


UNIVERSITY OF EDUCATION, WINNEBA

**DELEGATES' VIEWS ON MONETISATION OF PRIMARIES: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF NDC AND NPP PARLIAMENTARY
PRIMARIES IN YUNYOO CONSTITUENCY**



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**A Thesis in the Department of Political Science Education,
Faculty of Social Sciences Education, submitted to the School of
Graduate Studies in partial fulfilment**

**of the requirements for the award of the degree of
Master of Philosophy
(Political Science Education)
in the University of Education, Winneba**

JULY, 2023

DECLARATION

Student's Declaration


I, **Ernest Bawanin**, affirm that, apart from the references to other people's work that have been properly cited, this thesis represents my own original research. It has not been submitted, in whole or in part, for any other degree at this university or elsewhere.

Signature:

Date:

Supervisor's Declaration

I certify that, the preparation and presentation of this thesis was supervised in accordance with the guidelines on supervision of thesis as laid down by the School of Graduate Studies, University of Education, Winneba.



Name of Supervisor: DR. BRAKO ISAAC

Signature:

Date:

DEDICATION

This thesis is lovingly dedicated to the memory of my dearly departed daughter,

Nancy Nyannube Guat.



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The list of people who deserve acknowledgment is endless. It would be neglectful not to recognize at least some of the individuals who assisted me in numerous ways to finish this work.

I offer my sincere thanks to my supervisor, Dr. Brako Isaac, Senior Lecturer and Author in the Department of Political Science at the University of Education, Winneba, for the invaluable guidance. His invaluable insights, thorough guidance, corrections, provision of relevant materials, and useful suggestions were instrumental in shaping the content and structure of this research. Dr. Brako's constant encouragement to finish quickly was a critical motivator, and without him, this work would not have been feasible.

I would also like to convey my profound appreciation to my wife, Madam Vera Teni, who has been a pillar of support and a prayer warrior during my illness. My absence from home throughout my studies and subsequent ill health deprived her and our lovely children, Loom and Paaki, of the care and attention they needed. I am delighted to acknowledge their patience and understanding.

My parents, Mr. and Mrs. Guat, deserve endless thanks for their unwavering support and for giving me with an education.

I am similarly, grateful to my former headmasters, Mr. Ahmed Bukari, Mr. Fuseini Mohammed, and Mr. Alidu Alhassan, for their encouragement and the opportunities they afforded me to pursue further studies.

Special thanks to my senior brother, Emmanuel Ladinin, as well as Yushawu, Tony, and Chrispin, for their immense support.

Finally, I extend tons of gratitude to my course mates: Hallo, Ntim, Hussain, Fred, Felix, Dakwah, Alice, Alex, among others. Your consistent motivation was invaluable.

Thanks to everyone for your backing and positive reinforcement.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION	iii
DEDICATION	iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS	vi
LIST OF TABLES	viii
LIST OF FIGURES	ix
LIST OF ACRONYMS	x
ABSTRACT	xi
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Background to the Study	1
1.2 Statement of the Problem	4
1.3 Purpose of the Study	6
1.4 Research Objectives	6
1.5 Research Questions	6
1.6 Scope and Delimitation	7
1.7 Organization of the Study	7
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW	9
2.1 Introduction	9
2.2 Conceptual Perspectives of Monetisation	9
2.3 Vote Buying	11
2.4 Funding for political parties	23
2.5 Causes of Monetisation	33
2.6 Implications of Monetisation on Democracy	37
2.7 The Impact of Financial Influence on the Integrity and Equity of the Primary Election Process	40
2.8 How to Address the Monetization of Parliamentary Primaries from the Perspectives of Delegates	42
2.9 Theoretical Framework	44

2.10 Gaps in the Literature	52
2.11 Summary	56
CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODS	57
3.1 Overview	57
3.2 Philosophical World View	57
3.3 Research Approach	58
3.4 Research Design	60
3.5 Population	62
3.6 Sample	62
3.7 Sampling Technique	62
3.8 Research Instruments	64
3.9 Data Collection Procedure	64
3.10 Data Sources and Types	65
3.11 Data Analysis	66
CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION	71
4.1 Introduction	71
4.2 Causes of Monetisation	75
4.3 Implications/Effects of Monetization on Democracy	78
4.4 Impact of Monetary Influence on the Integrity and Fairness of the Primary Process	81
4.5 Addressing the Monetization of Parliamentary Primaries	82
CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS	86
5.1 Introduction	86
5.2 Summary of the Study	86
5.3 Conclusion	93
5.4 Recommendations	94
5.5 Limitations	95
REFERENCES	97
APPENDICES	105

LIST OF TABLES

Table 4.1: Demographic Characteristics of sex of Participants	71
Table 4.2: Demographic Details Regarding the Age of participants	72
Table 4.3: Demographic Information on Participants' Marital Status	72
Table 4.4: Demographic Characteristics Relating to the Highest Educational Attainment of Respondents	73



LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 3.1: Yunyoo Nasuan District Map	70
Figure 4.1	73
Figure 4.2	74
Figure 4.3	74
Figure 4.4	75



LIST OF ACRONYMS

EC	:	Electoral Commission
IEA	:	Institute of Economic Affairs
NER	:	North East Region
NPP	:	New Patriotic Party
NDC	:	National Democratic Congress
CDD	:	Center for Democratic Development
IDEG	:	Institute for Democratic Governance
DCE	:	District Chief Executive
OECD	:	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
GNA	:	Ghana News Agency
NIF	:	National Integrity Fund
IFES	:	Institute for Free Elections and Democracy
EMB	:	Election Management Bodies
UNCAC	:	United Nations Convention against Corruption
SADC	:	Southern African Development Community
UEW	:	University of Education, Winneba
IDEA	:	International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
NCCE	:	National Commission for Civic Education

ABSTRACT

The current study explores delegates' views and nuanced perspectives on the monetization of parliamentary primaries in the Yunyoo Constituency of the North East region of Ghana. Utilizing qualitative research methods, including detailed interviews, the study examines the impact of monetization on the country's democracy and the overall functioning of the political system. The findings reveal that delegates perceive monetization as a significant challenge to the electoral process, leading to corruption, unfairness, and bias in candidate selection, ultimately undermining the political system. The study identifies several factors fueling the monetization of parliamentary primaries, including endemic poverty, rising inequality, the insatiable quest for money by prospective voters, failed promises, the perception of politics as a business, and the absence of government financial support for political parties and their candidates, along with weak regulation of political financing. The practical implications of these findings for electoral reform and democratic governance in Ghana are discussed. The study highlights the need for demonetization, the establishment of more transparent and accountable party financing mechanisms, and reforms that strengthen the role and independence of delegates in the primary election process.



CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Politicians engage in zero-sum politics by employing various strategies, including the use of financial incentives, material resources and other unconstitutional means in electoral politics. In Ghanaian politics, there is an increasing trend that undermines the core principles of democracy. In democratic systems, politics thrives on active popular participation through free, fair, periodic, and credible intra-party and general elections. These democratic norms are typically observed in more advanced democracies, where both politicians and voters have embraced a strong civic democratic culture.

Thus, the practice of swaying voters through financial incentives and material goods to secure political power remains prevalent in Ghana's political landscape, and it has the potential to exacerbate corruption within the country. This stems from the fact that, whatever resources expended on the electorate, the politician, after having had access to political power, will recoup his investment by diverting public funds for personal gains. Such practice will deny the masses meaningful infrastructure projects capable of improving their living standards. Samura (2009) argued that the genuine development priorities of a country are frequently overlooked in favor of those that provide personal benefits to decision-makers, highlighting this viewpoint. The nation's democracy is under grave danger due to the growing commercialization of politics.

For political gain, politicians have begun using monetary incentives and other forms of physical inducement to sway voters. Democratic elections, which ought to showcase the competition of ideas, policies, and plans, are currently marked by the exchange of cash and other presents like rice bags and motorcycles (GNA, 2020). It has become

routine for political rivals to accuse each other of vote-buying during elections, yet no measures have been taken to address this issue. Many political analysts have warned that if this trend continues, money will become the primary factor in electing individuals to Parliament, overshadowing the essential legislative role of rulemaking.

A key element of democracy is a transparent process for selecting and replacing government officials through free and fair elections (Diamond, 2004). Thus, elections that are free from malpractice are essential to the foundation of democracy (Nwankwo et al., 2017).

Ojo (2008) asserts, elections facilitate a peaceful transfer of power and bestow political legitimacy on the government. Moreover, they engage citizens actively in political decision-making to foster accountability and responsibility. However, in many African countries, elections often fall short of being free and fair, with issues such as violence and vote-buying frequently occurring (Bratton, 2008). In a well-functioning democracy, as Heywood (2007) notes, seeking electoral support should involve open debate and reasoned arguments about the competence of political candidates. Individuals running for office are expected to seek public support by offering policies that serve the common good and persuading the median voter (Nichter, 2008). The electorate selects the candidate whose policies and programs best match their preferences. Nonetheless, due to the intense competition in elections, political candidates often use various strategies to achieve victory, such as violence, coercion, deceit, and electoral fraud (Cletus, 2017). When these methods fail, vote-buying becomes a common practice.

Political competitors frequently turn to financial and material incentives rather than presenting ideas, policies, and practical solutions that could improve citizens' lives,

using these tactics to secure victories in primaries (Debrah, 2018). The monetisation of electoral politics is a significant concern in Ghana. The current situation has made politics the domain of the wealthy, due to the significant expenses involved with running a campaign mean only those with substantial financial resources can participate. If not properly managed, the monetisation of political contests will lead to the election of individuals with radical ideas to Parliament, resulting in the creation of radical laws, potential public rebellion, and destabilization of the country (Center for Democratic Development, 2018). Cheeseman (2015) noted that for many years, the path to democratic maturity in developing countries has been marred by vote-buying. Furthermore, Cheeseman (2015) contended that, despite advancements in voter education and the expansion of the middle class in Ghana, vote-buying continues to be a significant aspect of the country's electoral politics and democratic processes. Other scholars, including Lindberg (2003), Frimpong (2008), and Gadjanova (2017), share this view. However, most of these studies concentrate on national elections and give limited consideration to delegates' perspectives on the role of monetization dynamics in parliamentary primaries and the reasons party elites favor redistributive politics. The works by the Center for Democratic Development (2018) and Ichino & Nathan (2013) are among the most comprehensive studies on vote-buying during internal party elections in Ghana, emphasizing the widespread clientelism and patronage instead of competition based on ideas and policies.

Other scholars argue the monetization of politics is often linked to high levels of poverty. Politicians frequently target economically disadvantaged delegates for vote-buying, as they are more susceptible to financial incentives (Kramon, 2009). According to Ichino and Nathan (2012), the main method of rivalry during party primaries in Ghana is the dispersal of cash and gifts.

Research on the monetisation of electoral politics in Ghana has helped to clarify the concept of monetisation, provide evidence of its prevalence, explore party financing, examine the costs of contesting parliamentary primary elections, address public disenchantment, and propose measures for demonetizing electoral politics. However, there has been little focus on understanding delegates' views and nuanced perspectives on the monetisation of parliamentary primaries and its impact on democracy. Therefore, this study seeks to investigate how delegates perceive and interpret monetisation of parliamentary primaries in the Yunyoo Constituency as a case example.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The monetisation of elections has become a common term in Ghana (Ichino and Nathan, 2012). It is prevalent among both the NDC and NPP, particularly during primary elections for political leaders such as presidential and parliamentary candidates. Recently, even elections for regional, constituency, branch executives, and ward coordinators have been marred by monetisation issues. In both developed and developing democracies, people tend to vote expecting the dividends of democracy in return, such as good leadership, infrastructure, security, quality education, and employment. When these dividends are not delivered, the electorate often turns to vote trading for monetary gratification and other benefits, disregarding the consequences for democracy (Lindberg, 2010).

The monetisation of political campaigning and government is a worldwide issue (Onah & Nwali, 2018), with a more pronounced impact on African politics compared to other continents (Bryan & Baer, 2005).

Parliamentary primary elections have become so competitive and expensive that both candidates seeking parliamentary positions and current officeholders frequently gather

campaign funds from abroad (Lindberg, 2010). The expenses associated with these campaigns often result in nominees having insufficient resources for the general elections (Ichino & Nathan, 2010). In Ghana, the monetisation of electoral politics is a major concern. The perception of monetisation and vote-buying from the local to the countrywide level has gained attention recently. The Center for Democratic Development (CDD, 2018) and the Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG, 2020) have expressed concern over the increasing trend of monetary inducements in Ghanaian politics. According to the CDD, this unchecked phenomenon could lead to the rise of powerful "godfathers" who could covertly control the country by sponsoring politicians to power with money.

A latest report by the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, in collaboration with CDD (Suhuyini, 2018), disclosed that securing a party's primary nomination for parliamentary elections requires a minimum of \$86,000 for a Member of Parliament. This report is one of the few that extensively explores this aspect. What remains largely unexplored in the discourse on the monetisation of electoral politics in Ghana is how delegates perceive and interpret the monetisation of primary elections and its impact on democracy. Therefore, our understanding of the monetisation of electoral politics in Ghana appears to have overlooked the perceptions of primary election delegates and the meaning they assign to this monetisation and its impact on the country's democracy.

What has been largely overlooked in the literature are the nuanced views and perspectives of party delegates on the monetisation of primaries. This study seeks to address this significant gap by focusing on the insights of political party insiders, often neglected in studies of political institutions, using the Yunyoo Constituency as a case study. Investigating the monetisation of parliamentary primaries in the Yunyoo Constituency of the North East Region of Ghana is essential to addressing this political

issue and preventing it from permeating every aspect of political life. If left unaddressed, this challenge could impede the advancement of Ghana's democracy in the future. This scenario forms the basis of this research.

1.3 Purpose of the Study

The main goal of this study was to examine the nuanced views and perspectives of delegates from the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) regarding the monetization of parliamentary primaries in the Yunyoo Constituency and to propose suitable measures to address or resolve this issue.

1.4 Research Objectives

The study's specific objectives are:

1. To examine delegates' views on the causes of the monetisation of parliamentary primaries in the Yunyoo Constituency.
2. To assess delegates' views on the implications of monetisation of parliamentary primaries for the country's democracy.
3. To understand delegates' views on how financial influence affects the integrity and equity of the primary election process in the Yunyoo Constituency.
4. To explore delegates' views on measures that can be implemented to address the problem of monetisation of parliamentary primaries.

1.5 Research Questions

The study was directed by the following research questions:

1. What are the causes of the monetisation of parliamentary primaries in the Yunyoo Constituency?
2. What are the implications of monetisation of parliamentary primaries for the country's democracy?

