the goal of political privacy. In large elections, they are seen as a way to shield democracy against corruption and vote-buying, giving citizens protection from intimidation and coercion so that they can make free choices. The question is if the ballot is secret, and vote sellers therefore can take their payments and vote as they choose, why do parties engage in vote buying at all? Brusco, Nazareno and Stokes (2004) answer is that certain kinds of parties can overcome the secret ballot and make fairly accurate inferences about whether people whom they “paid” actually voted for them.

Although the secret ballot allows voters to renege on commitments to vote for a particular candidate, it does not necessarily eliminate vote buying. Indeed, literature has uncovered a number of strategies and mechanisms that enable parties to uphold a certain level of monitoring of how and if people vote.

In trading money for votes, parties and candidates generally try to ensure that their investments are effective (Hicken, 2011). Thus, political parties would like to ensure or ascertain for themselves that recipients of their vote buying incentives do as they ask them to do. Where ballot secrecy is not legislated, buying votes can be an efficient and effective campaign strategy because politicians and their agents can directly monitor recipients to make sure they are getting votes for their investments. On the other hand,

where the ballot is formally secret, voters are free to accept incentives and make their voting decisions based on other criteria. This demands that parties or candidates use a means to monitor recipients of the incentives during the voting period. A number of mechanisms are employed to circumvent ballot secrecy to monitor voters' electoral choices as Schaffer and Schedler (2007, 30-31) posit, political parties often develop clever ways to monitor vote-buying agreements. One way they do so is through the use of political machines (Scott, 1969; Stokes, 2005). Machines are bottom-heavy organizations with deep ties in the communities where they distribute material resources.

From the perspective of buyers, the business of vote buying involves problems of surveillance as deep and troubling as the problems of enforcement. Most consumer markets are transparent in so far as contract compliance is relatively easy to verify. One needs only to look whether a trading partner has delivered goods and services of the specified amount and quality. In the words of Schaffer et al (2005), markets for votes, in contrast, are opaque. Under the veil of secret voting, voter behavior is shielded from direct inspection. Vote buyers may have great difficulty knowing whether presumptive vote sellers actually honor their commitments on election day.

Schaffer (2008) observes that monitoring individual votes is but one strategy available to candidates and their operatives to increase the likelihood that voters will cast their ballots in the desired way. Some scholars argue that the effective use of incentive offers requires an ability to observe how individual recipients vote (Rusk 1974: 1041-1042; Gerber 1994: 136; Heckelman 1995). Even where an individual is able to vote secretly, givers may still have a number of options available to them, depending on the cultural, social,

and institutional circumstances they find themselves. He adds that only under certain circumstances will the disruption of individual vote monitoring lead to the abandonment of vote buying incentive strategies.

Kramon (2011) in his paper, “Why do politicians buy votes when the ballot is secret? Theory and experimental evidence from Kenya,” seem to express similar view with Schaffer (2008) when he said that during vote buying, politicians generally make some effort to monitor voters to ensure that clients follow through on their end of the vote-buying bargain. In this wise, voters are monitored after the contract to ensure that they go by what was agreed upon in the vote buying contract. He mentions two ways by which politicians can do this:

First, politicians can invest in the construction of a political machine and Stokes (2005) shares in the same view; Secondly, they can purchase the services of pre-established patrons who do the monitoring on their behalf (Keefer & Vlaicu, 2008). But Van De Walle (2007) is of the view that very few African political parties have the organizational structure or capacity to systematically monitor the votes of those to whom they distribute goods. He adds that they do not often try to do so.

Heckelman and Yates (2002) account that Australia and the United States of America first used secret ballots for public elections in the latter half of the 19th Century. The ostensible reason for their introduction was to prevent coercion by employers and political parties, who often controlled the printing and distribution of ballots and could thus prevent their supporters from deviating from the “party line” in individual races within a given election.

In their book, “Beliefs about ballot monitoring in Latin America” Kiewiet de Jonge & Nickerson (2014) establish that when ballots are secret, voters can avoid potential social, economic, and physical sanctions for voting for the “wrong candidate. Thus, due to the secret nature of balloting, voters are free from intimidation, loss of job and other sanctions from their employers and superiors or leaders once they cannot know whom they voted for. While ballot secrecy is the norm in most advanced democracies as well as many new democracies, the threat of monitoring of vote choices remains if citizens believe that their ballot decisions can be monitored, even if parties and candidates cannot actually determine individual vote choices. This is particularly troubling in many new democracies in which vote buying and electoral intimidation are common, since enforcement of such exchanges hinges on whether citizens believe that their voting behavior can be monitored. While perceptions of ballot secrecy are central to models of vote buying and intimidation, studies of such perceptions are nearly non-existent outside of advanced democracies.

Collier and Vicente (2009) in their paper, “Votes and violence: Evidence from a field experiment in Nigeria” were of the view that votes buying suffers from the obvious limitation that if the ballot is secret it is difficult for the politician to enforce the bargain. They add that it may nevertheless become effective either if the secrecy of the election is doubted, or if the voter attaches moral value to keeping his/her word. To them, most standard models of elections would suggest that vote-buying should not exist. This is explained from two issues they identify. First, with secret balloting votes are unobservable, and secondly a politician’s promises are unenforceable. This is why

Robinson and Verdier (2003) are of the view that with this double commitment problem, there is no formal way to contract for votes in an election.

Prior to the adoption of the secret ballot, elections were held originally by voice or hand voting and then by separate coloured ballots that allowed voters to be monitored easily. Hence, political parties were in a position to offer money in return for votes. Newspapers and the popular press chronicled this active vote market. For example, Speed (1905) claimed that 170,000 vote sellers were “employed for the day” in New York City, and McCook (1892) discusses vote-market activity in various small towns and city wards throughout Connecticut. He observes that secrecy in voting eliminated the possibility of verification, however, without verification, parties would not risk their money by paying someone to vote for them. Under a secret ballot, the vote contract became unenforceable. Although the intent of the secret ballot was to dismantle the vote market, it may not have been enacted strictly to save the “integrity of the ballot.” Incumbent candidates could expect to prosper under the secret-ballot system because it eliminated the incentive to bribe voters. Given that candidates were unaware of individual voter preferences, then, in general, bribery was more efficient for challengers, and therefore incumbents benefited directly from legislation that inhibited it.

To ensure that voters genuinely vote for the party giving the incentive, there are a number of strategies available to parties to monitor the votes of beneficiaries. For one, parties might monitor how individuals vote as either a condition for post-voting payment or as a prelude to post-voting retribution if the recipient does not do as instructed. Gish (1961: 63) recounts that sometimes election officials were counted on to observe how voters fill

out their ballots, as was commonly done in the early 20th century Adams County, in Ohio. Even when direct observation was not possible, there were a number of ways they monitored how individual ballots were cast. Where voters write in names on the ballot, they might be given carbon paper to record how they voted, as in the Philippines. Italian political parties also lend mobile phones with cameras so recipients can photograph to prove how they voted. They might also be instructed to fold the ballot in a distinctive way, or to put a pinhole in one corner of the ballot, as happens in Corsica. Another way was to give a voter a fake or stolen filled-in ballot before entering the polling station. The voter casts the filled-in ballot, and gives the blank official ballot he or she received in the polling station to another voter who would be waiting outside. This voter then fills out the official ballot to the buyer's satisfaction, goes into the polling place, and repeats the process. The practice, called “telegraphing” in Cambodia, and “lanzadera” (Spanish for “shuttle”) in the Philippines, was also common in 19th century Australia and United States where it was known as the “Tasmanian dodge” (Schaffer, 2002b). In locales where there are dense social networks, as in some urban areas of Argentina, it is also often possible for givers to pick up “clues” about those who accepted their offers (Brusco, Nazareno & Stokes, 2002; 8). Voters are sometimes put under conditions to prove their honouring of the contract. In this case, voters are taking a picture of their ballots with their mobile phones.

Where ballot monitoring is impossible, Stokes (2005) asserts that an army of local-level organizers or people who live in the neighborhoods under their political responsibility, know everyone’s name, know who went to the polls and who didn’t, and know who was

able to look them in the eye the day after the election. Parties use this fine-grained information – this “tremendous local knowledge.”

On election day, it is against the law for an election official to indicate an unauthorised mark on a ballot paper meant for a voter to indirectly suggest to him/her which party or candidate to vote for or to give course for a voter’s ballot to be monitored. Again, to curtail ballot monitoring, voting screens or booths are provided in Ghana by the Electoral Commission for a voter to cast his or her vote in. This screen is shown in figure 1.





Fig. 1: A Voter casting his vote in a Voting Booth/ Screen

2.6 Legislations against Vote Buying

Vote buying seems to be a complex phenomenon in terms of both its causes and its consequences. The problem of vote-buying seem to remain a threat to democracy as it poses serious challenge to free and fair elections and the legitimacy of political office holders. The menace must therefore be confronted head-on in order to protect a nation's democracy from collapse. One of the ways of curbing this menace is enacting laws against the practice.

The laws in several democratic countries frown upon vote buying but the regulations governing vote buying in modern liberal democracies seem paradoxical. It is wrong and illegal to offer individual voters in political elections incentives for their votes. But it is, however, acceptable (or at least, constitutionally protected) to promise identifiable groups of voters particular benefits in exchange for their votes.

There is legislation on the phenomenon of vote buying in Ghana just as in other democratic countries. For instance, under the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, vote buying is an offence in Section 33 of the Representation of People Law, 1992. According to Section 33 of the law, titled, Bribery, a person commits an electoral offence:

- a. If he directly or indirectly acts through another person
 - i. Gives money or obtains an office for a voter in order to induce the voter to vote or refrain from voting.
 - ii. Corruptly does such an act on account of a voter having voted or refrained from voting.

iii. Makes a gift or provides something of value to a voter to induce the voter to vote in a certain way or to obtain the election of a candidate.

iv. If he advances or pays money or causes money to be paid to or for the use of a person with the intent that the money or part of it shall be expended in bribery at an election.

i. If before or during an election he directly or indirectly, by himself or through another person acting on his behalf, receives, agrees or contracts for money, gift, a loan or valuable consideration or an office, place or employment for himself or for another person for voting or agreeing to vote, refrain or agreeing to refrain from voting.

These electoral laws bear some significance with that of the Unites States of America.

In Article 181:1 0f the United States of America constitution,

1. A person commits the offence of buying votes when he or she;

a. Promises , offers or give to a person, directly or indirectly, an undue benefit for a person or a third party of entity;

b. in order that the person;

i. vote;

ii. refrain from voting;

iii. cast a vote; or

iv. cast his or her vote in favour of or against a particular person or proposal.

2. A person commits the offence of selling votes when he or she:

a. Solicits or accepts directly or indirectly an undue benefit for himself or herself or a third party or entity;

- b. In order that a person;
 - i. Vote;
 - ii. Refrain from voting;
 - iii. Casts a void vote; or
 - iv. Casts his or her vote in favour of or against a particular person or proposal.

This makes it an offence to give or receive money or something of value as a means of inducing a person to vote, or not vote, in a certain way. It can be deduced from the above that election officials, a candidate, a voter, or any member of the general public could engage in buying votes, which is also deemed as an electoral offence.

In the U.S, there are state specific laws that ban electoral incentives and for that matter vote buying. In some states these law or code may itself contain criminal offences. In other States these offences are contained in the criminal codes. Vote buying, even when consonant with local norms, is still illegal. Consumer markets are legal markets unlike vote buying markets. Where laws against vote buying are enforced, and especially where hefty rewards are given to citizens who reveal the identities of vote buyers to police, givers need to worry that buyers will not only defect, but turn them in.

In Ghana, the electoral laws are such that any suspect who is apprehended and proved guilty by a competent court of law, could be fined or sentenced to a certain term of imprisonment or both. With certain offences, a person could, in addition, be banned from participating in public elections for a certain period of time or from holding public office.

Where a candidate's agent commits an electoral offence and it is proved beyond all reasonable doubts that the agent did so prior to the knowledge and consent of the candidate in question, it is the candidate who is held responsible. In the United States of

America, vote buying and selling are considered as criminal acts and the penalties include one to five years of imprisonment. The court may also impose a fine, as a principal penalty, upon a person convicted of buying or selling votes. (Article 181:2) Electoral offences are by no means confined to the agent or candidate as they could be committed by all and sundry. Again, it is an undeniable fact that in Ghana like elsewhere, our electoral process is not immune from electoral offences.