3. How does monetisation affect the integrity and equity of the primary process in the Yunyoo Constituency?
4. What measures should be put in place to eliminate or reduce the monetisation of parliamentary primaries?

1.6 Scope and Delimitation

The study was limited to the Yunyoo Constituency and specifically examined the nuanced views and perspectives of delegates regarding the monetisation of parliamentary primaries. It focused exclusively on interviewing delegates from both the NPP and NDC parliamentary primaries within the Yunyoo Constituency. Consequently, delegates from presidential primaries and other political party's parliamentary primaries were not included in the study.

1.7 Organization of the Study

The study is structured into five chapters:

Chapter One: This chapter includes the study's background, research problem, purpose, research questions and objectives, as well as the scope.

Chapter Two: This chapter outlines the theoretical framework and examines pertinent literature. It is divided into two sections. The first section reviews literature related to the key issues, including the concepts of monetisation, vote-buying, political party financing, vulnerability factors for monetisation, the implications of the monetisation of parliamentary primaries on democracy, the effects of monetary influence on the electorate's choice of candidates, and strategies to address the monetisation of parliamentary primaries. The second part discusses election theories that serve as an interpretive guide for the study, aiding in understanding the nuanced views and perspectives of delegates.

Chapter Three: This chapter addresses the research methodology, starting with an explanation of the philosophical worldview guiding the study and the reasons for employing qualitative methods. It justifies the choice of data collection and analysis techniques and details the methods used, including the research design, population, sample size, sampling methods, and the procedures and tools for data collection and analysis.

Chapter Four: This chapter provides the analysis of the study's data.

Chapter Five: This chapter reviews the key findings, summarizes the results, draws conclusions, and presents recommendations. It also emphasizes the research's contribution to existing knowledge and offers suggestions for future studies.



CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW


2.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the theoretical framework and examines the pertinent existing literature related to the study. Starting with the conceptual perspectives of monetisation, the chapter is organized into sub-themes: vote buying, political party financing, the implications of the monetization of parliamentary primaries on democracy, how monetary influence affect the integrity and fairness of primary election procedure and strategies to address the monetisation of primaries from the perspectives of delegates. The theoretical framework is presented alongside the literature review, which highlights the gaps that this study seeks to address.

2.2 Conceptual Perspectives of Monetisation

According to IDEG (2020), monetisation in politics refers to the significant rise in the expenses associated with participating in politics or running for political office. This occurs when money, rather than the will of the people, determines who controls the nation, a phenomenon known in Ghana as "moneycracy." Broadly, monetisation involves converting something into money. In banking, it refers to converting assets into legal tender, and informally, it means exchanging possessions for cash equivalents (IDEG, 2020). In economic theory, monetization refers to converting an asset into cash or legal tender. (IDEG, 2020). Similarly, in politics, Monetization occurs when cash, rather than ideas and policies, becomes the currency for accessing and attaining political power (IDEG, 2020). Votes are mobilized not by superior policy alternatives but by the financial strength of candidates. This refers to the practice of offering cash and other incentive rewards to voters in exchange for their votes, commonly referred to as vote-buying in Ghana.

For this study, monetisation is defined as the practice where political aspirants use monetary rewards and material items to influence voters' decisions. In developing democracies such as Ghana, vote-buying has been a notable issue since the introduction of party primaries via the delegate system (International IDEA, 2016). This practice has become a characteristic of Ghanaian democracy, especially within the National Democratic Congress and the New Patriotic Party where accusations of vote-buying during internal primaries are common (IDEG, 2020). Scholars and political scientists have long worried that monetisation distorts and subverts the electorate's will. Recently, the scientific community has shown increased interest in the monetisation of electoral politics, especially at the parliamentary level, where a few delegates select candidates for general elections.



Monetisation is a global phenomenon and a trend in today's political systems, using various methods to manipulate delegates through monetary appeals. Asante and Kunnath (2008) identify three key cost components in running for parliamentary or presidential office in Ghana: the expenses associated with securing victory in party primaries, the costs of winning general elections, and the financial obligations incurred after being elected. Campaigns, media advertisements, party worker payments, and donations are major expenses. Consequently, both parliamentary and presidential elections in Ghana have seen the frequent use of financial incentives during intra-party contests and general elections. These contests often rely on personal votes, with candidates targeting delegates by offering different amounts of money depending on their financial resources.

Monetisation has become more pronounced among the NDC and NPP recently. Several factors drive monetisation or vote-buying in electoral politics. The system of using delegates in parliamentary and presidential elections, where only a small number of

chosen party members cast votes, exacerbates vote-buying by raising the cost of votes due to their scarcity. Furthermore, the extent of vote-buying and selling is influenced by the economic, social, and political status of the candidates, with wealthier individuals more inclined to participate in vote-buying because of their perceived financial advantage.

This study aims to understand the nuanced views and perspectives of delegates on monetisation within the framework of vote-buying practices in Ghana using the Yunyoo Constituency as a case study.

2.3 Vote Buying

In the last ten years, the term "vote buying" has become more frequently used in academic and media discussions. Vote buying can be broadly defined as the act of exchanging votes for monetary or material rewards, whether those rewards are immediate or anticipated. This suggests that votes are treated as commodities that can be bought or sold for personal benefit. If viewed this way, the ethical implications of buying or selling votes can be questioned. Sha (2006) describes vote-buying as “any method of persuasion where one person offers financial benefits to another with the aim of affecting their vote.” Another definition characterizes vote buying as “a gift or gratuity given to influence the actions or behavior of the recipient, particularly money or other forms of significant reward provided or promised in exchange for betraying trust or performing a duty corruptly, such as voting in a particular way.” Bello-Imam (2007) views vote buying as a type of bribery where money or other rewards are offered in exchange for voting according to specific instructions.

Vote buying can manifest in several ways. These include: offering money or goods to local political elites to secure block votes at specific polling stations or constituencies;

providing items like clothing, cutlasses, televisions, refrigerators, salt, iron rods, cement, sugar, and foodstuffs towards or electoral branches to attract votes; purchasing motorbikes or covering admission and school fees for local delegates or their families in exchange for votes; bribing security agents or electoral officers to facilitate or aid in electoral fraud; and hiring political thugs to steal ballot boxes. The most commonly referenced definition by Etzioni-Halevy (1989) sees vote buying as “the trade of personal material rewards for political backing” highlighting the individual rewards or tangible benefits provided to voters in return for their political endorsement.

Vote buying entails offering voters presents or rewards to persuade them to cast their votes in favor of the giver or candidate. This practice is perceived as a transaction in which voters receive items for their personal use and, in return, are expected to vote for the candidates or parties that provided these items. According to Etzioni-Halevy, this process resembles a contract or auction, where the voter essentially sells their cast their vote for the highest offer (Schaffer, 2002).

Researchers have attempted to define the concept due to its varied interpretations across different countries, shaped by historical, cultural, and political factors, as well as electoral systems (Schaffer, 2007). Vote buying, a form of pork barrel politics, provides private benefits aimed specifically at individuals (Lehoucq, 2007).

Nichter (2014) defines vote buying as an exchange between a candidate and electorate during an election period. This transaction can involve any type of monetary, tangible or pledged reward offered by a candidate, political party, representative, or backer to influence a voter's choice to either cast or withhold their vote, with the goal of enhancing the likelihood of a particular candidate winning the election. In essence, any

instant or pledged reward intended to influence voting behavior is considered vote buying.

Fox (1994) similarly defines vote buying as “exchanging political rights for tangible benefits,” emphasizing the transaction where a voter sells their right to vote in exchange for benefits.

Bryan (2005) broadens the concept by defining it as “using financial incentives and direct advantages to sway voters” explicitly including money as well as other tangible goods like food. According to Bryan, voters are offered money and direct benefits to influence their voting decisions or to abstain from voting altogether. Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes (2004) define vote buying as a practice where candidates provide private goods, such as money and presents, to gain electoral favor or boost voter turnout. They concentrate on energizing voters, particularly party loyalists and undecided voters, to come out in large numbers and cast their ballots for the party or candidate.

Schaffer and Schedler (2005) further elaborate on the transactional nature of vote buying, emphasizing that it involves a reciprocal exchange between politicians (buyers) and voters (sellers). They argue that a successful transaction occurs when both parties fulfill their roles: politicians provide money, and voters cast their votes in favor of the politician. If voters accept the money but vote according to their original preferences, the transaction fails, resulting in a one-sided benefit for the voter. Understanding this exchange is crucial for analyzing voter turnout, as it sheds light on political engagement and the electorate's view of their political influence. By examining voter turnout, electoral bodies can evaluate and enhance their election processes to promote greater voter participation.

Schaffer and Schedler (2005) propose that if we adopt a literal understanding of the term anchored in economic exchange, vote buying can be defined as a market transaction in which parties, candidates, or intermediaries pay (in cash or kind) for "electoral services" provided by individual citizens. These electoral services include either casting a favorable vote or refraining from voting altogether. They view vote buying as a market exchange where the commodity being traded votes carries a well-defined institutional meaning. Voters, in this transaction, are essentially engaged to provide electoral services, such as supporters and swing voters turning out in large numbers to vote for a party, for which they are rewarded. Conversely, opposition supporters may be paid to abstain from voting.

Schaffer and Schedler describe votes as formal expressions of preference by individual members of decision-making bodies. They identify two types of barriers that can hinder vote buying: objective and inter-subjective. Objective barriers stem from the uncertainty surrounding seller compliance, given that vote buying is illegal and does not take place within a conventional market governed by social and legal norms. Inter-subjective barriers, on the other hand, arise from cultural variations in the perception and practice of vote buying.

Schaffer (2007) notes that vote buying entails providing voters with small tangible items, such as money or food, shortly before an election to try to secure their votes. He highlights that while the incentive in vote buying holds monetary value, it is not limited to cash alone and can also include other tangible goods. Voters are given these incentives before they cast their votes as part of the agreement.

Although some cultures and sources limit vote buying to the distribution of cash, others encompass a broader range of items. Schaffer (2007) observes that political agents

frequently offer various goods and services as vote-buying incentives, including rice, chickens, whiskey, clothing, soccer balls, Viagra, haircuts, and teeth cleaning. These incentives can have different meanings for both the giver and the recipient. Voters might interpret these incentives in various ways, and the intent behind the gift may not always be clearly communicated. An agent might view the incentive as a binding payment, whereas the voter might see it as a "not legally binding" gift (Schaffer & Schedler, 2005).

Nugent (2007) argues that voters' understanding of vote buying is shaped by their perceptions of the practice. It is crucial to examine the various interpretations of vote-buying incentives or gifts for both the donors and the recipients. For some voters, receiving such incentives conveys a positive message, reinforcing the idea that understanding these practices requires considering the perspectives of all parties involved.

On the other hand, not distributing material resources can send a negative message to voters. Nugent (2007) suggests that when a candidate does not provide such resources during their campaign, it can imply that the candidate, whose wealth and lifestyle may greatly differ from those of the voters, is disconnected from the needs of less affluent constituents. In this context, avoiding vote buying can be disadvantageous compared to opponents who are actively engaged in the practice.

Kramon (2011) argues that vote buying reveals a candidate's readiness and capability to offer small, private goods that are greatly appreciated by poor voters. Politicians engage in vote buying to show their credibility in providing specific, targeted, or patronage goods to impoverished voters. A candidate who invests heavily in vote buying is viewed as more likely to deliver future benefits to low-income constituents.

Economically disadvantaged and less formally educated voters are often targeted in vote buying because they are more significantly affected by the provision of gifts. Parties prioritize purchasing the votes of poorer voters before trying to buy those of wealthier individuals (Stokes, 2005). For instance, Bratton (2008) notes that in Nigeria's 2007 elections, the typical amount given to voters was \$4. This economic strategy makes poorer voters primary targets for vote buying by parties aiming to enhance their electoral prospects, as the same resources can secure more votes from poorer voters than from wealthier ones.

Political cynicism also contributes to vote selling. Ayoade (2006) explains that the people's lost hope due to politicians' failed promises leads them to accept election gifts as the only way to receive any benefits from democracy. Ojo (2008) states that by accepting gifts, voters are essentially asking for payoffs, justifying politicians in prioritizing private interests over the common good. This creates a gap between true democracy and the flawed system observed in Ghana.

In summary, vote buying often serves as a more compelling motivator for poor voters than the promise of public goods, as they are frequently overlooked in public goods distribution. Desposato (2007) observes that, on average, poor voters prefer immediate private goods to delayed public goods. Without other income sources, it is improbable that poor voters will reject vote-buying incentives (Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros, & Estevez, 2007).

Vote buying, which involves using money and direct benefits to sway voters, is a widespread issue among political elites. The concept of vote buying spans from traditional party campaigning and legitimate party appeals to systematic corruption (Bryan & Baer, 2008). As a result, the political establishment is frequently perceived

as a group of affluent individuals making policy decisions driven by personal interests rather than the public good. Clientelist exchanges are pivotal in political interactions across regions including Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia, and South America (Beck, 2008; Van Klinken, 2009; van de Walle, 2007).

Historically, vote buying was prevalent in the nineteenth-century United States, especially in cities like Chicago, New York, and Newark, where votes were traded for cash, food, alcohol, healthcare, and other benefits (Stokes et al., 2013). According to Bense (2004), voters would exchange a party ticket for items such as whiskey, boots, or money. Modern instances of vote buying and selling in American elections still occur. For instance, Campbell (2005) reports that a Democratic leader in Logan County, West Virginia, accepted \$35,000 in cash to support Senator Kennedy, using the funds to purchase votes. Other significant cases include the primary election in Chicago in March 1972 and the elections in the coal-rich Appalachian Mountains during the 1980s (Campbell, 2005).

Non-academic sources also indicate that vote buying was a prevalent form of election scam during the 2010 elections (Fahrenthold, 2012). Additionally, vote buying continues to be widespread even in developed countries (Leight, Pande, & Ralston, 2016). Clientelism, which has a deep-rooted history extending to the Roman Republic (Yakobson, 1995), remains a common practice globally (Schaffer, 2007). Scholarly research has documented vote buying strategies in various countries, including Argentina (Brusco, Nazareno, & Stokes, 2004; Stokes, 2005).

Political clientelism occurs when voters, campaign team members, or other individuals provide electoral support to politicians in exchange for personal favors or material rewards. This frequently involves the distribution of goods, favors, or payments to

individuals or small clusters of voters, who are then expected to cast their votes in return. At the grassroots level, interactions among ordinary citizens, party workers, community leaders, and political representatives are often marked by the concept of the “politics of the belly” (Bayart, 1993), where political operatives seek to extract tangible rewards from the political system.