Kwofie (2008), the CEO of the Institute for Liberty and Policy Innovation (ILAPI-GHANA), posits that no constitutional instruments and laws can avert the menace. In his view, laws don't change people, they only guide people. There are strict laws in the Philippines too; a person convicted of vote buying may be sentenced to serve one to six years imprisonment, but the business is booming. Vote buying is ongoing. In the USA, vote buying is banned but has not stopped. He asserts that politicians are the ones making the laws and they are the same people flouting them because legality and illegality don't solve problems but they create more problems. Hence, more have to be done to curb the menace.

2.7 Conceptual Review

The framework for this study is deduced from the General Incentive Model which was developed by Clark and Wilson in 1961. They posit that if we know the kinds of incentives that an organisation may give to induce members' greater cooperation, then something can be learnt about the incentive system a political party uses to sustain members' participation in its activities. Clark and Wilson (1961: 130) pointed out that the internal and external events of organisations may be explained by understanding their

incentive systems. They add that all organisations in good standing must provide “tangible or intangible incentives” to their members to induce their optimal contribution. The definition of an “incentive” can be very broad. The term can therefore be explained in relation to its context. In this context, an incentive is a formal scheme used to promote or encourage specific actions or behaviours by a specific group of people during a defined period of time. Incentives are things that incite or tend to incite an action or greater effort, as a reward offered for increased productivity. Incentive programs are used in business management to motivate employees and in sales to attract and retain customers. In this wise, vote buying incentives are external measures that are designed and established by political parties or candidates to influence the behaviour of voters in an election. Incentive systems or structures used during vote buying are combinations of several more or less coherent incentives. Parties and candidates use money and materials as extrinsic motivation or incentive to get electorates do their wishes.

Incentive systems can encourage or discourage electorates and their behaviours during elections. Organisations such as political parties continually seek ways to keep their core supporters. They also try to increase votes in their favour which would give them control over the governance of a country. In doing these they put a lot of strategies on board. A party’s success in winning elections can depend on its ability to create the conditions and systems (formal and informal) that entice voters to vote for them. Also, a good incentive system encourages politicians to be creative by using varied strategies to buy the votes of electorates.

In the use of incentives to buy the votes of electorates, politicians often use monetary and non monetary incentives to coerce voters. These incentives are usually targeted on the

poor or less educated class of opposition backers to not turn out and vote which is referred to in this model as 'negative vote buying, swing voters and a party's main supporters to turn out and vote which are also referred to in this model as 'turnout buying' (Cox & McCubbins, 1986). While negative vote buying reduces votes for the opposition party, Turnout buying increases votes for the party buying votes.

Vote-buying incentives provide goods which are short-term, private, and have a high degree of certainty (Desposato, 2007; Stokes, 2007). Because of this, poor voters assign higher values to vote-buying where uncertainty of the compensation for her vote is low (Desposato, 2007). Two main purposes are intended to be achieved during the distribution of these vote buying incentives: Thus to ensure positive or participatory vote buying and also to achieve negative turnout.

Positive or participatory vote buying is where the incentives are used to influence party supporters and swing voters to go out and vote for the party issuing the incentives. On the other hand, negative vote buying is where core supporters or backers of the opposition are coerced with incentives so that they do not turn up and vote for their party. Hence, electoral incentives are intended to increase turnout for the distributing party while it reduces turnout for the opposing party, giving the distributing party an upper hand to win the election.

The poor and less educated among electorates are almost always the target during the distribution of vote buying incentives. This is attributed to the fact that gifts have more force among the poor. Hence parties will buy the votes of the poor before trying to buy those of the wealthy (Stokes, 2005). For example, the poor who finds a cedi on the street

will be made happier by finding it than will a wealthy person. This is due to diminishing marginal utility of income. Assuming that a political party can secure a person's vote by giving him/her something that s/he values sufficiently highly. This makes vote buying, prohibitively expensive when extended to wealthier voters.

A party that wants to win enough votes to get elected at the lowest possible cost would start by giving the poorest person something, then the next poorest, and so on until the party has purchased just enough votes to win. This justifies why Dixit and Londregan, (1996) conclude that vote buying starts at the bottom, and not at the top, of the income distribution. Parties pay for poor people's votes before attempting to buy the votes of wealthier people; they can pay poor voters a relatively modest price, whereas they would have to pay wealthier voters more. Parties therefore buy more votes among the poor by offering even relatively modest amounts to each voter. For instance, Bratton (2008) reports that during Nigeria's 2007 elections the most common amount of money offered to voters was US\$4. These economic mechanisms are likely to make poor voters the prime targets of vote buying by political parties who want to maximize their (re)election chances. It follows that the same outlay of resources by the party will buy more votes among poor than among wealthy voters.

As the party moves up the income distribution, each next voter's support has to be purchased at a higher price. Assuming that if a party starts with the poorest voter and bought votes one by one until its money gave out it would run out of money before it got to the voter whose support would put it over the top. They would have to adopt another strategy that will allow it to add the votes of some wealthier voters which is programmatic mobilization. Programmatic mobilization is a strategy where a party

promises (and, once in office, delivers) public goods or redistributive goods that go to all members of some abstractly defined category of citizens, regardless of their votes. Programmatic mobilization is a weak strategy. It is not a sure thing since from the perspective of parties thirsting for power (by definition) the people who benefit from public goods get these goods whether they vote for the party providing them or not. Beneficiaries of this strategy have weaker incentives to cast their vote for the party

In a nutshell, vote-buying can be a greater motivation to the poor to vote than the enticement of public goods, as the poor are oftentimes forgotten about in the distribution of public goods. Desposato (2007: 104) says ‘poor voters, on average, should have higher utility for immediate private goods than for delayed public goods.’ Moreover, unless a voter has an alternative source of income and simply did not need the incentive, it is unlikely that poor voters will therefore be able to resist vote-buying incentives (Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros & Estevez 2007).

The various variables highlighted in this framework are interlinked and cannot be addressed in isolation. These variables or requirements stated are very critical to the success of the model.




Fig 2: Conceptual Review

Source: Schaffer & Schedler (2005).

2.8 Appraisal of Reviewed Literature

The conclusion from this chapter is that

Vote buying is explained to be the use of monetary or non-monetary materials or items to influence the decisions or behaviours of voters in an election.

Vote buying does not only involve money but other materialistic items.

The giving out of vote buying incentives conveys a positive message to some voters while the lack of it sends negative signals to others.

The poor class of electorates is usually the targets in the vote buying process.

Vote buying strategies may target either electoral choices or electoral participation

The incentives may carry different and varied meanings to both givers and recipients.

There are legislations against vote buying in Ghana.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

This chapter examines the methodology and procedures used to carry out the research. It is again important to mention that this chapter concerns itself with the research design, population, sample and sampling technique. It also discusses the various instruments used in the study, the administration of the instruments, collection of data and data analysis procedure as well as discussions on the limitations and ethical considerations of the research.

3.1 Research Design

The study used the mixed method approach which is a combination of both qualitative and quantitative research methodological approaches in collecting data. In the words of Tashakkorri and Teddle (1998: 17-18) the mixed methods (quantitative and qualitative methods) are “those that combine the quantitative and qualitative approaches into the research methodology of a single study or multiphase study.”

The mixed-method approach is a way to come up with creative alternatives to the study or a more monolithic way to conceive and implement ultimate findings of the study. It is likely that the blending of two methodologies in a single research paradigm can produce alternatives that will not be able to represent radical shifts in the short run. Integrating different methods is likely to produce better results in terms of quality and scope. The combination of the two research approaches offer a good benefit on the study of which either could have on the work (Creswell & Plano, 2007).

The choice of the research design was guided by the research questions and objectives, the extent of existing knowledge, the amount of time and other resources the researcher had at his disposal (Saunders et al, 2003). Hence, the survey design was adopted as the research strategy in this study. This is often acquired by using a questionnaire administered to a sample population. Survey tends to be used for exploratory and descriptive research. In addition survey strategy allows a researcher to collect quantitative data which can be analyzed quantitatively using descriptive and inferential statistics.

Descriptive survey as a design, portrays accurately the characteristics of particular individuals, groups or situations. That is, a survey provides a quantitative or numerical description of trends, attitudes, or opinions of a population by studying a sample of that population. This design was adopted because it involved data collection in order to answer the research question concerning the current status of the subject of the study. The researcher described the characteristics of the population by directly examining the samples of that population through the use of questionnaires.

The descriptive survey was also found to be appropriate because it is concerned with conditions or relationships that exist, practices that prevail, beliefs, points of views or attitudes that are held, processes that are on-going, efforts that are being felt or trends that are developing (Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2007). This is in line with the purpose of this study because it examined vote buying incentives and how they affect the decisions or behaviours of voters.

3.2 Population

The population is the whole group of people from which the sample for statistical measurement is going to be taken. This group which is taken from the general population shares common characteristics such as sex, age and voter status. The target population for this study consists of the entire group of potential voters in the Shama district in the Western region who are 18 years and above.

3.3 Sample and Sampling Procedures

According to Best and Khan (1995), “the primary purpose of research is to discover principles that have universal applications; but to study a whole population to arrive at generalizations would be impracticable, if not impossible” (p.13). This necessitated the use of a sample from which the required information was collected.

Five (5) communities or electoral areas in the district were selected for the study. These communities were Atwereboanda, Komfueku, Beposo, Nyankrom and Shama. Information from the District Electoral Commission indicates that there were a total of 12,101 registered voters in these five communities. The communities are scattered but can be easily identified in the district. Questionnaires for the study were administered in all these five communities.

Krejcie and Morgan (1970) approximate a sample size of 300 for a population above 12,000. In this wise, a sample size of three hundred (300) was chosen for the quantitative study to respond to the questionnaires while twenty of these people were randomly selected for the qualitative study. Two party activists were also interviewed to support the data.

Three sampling techniques were employed for the study:

1. Convenience sampling was adopted to select the Shama district. Again convenience sampling was also used to select the five communities, namely: Atwereboanda, Komfueku, Beposo, Nyankrom and Shama.
2. Proportional sampling technique was used to select the three hundred (300) respondents as there was differential numbers of registered voters in the selected communities. The proportional sampling technique was used to ensure that the selected five (5) communities have a fair representation in the study.
3. The simple random sampling technique was used to select the participants.

The basic requirement used in the sampling was that a participant was to be of eighteen years and above. Potential voters in these communities were used as the sample for the study. Four (4) of those who responded to the questionnaire from each of the five of the selected communities were randomly selected and interviewed for the triangulation. Two other party agents who took part in the distribution of vote buying incentives were also interviewed to authenticate the information given by participants. The breakdown of the population according to the communities that formed the sample is as follows:

Table 3.1 Sample Size According to Communities.

Community	Population	Sample
Atwereboanda	274	6
Komfueku	1,446	35
Beposo	1,963	48
Nyankrom	429	11
Shama	7,989	200
Total	12,101	300

Source: Field Work

3.4 Research Instruments

The main instruments used for the study were questionnaire and interview guide. The two instruments were used to enable the researcher triangulate the information to test the consistency of the findings obtained from each of the instruments used. Bekoe (2006) supported this view when he asserted that triangulation in research is to test for consistency of findings obtained through different instruments. It was therefore important that different instruments were used to validate the information gathered.

The questionnaires were used to give the researcher an insight into the range of items or incentives used to buy votes, conditions attached to vote buying incentives, relationship between vote buying incentives and voters' decisions or behaviours and respondents' knowledge of the laws on vote buying. Through the use of the interviews, the study explored into detail the items the questionnaire sought to measure from each participant. According to Cohen and Manion (1989), an interview entails a type of conversation which is initiated specifically by the interviewer purposefully for obtaining relevant

information and description, prediction or explanation which cannot be obtained when the questionnaire is solely relied on for the information.

3.4.1 Questionnaire

Questionnaires were used to reach potential voters in the district to solicit their views on what the subject is all about. A forty-five (45) item questionnaire was prepared (see appendix B). The questionnaire was divided into five parts, consisting of six items on preliminary personal data and thirty-nine (thirty seven closed ended and two open ended) items on other research items. The personal data enabled the researcher to have information on participants' characteristics on gender, age, educational qualification, occupation, level of monthly income and voting status. This was to find out whether respondents were registered voters or not.

These questionnaire items were developed first to examine the relationship between vote buying incentives and voters' decisions. In order to ensure that the questionnaire items were valid and reliable, the drafted questionnaire was trial-tested on potential voters at Ngyiresia, a fishing community in the Sekondi –Takoradi Metropolis in the Western Region who did not form part of the population. The revised questionnaire was further improved upon based on the suggestions of the researcher's supervisor.

3.4.2 Interview

Interviews were used to enable the researcher to probe into some information provided on the questionnaire. Two different interview guides were prepared: interview guide for voters and interview guide for party officials. Interview provides the interviewer with

more flexibility and also certain confidential information the interviewer might not have put in writingop using the questionnaire (Kumekpor, 2002; Twumasi, 2001(

To Kumekpor)2000), an interview affords the interviewer the opportunity to explain the purpose of the investigation and can explain more clearly just what information s/he wants. “If the subject misinterprets the question, the interviewer may follow it up with a clarifying question,” (Kumekpor, 2002; p.29). The interview guide for voters (see appendix C) consisted of twelve (19) items which were mostly open-ended questions to ensure that respondents express themselves to give the researcher detailed information for the study. The interview guide for party officials (appendix D) also consisted of twelve (12) items which again were open ended questions to ensure that party officials can also give more information to buttress information given by voters. Again, the interview was preferred because it ensures that each of the respondents was basically asked the same questions so as to facilitate the analysis of the data obtained. Oral permissions were used to select participants for the interview. This helped the researcher to pick participants who were willing to give information to be interviewed. This was anonymous because of research ethics. This helped the researcher to triangulate.

The interview guide was developed based on the items in the questionnaire. In order to ensure the validity and reliability of the items, the interview guide was trial tested as some of the people on whom the questionnaire was tested on were selected to be interviewed. After the trial test, the interview guide was taken through further improvement

3.4.3 Justification of the triangulation technique

As vote buying is secretive and sensitive, and survey and interview responses are subject to response bias (Kramon 2013), the researcher used questionnaire and interviews to cross-check the responses given on the questionnaire for authenticity. To do this, personal coding was done on the questionnaire to give clue to participants. This was anonymous because of research ethics. twenty respondents were selected to go through the interview. The essence of this was for triangulation.

Cohen, Manion and Morrison (2007) defined triangulation as the use of two or more methods of data collection in the study of some aspect of human behaviour. They further added that triangulation technique in the social sciences attempts to map out, or explain more fully, the richness and complexity of human behaviour by studying it from more than one stand point by making use of both quantitative and qualitative data. The researcher acknowledged the fact that triangulation can assist in explaining the relationship between vote buying incentives and voters' decisions. Combining data from different methods will certainly increase the quality of the data. In view of this Thomas and Nelson (1996) pointed out that triangulation is valuable because of the increased quality control achieved by combining methods and data sources. The complementary function of each of these data collection methods enriched the quality of this study. Combining different sources and methods in the research process helped the researcher to build on the strength of each type of data collection. This minimized the weakness of any single approach (Nau, 1995). However, this is not to say that triangulation is the most perfect method of data collection in research. That is why Thomas and Nelson (1996) cautioned that multiple methods may serve to magnify error. In view of this, the

researcher was cautious in using these two types of data collection instruments. This caution was taken to reduce the error margin of the study as a result of using the two methods.

3.5 Data Collection Procedure

Administration of the research instruments began in January, 2017. The exercise begun with visits to the selected communities where potential voters were spoken to and their permissions sought for the administration of the instruments. Introductory letters from the Head of the Department of Social Studies Education, in the University of Education, Winneba were attached to the verbal permissions sought. A visit was made to each community selected with the introductory letter seeking permission from participants to schedule an ideal time for the administration of the instruments especially where participants could not complete the questionnaires themselves due to low level of or no education.

A total of 300 questionnaires were self administered to potential voters. The study adopted the self administration method because it included illiterate respondents and also a high response rate was needed. The study used both qualitative and quantitative methods as the research approach in gathering data. The data gathered are primary and secondary data. The primary data are from administering of questionnaires, and interviews. In the view of Osuala, the primary data is significant to the research work because it enhances the provision of relevant facts and figures concerning the population under study. In that the required information needed for the research is provided (Osuala, 2007).

In the same vein, the secondary data is based on library research, books and articles from journals. These materials were drawn from the Dr. Sam Jonah library (University of Cape Coast) the Political Science Department library, The Balme Library, the library for Institute of Democratic Governance and from the Centre for Democratic Development library. Electronic sources such as Jstor, Sage, amongst others were also used and formed part of the data gathered for the empirical study. The secondary data in conjunction with the primary data (questionnaires and interviews) helped in providing better understanding of the empirical study.

To attain objective scoring of items listed in the interview guide, a recorder was used for validity and reliability. The researcher spent one week in each community to enable him to reach all respondents and most importantly to afford them enough time to administer the instruments. The process of administering the questionnaire began with the identification of potential voters and briefing them on the objective and significance of the study after which the questionnaires were distributed to them. Respondents had one week to respond to the questionnaires and return them to the researcher. The respondents gladly took the questionnaires and some even immediately answered and handed them over to the researcher. Others returned the completed questionnaires the next day.

Four respondents from each selected community who had also completed and returned the questionnaire were selected for the interview. Some participants were unwilling to be interviewed and therefore selection was based on participant's willingness. Participants were briefed on the essence of the exercise and were assured of confidentiality of the exercise after which the interview was conducted and recorded on a tape recorder. The interviews lasted between five (5) to eleven (11) minutes for each participant.

3.6.1 Validity

Every good research must have some kind of validity and reliability so far as its data collection instruments are concerned. The validity of the questionnaire items and semi structured interview items were ensured through the following processes.

According to Opoku (2005), validity refers to the fact that the test items constituting a questionnaire in survey research are measuring the construct that the test developer has designed it to measure. The validity of the questionnaire instrument and semi structured interview guide, was ascertained by first discussing the items with some friends in academia. Some items were scrapped off and reframed before I handed them over to my supervisor for scrutiny. He looked at the protocols to ensure that they were guided by the research question, thus that it measures what it was supposed to measure. Questions that were similar were deleted and those that were not well structured were re-structured.

For validation of the interview discussions, interviews in the study were taped and transcribed. The transcripts were sent back to the participants for verification and validation. This, apart from providing an opportunity for the participants to further elaborate their views, ascertained that the transcripts truly reflected their views. This was done by checking the content to be sure it measures what it is supposed to measure.

In the words of Burns (2000) if the study and its findings make sense to participants then, it must at least have some validity. In this research, validity was again addressed by triangulating the findings from the two instruments used for the study. This was necessary because of the value triangulation adds to the research work.

3.6.2 Reliability

The reliability of the questionnaire was ensured by pilot testing the questionnaire and the interview guide. The pilot testing was done at Ngyiresia in the Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolis of the Western Region. The respondents were selected because they had the same characteristics as respondents from the study area. The Pilot testing enabled modification and clarification of questionnaire items that appeared ambiguous to respondents. Other materials that were found unsuitable were dropped. With the experience from this pilot testing only eligible and potential voters were selected as respondents for the actual data collection. All these were geared towards improving the reliability of the research. According to Bell (1993) reliability is the extent to which a test or procedure produces similar results under constant conditions on all occasions. To ensure reliability of the study, the documents, and outcome from questionnaire, interview and the observation was triangulated in a pilot study.

3.7 Data Analysis

The researcher employed the combination of both qualitative and quantitative methods for the data analysis. The quantitative data were derived from survey in the form of questionnaires while the qualitative data were derived from interviews.

The quantitative data entry and analysis was done by using Statistical Product for Service Solution (SPSS). It was edited, coded and analyzed using tables of frequencies and percentages. Words were used to interpret the tables and percentages for understanding. The Pearson Chi-Square was used to determine whether significant difference exists between gender and the distribution of vote buying incentives, income and voting behaviour. The *p* - *value* is the smallest value (probability) for finding significant

differences. The *p* - value is the smallest value (probability) for which the null hypothesis was rejected. A critical value of $\alpha = 0.05$ was adopted for significance in the statistical analysis.

The qualitative data entry and analysis was also done through content analysis. Content analysis is a process of deriving meaning out of the responses got through interviews (Patton, 2002).

The responses were described and explained in the form of narratives. Sometimes responses were quoted verbatim to authenticate claims made. The responses were answers to open-ended questions. Koul (2000) quoted Patton (1982; p. 28) on this issue as expressing the view that “responses from open-ended questions in the form of direct quotations reveal level of emotions of respondents, the way in which they have organised their world, their thoughts and experiences about certain happenings, and their perceptions.” Quantitative data were tabulated, organised, analysed and interpreted to draw sound conclusions and generalisations.

CHAPTER FOUR

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS

4.0 Introduction

This chapter first gives the general overview of the demographic data of the respondents in the study area. It presents the distribution of participants by gender, age, academic qualifications, professional status, level of income, and voting status. The chapter also presents information obtained on the research questions and simultaneously discusses the findings of the study.

The purpose of this study was to determine the relationship that exists between vote buying incentives and voters' decisions. A voters' response to vote buying incentives instrument which contained 39 items, an interview guide for voters that contained 17 questions and another interview guide for party officials which also contained 12 questions were employed for the study. Items which aimed at measuring the range of items used in buying votes were measured on a four point likert-scale. The triangulation method was adopted in the data collection process. A sample size of 300 potential voters was used for the study; however 280 which represent 93.3% of the questionnaires were retrieved. Information obtained from the sampled potential voters were analysed using both descriptive and inferential statistics.

4.1. Analysis of the Characteristics of Respondents

4.1.1. Sex of Participants

The study sought to find out whether there was any significant difference in respondents' sexes. The distribution of potential voters by sex is presented in Table 4.1.1

Table 4.1.1. Sex of Respondents

Sex	Frequency	Percent (%)
Male	148	52.9
Female	132	47.1
Total	280	100.0

Source: Fieldwork, 2017

Data from Table 4.1.1 shows that 148 (52.9%) of the respondents are males, while the remaining 132(47.1%) are females. This means that there were 16 (5.8%) more male respondents in the study than female.

This discrepancy in the distribution of potential voters by gender could be ascribed to the fact that, generally, more potential male voters were willing to take part in the study than potential female voters.

4.1.2. Age Range of Respondents

Table 4.1.2 takes a look at the age range of the respondents.

Table 4.1.2. Age Range

Age	Frequency	Percent (%)
18 – 20 years	50	17.9
21 – 30 years	76	27.1
31 – 40 years	62	22.1
41 – 50 years	33	11.8
51 – 60 years	27	9.6
61 – 70 years	31	11.1
71 years and above	1	0.4
Total	280	100.0

Source: Fieldwork, 2017

From Table 4.1.2, 50 (17.9%) of the respondents were within the ages of 18 to 20 years. Seventy-six (76) representing (27.1%) of the respondents were of 21 to 30 years. Sixty-two (62) potential voters forming 22.1% were within the ages of 31 to 40 years. Thirty-three (33) or 11.8% were within the ages of 41 to 50 whereas 27 (9.6%) were found to be within the range of 51 to 60 years. Again, 31 (11.1%) were between the ages of 61 and 70. Only one, (0.4%) of the respondents was above 70 years. This means that most of the respondents were within the ages of 18 and 40 years.

4.1. 3. Educational Qualification of Respondents

Table 4.1.3 displays the highest educational qualification of respondents.

Table 4.1.3: Educational Qualification

Qualification	Frequency	Percent (%)
None	23	8.2
Basic	58	20.7
SHS	78	27.9
Professional/Training/Vocational	15	5.4
DIPLOMA	26	9.3
Tertiary/ Degree	62	22.1
Others	18	6.4
Total	280	100.0

Source: Fieldwork, 2017

Table 4.1.3 shows that out of the 280 respondents that submitted their questionnaires, 23 of them representing 23 (8.2%) had no formal educational qualification whereas 58 representing 20.7% of the respondents had basic education. Seventy-eight (78) of the respondents who represents 27.9% had a Senior High School educational qualification, 15 respondents representing 5.4% had a professional, training or vocational education. Twenty-six (26) respondents which represent 9.3% hold a diploma while 62 of the respondents which represented 22.1% had tertiary degrees while the remaining 18 of the respondents who constituted 6.4% had other educational qualifications. This means that more Senior High School graduates were used for the study.