Muhtadi (2018) points out that vote buying in Indonesia is significantly greater than other countries for which survey data is available. During the 2014 legislative elections, between 25 and 33 percent of voters equating to 47 to 62 million individuals received payments or gifts. This practice has historical roots, being prevalent in village-head elections in Java since the New Order Period and even earlier (Aspinall & Rohman, 2007). The prevalence of vote buying varies depending on the type of election and the region. In larger electorates, widespread cash payments are less common, making vote buying more frequent in primary elections, where candidates need only a simple majority in a constituency to secure a spot on the parliamentary ticket.

According to Power (2014), giving money to voters does not guarantee their vote, but not giving anything ensures they won't vote for you. Candidates face a dilemma: expenditures on payments from their own resources do not guarantee a triumph, yet they risk being seen as unserious candidates if they don't pay at all. Clientelist politics, often described as "contingent exchange" (Stokes et al., 2013; Hicken, 2011), involves politicians granting benefits either to solicit political support or to reward past support. These payments function as an “entry ticket” (Aspinall et al., 2015).

Clientelist politics is often demand-driven (Nichter & Peress, 2006). Candidates feel compelled to participate due to voter expectations and fear of being outbid by rivals. Ethnographic studies describe clientelist transactions from the voters' perspective,

focusing on conditions that make vote selling likely (Posada-Carbo, 1996; Sabato, 2001; Auyero, 2000; Szwarcberg, 2023; Borges, 2009). Survey-based research investigates matters associated with vote buying, such as the role of incumbency (Wantchekon, 2003), the impact of poverty (Jensen & Justesen, 2014), and the association of vote buying in struggling democracies with lower levels of public spending (Khemani, 2015).

Statistical studies focus on perspectives on vote buying (Bratton, 2008; Weitz-Shapiro, 2012), with most literature considering countries with developing economies and describing vote sellers as low-income individuals (Weitz-Shapiro, 2014), uninformed (Nickerson, 2014), and lacking democratic principles (Carlin & Moseley, 2015).

The subject of vote buying in Africa is so comprehensive that it could easily constitute a book (Ohman, 2014). Ohman considers vote buying to be a straightforward deal where a candidate hands over money in exchange for votes, showcasing their wealth and generosity. Countries like Nigeria, Kenya, and Ghana are often cited for this phenomenon (Bratton, 2008; Vincente, 2008; Kramon & Posner, 2013). Since the early 1970s, when democratic elections gained popularity, vote buying has spread globally. Vincente (2008) noted that vote buying regularly occurs across various regions globally. Wantchekon (2003) argues that electoral politics in Africa are often inherently clientelist, with political elites distributing personal favors to supporters who reciprocate with votes.

In Africa, as in many other regions around the world, vote buying is prevalent. Research on African politics indicates that elections are often marred by ongoing clientelism and vote buying (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997; Lindberg, 2003; Robinson, 2013). Some scholars argue that labeling African elections as clientelist is a Western perspective,

arising from unexamined evaluation with Western political systems (Bratton & Mattes, 2001; Osei, 2012). Nonetheless, much of the existing literature agrees that vote buying is widespread in African elections (Robinson, 2013; Jensen & Justesen, 2014).

In Ghana, vote buying is a widespread problem. Despite Ghana being frequently celebrated as a model of democracy in Africa, the increasing prevalence of electoral clientelism is troubling. Extensive literature addresses vote buying and other electoral misconduct in Ghana and across Africa (Bayart, 1993; Lindberg, 2003; Cammack, 2007; Frimpong, 2008; Cheeseman, 2015). However, much of this research focuses on national elections, with insufficient attention given to parliamentary primaries, which are vital to the study and sustainability of democracy.

Vote buying in Ghana dates back to before the return of democracy in 1992 and has remained pervasive since the beginning of the Fourth Republic. Over the course of seven successive elections, Ghana has worked to move past a period of political turbulence (Gyampo & Paalo, 2019). Significant progress has been attained through constitutional changes, effective management and reforms in the electoral system, building consensus among leaders, engagement of civil society, and a broad spectrum of media voices all of which have contributed to increased citizen engagement in political activities (Lindberg, 2003; Frimpong, 2008; Osei, 2015). Political parties have created codes of conduct to ensure that elections are conducted fairly and peacefully (Frimpong, 2008). Despite these improvements, vote buying continues to be a feature of successive elections in Ghana (Cheeseman, 2015).

Before the 2004 elections and during the initial years of the Fourth Republic, the process for selecting parliamentary candidates and party executives was heavily influenced by political 'godfathers,' ethnicity, tribalism, ballot snatching, physical

violence, and vote rigging (Carbone, 2003). Although these issues still affect elections to some extent (Osei, 2012), vote buying has increasingly drawn the attention of stakeholders and political commentators. Gyampo (2018) points out that vote buying is not a new phenomenon in Ghana. Since 1992, elections, especially internal party elections, have been plagued by vote buying, which undermines the will of the people and obstructs the selection of competent leaders.

Until 2004, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) did not use intense primary elections to choose their parliamentary and presidential candidates. However, in 2004, both parties introduced policies that required parliamentary candidates to be elected by delegates chosen by local administrative committees (Ichino & Nathan, 2012). Many candidates who did not succeed in these elections attribute their losses to vote buying. For instance, during the NPP primaries in July 2020, evidence of vote buying emerged, with some candidates reportedly paying up to GHC3,000 per delegate (Corruption Watch, 2020). Similarly, at the NDC Women's Organizers Conference in 2018, delegates were observed calculating the money they had received from each candidate, indicating that financial incentives played a significant role in influencing voting behavior (The Mirror, 2020). This issue is encapsulated in the phrase "Fear delegates," coined by Kwadwo Owusu Afriyie, the former general secretary of the NPP, following his loss in the Tamale reelection bid (GhanaWeb, 2014).

Candidates frequently use market-like terminology to describe their vote-buying tactics, such as referencing the "current rate" of a vote and labeling electorate as greedy (Aspinall et al., 2017). They often try to match or surpass the payments made by their rivals, resulting in a surge of payments right before the vote. Although some voters may be influenced by the highest bidder, the market-based perspective does not fully account

for the role of money in these exchanges. The culturalist approach to clientelism provides a more comprehensive understanding, as it suggests that cash distribution taps into norms of reciprocity. Through gift-giving, candidates seek to create a sense of obligation among voters, hoping to secure their support in return.

A survey conducted by India's Centre for Media Studies revealed that during the 2009 election in Tamil Nadu, 33.4 percent of some electorate received money from the supporters of the candidates in return for their votes. By 2011, voters were also enticed with household appliances such as blenders and grinders. In addition to these items, voters were offered cash, alcohol, seeds, private parties, and even admission to academic institutions (E.C. of India, 2016). In some villages, local beliefs hold that consuming salt at a specific location creates a sense of obligation to remain loyal to the person associated with that place (Malhotra, 2014).

This study supports findings from empirical research on clientelism and vote-buying in developing nations." For example, Wantchekon (2003) conducted experimental research in Benin, randomly assigning locations for clientelist and public policy campaign messages. The study found that clientelism, where votes are exchanged for future political favors, was more effective for regional and incumbent candidates and less appealing to women, who preferred public policy campaigning. Brusco et al. (2004) presented comprehensive survey-based, non-experimental research on vote buying in Argentina, demonstrating its effectiveness when transactions are enforceable. This study builds on these methods by using qualitative approaches to explore delegates' nuanced views and perspectives of the monetisation of parliamentary primaries and its implications for the country's democracy.

2.4 Funding for political parties

This section examines the relevant literature on the debated topic of funding for political parties, considering political party finance, its sources, nature, and associated problems. The review also discusses arguments in favor of government financial support and the conditions in developing African nations.

Funding for political parties is a critical issue in Africa, advocating for national funding to help lower corruption levels in government. Aryee et al. (2007) argues that reliance on funding from a limited group of wealthy persons or organizations threatens the long-term viability of democracy in Africa. Political party financing is a highly contested issue globally, attracting unclear and ambiguous debates. Ohman (2014) observed that political finance can strengthen political parties and candidates, providing opportunities for more equitable competition.

He also emphasizes that transparent funding for political parties and candidates is essential for combating corruption and preserving public trust in politics. Transparency ensures fairness by revealing improper influence, preventing illegal financial contributions, and promoting rule compliance. Political parties need funds to cover electoral campaigns, operational expenses, overhead costs, maintain their organizational image, mobilize membership, and communicate their platforms (Aryee et al., 2007). Sufficient funding is crucial for ensuring the vitality and competitiveness required for a transparent democracy (Nam-Katoti et al., 2011). Proper financing of political parties is vital for effective governance and reducing corruption, which can otherwise lead to political appointments and contract allocations favoring party financiers (Aryee et al., 2007). Bofo Arthur (1998), as referenced by Aryee et al. (2007), identified a positive link between a party's financial resources, organizational effectiveness, and the functioning of democratic processes.

Scholars have various viewpoints and theoretical propositions on political parties' role in sustaining democratic statecraft. Political parties are viewed as central to democracy because they play a crucial role in both forming governments and developing political leaders at both national and local levels (Bienzen, 2004; Boafo-Arthur, 2003). In a democracy, power and influence emerge from the rivalry and discord between different groups, particularly political parties that vie for parliamentary positions to secure office and validate their actions.

Although political parties were not originally a component of democratic politics, political leaders soon recognized the necessity of organizing joint efforts, which led to the establishment of political parties (Aldrich, 1995).

Political parties are essential to elections, serving as the crucial connection between the public and democratic governance. Many consider democracy inconceivable without political parties because they are vital for democratic competition and representation. Regular elections and political parties provide citizens with meaningful governance choices, political participation avenues, and opportunities for a country's future (NDI, 2017). While there are parties without democracy, such as the Communist Party in China, democracy cannot exist without political parties (Gupta, 2018).

Funding political parties, directly or indirectly through candidates, is a major issue. Perspectives on political party funding are influenced by one's views, understanding, and beliefs about the function that parties serve in a democracy. While political party financing is recognized as crucial for the functioning of democratic governments, the concept is frequently unclear, with unclear definitions and ongoing debates. Essentially, funding for political parties encompasses both monetary and non-monetary resources gathered for election campaigns (Fambom, 2003). According to Ohman and Zainublai

(2009), funding for political parties encompasses the fundraising activities and spending undertaken by parties during elections. Funding for political parties involves using funds for political activities, including elections, and maintaining organizational sustainability through reliable funding sources.

Political party funding is indispensable for modern competitive political systems (Institute of Economic Affairs, 2008; Nassmacher, 2003; Gyampo, 2015). Political parties need access to funds to participate in the political system, yet the influence of money in politics poses a serious threat to democracy globally, with issues ranging from business contributions to election campaigns in the United States to drug money in Latin America and corruption controversies in Asia and Europe (Ohman, 2012). Political Party finance encompasses all financial resources involved in the political system, both lawful and unlawful, used for ongoing party activities and election campaigns. It encompasses how parties and candidates raise money for election campaigns (Senkumba, 2005).

Funding for political parties is essential for sustaining political activities, including running campaigns and being active during non-election periods. Reliable funding is vital for the existence and impact of political parties and candidates in contemporary democracies. Political parties are necessary institutions of modern democracy, requiring substantial funding for their activities (Bienzen, 2004). Insufficient funding has been identified as a weakness among political parties in Ghana (CDD, 2005). Aryee et al. (2007) also linked the organizational challenges of Ghanaian political parties to inadequate funding. The growing organizational demands further exacerbate the need for financial support, requiring a range of fundraising strategies (Shillington, 1992).

Austin (1964) observed that funding for political parties initially relied on voluntary contributions from wealthy individuals, which eventually led to corruption and undue influence in political appointments and contract allocations (Griner & Zovatto, 2005). The financial demands of contemporary political competition are too great for a few individuals to handle alone, resulting in the need for membership fees and levies (Aryee et al., 2007). Nam-Katoti et al. (2011) identified membership dues as a widely used fundraising strategy. Biezen (2003) contends that membership fees do not give members significant influence over the party, though they do not provide all necessary funds. The Political Parties Law (Act 574 of 2000) does not restrict the amount of dues a party can collect, thereby motivating parties to generate funds through marketing and by offering benefits to their contributing members.

2.4.1 Global Perspective

Globally, political party financing primarily comes from two sources: Public (state) funding and private funding are sources of financial support for political parties, with varying prominence across different regions. Public funding involves any contribution, whether monetary or in-kind, provided by the state to cover all or part of political parties' expenses. This is intended to ensure a level playing field for political competition. In both established and emerging democracies, the state frequently subsidizes the costs incurred by political parties and candidates.

In Western European countries such as the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden, public subsidies are awarded to political parties and their candidates based on the number of seats or votes they achieve (Nassmacher, 2003). Since 1988, France has provided financial support to cover the costs of propaganda and campaigning for political parties and candidates. To qualify for a

subsidy during legislative, municipal, and regional elections, candidates must obtain at least 5% of the vote, which then grants them a subsidy covering 50% of the state's election spending limit. Presidential candidates are eligible for a refund amounting to one-third of their legal spending limit (Nassmacher, 2003).

Spain has a more complex system of public funding, with payments made for each seat won in the national parliament's two chambers and financial aid provided for campaign expenses. Grants are also allocated to factions within the 17 regional parliaments. (Nassmacher, 2003). In contrast, in the United Kingdom, public funding mainly takes the form of in-kind support, such as free election broadcasts and postal services during campaign periods. The Political Parties, Elections, and Referendums Act of 2000, however, introduced financial support for policy research by creating a Policy Research Fund, which distributes £2 million annually to registered political parties.

Countries such as Australia, Canada, and the United States also provide public funding for political parties. In Australia, a party that secures at least 4% of all first-preference votes is eligible for public subsidies (Nassmacher, 2003). In Canada, registered political parties that receive 2% of the votes nationwide or 5% in individual electoral districts are reimbursed 22.5% of their documented expenses. Additionally, candidates are eligible for a 50% reimbursement of their election expenses. In the United States, the Presidential Election Campaign Fund covers the campaign expenses for both Republican and Democratic candidates.

In Latin America, the availability of public funding varies by country. Nations such as Brazil, Bolivia, Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Panama provide financial support for policy research conducted by political parties (Zovatto, 2003). Public funding can be either direct, involving cash subsidies, or indirect, such as

providing training. In Asia, public financing for political parties is common in many democracies. Countries such as Indonesia, Japan, the Maldives, Mongolia, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Timor-Leste offer regular subsidies for both election and non-election activities (Falguera et al., 2012). In 2012, South Korea allocated \$41.15 million for election subsidies and offered additional support to parties with female candidates. Japan's major political parties depend significantly on public subsidies, while Bhutan funds political party campaigns entirely through the Public Election Funding Law.