4.1.4: Occupation of Respondents

Table 4.1.4 presents the occupations of the respondents.

Table 4.1.4: Respondents' Occupation

Qualification	Frequency	Percent (%)
Unemployed	55	10.7
Student / Apprentice	39	19.6
Farmer	39	13.9
Trader/ Businessman	19	13.9
Artisan	3	6.8
Fisherman	56	1.1
Civil servant	39	20.0
Others		13.9
Total	280	100.0

Source: Fieldwork, 2017

From Table 4.1.4, 30 (10.7%) of the respondent are unemployed, 19.6% (55) are students or apprentices. About 39(13.9%) of the respondents are farmers. Another 39 (13.9%) of the respondents are traders or engaged in businesses. Artisans constituted 19 which is represented by 6.8% whereas 3 (1.1%) of the respondents were fishermen. Fifty-six (56) representing 20.0% of the respondents were civil servants. Other occupations constituted 39 (13.9%). This implies that more of the respondents were civil servants.

4.1.5. Respondents' Levels of Income

Table 4.1.5 displays the income levels of respondents.

Income (GHC)	Frequency	Percent (%)
Less than 100.00	101	36.1
100.00 - 250.00	53	18.9
251.00 -500.00	34	12.1
501.00 – 750.00	9	3.2
751.00 – 1000.00	34	12.1
More than 1000.00	49	17.5
Total	280	100.0

Source: Fieldwork, 201

From the Table 4.1.5, out of 280 respondents, 101(36%) of them are on income level of less than GHC 100.00. Fifty-three (53) representing 18.9% of the respondents are within the income ranges of GHC 100.00 to GHC 250.00. Thirty-four (34) forming 12.1% of the respondents are within the income ranges of GHC 251.00 to GHC 500.00. Nine (9) representing 3.2 of the respondents are also within the income ranges of GHC 501.00 to GHC 750.00. Thirty-four (34) representing 12.1% of the respondents fall within the income range of GHC 751.00-GHC 1,000.00 whereas 49 (17.5%) are on an income of more than GHC 1,000.00 per month. This means more of the respondents are on an income of less than GHC 100.00 per month.

Table 4.1.6: Respondents' Voting Status

Table 4.1.6 analyses the voting status of the respondents. This was done to find out whether respondents have their names in the voters' register and can take part in any elections held in the country. This Table 4.1.6 takes a look at the voting statuses of respondents

Table 4.1.6: Voting Status of respondents

Voter Status	Frequency	Percent (%)
Registered Voters	266	95.0
Unregistered Voters	14	5.0
Total	280	100.0

Source: Fieldwork, 2017

From Table 4.1.6, out of the total respondents of 280, 266 (95.0%) are registered voters whereas 14 (5.0%) of the respondents were unregistered voters. This implies that more of the respondents were registered voters.

4.2 Data Collected on Research Questions

In this section the main data collected in response to the research questions will be presented to address the four research questions that guided the study. The questionnaire and the one-on-one interview for voters and party officials were presented side by side to address each research question. The data from the questionnaire have been presented using tables of frequencies and percentages. The interview sessions centered on soliciting respondents' in-depth views on the research questions.

The themes that emerged from the interviews with voters and party officials were combined with the responses from the questionnaire to address the research questions. This authenticates the responses given by respondents in the questionnaire. This helped the researcher to do the triangulation.

Research Question One

What is the range of items used as incentives by politicians to buy the votes of electorates?

This section assesses the respondent's ideas on whether they have received an incentive from political parties before. It also considers the range of incentives used to buy votes. Items 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 on the questionnaire (see appendix A) were used to solicit responses from the respondents on the range of items used to buy votes. Questions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the interview guide for voters (see appendix B) were the items used to find out participants' views on the range of items used to buy the votes of voters. Also, question 5 of the interview guide for party officials (see appendix C) was used to complement the questionnaire items and interview guide for voters. Table 4.2.1 is the compiled views.

Table 4.2.1. Gifts/ Incentives Distribution between Males and Females.

ITEMS	Responses from Questionnaire: I have once been offered a gift/an incentive by a political party.		Total (%)
	Yes	No	
	(%)	(%)	
Male	44 (29.7)	104 (70.3)	148 (100)
Female	50 (37.9)	82 (62.1)	132 (100)
TOTAL	94 (33.6)	186 (76.4)	280 (100)

Source: Fieldwork, 2017

Table 4.2.2: Chi square Test of Relationship between Sex and Incentive Distribution.

ITEMS	Chi-square test: Gender			
	Value	df	asym. sig. (2- sided)	N of valid cases
1. I have been offered a gift/ an incentive by a political party or a candidate	2.078 ^a	1	.149	280

Source: Fieldwork, 2017

From Table 4.2.1, 94 (33.6%) of the respondents have once received a gift or an incentive from a political party. This is made up of 44 (29.7%) of males and 50 (37.9%) of females. One hundred and eighty six (186) representing 64.4% of the respondents which is made up of 104 (70.3%) of males and 82 (62.1%) of females have never received an incentive or gift from a political party. From the table, approximately a third of the total respondents have been exposed to vote buying incentives.

Out of the total of the 20 participants interviewed, six which represent 30% confirmed having received a gift/an incentive from a political party. This means that about one third of the respondents have ever benefitted from vote buying incentives. This according to Dr. Akwete (2016) asserts that it is very dangerous for the country's young democracy and warns of a possible collapse of Ghana's democratic system if vote buying is not stopped. This is similar to Kramon's findings in his 2013 dissertation "Vote Buying and Accountability in Democratic Africa" which reported that close to 30 percent of adults report receiving cash handouts in Nyanza and Eastern Provinces of Kenya.

Item 1 of Table 4.2.2 which reads *I have been offered a gift/ an incentive by a political party*, **did not** establish a relationship between sex and the distribution of vote buying incentives. This shows a Chi-square of 2.078 with *p*-value equals to 0.149. This shows that no significant difference exist between age range and the distribution of the incentives. The null hypothesis was not rejected. This means there is no relationship between sex and the distribution of the incentives.

Table 4.2.3. Knowledge of Someone Who has Benefitted from an Incentive from a Political Party

Item	Frequency	Percent (%)
Strongly Disagree (SD)	49	17.5
Disagree (D)	62	22.1
Strongly Agree (SA)	89	31.8
Agree (A)	80	28.6
Total	280	100.0

Source: Fieldwork, 2017

The result from Table 4.2.2 shows that 49 (17.5%) of the respondents strongly disagreed that they know someone who has benefitted from an incentive from a political party. Sixty-two (20.1%) disagreed with the statement and 89 (31.8%) agreed with the statement while 80 (28.6%) strongly agreed with the statement.

From the interview conducted, participants just named and pinpointed neighbours in their community who had benefitted from these incentives. Others even went ahead to name what those beneficiaries were given. This is an indication that more of the respondents know people who have ever benefitted from a vote buying incentive from a political party. This also indicates that more people are becoming aware of the vote buying practices in the Ghanaian electoral system.

Table 4.2.4. Number of Times of Receiving Incentives

S/ N	ITEM	SD (%)	D (%)	A (%)	SA (%)	TOT AL
1	I have received a gift or an incentive from the same party more than once	49 (17.5)	66 (22.1)	89 (31.8)	80 (28.6)	280 (100)
2	I have ever received gifts from multiple parties.	163 (58.2)	91 (32.5)	15 (5.4)	11 (3.9)	280 (100)

Source: Field work, 2017

Item 1 on Table 4.9 which is - I have received a gift or an incentive from the same party more than once indicates that 49 (17.5%) of the respondents strongly disagreed with the statement, 66 (22.1%) of the respondents disagreed with the statement. Eighty-nine (31.8%) of the respondents agreed with the statement while 80 representing 28.6% of the respondents strongly agree with the statement. This indicates that more than half of the respondents have received gifts from the same party more than once.

Item 2 of the table which is - *I have ever received gifts from multiple parties* which tries to find out whether a respondent has received an incentive or gift from a party more than once indicates that 163 (58.2%) of the respondents strongly disagreed with the statement and 91 (32.5%) of the respondents disagreed with the statement. Fifteen (5.4%) agreed with the statement while 11 (3.9%) strongly agreed with the statement. This means that most of the respondents have received incentives or gifts from only one political party.

Table 4.2.5: Specify the Gift you Received as an Incentive

This question elicited from respondents the items they were given as vote buying incentives. The details are presented in Table 4.2.5

Table 4.2.5: Range of Items Received as Incentives from Political Parties.

Item	Frequency	Percent (%)
No incentive	186	66.4
Unspecified	6	2.1
Silver pan (Basin)	8	2.9
Food	1	0.4
Cloth	9	3.2
Cloth/ money	2	0.7
Cutlass	3	1.1
Gas cylinder	12	4.3
Laptop	3	1.1
Money	41	14.7
Outboard motor	2	0.7
Wellington boot	7	2.5
Total	280	100.0

Source: Fieldwork, 2017

From Table 4.2.5, out of the total of 280 respondents, 6 (2.1%) of them who received incentives from political parties did not specify the incentive they received. Eight representing 2.1% of the respondents received (silver pans) basins, 1 (0.4%) was given

food, 9 (3.2%) received cloths, 2 (0.7%) benefitted from cloth and money and 3 (1.1%) were given cutlasses, While 12 (4.3%) also received gas cylinders, 3 (1.1%) had laptops, 41 (14.7%) were given money, 2 (0.7%) were given outboard motors and 7 (2.5%) were also given wellington boots.

In an interview, some of the participants identified cutlasses, gas cylinders, cloths, silver pans (basin) and money, among other things as the items they received from party officials.

Gifty (name withheld) a farmer indicated that “The party officials came here in their cars. They gave me cutlass, wellington boots and a box of matches that contained 20 Ghana Cedis.”

From the Table and the interview, it can be deduced that items used as vote buying incentives range from silver pans (basins), cloths, gas cylinders, laptops, food, money, cutlasses, outboard motors, and wellington boots. Again from the data, money tops the list of item that is often used in buying votes.

This bears some similarity with CDD’s findings in their 2016 pre-election survey on Ghana’s 2016 elections titled “Prospects for credibility and peacefulness” as they also identify money, food and other material items as part of the items used to buy votes. CDD’S findings also affirm that money is the item often used in vote buying as they identify cash /money as the topmost item politicians reportedly offered in exchange for votes. Kramon (2013) also asserts that cash and other types of handouts, which are often referred to as “chop money” are common to campaigns in Ghana.

One of the party officials hinted that the range of items used in buying votes may depend on the occupation the people in an area are engaged in as farming tools like cutlass and wellington boots are usually given out in farming communities whereas silver pans (basins) and outboard motors are given in fishing communities.

Table 4.2.6: Distribution of Respondents on their Communities Benefitting from Developmental Projects Prior to the 2016 General Elections.

Item	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Yes	111	39.7
No	169	60.3
Total	280	100.00

Source: Fieldwork, 2017

Table 4.2.6 illustrates that 37 (20.2%) of the respondents strongly disagreed that their communities benefitted from a developmental project prior to the 2016 general elections. Twenty-one point nine percent representing 40 of the respondents disagreed with the statement. Fifty-three representing 29.0% agreed with the statement while another 53 (29.0%) also strongly agreed that their communities benefitted from an incentive. This means that more of the respondents' had their communities benefitting from developmental projects prior to the 2016 presidential and parliamentary elections. Participants named some of the developmental projects as the building of community clinics which are usually called CHIPS compounds, construction and tarring of roads, construction of boreholes and building of school structures.

4.3. Research Question Two:

What are the Conditions Politicians attach to Vote Buying Incentives?

This section tried to find out whether it is true that conditions are attached to the incentives during vote buying. It also solicits respondents' views on the kind of conditions that were attached to their incentives. The questionnaire contains seven (7) items on this research question. These are items 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19.

The interview guide for voters has five (5) items to address this. These are questions 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11. The interview guide for party officials also has four (4) items to address this research question and these are items 7, 8, 9 and 10.

Table 4.3.1: Distribution of Respondents on whether Conditions were attached to their Incentives.

Item	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Yes	13	13.8
No	81	86.2
Total	94	100.00

Source: Fieldwork, 2017

From Table 4.3.1, out of the total of 94 respondents who received incentives or gifts from political parties; only 13 (13.8%) responded "Yes" while the remaining 81 (86.2%)

respondents responded “No.” This means few of the respondents who had been given incentives had conditions attached to their incentives.

Almost all the respondents interviewed, indicated that no condition was attached to their incentives. Only two respondents confirmed that a condition was attached to their incentives.

Adwoa (name withheld) a fishmonger, when asked whether she was given any condition when the incentive was given to her indicated that she was only given a silver pan (basin) and a party branded T shirt. She added that “The T shirt was an indication of whom I should vote for. That’s all’

Mr. Yoofi (name withheld) also had this to say when asked the same question “but they know I am a party member that is why they gave me the party branded T shirt with an amount of cash and no condition was attached.”

This confirms what one of the party organizers indicated that they do not actually attach conditions to the incentives unless they have doubts about the party affiliation of the person or have the belief that a person just wants to collect the item and not vote for them. This defies the general notion held or the speculation that conditions are attached to the incentives.

Table 4.3.2: Conditions attached to Vote Buying Incentives.

S/N	ITEM	SD (%)	D (%)	A (%)	SA (%)	TOTAL
1	I was told to snap a picture of my ballot	35 (37.2)	54 (57.5)	5 (5.3)	0 (0)	94 (100)
2	I was given an incentive and made to swear to go by the contract	39 (41.5)	52 (55.3)	2 (2.1)	1 (1.1)	94 (100)
3	I was given a ballot already thumb printed to use.	51 (54.3)	43 (45.7)	0 (0)	0 (0)	94 (100)
4	The condition was to spoil my ballot.	53 (56.4)	39 (41.5)	1 (1.1)	1 (1.1)	94 (100)
5	I was told that if I collect the incentive and do not do per the contract I will die	46 (48.9)	47 (50.0)	0 (0)	1 (1.1)	94 (100)
6	I rejected the incentive because of the condition attached to it	37 (39.7)	39 (41.5)	9 (9.6)	9 (9.6)	94 (100)

Source: Fieldwork, 2017

From item 1 of Table 4.3.2, which is - *I was told to snap a picture of my ballot* indicates that out of the total of 94(33.6%) respondents who had benefitted from vote buying incentives, 35 (37.2%) strongly disagreed that they were told to snap a photo of their ballots. Fifty-four (54) making 57.5% of the respondents indicated that they disagreed with the statement. While 5 (5.3%) agreed with the statement, no one strongly agreed to the statement that they were told to take a shot of their ballots.

Interview responses also indicated that only one of the 20 respondents interviewed indicated that she was asked to take a picture of her ballot. This means that this does not normally happen as a few of the respondents who had received incentives from parties were told to take a shot of their ballots. From the above it can be deduced that although it happens, it does not often happen that people are asked to snap a picture of their ballots during vote buying.

Item 2 of Table 4.3.2 which is - *I was given an incentive and made to swear to go by the contract* indicates that out of the 65 respondents who had benefitted from electoral incentives, 39 (41.5%) strongly disagreed that they were made to swear when they were given the incentive. Fifty-two (52) making 55.3% of the respondents disagreed with the statement. Two (2) making 2.1% of the respondents agreed with the statement and only one (1.1%) strongly agreed with the statement. This means that many of the respondents who had benefitted from incentives were never made to swear before being given the incentive. This finding also defies the general notion and speculation or perception being held that during the distribution of vote buying incentives, beneficiaries are made to swear in the name of deities before given the incentive.

Item 3 of Table 4.3.2, which is - *I was given a ballot already thumb printed to use* shows that 54.3% (29) of the respondents strongly disagreed with the statement. Forty-three (43.) making 45.7% of the respondents disagreed with the statement. None of the respondents agreed nor disagreed to the statement. This means it is very rare that voters are given already thumb printed ballot to use.

Item 4 of Table 4.3.2, asked respondents to respond to the statement *The condition was to spoil my ballot*. The responses are as follows; 53 (56.4%) of the respondents strongly disagreed with the statement. Thirty-nine (39) making 41.5% of the respondents disagreed to the statement and 1.1% (1) agreed with the statement while only one (1) which is 1.1% agreed with the statement.

Item 5 of Table 4.3.2, which is - *I was told that if I collect the incentive and do not do per the contract I will die* shows that 46 (48.9%) strongly disagreed, 47 (50.0%) disagreed. While none of the respondents agreed, only one (1.1%) respondent strongly agreed. This means that this condition as speculated is not normally attached to an incentive.

Item 6 of Table 4.3.2, asked respondents to respond to the statement *Even if a condition was attached I would not reject the incentive*. The responses are as follows; 37 (39.7%) of the respondents strongly disagreed with the statement. Thirty-nine representing (41.5%) of the respondents disagreed with the statement and 9 (9.6%) agreed with the statement while another 9 (9.6%) agreed with the statement. This means that a condition would not scare or deter voters from collecting the incentive.

When interviewed, Esi (name withheld) pointed out that “even if a condition is attached I will take it because it’s our own money.”

4.4. Research Question Three:

What is the Relationship between Vote Buying Incentives and Voter's Decisions or Choices?

This question sought to find out the relationship that exists between vote buying incentives and voters' decisions or behaviours. Seventeen (17) items were used to solicit respondents' views on this question and this ranged from items 21 to 36 of the questionnaire. Also, questions 12 to 15 of the interview guide were used to complement the questionnaire items on this research question. Again questions five and six on the interview guide for party officials also help to support the findings of this research question. Table 4.4.1 gives the illustrations.

Table 4.4.1: Distribution of Respondents on Voting in the last Presidential and Parliamentary Elections.

Item	Frequency	Percent (%)
Yes	216	77.1
No	64	22.9
Total	280	100.0

Source: Fieldwork, 2017

From Table 4.4.1, 216 (77.1%) of the total respondents responded affirmatively that they voted in the last presidential and parliamentary elections while the remaining 64 (22.9%) responded negatively. From this table, it can be seen that more of the respondents took part in the 2016 presidential and parliamentary elections.

Table 4.4.2: Relationship between Vote Buying Incentives and Voters' Decisions.

S/N	ITEM	SD (%)	D (%)	A (%)	SA (%)	TOTAL (%)
1	I am affiliated to a particular political party	64 (22.9)	64 (22.9)	78 (27.9)	74 (64.4)	280 (100)
2	I am not aware political parties give out gifts to attract votes	113 (40.4)	95 (33.9)	43 (15.4)	29 (10.4)	280 (100)
3	One should expect the party s/he supports to give him/her some gift before s/he votes for them.	159 (56.8)	63 (22.5)	33 (11.8)	25 (8.9)	280 (100)
4	One should vote for a certain party / candidate because of a gift they offered him/her.	154 (55.0)	85 (30.4)	25 (8.9)	16 (5.7)	280 (100)
5	A gift from a political party should influence one's vote	135 (48.2)	68 (24.6)	38 (13.6)	39 (13.9)	280 (100)
6	Even if I get an incentive from a party, I would still vote with my conscience	44 (15.7)	39 (13.9)	71 (25.4)	126 (45.0)	280 (100)
7	Voting for a party should depend on issues than gifts/incentives.	39 (13.9)	54 (19.3)	57 (20.4)	130 (46.4)	280 (100)
8	A swing voter should vote for the party that offers one gift(s).	157 (56.1)	94 (33.6)	16 (5.7)	13 (4.6)	280 (100)
9	If I am paid to vote for a certain party/candidate I would do just that.	145 (51.8)	96 (34.3)	26 (9.3)	13 (4.6)	280 (100)

10	I will vote for the party I support but would accept any incentive from any party	62 (22.1)	55 (19.6)	82 (29.3)	81 (28.9)	280 (100)
11	I am ready to vote for any party/candidate that would buy my vote.	163 (58.2)	64 (22.9)	36 (12.9)	17 (6.1)	280 (100)
12	I will vote for a party I am opposed to because I was offered an incentive to do just that.	154 (55.0)	87 (31.1)	28 (10.0)	10 (3.9)	280 (100)
13	If a party pays me so that I do not turn out and vote I would oblige.	160 (57.1)	69 (24.6)	35 (12.5)	16 (5.7)	280 (100)

Source: Field work, 2017

Item 1 of Table 4.4.2 which is - *I am affiliated to a particular political party* shows that 64 (22.9%) strongly disagreed with the statement. Another 64 (22.9%) disagreed with the statement. Seventy-eight(78) representing 27.9% of the respondents agreed to the statement and 74 (26.4%) strongly agreed with the statement. This means that more of the respondents see themselves to be affiliated to a political party. This is similar to CDD's findings in 2016 as they approximated 64% of the general electorates to be affiliated to a political party.

From Item 2 of Table 4.4.2, respondents were asked to respond to the statement *I am not aware political parties give out incentives or gifts to attract votes*. Out of the total of 280 respondents, 113 (40.4%) strongly disagreed with the statement while 95 (33.9%)disagreed. Forty-three (43), thus 15.4% agreed with the statement whereas 29 (10.4%) strongly agreed with the statement.

Egya Panyin (name withheld) when asked whether he is aware that parties give out incentives or gifts to attract votes remarked that “but this is not a secret?”

Egya Yaw, another participant said that “They are sharing moneys at rallies and in the communities. Who does not know?”

Many of those interviewed also confirmed that they are aware political parties give out incentives to attract the votes of the electorates. This shows that more of the respondents are aware that political parties give out incentives or gifts to buy votes.

From Item 3 of Table 4.4.2, respondents were given the statement “*One should expect the party s/he supports to give him/her some gift before s/he votes for them.*” One hundred and fifty-nine (159) which makes 56.8% of the respondents strongly disagreed with the statement and 63 (22.5%) of them disagreed with the statement. Thirty-three representing 11.8% of the respondents agreed with the statement whereas 25 (8.9%) strongly agreed with the statement. From the table more of the respondents were of the view that one should not expect the party s/he supports to give him/her some incentive or gift before s/he votes for them.

One of the party officials that were interviewed revealed that during the sharing of the incentives, they direct the items to the party supporters first before any other since they are sure that their own supporters would vote for them.

One of the participants commented that “Our party is in power. They have made enough money and that they should cushion us before we go and vote for them.” This also means that some party supporters expect to be given a kind of incentives by their own party and failure to do this may negatively affect the chances of the party as some party members

are likely not to turn out or they may spoil the ballot when they are not given incentives to go and vote. This finding confirms Bratton's (2008) assertion that "vote buying enhances partisan loyalty." in his paper "Vote buying and violence in Nigerian election campaigns." Bob-Milliar (2012) also reports that in Ghana there is still evidence that private material incentives tend to provide the glue that links party members and cadres to the party establishment.

Nichter (2008) also asserts that it is believed that parties offer particularistic benefits to core supporters during elections to sustain electoral coalitions. It is also suggested that parties distribute rewards to voting supporters to prevent the erosion of partisan loyalties" over time. Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter (2009) are of the view that unless operatives provide particularistic benefits, supporters may become swing or opposition voters during the next election.

Item 4 of Table 4.4.2 sought respondents' views on *one should vote for a certain party / candidate because of a gift they offered him/her*. One hundred and fifty-four (154) thus, (55.0%) out of the total respondents strongly disagreed with the statement while 85 (30.4%) disagreed with the statement. About 25 (8.9%) agreed with the statement and 16 (5.7%) strongly agreed with the statement. This means that more of the respondents would not vote for a political party because they were offered incentives or gifts. In other words, a gift from a political party or a candidate would not affect the votes of majority of the respondents.

From Item 5 of Table 4.4.2, respondents were expected to respond to the statement *an incentive or gift from a political party should influence one's vote*. 135 (48.2%) strongly

disagreed with the statement. About 68 (24.3%) disagreed, 38 (13.6%) agreed with the statement whereas 39 (13.9%) strongly agreed with the statement.

This shares some similarity with Kramon's(2013) unpublished dissertation "Vote Buying and Accountability in Democratic Africa" when he estimated that between 20 and 25 percent of Kenyans having had their votes influenced by incentives.

Eunice (name withheld) commented that not anything would buy her vote. "If I am going to vote for someone because s/he is offering me an incentive or gift then that should be valuable." Probing further, she identified employment or money above 1000 Ghana cedis as what would push her to sell her vote.

Kweku (name withheld) also suggested that if any candidate would offer him a job he is more ready to sell his vote to that person. "What I need now is a job. If Nana Addo or JM gives me job I would vote for him."