Across Africa, the situation is different. As of 2002, only fourteen out of over 53 African countries provided funding for political parties, with substantial amounts allocated primarily in South Africa, Morocco, and Seychelles (Safu, 2003). South Africa regulates and monitors public funding for political parties, whereas private funding is largely unregulated. The wave of democratization in Africa generally did not encompass comprehensive legal frameworks for public funding of political parties, often benefiting incumbents. Even opposition parties that succeeded in elections often maintained the existing situation regarding public funding. In countries such as Zambia and Uganda, opposition parties have resisted public funding to diminish monetary assistance for rival opposition groups.

Across Ghana, the state provided vehicles to political parties during the 1992 and 1996 elections, but public opposition led to the discontinuation of this support when the New Patriotic Party (NPP) assumed power in 2001. In regions of Africa where legislation for public funding is in place, it often favors incumbents. For example, in Zimbabwe during the 1990s, only parties that obtained at least 10% of the 150 parliamentary seats qualified for state subvention, a threshold unrealistic for under-resourced opposition parties facing systematic risks from the governing ZANU-PF party.

2.4.2 Political Party Financing in Ghana

Across Ghana, the issue of funding for political parties is as old as the Fourth Republic. Despite being a long-standing concern, it remains relevant and largely unaddressed. Some argue that public funding is the only transparent means of supporting political parties. Public funding entails the government offering financial support or other forms of assistance to political parties. Without this support, the significant expenses associated with political activities might enable affluent donors to control the political landscape, thus affecting election outcomes and other important decisions.

The Ghana Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD, 2005) reports that recent political campaign financing has involved donations from illegal activities such as illicit mining, oil smuggling, fraudulent enterprises, and corrupt procurement practices. The Ghana Centre for Democracy and Development's study suggests a strong link between campaign financing and organized crime in Ghana, a concerning phenomenon that risks undermining the governance system. If criminal interests dominate political financing, Ghana's democracy could devolve into a plutocracy, ruled by a few wealthy individuals.

Globally, 59% of countries have enacted laws providing public subsidies to political parties. (Pinto-Duschinsky, 2002). While subsidy rates vary, mature democracies and most Latin American democracies support political party financing. Ghana, despite its robust democratic credentials, does not provide state funding for political parties. Both the 1992 Constitution of Ghana and the Political Parties Act does not contain provisions for public funding. Given its democratic achievements, public funding could be a viable policy for Ghana, but any such decision must consider public opinion.

Occasionally, in Ghana, political parties have their filing fees refunded after elections if they achieve the required minimum vote threshold, effectively subsidizing filing fees.

However, several key questions remain unanswered:

1. What is the method of financing political campaigns in Ghana?
2. How effective is the Electoral Commission's (EC) regulatory oversight?
3. Are political parties effectively serving as instruments for national development?
4. Is it feasible for the government to fund political parties?
5. Should the responsibility for regulating political financing be transferred from the EC to a separate statutory body?
6. Do citizens support government funding for political parties?
7. Should the Political Parties Act, 2000 (Act 574) be amended?
8. How can political parties ensure transparency and inclusivity in the financing of their activities?

A 2005 study conducted by the Ghana Centre for Democratic Development (CDD) revealed that the majority of Ghanaians consider the effective operation of political parties to be essential for strengthening democracy. However, the same study indicated public resistance to government funding of political parties, influenced by the prioritization of social issues such as poverty alleviation, healthcare, and learning over political party funding (Abukari et al., 2015). Additionally, some argue that state funding might make political parties complacent, diminishing their efforts to recruit fresh members and raise funds from the public (Gyampo, 2015).

State subsidies could reduce reliance on wealthy donors and foster a fairer competition for political rivalry. Common sources of political party funding include membership

dues, fundraising activities, donations, and profits from party-owned businesses (Ninsin, 2006). Membership donations are viewed as the most dependable and authentic source, though their effectiveness depends on the size of the party's support base. Donations are also a significant funding source, but they can lead to undue influence on party decisions.

Arguments for state funding include limiting the influence of private money, addressing the disconnection between citizens and politics, creating a fair playing field, and managing the rising costs of political activities (Dalton, R. J., Farrell, D. M., & McAllister, I., 2000; Mair & van Biezen, 2001; Gunlicks, 1993). Political campaigns have grown more costly due to the increased use of mass media and aggressive campaign strategies (Mair, 1994; Farrell, 2002; Pinto-Duschinsky, 1990; Pinto-Duschinsky, 2002). State funding is considered essential to sustain the democratic system.

According to the Electoral Knowledge Network (2017), about 60% of countries provide direct public funding for political parties, while 25% do not receive any support. In some fragile democracies, political parties receive foreign aid to develop their manifestos, constitutions, and campaigning skills (Foresti, 2010). Most countries have laws governing political finance, including restrictions on donations from specific sources, spending caps, and provisions for public funding (International IDEA, 2012). Nevertheless, enforcement is a major issue, as many political parties and candidates continue to breach these regulations without consequence (Ohman, 2012).

Across Africa, political finance regulations exist but are often poorly enforced. Campaigns are primarily financed by candidates rather than political parties and are significantly shaped by clientelist networks (International IDEA, 2012). Issues such as

access to funds, misuse of state resources, vote-buying, illegal funding, and reliance on external funding are common issues. The majority of African countries, with the exception of Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gambia, Somalia, and South Sudan, have endorsed the 2005 United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), which requires transparency in the funding of political parties.

Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AUCPCC) offer additional guidance on regulations related to political finance. Despite these frameworks, compliance and enforcement are lacking. Ghana transitioned back to multiparty politics in 1992, with political party regulations specified in Article 55 of the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana and the Political Parties Act (2000). However, public funding of political parties has faced resistance. Countries like Botswana, Nigeria, and Egypt have also resisted or discontinued public funding, while others like South Africa, Morocco, and Tanzania provide state funding.

In practice, compliance with political finance regulations is poor, with larger parties suspected of receiving foreign funding in violation of the constitution (Bryan & Baer, 2005). Transparency and accountability in political party fund management are generally lacking. While African countries have various political finance regulations, the main issue lies in their implementation.

In conclusion, while regulations exist across Africa, effective oversight and enforcement are insufficient, leading to a lack of transparency and accountability in political financing.

2.5 Causes of Monetisation

Scholars have developed numerous theoretical explanations to account for the factors leading to monetization in West Africa, particularly in Ghana. This section examines these theoretical propositions to understand the views of delegates on the extent of this phenomenon in the Yunyoo Constituency of Ghana.

First and foremost, monetisation can be a more significant incentive for the poor to cast their votes compared to the promise of public benefits, as the "have-nots" often do not benefit from the distribution of public goods. As Desposato (2007) succinctly puts it, "On average, poor voters are likely to derive greater utility from immediate private goods compared to delayed public goods. Additionally, unless a delegate has multiple income sources and does not require the incentive, it is highly improbable that poor voters can resist the temptation of vote-buying incentives (Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros, & Estevez, 2007). The Ghana News Agency, GNA (2020) emphasized that poverty is to blame for the monetisation of Ghana's politics, noting that poverty drives people to use money in politics. He expressed hope that society would overcome this challenge as the country's political development progresses.

According to Lindberg (2010), in developing countries such as Ghana, modern legislators provide private goods like favors, personal assistance, and cash handouts in addition to their core mandate of oversight, representation, legislative, and deliberative duties, giving rise to clientelist practices or political patronage. Across poorer countries such as Ghana, widespread poverty creates a reliant relationship between the electorate and the political class, particularly with their elected officials (Ninsin, 2016).

Poverty has been recognized as a major factor influencing and determining vote buying. There are several reasons that explain why vote buying prospers in environments of

widespread poverty. The impoverished often have limited access to resources like phone credits, agricultural supplies, and funds for funerals and ceremonial events, which political figures can pledge to provide during elections. Scott (1969) highlights that this creates opportunities for clientelist relationships between electorate and political aspirants, where pre-election incentives are employed to gain electoral support from the impoverished. Dixit and Londregan (1996) and Stokes (2005) contend that the marginal utility of income is greater for poorer groups, which means that the benefit of selling one's vote is higher for those in poverty. Therefore, for voters experiencing material deprivation, exchanging their vote for monetary and material incentives can be a rational decision (Blaydes, 2006).

From the perspective of political parties, purchasing votes from those at the lower end of the income distribution is less expensive (Dixit & Londregan, 1996; Blaydes, 2006; Stokes, 2007). Political parties and their candidates can thus secure more votes from impoverished voters by offering relatively small sums to each individual. Bratton (2008) captures how the electorate was influenced by money during the 2007 elections in Nigeria, reporting that voters were offered as little as \$4. This monetisation likely makes poor voters targets of vote-buying by parliamentary aspirants and their financiers who want to maximize their election bids. Danjibo and Oladeji (2007) suggest that poverty renders individuals vulnerable and more prone to political manipulation. Building on this, Ojo (2008) argues that those who are impoverished and uncertain about their next meal are more likely to sell their votes in return for gifts from politicians.

Political cynicism also plays a role. Ayoade (2006) contends that the disillusionment of the people, stemming from unfulfilled promises by both current and former governments, drives citizens to accept election bribes, believing it is their only means

of gaining any advantage from democracy. Ojo (2008) clearly explains that when voters solicit payoffs, it effectively legitimizes politicians in exploiting public resources for their own gain. Candidates use election gifts as a strategy to safeguard against electoral defeat, highlighting the discrepancy between genuine democratic principles and the prevailing practices in Ghana.

Illiteracy is another factor affecting the Yunyoo Constituency and many Ghanaian communities. Danjibo and Oladeji (2007) argue that inadequate access to quality education in many African countries impedes effective governance during the process of electing leaders. As a result, voters who lack literacy skills may either fail to understand what to expect from political candidates or be indifferent to the consequences of their voting decisions. As a result, unqualified individuals may end up in positions of power, offering little value. Additionally, distributing gifts during elections turns into a business transaction for these individuals, who view it as a payoff for their initial expenditure once they secure power.

The absence of robust legislation and strict enforcement of rules also contributes to the monetization of politics. Fortes and Pritchard (1950) contended that regulations in African countries are often not enforced. Despite numerous laws and academic debates on this issue, there has been minimal progress in addressing it. Evidence shows that money continues to influence the election process, indicating that such legislation is only theoretical.

Brusco, V., Nazareno, M., & Stokes, S. C. (2004) argue that voters who "sell" their votes or are considered reliable targets for vote buying are often skeptical about future promises and prefer immediate rewards. These voters may demonstrate a strong preference for immediate gains over future benefits due to skepticism about the

intentions and promises of aspirants, believing that candidate pledges are mere rhetoric and unlikely to benefit them (Brusco et al., 2004). Across Ghana, particularly in the Yunyoo Constituency, a number of political leaders have come under criticism for reneging on their commitment, leading the electorate to prefer immediate rewards before voting. This study will explore respondents' views on receiving gifts for their votes.

Stokes (2005) suggests that politicians find it easier to target impoverished individuals because, for these voters, the immediate benefit often surpasses the benefit of supporting their preferred candidate. Poverty leads the electorate to place great importance on electoral rewards such as money, indicating a great propensity for impoverished voters to exchange their votes for monetary incentives. Similarly, Gonzalez, M., Lopez, R., & Rodriguez, M. (2014) assert that individuals who receive gifts in return for their votes are often impoverished, less informed, and demonstrate strong tendencies toward reciprocation. This suggests that poverty might both drive individuals to sell their votes and motivate candidates to offer gifts. In Yunyoo, many households face significant poverty, including difficulties meeting basic needs like food. While the aforementioned scholars based their findings on data from other countries, this study utilizes interviews to explore how poverty, education, and ideology contribute to the practice of vote buying and selling in Yunyoo.

The notion of gift-giving is also relevant. Graziano (1976) notes that in traditional societies, the personal connection established through the exchange of gifts often obligates individuals to reciprocate. Brusco et al. (2004) highlight that individuals participate in vote-buying because they perceive a normative duty to reciprocate for the campaign gifts they receive. This implies that even if voters initially do not intend to sell their votes, receiving rewards from political candidates during campaigns creates a

sense of obligation to vote in return. If candidates recognize the influence of gifts, they are likely to use them to sway voter decisions. In Yunyoo, the cultural significance of gifts makes them particularly important. This study examines whether the cultural value placed on gifts explains the practice of vote buying and selling and investigates the effects of receiving rewards from multiple candidates competing for the same position.

2.6 Implications of Monetisation on Democracy

Literature on the vote buying-democracy conundrum highlights a complex relationship. A key tenet of democracy is the liberty to choose leaders and participate in decision-making. This implies that popular interests should drive elections. However, votes secured through bribery often do not accurately reflect the true interests of the electorate (Stokes, 2007). This study investigates the perceptions of delegates in the Yunyoo Constituency regarding how monetized elections during parliamentary primaries impact democratic principles, such as free choice and representing the delegates' interests.

Nichter (2008) asserts that vote buying is detrimental to democracy, calling it “a mockery of democratic accountability.” When delegates trade their votes, they forfeit their ability to hold leaders accountable for development programs, thereby undermining the social contract between leaders and their constituents. Stokes (2005) argues that by emphasizing accountability, voters can mitigate misconduct by elected officials and compel governments to be more responsive. However, monetization raises campaign costs, excluding candidates with modest financial resources and obstructing women and minorities who lack the financial muscle to compete (Ballington, 2003; Best, 2008).

In Ghana, women are particularly sidelined in the political process due to financial constraints. Adetula (2015) observes that political extremism and election-related violence are negative consequences of monetized elections, as investors who contribute substantial funds may resort to any means necessary to secure victory. The effects of monetization encompass rising violence, elevated unemployment, poverty, income inequality, inadequate public services, and less accountable governments. Consequently, "money politics undermines the ability of electoral outcomes to reflect the will of the people and fails to ensure democracy, accountability, and good governance" (International IDEA, 2001).

The influence of wealth and financial resources in primary elections has serious consequences for democracy. Berman (2015) argues that the 1992 presidential primaries introduced wealthy campaigns into American politics, making money an obstacle to political candidacy for non-affluent Americans. Hube (2014) noted how Republicans attempted to undermine conservative activists by cutting their fundraising activities. Hogan (1999) asserted that increased campaign spending has become an individual affair, discouraging many from running. Jerome (2009) reported that many wealthy congressional candidates lost elections because voters perceived them as buying their way into office. Crowley (2012) argued that independent fundraising and extended primaries can discourage voters and tarnish candidates' images.