From Table 4.4.2 and the interview, more than half of the respondents are of the view that an incentive from a party would influence their votes. This also means that an incentive from a political party or a candidate would have an influence on the decisions of some voters as Morrison (2008) concludes that Ghanaian voters reward local public goods provision when deciding how to vote. This conforms to Schaffer's (2002) assertion that voters may consider a vote buying incentive as something that comes with strings but does not generate explicit obligation to reciprocate at the ballot box.

Item 6 of Table 4.4.2 respondents were to respond to the question *even if I get an incentive from a party, I would still vote with my conscience*. About 44 (15.7%) of the respondents strongly disagreed whereas 39 (13.9%) disagreed with the statement.

Seventy-one (71) making 25.4% of the respondents agreed with the statement whereas 45 (45%) strongly agreed. From this table, it means more of the respondents would vote their conscience even if they are given incentives.

During the interview, one of the respondents stated that “the money the politicians use to purchase the items or incentives are the tax payers’ money. I would take it when it is given to me but I would vote for the candidate I feel to vote for.”

Item 7 of Table 4.4.2 reflects respondents’ view on the statement *voting for a party should depend on issues than incentives or gifts*. Thirty-nine(39)making 13.9% of the respondents strongly disagreed with the statement while 54 (19.3%) disagreed and 57 (20.4%) agreed. A majority of 130 (46.4%) strongly agreed with the statement. This means that more of the respondents (voters) would base their decisions on issues than incentives.

Item 8 of Table 4.4.2 which is - *a swing voter should vote for the party that offers one gift(s)* indicates that out of the 280 respondents, 157 (56.1%) strongly disagreed, 94 (33.6) disagreed, 16 (5.7%) agreed and 13 (4.6%) strongly agreed with the statement. This means that majority of swing voters are likely not to vote for a party after being given an incentive.

Item 9 of Table 4.4.2, elicited responses from the statement *If I am paid to vote for a certain party/candidate I would do just that*. With this statement, 145 (51.8%) of the respondents strongly disagreed while 96 (34.3) disagreed. Again, 26 (9.3%) agreed and 13 (4.6%) strongly agreed with the statement. It can be inferred that more of the respondents are ready to accept incentives from parties without voting for them. This may be one of

the reasons why an incentive intended by an operative as binding payment may be understood by a voter as a non-binding gift.

From item 10 of Table 4.4.2, respondents were to respond to the statement *I will vote for the party I support but would accept an incentive from any party*. Out of the total 280 respondents, 62 (22.1%) strongly disagreed with the statement whereas 55 (19.6%) disagreed. Again, 82 (29.3%) agreed while 81 (28.9%) strongly agreed with the statement. This could be interpreted that more of the respondents would accept an incentive from a political party but would vote for the party they support.

Item 11 of Table 4.4.2 which is – *I am ready to vote for any party that would buy my vote* reveals that 163 (58.2%) of the total respondents strongly disagreed with the statement, 64 (22.9%) indicated that they disagree with the statement. While 36 (12.9%) indicated their agreement to the statement, 17 (6.1%) strongly agreed with the statement. This means that less of the respondents are ready to sell their votes for money or materialistic goods. This also means that a portion of the voting population is ready to sell their votes to political parties or their candidates.

Madam Ellen (name withheld) hinted that “I cannot exchange my vote for the meager items they offer.” So she is never ready and willing to exchange her vote for an incentive.

Fiifi (name withheld) said that he is ready to vote for the party that would buy his vote but that would depend on what they offer in exchange for the vote. In other words, Fiifi was ready to exchange his vote for an incentive.

Item 12 of Table 4.4.2 elicited views on whether *one should abstain from voting in an election after being paid to do so*. The responses were as follows: respondents of 129

(46.1%) strongly disagreed and 77 (27.5%) disagreed. While 49 (17.5%) agreed, 25 (8.9%) strongly agreed with the statement. This means that more of the respondents would not abstain from voting when given incentives to do so.

Maame Yaa (name withheld) had this to say “I must exercise my franchise. Why should I abstain from voting because of 50 Ghana they would give me?”

Julie (name withheld) also had this to say “Aaaaah!! they should take their things. I would not abstain from voting. ”This means that voters are not ready to abstain from exercising their franchise in an election due to a gift or an incentive they would be given. So they would an incentive would not influence their participation in an election.

From Item 12 of Table 4.4.2, respondents were to respond to the statement *I would vote for a party I am opposed to because I was offered an incentive to do so*. More than half of the respondents 154 (55.0 %) responded that they strongly disagree with the statement and 87 (31.1%) disagreed with the statement. While 28 (10.0%) agreed, 11 (3.9%) strongly disagreed with the statement.

From the interviews, only two people responded that they would vote for the party they are opposed to but even that they added a caveat that that would depend on the quantum of money they would be given.

These indicate that more than half of the respondents are not willing to vote for parties they are opposed to when they are given incentives. In other words, an incentive would not influence a voter to vote for a party s/he is opposed to.

Item 13 of Table 4.4.2 which elicited responses on the statement - *If a party pays me so that I do not turn out and vote I would do just that* indicates that 160 (57.1%) indicated that they would not abstain from voting when they are paid to do that and 69 (24.6%) indicated that they disagreed with the statement. While 35 (12.5%) indicated that they agree with the statement, 16 representing 5.7% of the respondents strongly disagreed. More than half of the respondents strongly disagreed with this statement that if a party pays a person so that the one abstains from voting, one should do just that. This is what Nitcher indicated in his 2008 model as a “negative turnout buying. This strategy is used by opposition parties to demobilize active opponent to abstain from voting. Although few of the respondents are ready to fulfill this, according to Nitcher, this strategy in a way can yield some result.

Table 4.4.3: Chi square Test of Relationship Between Incomes and Voters Decisions.

ITEMS	Chi-square test: Levels of income			
	Value	df	asym. sig. (2-sided)	No of valid cases
1. Even if I get an incentive from a party, I would still vote with my conscience	27.911 ^a	15	0.22	280
2. Voting for a party should depend on issues than gifts/incentives.	47.814 ^a	15	0.000	280

Source: Field work, 2017

Item 1 of Table 4.4.3 which reads *Even if I get an incentive from a party, I would still vote with my conscience*, finds the relationship between income and the voting choices of

voters. It shows a Chi-square of 27.911 with p -value equals to 0.022. This shows that a significant difference exists between income (economic status) of voters and their voting decisions after being offered incentives. The null hypothesis was therefore not accepted.

Item 2 of Table 4.4.3 which reads *Voting for a party should depend on issues than gifts/incentives*, finds the relationship between income and the voting choices of voters. It shows a Chi-square of 47.814 with p -value equals to 0.000. This also shows that a significant difference exists between income (economic status) of voters and their voting behaviour after being offered incentives. The null hypothesis was therefore not accepted.

Table 4.4.4. Distribution of Respondents on their Votes being Influenced with a Developmental Project in their Communities.

Item	Frequency	Percent (%)
Strongly Disagree (SD)	82	29.3
Disagree (D)	73	26.1
Agree (A)	73	26.1
Strongly Agree (SA)	52	18.6
Total	280	100.0

Source: Fieldwork, 2017

During elections especially by-elections, parties especially the government in power commits to developmental projects in certain communities that fall under the constituency in question. Since these developmental projects are meant to win more votes, Table 4.4.4 took a look at whether these developmental projects have any influence on the votes of people.

Table 4.4 suggests that a majority of 82 (29.3%) of the respondents indicated that they strongly disagreed that a developmental project would affect their votes. Seventy-three representing 26.1% indicated that they strongly disagreed with the statement. Another 73 (26.1%) indicated that they agreed with the statement while 52 (18.6%) also indicated that they strongly agreed with the statement. This means that developmental projects used as incentives are not going to affect the voting decisions of majority of the respondent.

4.5.0. Research Question Four:

How Conversant are Voters with Vote Buying Laws in Ghana?

This section sought to find out voters' knowledge on vote buying laws in Ghana. The research question sought to find out whether voters were aware of what the Ghanaian constitution says about vote buying. Thus it tries to find out whether voters are abreast with the laws on vote buying in Ghana. From the questionnaire nine items are used to assess respondents' views on this section. These range from items 37 to 45. Also the interview guide for voters has three (3) items on this section. These are items 16, 17 and 18. Moreover, the interview guide for party officials has one item (1) to address this question and that is item 12.

4.5.1: Knowledge of the Laws on Vote Buying.

S/N	ITEM	SD (%)	D (%)	A (%)	SA (%)	TOTAL
1	It is lawful to receive an offer from a party or candidate on condition of voting for them.	137 (48.9)	84 (30.0)	43 (15.4)	16 (5.7)	280 (100)
2	It is lawful for a party to ask a voter to vote for a party with a gift.	145 (51.8)	96 (34.3)	26 (9.3)	13 (4.6)	280 (100)
3	I am aware giving or receiving incentives from a party to vote for their candidate is an offence punishable by law.	53 (18.9)	80 (28.6)	75 (26.8)	72 (25.7)	280 (100)
4	A vote is a personal property and the law allows one to exchange it for a gift from a party.	132 (47.1)	86 (30.7)	37 (13.2)	25 (8.9)	280 (100)
5	It is not wrong to show my ballot to the one who paid for my vote after casting my vote.	134 (47.9)	70 (25.0)	51 (18.2)	25 (8.9)	280 (100)
6	The law allows a voter to reveal his/her ballot to the one who paid for his/her vote.	139 (49.6)	89 (31.8)	25 (8.9)	27 (9.6)	280 (100)
7	Revealing my ballot after voting is acceptable by the constitution.	139 (49.6)	82 (29.3)	47 (16.8)	12 (4.3)	280 (100)
8	I am ready to report any party or candidate that offers me an incentive to the police.	52 (18.6)	60 (21.4)	73 (26.1)	95 (33.9)	280 (100)

Source: Field work

From Item 1 of Table 4.5.1 which is *It is lawful to receive an offer from a party or candidate on condition of voting for them*. One hundred and thirty-seven of the respondents (137) representing 48.9% strongly disagreed with the statement while 84 (30%) disagreed. Another 43 (15.4%) agreed and 43 (15.4%) agreed while 16 (5.7%) strongly agreed with the statement.

From the interviews conducted, the following were gathered;

Alice (name withheld) indicated that “we have heard on radio that it is against the law to accept an offer from a party or its officer or representative on condition of voting for them in an election. But we cannot reject it because it is our own monies they use.”

Mena Nyameyie (name withheld) also stated that “we are aware that accepting a gift/ an incentive from a party on condition of voting for them is prohibited by the law. ”This indicates that she is aware that there are laws against receiving an incentive to vote for a party or its candidate.

From the above, it can therefore be stated that majority of the respondents see it to be unlawful to be offered an incentive to vote for a political party or its candidate. This means that many of the respondents are aware that it is unlawful for a voter to receive an offer from a party or its candidate on condition of voting for them.

Item 2 of Table 4.5.1 which is - *It is lawful for a party to ask a voter to vote for a party with an incentive* suggests that many of the respondents are aware that it is unlawful for a party to ask a voter to vote for them with an incentive or gift. This is stemmed from the fact that 145 (51.8%) strongly disagreed with the statement while 96 (34.3%) disagreed.

Another 26 (9.3%) agreed with the statement and 13 (4.6%) strongly agreed with the statement.

The interviews also support this as more than half indicated that they know that asking a voter to vote for a certain candidate with a gift/ an incentive is frowned upon by the laws of the country. This means that voters are now conversant with the laws on vote buying.

Item 3 of Table 4.5.2 which is – *I am aware giving or receiving incentives from a party to vote for their candidate is an offence punishable by law.* The table indicates that as 53 (18.9%) strongly disagreed with the statement, 80 (28.6%) disagreed and 75 (26.8) agreed while 72 (25.7%) strongly agreed with the statement. This means more than half of the respondents are aware that giving or receiving an incentive from a party to vote for their candidate is an offence punishable by law. However, a significant number of the respondents are also not aware that giving or receiving an incentive from a party to vote for their candidate is an offence punishable by law. This seems to support the Centre for Democratic Development (CDD) and Coalition of Domestic Election Observers (CODEO) survey reports prior to Ghana's 2016 presidential and parliamentary elections that some Ghanaians do not know that vote buying is an offense and punishable by law.

When asked whether he knew that he could be punished by a court for taking an offer to vote for a person Emma (name withheld) said, “if I reject it someone else would accept it. After all it's our own money they use for these things.”

Item 4 of Table 4.4.4 which is - *A vote is a personal property and the law allows one to exchange it for a gift from a party* suggests that many of the respondents do not agree that their votes are their personal property and so can be exchanged for a gift or an incentive

from a political party. This is deduced from the table as 132 (47.1%) responded that they strongly disagreed with the statement and 86 (30.7%) disagreed with the statement. Another 37(13.2%) agreed with the statement while 25 (8.9%) strongly disagreed with the statement.

Item 5 of Table 4.5.3 which is - *it is not wrong to show their ballots to the one who paid for their votes after casting their votes* suggests that 134 (47.9%) of the respondents strongly disagreed, 70 (25.0%) disagreed and 51 (18.2%) agreed while 25 (8.9%) strongly agreed with the statement. This means that the respondents are very much aware that it is wrong to show one's ballot to the one who paid to be voted for.

From Item 6 of table 4.5.3, which is - *The law allows a voter to reveal his/her ballot to the one who paid for his/her vote* it can be seen that about half of the respondents 139 (49.6%) strongly disagreed and 39 (31.8%) disagreed with the statement. While 25 (8.9%) agreed with the statement, 27 (9.6%) strongly agreed with the statement that they are aware that the law does allow a voter to reveal his/ her ballot to the one who paid for his/her vote.

A number of the participants when interviewed revealed that they are conversant with this electoral law as Kofi (name withheld) had this to say. "I think it is wrong to take a shot of my ballot and show it to someone." This indicates that participants are conversant with this law although a portion is not hence, the need for more education on electoral issues and for that matter on vote buying.

Item 7 of Table 4.5.4 indicates that 139 (49.6%) responded that they strongly disagreed with the statement and 82 (29.3%) disagreed. While 47 (16.8%) agreed with the

statement, 12 (4.3%) strongly agreed with the statement. This can be interpreted that many of the respondents are aware that revealing their ballots after voting is unacceptable by the constitution. The constitution of Ghana and electoral laws strongly speak against this act. Morton and Ou (2013) in their paper “The Secret Ballot and Ethical Voting”, noted that secret ballots are used in many voting situations in order to ensure privacy and anonymity. They add that in large elections they are seen as a way to shield democracy against corruption and vote-buying, giving citizens protection from intimidation and coercion so that they can make free choices.

Item 8 of Table 4.5.5 took a look at respondents’ readiness to report a party, its agent or candidate that offers incentives to buy votes to the police indicated that 52 (18.6%) strongly disagreed with the statement whereas 60 (21.4%) disagreed with the statement. While 73 (26.1%) agreed with the statement, 95(33.9%) strongly agreed with the statement. In this wise, more of the respondents are ready to report vote buying to the police. Yet, there is a huge number of people who are not ready to report any kind of vote buying to the police. When asked why they are not ready to report incidents of vote buying to the police, these are what some of the respondents had to say:

Respondent 1: I will not waste my time because in Ghana laws do not work and so even if it is reported it would not yield any positive result.

Respondent 2: the offence is being committed by both party in power and the opposition. We all know the law does not work against the party in power.

4.6 Summary

The findings show that:

Out of the two hundred and eighty (280) potential voters used for the study, one hundred and forty-eight (148) representing 52.9% of the respondents are males, while the remaining one hundred and thirty two (132) which represents 47.1% of the respondents are females.

Fifty (50) of the respondents representing 17.9% were within the ages of 18 to 20 years. Seventy-six (76) representing 27.1% were between 21 to 30 years. Sixty-two (62) potential voters forming 22.1% of the respondents were within the ages of 31 to 40 years. Thirty-three (33) representing 11.8% were within the ages of 41 to 50 whereas twenty-seven (27) representing 9.6% were found to be within the range of 51 to 60 years. Thirty-one (31) representing 11.1% of the respondents were between the ages of 61 and 70. One (1) of the respondents was above 70 years. This means that most of the respondents were within the ages of 18 and 40 years. This is shown in Table 4.1.2

Twenty-three (23) of the respondents representing 8.2% had no formal educational qualification whereas fifty-eight (58) representing 20.7% of the respondents had basic education. Seventy-eight (78) of the respondents which represent 27.9% had a Senior High School educational qualification; Fifteen (15) respondents representing 5.4% had a professional, training or vocational education. Twenty-six (26) which represents 9.3% respondents had a diploma while sixty-two (62) of the respondents which represents 22.1% had a tertiary or degree while the remaining eighteen (18) of the respondents which constituted 6.4% had other educational qualifications. This is shown in Table 4.1.3

Thirty (30) of the respondents are unemployed, which represents 10.7%. Fifty-five (55) representing 19.6% are students or apprentices. Thirty-nine (39) representing 13.9% of the respondents are farmers. Another thirty-nine (39) of the respondents which represents 13.9% are traders or engaged in businesses. There were nineteen (19) artisans which represented 6.8% whereas three (3) (representing 1.1%) of the respondents were fishermen. Fifty-six (56) of the respondents representing 20.0% were civil servants. There were thirty-nine (39) of the respondents (representing 13.9%) who were engaged in other occupations. This implies that more of the respondents were civil servants. This is illustrated in Table 4.1.4

Out of the 280 respondents, one hundred and one (101) (representing 36%) receive an income of less than GHC 100.00 per month. Fifty-three (53) of the respondents (representing 18.9%) are within the income ranges of GHC 100.00 to GHC 250.00. Fifty-three (53) of the respondents which represent 18.9% are within the income ranges of GHC 251.00 to GHC 500.00. Thirty-four (34) of the respondents which represent 12.1% are also within the income ranges of GHC 501.00 to GHC 750.00. Thirty four (34) of the respondents representing 12.1% fall within the income ranges of GHC 751.00-GHC 1,000.00 whereas Forty-nine (49) which represents 17.5% are on an income of more than GHC 1,000.00 per month. This means more of the respondents are on an income of less than GHC 100.00 per month. This is illustrated in Table 4.1.1

Out of the total respondents, two hundred and sixty-six (266) which represents 95.0% are registered voters whereas fourteen (14) of the respondents which represents 5.0% are unregistered voters. This implies that more of the respondents were registered voters. This is represented in Table 4.1.6.

The following are the broad outcomes derived from the discussion of the various sources of data used in the study:

Firstly, the research question 1, used in the study revealed that ninety-four (94) representing 33.6% of the respondents have in one way or the other received gifts from political parties. This is made up of 44 (29.7%) males and 50 (37.9%) females. On the other hand, 186 representing 76.4% of the respondents which is made up of 104 (70.3%) males and 82 (62.1%) females have never received any incentive from a political party. This shows that about a third of the population has been exposed to vote buying. One hundred and one (101) which constitutes 39.7% of the respondents have their communities benefitting from a developmental project prior to the 2016 general elections whereas one hundred and sixty-nine (169) representing 60.3% said their communities never benefitted from any developmental projects

It also revealed that the range of items used in buying votes include silver pans (basins), cloths, gas cylinders, laptops, money, outboard motors, and wellington boots. Among all these, money topped the list of items used in buying votes.

It again reveals that there is no relationship between gender and the distribution of the incentives, Thus during the distribution of the incentives neither males nor females are targeted.

The study again revealed that there is no relationship between sex and the incentive distribution as the chi square test gave a df of 1.

Secondly, the research question two reveals that conditions are not really attached to the giving of the incentives. Thus, while 86.2% of the respondents responded that no

condition was attached to their incentives, 13.8% responded that conditions were attached to their incentives. The data revealed that conditions are only attached where there is a suspicion that one only wants to benefit from the incentive without the conviction of voting for the distributing party.

Thirdly, the research question three also reveals that vote buying is effective. Vote buying can influence the voting decisions of some electorates. It can have an effect on some voters' decisions as low income level recipients are likely to collect the incentive and go by the contract by abstaining from voting or voting for the distributing party. Some voters are ready to collect the incentive and go by the contract either to abstain from voting or receive the gift and vote for the party or candidate distributing the incentive. Again, the null hypothesis was rejected as it also revealed that a significant difference exists between income (economic status) of voters and their voting decisions after being offered incentives. In addition, the study also revealed that a developmental project put up in a community prior to an election has the capacity to influence the decisions of some voters but not the majority.

Fourthly, more potential voters are aware of the laws on vote buying in the country. For example, more voters are aware that receiving an incentive from a party or its candidate is unlawful. Again, more voters are aware that a vote is not personal property to be exchanged for an incentive. Again, more voters are also aware that it is against the law to reveal one's vote to another person after one has cast his/her vote in an election. More voters are also ready to report incidences of vote buying to the police.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Introduction

The study investigated voters' response to vote buying incentives in the Shama district of Ghana. The research examined the range of items used to buy votes of individual voters, whether conditions are attached to the incentives and the kind of conditions if any, the relationship between vote buying incentives and voters' decisions and how voters are conversant with the laws on vote buying in Ghana. The presentation in this concluding chapter is presented under:

Summary;

Implications on Ghana's Democracy;

Conclusions;

Recommendations;

Limitations to the Study

Suggestions for further Research.

5.1 Summary

Based on the results and the discussions presented in relation to the four (4) research questions the following are the major findings:

1. Vote buying is gradually gaining root in Ghanaian politics. Approximately a third of Ghanaian voters have had the experience of vote buying by receiving an incentive from a political party.

2. The items used in buying votes range from money, silver pans (basins), cloths, cutlasses, gas cylinders, laptops, money, outboard motors to wellington boots.
3. Money tops the range of items used as incentives during vote buying..
4. In most cases conditions are not attached to the incentives except where the one giving the incentive suspects that the one is not going to vote for them.
5. Officials only target voters to turn out and vote for them but do not target voters to abstain or spoil their ballots.
6. Voters are not willing to reject the items (incentives) even if conditions are attached to them.
7. There is no relationship between sex and the distribution of the incentives.
8. There is a relationship between income (economic status) and voters' decisions.
9. There is a relationship between vote buying incentives and voters' decisions. This makes incentives effective in winning votes.
10. More Ghanaians are aware that political parties give out incentives to attract the votes of voters.
11. More voters are willing to collect incentives from parties but vote for the party they support or identify with.
12. In spite of the incentives, more potential voters are likely to vote based on issues or with their conscience.
13. Voters are not ready to abstain from voting upon receiving an incentive from a political party.
14. A developmental project in a community would influence the votes of some voters.

15. Voters are now aware that the constitution of Ghana is against the practice of vote buying.
16. Voters are aware that buying or selling one's vote is punishable by law.
17. Voters are also aware that revealing one's ballot to someone is punishable by law in Ghana.
18. More voters are willing to report acts of vote buying to the police but wondered how that would end.
19. It is indeed undemocratic and all political parties and other stakeholders of elections must help to fight it

5.2 Implications on Ghana's Democracy

Implications drawn from the findings are:

Vote buying is one of the major triggers of corruption by politicians after they get into power, because they want to get return on money invested during election campaigns. This can lead to the abuse of state resources.

The use of incentives to buy votes may have repercussions on Ghana's elections. It can negatively impact the quality (freeness and fairness) of elections. Vote buying can contribute to the wrong political parties being elected to serve the nation. Once voters are paid to cast their votes in a certain way they become enslaved by their political paymasters as, by default, their rights to challenge their vote buying political paymasters are restricted.

That vote buying is so widespread raises concerns about the quality of emerging democratic institutions and the potential for elections to deliver better and more accountable governments.

A nation that is user-friendly to vote buying and vote selling, would not be in the best books of the foreign multinational companies seeking to invest in developing countries and vote buying may be a factor that can play against the country being selected for foreign investments

By the use of incentives to buy votes the power of the ordinary Ghanaian is gradually being sold to the rich politicians who may decide who wins an election in Ghana.

That some voters are not conversant with vote buying laws may make them fall victims to vote buying.

Those with access to resources may often be willing to use large amounts of money in order to access even larger sums further on. This increases the role of money in elections, and decreases the chances of those with less access to money, including women and the youth.

Political parties may frequently hijack purported developmental programs or projects for the purpose of buying votes.

5.3 Conclusions

There have been enough laws enacted on vote buying but the laws are not being enforced. It is unfortunate that all the law enforcement agencies that should enforce the laws on vote buying sit down unconcerned while the politicians who form the executive perpetuate this evil.