Monetisation has a calamitous impact on accountability systems and representative democracies. Representative democratic systems require honest, competitive opportunities among candidates based on policies, programs, and pragmatic ideas. Diamond (2004) asserts that a clear and open process for selecting and changing government officials through free and fair elections is a fundamental aspect of democracy. Monetisation undermines democracy, breeding corruption and reducing

honesty in political activities. Politicians who buy votes often recoup their investments through corruption (Ojo, 2008), compromising their integrity and accountability to their financiers (Bryan & Baer, 2005). The NIF (2001) contends that monetization distorts the democratic principle of "one person, one vote" into "one donor, significant influence."

CDD, (2020) highlights dual impact of monetisation on governance and democracy. Monetisation allows wealthy but incompetent individuals to gain power while sidelining competent but financially weak candidates. This depletes state institutions of the necessary competence and experience. The Ghanaian Parliament reflects this issue, with only about 5% of members performing real parliamentary duties (Ghanaweb.com). High absenteeism rates further undermine parliamentary functions (Ghanaweb, 2020). Literature indicates that vote buying leads to negative development outcomes, such as corruption in government, as leaders who buy votes seek to recover their expenses through corrupt means (Muhumuza, 1997). Vote buying reduces critical citizenship, hindering leaders' accountability and leading to poor service delivery (Gonzalez et al., 2014). Political clientelism, including purchasing votes, hinders institutionalization of authority (Graziano, 1976).

IDEG (2020) states that monetisation undermines democracy and national development by promoting corruption, weakening accountability mechanisms, and reducing honesty and integrity in politics. Aryee (2019) emphasizes that political finance can lead to corruption, impacting democratic governance. Sha (2005) outlines five impacts of vote buying on Nigerian democracy: it prioritizes money over merit and ideology, promotes elitist politics, weakens popular participation, tarnishes parliament's image, and causes elected officials to focus on recouping their investments rather than development.

Vote buying has severe consequences for democratic governance. It undermines free and fair elections, casting doubt on government legitimacy. Voters who sell their votes lose the right to demand accountability, encouraging corruption and eroding democratic governance. In conclusion, vote purchasing and selling undermine democracy, weaken good governance, and obstruct development. The primary causes in Ghana include poverty, illiteracy, and political practices. Without political will to eradicate vote buying, good governance will remain elusive, leading to poor infrastructure, education, employment, and increasing poverty.

2.7 The Impact of Financial Influence on the Integrity and Equity of the Primary Election Process

In any society where voters or election delegates are not adequately insulated from undue external influences, particularly financial ones, their ability to choose freely is compromised. Ojo (2008) argues that this leads to poor candidate selection, as political merchants who may not contribute positively to democratic development often get elected. Talented candidates who could make substantial contributions are shut out of the democratic process merely because they cannot bear the high costs of campaigning. As one politician remarked, "elections are not accessible to the low-income individuals. It is a highly costly endeavor, very costly." (cited in Nugent, 2005). According to the NIF (2001), monetization weakens the voter's ultimate authority and distorts the voting process in favor of those with significant financial resources.

The main issue is whether elections funded by money enable people to vote freely for their leaders and ensure equal influence in political affairs.

Muhumuza (1997:177) highlights the danger that unpopular candidates can win elections based on their financial power, overshadowing the true power of delegates

and turning democracy into an illusion. Bratton (2008) supports this view, pointing out that money in elections erodes democratic principles of political freedom and equality by giving an advantage to the wealthy while disadvantaging the poor. Tobin (1970), as cited in Kochin and Kochin (1998), also argues that a market for votes would centralize political power in the hands of the wealthy, particularly those who benefit from government privileges.

Individuals with modest financial resources but strong leadership skills may avoid electoral competition, resulting in a government that primarily serves the interests of the wealthy. This creates two primary issues: delegates are morally compromised and unable to make the right political choices, and the political playing field becomes distorted, preventing candidates and parties without significant resources from competing (Nwozor et al. 2021). As a result, citizens are deprived of adequate representation because political positions are auctioned to the highest bidder, sidelining competent and committed individuals without financial power. Nketiah (2021) notes that the more politics becomes monetized, the more merit is sacrificed.

Individuals of integrity who truly wish to serve but cannot afford to purchase votes often lose elections, while candidates who are financially well-off or corrupt may succeed. Bratton (2008) emphasizes that vote buying restricts citizens' ability to freely express their electoral preferences. Lindberg and Morrison (2008) argue that delegates recognize their increased value when competition is high and are encouraged by rumors of money and other handouts from candidates or their aides. This creates a vicious cycle of increasing demands and patronage, which undermines the legitimacy of democratic elections and discourages potential leaders who lack the financial means to sustain such campaigns. The impression left by vote buying during primaries is that money and material gains primarily determine delegates' voting behavior (The Mirror, 2020). This

is echoed in the well-known “Fear delegates” slogan of the late Kwadwo Owusu Afriyie, widely known as Sir John, who was the former general secretary of the New Patriotic Party, after he lost his reelection bid in Tamale (GNA, 2020).

In conclusion, the widespread practice of vote buying has a detrimental effect on the country’s democracy and significantly influences candidate selection. Vote buying compromises the quality of democracy by depriving citizens of their right to make free choices, which is a fundamental aspect of political liberty. It exacerbates political disparity between the rich and the poor and undermines accountability, which is essential for ensuring that leaders remain responsive to the electorate.

2.8 How to Address the Monetization of Parliamentary Primaries from the Perspectives of Delegates

It is widely recognized that money plays a vital role in politics. Stanbury (1986:798) aptly describes it as “the mother’s milk of politics,” while Haughton (2012) calls it the fuel for the engine of political parties. Therefore, it is essential to address its negative effects while promoting its positive aspects (Ohman, 2013). This section examines solutions proposed by scholars and stakeholders to address the monetization of elections.

Scholars propose that political parties should broaden their electoral college to include all registered members in the voting process (GNA, 2020). This increase in the voter base would reduce the price per vote and improve inclusiveness, thereby minimizing vote buying and selling (Ichino & Nathan, 2016). Party primaries have become a profitable venture for delegates, posing challenges for parties and candidates to accept such proposals (Ichino & Nathan, 2016)

One proposed solution to combat monetization is government funding for political parties and their candidates (Aryee, J.R.A; Anebo, Felix KG & Debrah E, 2008). State funding could strengthen parties, reduce the influence of money in elections, and promote greater discipline and control within parties. Public funding could assist with developmental activities such as creating party manifestos, conducting public education, supporting research, and organizing annual conferences (IDEG, 2015). Therefore, requiring public financing for electoral campaigns could help counter the harmful impact of money in politics.

Aryee (2019) suggests that the government should create thorough legislation to enhance party responsibility and curb money laundering in political elections. He posits that political parties are often driven by material self-interest and are highly susceptible to corruption (Ghanabusinessnews.com, 2019). Ohman (2013) argues for realistic reforms to counteract the adverse effects of money in politics. Proposals include amending party constitutions to allow unorthodox methods of selecting MPs (GNA, 2020), although these might undermine internal democracy.

The Electoral Commission has been criticized for failing to enforce existing electoral laws and regulate political parties effectively. IDEG (2019) proposes establishing an independent constitutional body to regulate political parties, administer party funds, and audit their accounts to ensure accountability. Rigorous enforcement of Act 574 (2000) of the political parties and current election regulations is essential for tackling monetization.

According to Aryee et al., (2008), the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) should receive sufficient resources to educate the electorate on the importance of elections rather than seeking freebies from candidates. She also emphasizes the need

for political parties to file their audited accounts, highlighting the frustrations caused by the monetization of electoral process.

To sum up, the monetization of electoral process in Ghana has become a significant concern for ordinary citizens, politicians, civil society organizations, and religious bodies. Each election season brings renewed interest in the issue, as spending on delegates or the electorate reaches new heights and new scandals emerge. However, this interest often subsides after the election cycle. Ojo (2008) warns that any electoral system thriving on monetization will not produce transparent leaders or governments. This study aims to identify strategies to combat this practice in Ghana.

2.9 Theoretical Framework

A long-held objective of political theorists has been to create a logical, uniform, and significant election theory. Given the myriad theories related to electoral matters, this study relies on the political clientelist exchange theory and rational choice theory to explain and discuss its subject matter. In this section, the researcher reviews literature on these two theories to provide a robust theoretical foundation for the research, aiming to offer a comprehensive explanation linking theory and practice. The clientelist exchange and rational choice theories are employed to elucidate the literature, and connect the findings and analysis within the study. Below is a detailed explanation of these theories.

Clientelist Exchange Theory

Clientelist exchange theory posits that electoral processes are often defined by the trading of goods and services for political backing. This theory emphasizes the reciprocal relationship between candidates and voters, where voters receive tangible

benefits in return for their electoral support. This patron-client relationship can undermine democratic principles by prioritizing personal gain over the collective good.

Rational Choice Theory

In contrast, rational choice theory posits that individuals make political decisions through a rational assessment of personal gain. Voters and candidates alike are seen as rational actors who weigh the costs and benefits of their choices. In the context of elections, this theory explains voter behavior in terms of personal interest, where voters choose candidates who they believe will maximize their utility.

By integrating these theories, this study seeks to offer a nuanced of the dynamics at play in monetized elections. The application of clientelist exchange theory helps to explain the prevalence of vote buying and selling, while rational choice theory offers insights into the decision-making processes of voters and candidates. This theoretical framework underpins the analysis and findings of the research, linking theoretical propositions with practical outcomes.

2.9.1 Clientelist Exchange Theory


For theoretical grounding, this research employs the political clientelist exchange theory, which is primarily supported by Piattoni (2001), Wantchekon (2002), and Stokes (2007). This theory interprets politics, especially election campaigning and voting, as a transactional process, highlighting the exchange of material goods by politicians for voter support. Piattoni (2001) describes clientelist vote-buying as "the offering of cash or small consumer goods by political parties, whether in office or in opposition, in return for the voter's support."

Clientelism is a theory that clarifies the political dynamics of elections and the interactions between different interest groups in political bargains for economic and

other benefits. It describes how individuals and groups engage in political-economic relationships in terms of power sharing and economic distribution. Originally used to explain political relationships in medieval Europe, clientelism became increasingly prominent in 1970 through to 1980, with a third wave of research emerging in 1990 and early 2000.

Clientelism encompasses a framework of political actions, relationships, or strategies that benefit both sides, such as vote buying, rewarding swing voters, contract awards, project allocations, and other practices leading to corruption and abuse of political office. This enables corrupt politicians to control political office and allows corrupt voters to continue bargaining.

Clientelism explains how patron-client relationships emerge within a state, particularly in democratic regimes, through power struggles. There are five basic principles or assumptions of clientelism:

- 
- The logo of the University of Education, Winneba, is a circular emblem. It features a central sun-like symbol with rays, surrounded by a blue and red border. Below the emblem is a banner with the text "EDUCATION FOR SERVICE".
1. The relationship involves two parties.
 2. The relationship is unbalanced.
 3. The relationship is individual and long-lasting.
 4. The relationship involves mutual exchange.
 5. The relationship is entered into willingly.

Clientelism thus explains the incidence and nature of election-related corruption in Ghana through the mechanism of power struggles and the examination of leaders' actions with political power post-election in democratic regimes. Politicians negotiate and trade power for personal gain, lobby voters with material benefits, and use their electoral mandates for self-enrichment through corrupt practices, often in collaboration with intermediaries and constituents who secure contracts, bribes in return for political

backing. This framework fits the study of delegates' perspectives on the monetization of parliamentary primaries in the Yunyoo Constituency.

2.9.2 Justification for the choice of Clientelist Exchange Theory and why it is useful for the research

Within the scope of this research, the clientelist exchange theory was applied to understand how political parties and their candidates utilize funds to sway delegates, secure votes, and win elections. This theory posits that voters may be more inclined to support candidates who offer tangible benefits rather than solely basing their decisions on ideology or policy. The literature provides several reasons why this theory is particularly useful for studying the monetization of primaries.

Firstly, the theory helps clarify why vote buying is a common occurrence in various political systems. By offering material benefits to voters, politicians can create a sense of obligation and loyalty among their supporters (Hicken, 2011). Secondly, the clientelist exchange theory sheds light on how corruption can serve as an instrument to manipulate vote outcomes. Political figures may use their resources to bribe party delegates or engage in other corrupt practices to secure their positions (Tanzi, 1998). Thirdly, the theory highlights the importance of patronage in shaping political behavior. In the context of primaries, patrons may use their resources to support favored candidates, influencing election outcomes (Mann, 1984).

In this study, the theory was deployed through interviews with NDC and NPP delegates and their parliamentary candidates. These interviews provided insights into the benefits offered and received in return for political backing. Applying this theory provided a clearer insight into the intricate relationships among politicians, delegates, as well as resources that shape political outcomes. The clientelist exchange theory, also known as

patron-client theory, suggests that political leaders and other powerful individuals offer products and services to their constituents in return for loyalty and assistance.

However, the theory is not without weaknesses. It has been criticized for several reasons:

1. Lack of Attention to Cultural Context: Clientelist exchange theory is based on Western concepts of politics and governance. However, Ghanaian cultural context and society have unique characteristics that influence political behavior, such as the importance of respect for authority and traditional values (Ninsin, 2013). The monetization of primaries may be shaped by these cultural factors, which are not fully considered by the clientelist framework.

2. Neglect of Institutional Factors: According to Saffu (2016), the clientelist exchange theory tends to focus on individual-level relationships between politicians and voters while ignoring institutional factors. In the context of primaries, party rules, regulations, and leadership structures can play a significant role in shaping outcomes. These institutional factors, which may influence the monetization of primaries, are not fully accounted for by the clientelist framework.

3. Simplistic View of Political Behavior: While the clientelist exchange theory emphasizes the significance of patronage and individual relationships in influencing political behavior, monetary conversion of primaries may involve more complex and subtle forms of influence such as corruption, bribery, and strategic manipulation of party rules (Gyimah-Boadi, 2013). The clientelist framework may not fully capture these dynamics.

In conclusion, while the clientelist exchange theory has been useful in understanding the views and nuanced perspectives of delegates on monetization in the Yunyoo Constituency, its assumptions about the nature of political relationships and voter motivations are overly simplistic. The theory does not fully capture the complex dynamics of modern democratic politics.

2.9.3 Rational Choice Theory in Voting Behavior

Many scholars argue that delegates or voters exercise rationality in their voting decisions, whether these decisions are immediate or long-term (Achen, 2002; Antunes, 2008; LeDuc, L., Niemi, R. G., & Norris, P. 2014; Sarlamanov & Jovanoski, 2014).