One wonders where the politicians get the monies from to buy votes. Each and every government has been accused of corruption. It is believed that politicians engage in corruption to perpetuate this act.

Vote buying has gradually gained roots in the Ghanaian electoral system. The poor have often been the target of political parties during vote buying. This has made vote buying more effective with the poor. Often, the effectiveness of vote buying with poor voters is interpreted as a reflection of the fact that small material goods have a greater marginal utility to poor voters. In short, vote buying builds a politician's credibility as a patron for the poor and can therefore be effective despite ballot secrecy because of the information that vote buying conveys to poor voters, who make up a large proportion of the electorates in Ghana.

Senior High School students are not left out during vote buying. They have also been the target of the politicians during and they fall for it. Many SHS students are offered incentives to turn out and vote for the distributing party.

The stakeholders in charge of educating the public on electoral issues including the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) and the Electoral Commission of Ghana (EC) have failed to educate voters on the laws on vote buying hence, voter education is poor in Ghana.

These results are a clear indication that vote buying is gradually gaining roots in Ghanaian elections and there is some level of relationship between vote buying incentives and voters' choices.

5.4 Recommendations

Vote buying is undemocratic. It is the bane of Ghana's democracy. The imperative is to search for ways to eliminate it from the country's developing democracy.

On the basis of the findings and its implications on the country's young democracy, the following recommendations were made.

1. Law enforcement and related mechanisms. There has been enough legislation to ban vote buying in Ghana. The problem is respective institutions have failed to enforce these legislations. The law enforcement agencies and all stakeholders including the Police, the judiciary, the Electoral Commission (EC) and others must ensure that culprits are put before courts and punished.
2. There should also be new resolve to fight corruption among leaders who also use all means to make money to engage in vote buying.
3. Reducing poverty. Since the findings concluded that there is a relationship between income (economic status) and voters' decisions, governments should make it a point to reduce poverty by enhancing wealth redistribution by creating or providing jobs especially for the rural folks.
4. Furthermore, since some Senior High School students also take part in national elections and are targets in distributing the incentives, the curriculum at this level of education should include vote buying to sensitize and conscientize them about the menace.
5. More so, there is the need for more voter education and sensitization campaigns or awareness on ignorant citizens about the malpractice of buying votes. Voters, governments, NGOs, electoral bodies, civil societies, and non-state actors should find it an activity to spearhead to strengthen democracy by mounting vigorous campaigns to educate the electorates not to accept financial or material rewards before they vote for a particular candidate or party as this amounts to selling one's conscience.

6. Finally, creating awareness on the ills of the practice and retelling of societal morals by all electoral stakeholders. All stakeholders of elections in Ghana including the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE), the Electoral Commission (EC) together with media houses must educate the public on the negative effects of vote buying on the country's democracy. Besides, religious bodies can re-instill morals that the various religious bodies and the country uphold into their congregations who form the voting population.

5.5 Limitations to the Study

It is almost impossible or very difficult to determine the perception of a person, because perception is purely or scientifically covert. Hence the ways in which individuals analyse and interpret information and make sense of it, may or can be deceptive. As a result, data collected based on the range of incentives used to buy votes; Conditions attached to vote buying incentives; the relationship between vote buying incentives and voters' decisions; voters knowledge on vote buying laws might be right or might not give accurate information about the issue and so may not always represent the true picture or reflection of the problem concerned.

Therefore this study was based on inferences made through available information collected by the researcher. On this bases, responses to the questionnaire, interviews and the documents on vote buying, may be either accurate or with some biases.

The researcher recognises the limitations of the instruments used in measuring the respondents' views on the voters' response to vote buying incentives in the Shama district. These limitations included the fact that the close ended questionnaire may be

somewhat inexact and may fail to measure the response of voters to vote buying incentives with a kind of precision that was desired. However, this defect was minimized by the use of other instruments like the interviews.

The uncooperative attitude and unwillingness of some respondents especially party officials to open up during the face-to-face interviews was a limitation to the study.

The difficulties encountered in the retrieval of questionnaires administered and the locating of potential voters to answer the questionnaire was a problem as participants thought that the research was being done for a particular political party and demanded to be given some monies before giving any information.

5.6 Suggestions for Further Research

The current study was limited in scope. This is because the study covered only the Shama district of the Western Region of Ghana. An interesting field of research would be to compare the results of this thesis with similar research in other districts, municipal and metropolitan areas in the country and other African countries or at least West Africa.

Another area is to analyse the effects of electoral incentives on the voting behaviours of Senior High school students.

Moreover the effects of incentives on the first time voter would also be interesting and revealing.

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Appendix A



UNIVERSITY OF EDUCATION, WINNEBA

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE EDUCATION
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL STUDIES EDUCATION

P. O. Box 25, Winneba, Ghana

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17th April, 2017

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

Dear Sir/Madam

LETTER OF INDUCTION: MR. FRANK LORD BAIDOO

We write to introduce Mr. Frank Lord Baidoo to your outfit. He is a second year M.Phil Social Studies Education student with registration number 8150140008 from the above named Department.

As part of the requirements for the award of the Master of Philosophy degree, he is undertaking a research on “**Voters’ Response to vote buying Incentives: A case study of the Shama District**”.

We wish to assure you that any information provided would be treated confidential.

Thank you.

Yours faithfully,

PATRICIA BERNICE MENSAH

For: Head of Department

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL STUDIES EDUCATION
UNIVERSITY OF EDUCATION
WINNEBA



Appendix B

UNIVERSITY OF EDUCATION, WINNEBA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL STUDIES EDUCATION

QUESTIONNAIRE

Voter's response to vote buying incentives: A case study of the Shama District.

Dear Sir/ madam,

This questionnaire is designed to seek your views on the relationship between vote buying incentives and voters' decisions during elections. Every information given will be strictly treated confidential. Please do not write your name on any part of the paper. Kindly respond to the questions as sincerely as possible. I appreciate your views and time spent in filling this questionnaire.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Please supply the appropriate information by ticking [] in the appropriate box

1. Gender

Male []

Female []

2. Highest level of education

None []

Basic /JHS []

SHS []

Professional/Training/Vocational []

Diploma []

Tertiary/Degree []

Others, Specify

3. Age

18-20 years []

21-30 years []

31-40 years []

41-50 years []

51-60 years []

61-70 years []

71 and above years []

4. Occupation

a) Unemployed []

b) Student / Apprentice []

c)

Farmer []

d) Trader / Businessman []

e) Artisan []

f) Fisherman []

g) Civil Servant []

h.) Others

5. Level of income per month

a) Less than GH¢100.00 []

b) GH¢100.00 - GH¢250.00 []

c) GH¢251.00 - GH¢500.00 []

d) GH¢501.00 - GH¢750.00 []

e) GH¢751.00 - GH¢1000.00 []

f) More than GH¢1000.00 []

6. Voter status

Registered voter []

Unregistered voter []

Read each of the statements below. There are four responses; Strongly Disagree (SD), Disagree (D), Agree (A), and Strongly Agree (SA). Indicate your level of agreement by ticking [√]any of the four options.

THE RANGE OF INCENTIVES USED TO BUY VOTES

N ^o	STATEMENT	YES	NO
7	I have once been offered a gift/an incentive by a political party or a candidate.		
8	I know someone who has benefitted from an incentive from a political party		
9	My community benefitted from a project prior to the elections.		

N ^o	STATEMENT	SD	D	A	SA
10	I have received a gift or an incentive from the same party more than once				
11	I have ever received gifts from multiple parties.				

12. Please specify what you received from the party or its candidate

CONDITIONS ATTACHED TO VOTE BUYING INCENTIVES(This section is to be completed by only those who have ever received a gift/ incentive)

N ^o	STATEMENT	SD	D	A	SA
13	A condition was attached to my incentive or gift.				
14	I was told to snap a picture of my ballot.				
15	I was given an incentive and made to swear to go by the contract.				
16	I was given a ballot already thumbprinted and was told to return the one the EC officials would give to me to their agent.				
17	I was given an incentive and was told to spoil my ballot.				
18	I was told that if I collect the incentive and do not do per the contract I will die				
19	I rejected the incentive because of the condition attached to it				

20. Please specify any other condition that was attached to your gift/incentive

.....

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VOTE BUYING INCENTIVES AND VOTERS' DECISIONS


N ^o	STATEMENT	YES		NO	
		SD	D	A	SA
21	I voted in the last presidential and parliamentary elections				
	STATEMENT	SD	D	A	SA
22	I am affiliated to a particular political party				
23	I am not aware political parties give out gifts to attract votes				
24	One should expect the party s/he supports to give him/her some gift before s/he votes for them.				
25	One should vote for a certain party / candidate because of a gift they offered him/her.				
26	A gift from a political party should influence one's vote				
27	Even if I get an incentive from a party, I would still vote with my conscience				
28	Voting for a party should depend on issues than gifts/incentives.				
29	A swing voter should vote for the party that offers one gift(s).				
30	If I am paid to vote for a certain party/candidate and I would do just that.				

31	I will vote for the party I support but would accept any incentive from any party				
32	One should abstain from voting in an election after being paid to do just that.				
33	I am ready to vote for any party/candidate that would buy my vote.				
34	I will vote for a party I am opposed to because I was offered an incentive to do just that.				
35	If a party pays me so that I do not turn out and vote I would do just that.				
36	A developmental project in my community influenced my vote				

KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAWS ON VOTE BUYING

N ^o	STATEMENT	SD	D	A	SA
37	It is lawful to receive an offer from a party or candidate on condition of voting for them.				
38	It is lawful for a party to ask a voter to vote for a party with a gift.				
49	Politicians are thieves and even though I know it is illegal I would also not reject a gift from them				
40	I am aware giving or receiving incentives from a party to vote for their candidate is an offence punishable by law.				

41	My vote is my property and I can exchange it for a gift from a party.				
42	It is not wrong to show my ballot to the one who paid for my vote after casting my vote.				
43	The law allows a voter to reveal his/her ballot to the one who paid for his/her vote.				
44	Revealing my ballot after voting is acceptable by the constitution.				
45	I am ready to report any party or candidate that offers me an incentive to the police.				



Thank you

Appendix C

UNIVERSITY OF EDUCATION, WINNEBA

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL STUDIES

Thesis Interview Guide

The research examines Voters' response to vote buying incentives in the Shama district. I would be grateful if you could answer these questions for me in order to achieve this objective. Your responses would be treated confidential.

1. Are you a registered voter?
2. What is your affiliation to a political party?
3. Are you aware political parties give out gifts/incentives to attract votes?
4. Have you ever benefitted from a gift or an incentive from a politician or a party?
5. What did the party/candidate give you?
6. Do you know any person who has ever benefitted from such gifts/incentives?
7. Was there any condition attached to your gift/incentive?
8. What was the condition?
9. Did the condition tell you to spoil your ballot?
10. Were you told not to turn out and vote?
11. Did you honour the condition or ignore it?
12. What role did the incentive play in your voting decision?
13. Did your community benefit from any project prior to the elections?
14. How did that project influence your vote?
15. Are you aware of what the constitution say about vote buying?
16. Tell me anything you know the constitution say about vote buying

17. Did you know one can be penalized by a court for giving/receiving a gift/incentive from a party on condition of voting for them?
18. What is your readiness in reporting someone who approaches you with a vote buying incentive to the police?



Appendix D

UNIVERSITY OF EDUCATION, WINNEBA

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL STUDIES

Thesis Interview Guide

The research examines Voters' response to vote buying incentives in the Shama district. I would be grateful if you could answer these questions for me in order to achieve this objective. Your responses would be treated confidential.

1. Are you a political party activist?
2. What position do you hold in your party?
3. Have you been part in distributing gifts or incentives to voters?
4. How long have you been doing that?
5. What are the items that you normally give out?
6. Do voters vote for you when you give them the incentives?
7. When you give the gift do you attach any condition?
8. What are some of the conditions you attach to the incentives to ensure voters vote for your party/candidate?
9. Why do you attach conditions to the incentives?
10. Do the conditions work for you?
11. Are you aware of the position of the constitution on vote buying?
12. What do you know about the laws on vote buying?
13. Are you aware that the laws are against giving a gift, an offer or an incentive to someone to vote for a party or candidate?