This pattern of behavior aligns with rational choice theory. Downs' seminal work (1957) exemplifies the economic dimension of voter behavior, where rationality, uncertainty, and information influence voter choices. Downs likens political parties and their candidates to "entrepreneurs in a market-driven economy" who "develop policies they believe will attract the most votes."

In a typical political system, political parties and voters both act rationally to protect and preserve their self-interest. Rational choice theory seeks the optimal maximization of utility as its driving force. Downs (1957) defines rationality given the premise that "voters and political parties act in direct alignment with their self-interest" and choose methods that best achieve their goals. Rational choice theory presupposes that voters and political agents are fully rational, aiming to achieve maximum social gain by taking the best available action given their preferences and beliefs.

Rational choice theory predicts that voters will receive greater utility from and vote for the candidate whose issue positions are closest to their own (Downs, 1957). This model, derived from Downs' "An Economic Theory of Democracy" (1957), posits that

delegates or voters act rationally when making their voting decisions. They carefully consider and reflect on their assessments of candidates' promises, performance, policy preferences, and overall evaluations. Consistent with these beliefs, it is thought that individual delegates determine their candidate and party preferences based on personal interests, primarily motivated by material benefits rather than psychological tendencies or ideological viewpoints.

The idea that delegates or voters possess rationality suggests that voting behavior will be influenced by the costs and benefits associated with voting (Franklin, 2002). The benefits of voting can differ significantly from one election to another due to changes in economic or social policies. Additionally, the rational-choice perspective views voting based on intangible factors such as race, ideology, identity, or religion as "irrational" or "unconventional." According to this approach, voters are expected to make political decisions based on practical considerations related to issues that directly impact them.

As mentioned earlier, Popkin (1991) argues that voters do "reason" during elections. He posits that voters engage in reasoning about political parties, candidates, leaders, government performance, and politics more broadly before making their decisions. Popkin (1991) observes that the rational-choice approach acknowledges that voting is influenced by voters' capacity to evaluate political parties, their platforms, candidates, and the competence or integrity of leaders. According to proponents, politicians are endlessly opportunistic, choosing decisions or alternatives that maximize gains and avoiding those where costs exceed gains.

This means that political actors will choose to pay for votes if they believe they will be rewarded at the polls and will refrain if they think they will not be voted for. The

Rational Choice Theory of Elections is based on the economic theory of consumer behavior, which describes rationality in decision-making, spending or production by consumers and manufacturers for maximum utility and profit maximization. From the political science perspective, it is assumed that if consumers and manufacturers can be rational in their choices, voters can also be rational in their choice of candidates based on expected benefits or maximum utility from the politicians' actions after the election, be it monetary, in-kind, or through project allocations and contracts.

Politicians, like manufacturers in economic theory, can rationally spend their money and resources to secure political offices, anticipating benefits accruing after assuming office. This theory is also referred to as the Economic Theory of Democracy. It is assumed that if rational choice can effectively explain market dynamics, it can also explain political functioning, particularly elections. The theory draws a parallel between consumers of goods and services and voters, as well as between businesses and political parties. Just as corporations aim to maximize profits and consumers strive to maximize utility, voters seek to maximize the benefit they derive from their votes, while parties work to maximize electoral success through their political proposals.

The Rational Choice Framework is based on two main perspectives: Evaluative voting is based on voters' assessments of government performance, while non-evaluative voting is influenced by clientelist factors such as patronage, ethnic affiliations, and family connections. The fundamental assumptions of Rational Choice theory in elections are that voting is a deliberate and rational process where voters carefully consider the advantages and disadvantages of their options, leading to a thorough assessment of costs and benefits. The electorate will choose the candidate whose policies best align with and reflect their interests (Downs, 1957).

The theory suggests that the electorate engages in rational and goal-oriented behavior when making election choices (Oppenheimer, 2008). As a result, the decision to vote or abstain is based on a careful evaluation of potential benefits or gains. According to the model, voters will thoroughly analyze their options and choose the one that offers the highest utility compared to those with lower utility (Aldrich, 1993). This implies that personal interest drives the voter's decision.

Overall, a voter, driven by self-interest and material concerns, tends to prioritize personal benefits over collective gains. Such voters often lack strong party loyalty or significant connections to political parties (Downs, 1957; Bartle & Griffiths, 2002; Fiorina, 1977).

In conclusion, rational-choice theory has been instrumental in explaining how voters make decisions in elections. It illustrates how self-interest can lead voters to shift away from their initial political biases and party loyalties, causing changes in their preferences from one candidate to another. However, despite its usefulness, the theory has faced criticism for placing too much emphasis on rationality as the primary factor influencing voting behavior.

2.10 Gaps in the Literature

The study of delegates' perspectives on the monetization of primaries in the Yunyoo Constituency in Ghana distinguishes itself from existing literature in several ways. While previous research has explored the phenomenon of monetization of primaries in various contexts, this study offers a unique contribution by focusing on the specific context of the Yunyoo Constituency. This localized examination provides new insights and adds depth to our understanding of the issue, addressing gaps that have not been fully explored in broader studies.

Schaffer's (2007) study examined the effect of campaign finance on democratic accountability in developing countries. In contrast, this study explores delegates' views on the monetization of primaries within a specific constituency in Ghana, providing a more detailed awareness of the local interactions involved. Again, Schaffer and Schedler (2005) explored the relationship between campaign finance and political party development, highlighting the challenges of regulating campaign finance in developing democracies. This study complements their work by examining delegates' views on the monetization of primaries in a particular constituency, shedding light on how local party interactions shape perceptions of campaign finance.

Kramon (2011) investigated the impact of electoral commissions' institutional designs on campaign finance regulations. In contrast, this study focuses on delegates' perspectives on the monetization of primaries in a specific constituency, providing a grassroots-level understanding of how local actors perceive and navigate this issue.

Bryan and Baer (2008) analyzed how political funding affects political engagement and party rivalry in emerging democracies. This study builds upon their work by exploring delegates' perspectives on the monetization of primaries in a specific constituency, offering insights into how local political actors experience and respond to this phenomenon.

Ojo (2008) investigated the impact of regulatory frameworks on campaign finance in Nigeria. This study differs by focusing on Ghana and examining delegates' perspectives on the monetization of primaries in a specific constituency, providing a more nuanced understanding of local-level dynamics.

The study on delegates' views on the monetization of primaries in the Yunyoo Constituency in Ghana is set within a specific cultural and political context, distinct

from those explored by previous research. For instance, Ohman's (2014) study was conducted in Indonesia, Vicente's (2008) in Brazil, Wantchekon's (2003) in Benin, Lindberg's (2003) in Kenya, Cheeseman's (2015) in Kenya and Nigeria, and Jensen & Justesen's (2014) in several African countries. The unique cultural, social, and political dynamics of the Yunyoo Constituency offer a fresh perspective on the phenomenon of monetization.

All the aforementioned studies, including those by Ohman (2014), Vicente (2008), Wantchekon (2003), Lindberg (2003), Cheeseman (2015), and Jensen & Justesen (2014), recognized vote buying as a significant issue in electoral politics, especially in developing countries like Ghana. They acknowledged that vote buying can negatively impact democracy by compromising the credibility of the electoral process, promoting clientelism.

Regarding theoretical contributions, this study applied clientelist exchange theory and rational choice theory (RCT) to analyze delegates' views on the monetization of primaries in the Yunyoo Constituency. It enhances our comprehension of how local-level actors navigate the complexities of monetization in electoral contexts, emphasizing the importance of nuanced analyses that consider local dynamics and context-specific factors.

Methodologically, the study used qualitative methods, such as semi-guided interviews with delegates from the Yunyoo Constituency. This approach facilitated a more thorough insight into the experiences and viewpoints of local-level participants which might not be captured through quantitative surveys or other methods. The findings provided valuable insights into how delegates view the monetization of primaries and its impact on democratic management in Ghana.

Ichino and Nathan (2016) conducted a comprehensive review of campaign finance and electoral competition in Ghana, focusing on party financing and its impact on political parties. However, their study did not specifically examine delegates' perspectives on the monetization of primaries in a particular constituency like Yunyoo. The current study provides an in-depth examination of delegates' views on the monetization of primaries within the specific context of the Yunyoo Constituency, offering insights not covered in Ichino and Nathan's work.

Similarly, Asante and Kunnath (2008) investigated how funding of political parties influences electoral competition in Ghana, focusing on the effects of funding on the conduct of political parties and their candidates. Although their research touched upon primary elections, it did not delve into delegates' perspectives on the monetization of primaries. In contrast, the study on Yunyoo Constituency specifically focuses on delegates' views on this issue, providing a more detailed understanding of their attitudes towards the monetization of primaries. This study's focus on a specific constituency, Yunyoo, allowed for a detailed understanding of how the monetization of primaries affects delegates within that particular context, taking into account unique local factors. While previous studies on primaries and election monetization often address national or regional contexts, this research concentrated specifically on Yunyoo in Ghana. This targeted approach enabled a nuanced understanding of the local dynamics and influences on the monetization of primaries in that constituency.

For example, Gyimah-Boadi (2015) examined issues at the national level, offering a broad perspective on Ghanaian politics. In contrast, this study provided a localized view of delegates' perspectives on the monetization of primaries in Yunyoo. Similarly, Asante and Kunnath (2008) and Ichino and Nathan (2016) focused on wider themes and trends in Ghanaian politics, without the specific lens of a single constituency. By

narrowing the focus to Yunyoo, this study was able to offer more detailed insights into how local factors uniquely impact the monetization of primaries.

Delegate's Perspective: This study focused on the perspectives of delegates, offering unique insights into how these key stakeholders perceive and experience the monetization of primaries an area not thoroughly explored in previous research. By highlighting the voices and experiences of delegates, who are often overlooked, the study illuminated the internal workings of the primary process and the effects of monetization.

Although Bratton (2008) examined voters' attitudes towards vote buying, it did not delve into the perspectives of delegates. This study filled that gap by centering around the views and opinions of delegates, providing detailed insights into their thoughts and feelings about the monetization of primaries.

2.11 Summary

The literature indicates a consensus among scholars and experts that the monetization of parliamentary primaries undermines the democratic process and erodes the integrity of political institutions. Several studies have shown that monetary incentives, gifts, and favors offered by candidates to delegates during primaries can influence election outcomes and foster corruption. Additionally, the literature highlights that the monetization of primaries often marginalizes certain groups and individuals who lack access to financial resources, creating a skewed playing field. This review highlights the urgent need to tackle the issue of monetization in primaries in Ghana, stressing the importance of implementing stricter regulations and enforcing political party financing mechanisms to enhance clarity, responsibility, and equity in the electoral process.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODS

3.1 Overview

This part describes the approach taken in this research, providing an overview of the methodology and its implications. It covers the overall strategy for studying the phenomenon (Neville, 2007) and explains the procedures used in carrying out the research. This encompasses the philosophical perspective guiding the study, the research strategy, the research plan, the theoretical framework supporting the investigation, the target population and size of the sample, sampling procedure, data sources and categories, research instruments, data analysis procedures, positionality, and ethical considerations.

3.2 Philosophical World View

The philosophical worldview underpinning this research operates within the interpretive framework, which highlights the significance of examining social actions from the perspective of the participants (Tracy, 2012). Interpretive researchers argue that the world is not separate from our understanding of it." (Grix, 2004). This paradigm is particularly suitable for understanding the perception of monetization of primaries from the delegates' standpoint. Interpretive researchers argue that a more profound understanding of the social world is gained by examining it through the perspectives of the participants (Weber, 1949). They contend that reality is most effectively understood through people's interpretive abilities, rather than solely through sensory observations and experiences. This approach aims to understand individual's behaviors and perceptions regarding social issues, focusing on the meanings they assign to these issues. In this way, language plays a crucial role in constructing "reality" (Grix, 2004; Bryman, 2003). Social reality is co-created through meaningful interactions between

the researcher and the interviewee, with data collected verbally. Primary data collection methods encompass in-depth interviews, semi-structured interviews, participant observation, documents, audio-visual recordings, and life histories (Bryman, 2004; Creswell, 1998). This approach aligns with the qualitative research methodology.

3.3 Research Approach

This research uses a qualitative inquiry strategy, selected for its effectiveness in exploring the perspectives of delegates on the monetization of parliamentary primaries in Ghana, with a specific focus on the Yunyoo constituency. Qualitative research generates descriptive data, often comprising individuals' written or verbal expressions. The goal of qualitative analysis is to reveal the deeper and underlying meanings of human experiences.

Babbie and Mouton (2001:271) support this approach by arguing that qualitative studies involve detailed descriptions of participants' actions to understand social phenomena from the participants' perspectives, taking into account their values, background, and circumstances. Neuman (1997:329) highlights that qualitative research focuses primarily on capturing what people express through words, gestures, and tones, observing particular behaviors, and analyzing written documents or visual images. Similarly, Fink (2003:16) observes that qualitative surveys collect data on the meanings people assign to their experiences and the methods they use to express themselves. Fink (2003:16) further explains that qualitative surveys address questions like, 'What is X, and how do various people, communities, and cultures perceive and feel about X, and why? Given the nature of this study's subject exploring delegates' views on the monetization of parliamentary primaries a qualitative approach was deemed most appropriate.

Using a qualitative research technique enabled the researcher to obtain a more nuanced understanding into delegates' views on monetisation, which was the primary goal of this study. Numerous academics have described qualitative research as an interpretive method (Newman, 1997; Burns, 2003; Gorski, 2005). Interpretive strategy seeks to uncover the personal reasons and meanings underlying social behaviors (Durrheim & Blance, 2002:6). This framework was chosen because the study focuses on the personal experiences and insights of delegates from two major parties. Therefore, the researcher adopted an interactional epistemological perspective on their perceptions and used methodologies like in-depth interviews. An epistemological position determines the nature of the relationship between the researcher and the research subject." (Durrheim & Blance, 2002:6).

The research aimed at understanding delegates' views and perspectives of monetisation and empathetically interpret the meanings behind their statements. As Bryman (2012) qualitative researchers are often guided by interpretivism and are dedicated to understanding events and the social world from the perspectives of the individuals they study. As the name implies, the qualitative research approach focuses on 'quality' rather than 'quantity' (Miller & Brewer, 2003: 238).

A qualitative research approach was used because researcher aimed to understand delegates' perceptions of monetisation of primaries, with the Yunyoo constituency as a case study. According to Creswell (2014), the qualitative approach aims to comprehend the meanings that participants attribute to a social or human issue. This choice also aligns with Merriam's (2009), which suggests that "the primary goals of qualitative research are to understand how individuals make sense of their lives, outline the process of meaning-making rather than focusing on outcomes or products, and describe how people interpret their experiences".

According to Creswell (2013), the core of a qualitative study is found in its analytical evaluation of a phenomenon, enabling the researcher to develop a comprehensive and vivid picture of that phenomenon. This approach provides deeper insights into the phenomenon and its reflection of the 'outside world'. Therefore, qualitative approach is well-suited for this research as it offers more flexibility. It allows for differentiating impartiality from personal perspectives through reasoned analysis rather than depending on the limited measurements and strict limitations of quantitative methods (Engel & Schutt, 2009). Furthermore, qualitative information bring vitality to the research questions and objectives of the study. Since qualitative data are contextual, their analysis requires developing insights through a thorough understanding of a specific context (Cassell, C., Cunliffe, A. L., & Grandy, G. (2018), which supports the aim of this research.

3.4 Research Design

As Durrheim (1999, p. 32) describes, a research design is a structured plan that directs research activities, ensuring that conclusions are accurately reached. It addresses the fundamental question of which type of study will be conducted to deliver precise and reliable answers to the research problem. Additionally, a research design specifies how researchers will recruit or choose participants and gather information from them (Burger, 2005, p. 11). Given the primary objective of gaining an in-depth understanding of delegates' views in the Yunyoo Constituency regarding the monetisation of parliamentary primaries, this research utilized a case study approach. A case study is an empirical investigation that examines a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, particularly when the boundaries between the phenomenon and its context are not distinctly defined (Yin, 2003, p. 13). Case study research methods employ an inductive approach, enabling an in-depth exploration of individual cases. This approach

offers a detailed understanding that is often not achievable with more broad-based, cross-sectional methods (Eisenhardt, 1989). This method allows for an in-depth analysis of a product, process, or system innovation, providing valuable insights into the study's results (Hoskins, 2013). One goal of employing a case study approach is to address research questions by drawing on the participants' experiences and perspectives (Castillo-Montoya, 2016).

Denscombe (2007) argues that the case study approach is an effective method for comprehending social interactions and the complex connections inherent in cooperative activities. A case study aims to produce a 'detailed description and understanding' of a unit or case (Ary, D., Jacobs, L. C., Sorensen, C., & Razavieh, A. (2010). Bryman (2012:67) notes that the term “case” is most commonly associated with a location, such as a community or organization. Consequently, this research used the Yunyoo Constituency as a single case study. Case studies should be used when “you aim to address contextual conditions that are considered relevant to the phenomenon being examined” (Baxter, P., & Jack, S. (2008).

Monetisation has been a prevalent topic in the Yunyoo Constituency, particularly regarding the elections of political figures, including presidents and members of Parliament, as well as regional, constituency, and branch executive elections. Therefore, the Yunyoo Constituency is a viable case for studying delegates' views on monetisation and its impact on democracy. This work will focus on the quality of delegates' views on monetisation and assess the implications of this rising trend on primaries and the country's democracy, using the Yunyoo Constituency as a case study, rather than employing quantitative measurements. Furthermore, A case study design is suitable when research questions demand a comprehensive and "in-depth" description of social phenomena (Yin, 2013, p. 4).

3.5 Population

Population refers to the individual units to be studied (Degu & Yigzaw, 2006). In this study, the population includes delegates from the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP), as well as their parliamentary candidates in the Yunyoo Constituency. The estimated total population for the study is 1,075, with the NDC having 684 delegates and the NPP having 391. It is noteworthy that the NDC has 9 delegates per branch, while the NPP has 5 delegates per branch.

3.6 Sample

The number of participants for this research is 14 respondents, selected from both the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the National Democratic Congress (NDC). The respondents included 2 parliamentary aspirants (one from each party), 2 branch executives (one from each party), 6 constituency executive members (3 from each party), 2 ward coordinators (one from each party), and 2 (past or present) District Chief Executives (one from each party).

Vanderstoep and Johnston (2009) recommend a range of 5 to 35 respondents for qualitative studies to avoid redundancy. The aim is to explore the phenomenon for a better understanding, which necessitates selecting an appropriate sample size. Creswell (2005) posits that selecting a large number of interviewees for qualitative research can result in a superficial perspective, as the researcher's capacity to deliver a thorough analysis decreases with the inclusion of each additional individual or site.

3.7 Sampling Technique

Sampling is crucial in research because inaccurate sampling can undermine the validity of your study. There are two primary types of sampling: probability sampling and non-probability sampling. In probability sampling, every member of the population has an

equal and non-zero chance of being chosen (Osuala, 2007). Probability sampling encompasses techniques such as simple random sampling and stratified sampling. In contrast, non-probability sampling does not provide every member with an equal opportunity to be chosen. It involves subjective choosing of respondents who possess specific knowledge about the subject of study, in order to obtain accurate answers (Croach & Housden, 2003).

For this study, the sampling technique employed is purposive sampling, a form of non-probability sampling in which respondents are deliberately selected based on specific criteria of interest. The advantage of purposive sampling is its capacity to identify participants who are particularly rich in relevant information (Patton, 1990; Russell, 2013).

Purposive sampling is employed because not everyone in the Yunyoo Constituency possesses the knowledge and experience relevant to this study, making it essential to select delegates who do. Participants who meet specific selection criteria are typically chosen in purposive sampling (Alvi, 2006).

The rationale for using purposive sampling in selecting interviewees is also according to three essential criteria specified by Neuman (2004:138-140), which are especially pertinent to this study:

1. When the researcher aims to choose unique cases that provide valuable insights for a detailed investigation, such as examining delegates' views on the monetization of parliamentary primaries.
2. When the researcher intends to select individuals from a specialized and difficult-to-reach population, such as parliamentary candidates and delegates involved in primary elections.

3. When the goal of sampling is not to generalize to a broader population but to obtain a deeper understanding of the phenomenon being studied, such as exploring delegates' perceptions of the monetization of parliamentary primaries.

3.8 Research Instruments

A semi-structured interview guide was created and utilized to gather primary data. This method is described as "a collaborative process of understanding between interviewers and participants," suggesting that in-depth interviews are dialogues that generate knowledge (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2006, p. 128).

3.9 Data Collection Procedure

To collect primary data, the researcher carried out a series of in-depth interviews. Interviews are particularly valuable in qualitative research. According to Bless, Higson-Smith, and Kagee (2006, p. 116), "An interview involves direct personal interaction with the participant, who is asked to respond to questions related to the research problem". McMillan and Schumacher (2006, p. 350) also explain that in-depth interviews use open-ended questions to gather information on how participants perceive their world and interpret or make sense of significant events in their lives.

For this study, a partially structured interview approach was used, meaning a list of questions was prepared in advance. According to Bless et al. (2006:116), there is frequently a requirement for more precise and comprehensive information, and a partially-structured interview allows for this by providing a fixed set of questions to be answered by all interviewees. Nonetheless, this approach also permits the researcher to ask additional questions based on participants' responses. Although the questions were structured, this flexibility allowed the researcher to uncover new dimensions of the research problem by exploring the participants' explanations. This approach enabled

the researcher to delve deeper into key issues highlighted during the interviews. The interview process started with prior arrangements with the participants to arrange the date, time, and location for the interviews.

As Gubrium and Holstein (2001, p. 90) observe, "once the researcher identifies a respondent, they must then seek their consent to be interviewed, which typically involves obtaining informed consent". The study sought oral consent from all participants and only commenced the interviews after receiving their agreement. Each interview was conducted individually, involving only the researcher and the participant, and lasted no more than sixty minutes.

Semi-structured interviews provided participants with greater freedom and self-expression, allowing them to share additional information beyond simple 'yes' or 'no' answers. This format also allowed the study to explore supplementary topics that could lead to subsequent research. An interview guide was designed and reviewed with my supervisor before being used in the field. The study also obtained a cover letter from the Department of Political Science Education at the University of Education, Winneba (UEW). Participants' permission was granted, questions were asked in language appropriate for the participants' understanding, and the interviews were recorded.


3.10 Data Sources and Types

The study utilized both primary and secondary data. Primary data was gathered through a partially-structured interview guide specifically designed for this study. Secondary data was sourced from journal articles, internet resources, unpublished theses, dissertations, and other relevant materials.

3.11 Data Analysis

The study analyzed the collected data through thematic analysis, a method that involves organizing data into manageable themes, identifying key insights, and determining what should be communicated to others (Braun & Clarke, 2012; Tagoe, 2009). The process began with transcribing the collected data, which was then thoroughly read and coded. Emerging patterns from the coded data were used to develop themes, which formed the basis for presenting and discussing the results.

Data was collected during the interview sessions using field notes and recordings. Each interview was converted to written form verbatim into a word file to guarantee comprehensive and precise information. While verbatim transcription is time-consuming, it was essential to prevent the loss of important information. After transcription, the researcher organized the data by breaking it into smaller segments, each containing a piece of relevant information. These data segments were then reviewed to achieve a thorough understanding of the data, with the researcher writing down ideas and insights.



To identify patterns and categories from the data, the researcher continuously examined each dataset, posing questions such as "What is this about?" and "What were they discussing?" Data deemed irrelevant was discarded, while relevant data were organized into patterns and categories. The researcher subsequently compared these patterns and categories with those anticipated by the theory and existing literature.

3.11.1 Ethical Consideration

Research ethics is a growing concern that requires careful development and specification (Flick, 2006). Philosophically, ethical issues pertain to a set of codes that define what is considered 'moral' or 'immoral,' 'beneficial' or 'harmful'. In research,

ethics are regarded as standards for appropriate behavior, essential for maintaining the accuracy and consistency of the research process. Ethical issues in social science research address the question: What actions align with maintaining the integrity of the research? This concept is echoed in Pring's (2000) discussion of the "integrity of research."

Ethics in research involves obtaining informed consent from participants (Bell, 2005) and establishing clarity about the agreement between the researcher and their respondents (Bell, 1991). In this study, ethical considerations were strictly observed. The researcher first sought a cover letter from the Department of Political Science Education at UEW to bolster credibility. Participants were guaranteed that their information would remain confidential and anonymous. The researcher consciously set aside personal biases to ensure objectivity. Importantly, to avoid unethical practices, the researcher adhered closely to ethical guidelines.

The interviews were carried out following essential ethical principles, including privacy, anonymity, confidentiality (Neuman, 1997, p. 452), truthfulness, and voluntary participation (Durrheim, 1999, p. 66). At the beginning of the interviews, the researcher assured all participants that their privacy, anonymity, and confidentiality would be protected. Participants' names were not documented. The researcher also notified participants that their contributions would be kept securely and destroyed after the completion of the research. Additionally, all participants were informed of their right to withdraw from the study at any time without facing any repercussions.

3.11.2 Background of the Constituency

The Yunyoo Constituency is one of the 275 constituencies in Ghana and is part of the six constituencies in the North East Region. It was created from the former twin Bunkpurugu-

Yunyoo Constituency. According to data from the Electoral Commission (EC) for the year 2020 elections, Yunyoo is a rural Constituency with a total voter population of 23,423. The constituency is situated in the northeastern corner of the North East region of Ghana and shares borders with several constituencies: Garu-Tampene to the north, Bunkpurugu-Nakpanduri and the Republic of Togo to the east, East Mamprusi to the west, and Gusheigu and Chereponi to the south.

3.11.3 Polling Centers

The Yunyoo Constituency has 72 polling centers distributed across 13 electoral areas. Of these, the Konkomba communities hold the majority, with 51 of the 72 polling centers. Out of the remaining 21 polling centers, 16 are primarily located in Bimoba communities, which represent the second-largest ethnic group in the constituency, while 5 polling centers are situated in Mamprusi-dominated communities.

3.11.4 Voter Population

Out of the six constituencies in the North East Region, the Yunyoo Constituency has the smallest voter population, totaling 23,423, according to the Electoral Commission (EC) of Ghana's 2020 constituency summary.

3.11.5 Geography and Vegetation

The Constituency is situated in the dry savannah vegetation belt, characterized by grasses interspersed with drought-resistant trees such as the shea tree, nim tree, baobab, and dawadawa, among others.

3.11.6 Climate and Economic Conditions

The Constituency has two separate seasons: the dry period and the rainy period. The wet season generally extends from April to October, though the exact timing can vary from year to year. Similar to other regions in the north, the harmattan winds, which are relatively cold and hazy, can occur from November to late March. Overall, the dry

season is characterized by very hot and dry conditions, with temperatures ranging from 16°C during cold harmattan nights to over 40°C in the afternoons, particularly in March and April.

These challenging physical conditions limit opportunities for the local population, resulting in endemic poverty within the constituency. The primary occupation is agriculture, with about three-quarters of the population engaged in crop farming and animal husbandry. Major staples consist of maize, guinea corn, millet, groundnuts, yam, rice, soybeans, bambara beans, and other varieties. Consequently, there is a significant issue of unemployment during the dry season, as active farming predominantly takes place in the wet season. This situation leads to both long- and short-term migration, particularly among the youth, who seek better agricultural opportunities and improved living conditions in other parts of the country. Migration tends to involve more men than women, as women generally remain at home while their husbands seek opportunities outside the Constituency.

3.11.7 Current Member of Parliament

The incumbent Member of Parliament for the Yunyoo Constituency is Hon. Oscar Liwaal, who secured his seat representing the New Patriotic Party. He previously held the position of District Chief Executive from 2016 to 2020. In the 2020 parliamentary and presidential elections, he defeated the National Democratic Congress candidate, Hon. Joseph Naabu Bipoba. Bipoba had served as a Member of Parliament from the constituency's creation in 2012 until he lost his seat in 2020.



Figure 3.1: Yunyoo Nasuan District Map

3.11.8 Justification for the Study Area

The Yunyoo Constituency was chosen as it offers a representative sample of the population being examined. It reflects the broader context of the North East Region of Ghana, one of the country's poorest and most underserved areas (GLSS, 2022). The constituency encompasses both rural and urban areas, providing a comprehensive view of the diverse perspectives and experiences of delegates in the region.

3.11.9 Positionality

The researcher is a first-time delegate of the National Democratic Congress (NDC), party and began this study prior to assuming that role. Although the researcher had limited exposure to the concept of monetisation, he ensured that his personal biases and assumptions regarding the monetization of parliamentary primaries did not affect the study. His background and experience as a first-time delegate did not affect the analysis of the data. To address any perceived or potential biases, the researcher took specific measures including data triangulation.

CHAPTER FOUR

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

4.1 Introduction

This research aimed to gain insight into delegates' views on the monetization of parliamentary primaries in the Yunyoo Constituency, focusing on its causes, effects on democracy, and potential strategies for addressing the issue. The research sought to:

1. Investigate the reasons behind the monetization of parliamentary primaries in the Yunyoo Constituency.
2. Examine the impact of monetization on parliamentary primaries and its implications for the country's democracy.
3. Assess how monetary influence affects the integrity and impartiality of the primary election process.
4. Explore potential solutions to the problem of monetization in parliamentary primaries.

This chapter outlines and examines the study's findings, linking the results with existing literature and theoretical frameworks.

Table 4.1: Demographic Characteristics of sex of Participants

The study sought to identify the gender of the participants, as detailed in section 4.1.

Variable	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Male	12	85.7
Female	2	14.3
Total	14	100.0

Out of the 14 participants interviewed, 12 were males representing 85.7% and 2 females representing 14.3%. Clearly more males were interviewed than females even though painstaking efforts were usually made to include female delegates, women did not always seem prepared to grant interviews on highly politicized matters like monetisation.

Table 4. 2: Demographic Details Regarding the Age of participants

Variable	Frequency	Percentage (%)
31-40	6	42.9
41-50	5	35.7
51-60	3	21.4
Total	14	100.0

The data reveals that 6 interviewees, or 42.9%, were aged between 31 and 40. This was followed by 5 interviewees, accounting for 35.7%, who were aged between 41 and 50. Additionally, 3 interviewees, representing 21.4%, were aged between 51 and 60.

Table 4.3: Demographic Information on Participants' Marital Status

Variable	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Married	14	100.0
Total	14	100.0

As shown in Table 4.3, all participants were married.

Table 4.4: Demographic Characteristics Relating to the Highest Educational Attainment of Respondents

Variable	Frequency	Percentage (%)
WASSCE/SSCE	3	21.4
Diploma	8	57.1
Bachelor's Degree	3	21.4
Total	14	100.0

Literacy and education are crucial, as they are closely linked to individuals' perspectives on various issues. The research aimed to determine the highest level of education achieved by the participants and yielded the following results: 21.4% of respondents had completed the WASSCE/SSSCE, while a significant majority, 57.1%, held a diploma. Additionally, 21.4% of the respondents had obtained a degree.

Figure 4.1




Figure 4.2




Figure 4.3





Figure 4.4



4.2 Causes of Monetisation

4.2.1 Poverty

Poverty emerged as a significant factor contributing to the monetisation of parliamentary primaries in the Yunyoo constituency. A notable portion of respondents from both the NDC and NPP (9 out of 14) identified poverty as a key reason why people accept vote rewards. Participant 1 from the NPP remarked, "If people could support themselves, they wouldn't accept bribes." He also noted, "Namu! Namu a baat nan li kur," meaning that poverty is the root cause of monetisation issues. Similarly, Participant 2 from the NDC commented, "If a candidate for primaries can afford to register delegates for National Health Insurance or provide maize for their families, it's a done deal...it's over! So, poverty is at the heart of monetisation. Illiteracy and poverty are prevalent, and when you give someone a cedi, they feel as though you have given them a great fortune" (Field Data, 2022).

This aligns with Ojo's (2008:119) argument that individuals who are poor and face uncertainty about their next meal are more inclined to dispose of their votes in exchange for gifts from politicians. Desposato (2007:104) supports this view, stating that "poor voters, on average, place greater value on immediate personal benefits rather than on long-term public goods." In countries such as Ghana, widespread poverty plays a significant role in this issue, creating a "dependency relationship" between the voters and the politicians, including their elected representatives (Ninsin, 2016).

4.2.2 Insatiable Quest for Money

A considerable number of participants (9 out of 14) indicated that the demand for money in Yunyoo is exceptionally high. People place such a high value on money that politicians who provide financial incentives become their preferred candidates. Participant 1 from the NPP remarked, "Money is crucial here; if you don't have it, don't bother running for leadership." Emphasizing the strong desire for money, Participant 2, who served in the previous NDC administration, noted that if people hear about a candidate who is campaigning but does not own a car, they won't bother attending the campaign, as they assume the candidate lacks financial resources. Participant 3 from the NDC added, "Today in Ghana, delegates prefer to vote for someone with money. Your campaign message is irrelevant if you don't offer money. Delegates are more interested in the immediate financial benefit they can receive" (Field Data, 2022).

The mentality of "hand go, hand come" was prevalent among respondents from both political sides. As Participant 3 described it, politics is essentially a reciprocal arrangement: "You scratch my back, I scratch yours." This suggests that if voters are not offered monetary or material benefits, they may withhold their support. Participant 4 from the NPP further elaborated, saying, "No nine, No ten." He emphasized that he

would only vote for someone who is willing to spend money on him, adding, "If not, forget it. My vote, for me, is for sale" (Field Data, 2022).

This mentality reflects a stimulus-response mechanism, where people reciprocate benefits with their votes, rather than out of a sense of obligation. Brusco et al. (2004:78) argue that Individuals engage in vote buying because they perceive a "normative obligation" to reciprocate campaign handouts, treating them as if they were gifts.

4.2.3 Politics as a Business

A limited number of interviewees (5 out of 14) attributed the monetization of politics to viewing it as a business. They believe that politicians distribute money with the expectation of recovering their investments once they secure their positions. For example, Participant 5 from the NPP remarked that "many leaders pursue office for their own benefit and that of their families." Similarly, Participant 6 from the NDC stated, "Leaders enter government to make money for themselves; we also want our share before we cast our votes." Politics is perceived as a highly profitable venture. In a business context, transactions involve exchanging goods through buying, selling, or giving. If the value of what is received greatly exceeds what is given, people are more willing to give more (Field Data, 2022).

4.2.4 Failed Promises

A significant number of respondents (8 out of 14) believe that voters accept money from politicians due to the latter's failure to fulfill their manifesto and campaign promises. They argue that politicians often attract votes with enticing promises, only to abandon these commitments once elected. Participant 7 from the NDC expressed frustration, saying, "You cannot step on the testicles of the blind twice. These politicians have deceived us for far too long. We are here to claim our fair share and

vote. They only preach virtue and practice vice. So, now that we have the chance to take what belongs to all of us, I don't think it is a crime" (Field Data, 2022).

This aligns with the argument made by Brusco, V., Nazareno, M., & Stokes, S. C. (2004:78), who suggest that voters who "dispose of" their votes, or whom political candidates view as reliable targets for vote buying, are often those who are doubtful about future promises and prefer to receive immediate benefits.

4.2.5 Insufficient government funding for political parties and Candidates

One respondent (2 out of 14) linked the monetization of parliamentary primaries to the lack of government support for political parties and candidates in Ghana. Participant 8 from the NPP argued that, "The state should sponsor political parties and their candidates if we genuinely want to address this issue once and for all. Weak political parties lead to weak candidates who lack the capacity to address the problems facing the public" (Field Data, 2022).

4.3 Implications/Effects of Monetization on Democracy

The study highlighted several democratic consequences resulting from the monetization of parliamentary primaries, with many of the effects being negative and substantial.

4.3.1 Effects of Monetization on Democracy

Responses concerning the impact of monetization on the country's democracy were numerous and can be categorized into three main areas: denial of political equality, corruption, and the emergence of weak, unqualified, or undeserving candidates.

4.3.2 Lack of Accountability

Nichter (2008) contends that when individuals dispose of their votes, they relinquish their capacity to hold leaders accountable for development programs. This forfeiture of accountability is partly due to the guilt that voters feel for having chosen based on monetary incentives rather than merit. Participant 4 from the NPP observed that "candidates for parliament may easily disregard their constituents once they are elected; thus, receiving money and other benefits from aspirants is a way for delegates to claim their share while it is still available" (Field Data, 2022).

This suggests that if delegates view politicians as providing substantial, collective benefits, the effectiveness of vote buying as an election strategy diminishes. Participant 6 from the NDC added, "It undermines the accountability aspect of our democracy. If someone gives you money to secure your vote, do you still expect them to be accountable to you? People don't realize that when you sell your vote cheaply to a politician, holding them accountable becomes difficult" (Field Data, 2022).

The perspectives align with those found in the Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG) (2020) survey titled "Demonetizing Electoral Politics, Strengthening Accountable Governance: What Path Forward for Ghana?" This survey suggests that monetization undermines democracy and national development by fostering corruption, weakening accountability mechanisms, and diminishing the roles of honesty and integrity in politics.

4.3.2.1 Ineffective and Incompetent Leaders

The study's findings suggest that monetization leads to the election of ineffective leaders. Respondents noted that wealthy individuals were more likely to win elections influenced by money, while potentially qualified leaders without financial resources

struggled to secure positions. Consequently, leadership positions were filled based on financial means rather than competence. Participant 11 from the NPP remarked, "Cash for votes has replaced merit-based voting." Similarly, Participant 7 from the NDC expressed frustration, saying, "Finding good leaders in the Yunyoo Constituency is challenging because most voters choose based on money, not competence."

These observations echo Muhumuza's (1997:177) assertion that "a major risk of monetizing the electoral process is that an unpopular candidate may win an election due to their financial power." This implies that when elections are decided based on financial contributions rather than qualifications, competence is sacrificed for mediocrity. As a result, citizens suffer, as they are unable to fully benefit from democracy due to the election of ineffective and unsuitable leaders.

4.3.2.2 Corruption

Monetization of elections leads to corruption. Participant 8 from the NPP explained, "Our system is such that people believe the only way to secure a position, such as a Member of Parliament or District Chief Executive, is by influencing the person with the authority to appoint you" (Field Data, 2022). This observation aligns with the Corruption Watch Report (2020), which found that some candidates paid up to three thousand cedis per delegate during parliamentary primaries. This mindset often results in elections being swayed by vote buying and the manipulation of voters' consciences.

Corruption involves using public office for personal gain. When politicians use money to secure their positions, they are likely to seek to recoup their investments once in office. Politicians are not philanthropists or benevolent figures; they are likely to use the resources gained from their public roles to benefit themselves. This finding supports Aryee's (2019) view that monetization in politics acts as a conduit for corruption,

negatively impacting democratic governance. Aryee argues that while money is essential in politics for parties and candidates to fulfill their responsibilities, it must be used wisely to support governance. Misuse of such funds can lead to corruption and power being captured for the benefit of a few.

4.4 Impact of Monetary Influence on the Integrity and Fairness of the Primary Process

4.4.1 Denial of Political Equality

Respondents indicated that monetized primaries hindered equal opportunity for poorer individuals to compete in elections alongside wealthier candidates. Those with financial resources are better positioned to secure political roles. For instance, a young, promising NDC parliamentary aspirant who lacked funds lost to a well-established, two-term Member of Parliament due to the financial disparity. Participant 9, a former constituency chairman aspirant from the NPP, expressed frustration, saying, "because of the role of money in elections, individuals with limited financial resources find it increasingly difficult to vie for leadership positions."

Participant 10, a former NDC parliamentary aspirant and delegate, also noted, "To become a candidate, one must first work for many years to save enough money to give to the electorate during the primaries" (Field Data, 2022).

These observations support Aryee's (2019) argument that monetized elections citizens are deprived of quality representation and leadership when political positions are essentially auctioned off to the highest bidder. Competent and dedicated individuals who lack financial resources are thus excluded from serving. As the monetization of politics increases, merit continues to be sacrificed (Nketiah, 2021).

4.4.2 An Assault on Free Choice

The findings reveal that the integrity of electoral freedom is compromised in monetized elections. Voters often prioritize financial incentives over the competencies of candidates when casting their votes. Delegates are more likely to support candidates who offer them money, which discourages qualified and capable politicians without financial resources from running for office due to the fear of losing. Participant 9 from the New Patriotic Party (NPP) remarked, "This undermines the integrity of politics and skews the people's power and will due to the influence of money." Similarly, Participant 12 from the NDC observed, "Politicians are elected not based on their leadership qualities, moral values, or ethical standards, or commitment to the common good, but for their financial contributions" (Field Data, 2022).

Democracy is supposed to be about free choice, but when voters' decisions are influenced by money, it undermines the entire process of free choice, opinion, and expression. As a result, monetization erodes fundamental citizen rights. This supports Bratton's (2008) claim that monetized elections undermine political liberty.

4.5 Addressing the Monetization of Parliamentary Primaries

4.5.1 Expansion of the Electoral College

Respondents were asked for solutions to address the issue of monetization in elections, acknowledging that it is a pervasive issue impacting all political parties. The general agreement was to broaden the Electoral College to include all card-carrying members could be an effective strategy to minimize or even eliminate monetization. For example, Participant 14 from the NDC suggested, "Parties should focus on tackling the issue of monetization by increasing the number of voters to include all card-carrying members and potentially decentralizing voting centers. This would make monetization less appealing and more challenging for political parties and candidates." Similarly,

Participant 13 from the NPP proposed that expanding the Electoral College would make it prohibitively expensive and nearly impossible for candidates to buy votes nationwide (Field Data, 2022).

This recommendation aligns with Ichino & Nathan's (2016) argument that granting voting rights to all registered party members in a constituency would improve inclusiveness and significantly reduce the prevalence of vote buying and selling.

4.5.2 Establishing a Public Financing System


There is ongoing debate regarding the necessity of providing public funding to assist political parties and their candidates in Ghana. The general consensus is that strong political parties play a vital role in advancing democracy and fostering sustainable development. Political parties play essential responsibilities in the establishment of a government, leadership development, and holding the incumbent government accountable. Participant 10 from the NDC noted, "Given the substantial costs associated with political activities—such as nomination, filing, and the production of posters, flyers, and banners—without public support, wealthy financiers may become political godfathers who influence electoral outcomes" (Field Data, 2022).

This perspective aligns with Aryee et al. (2007), who argue that relying on a limited group of affluent individuals or organizations for party funding is detrimental to the enduring stability of democracy in Africa. Additionally, as a solution to combat the monetization issue prevalent in the political arena, Aryee et al. (2007) suggests that the state should assume responsibility for providing financial support to political parties and their candidates at all levels of elections.

4.5.3 Providing Effective Education to Delegates and Political Actors

The study strongly highlighted the need for effective education as a solution to address the monetization of primaries in the Yunyoo Constituency, particularly between the NDC and NPP. Participant 11, a delegate from the New Patriotic Party, suggested that one approach to combat monetization is to "educate delegates to vote against political parties and candidates who offer bribes during primaries and to support those who campaign on issues instead." Similarly, Participant 7 from the NDC added, "When voters are unaware of the consequences of accepting bribes and voting in return, they may perceive it as acceptable behavior. Therefore, both the givers and recipients of bribes should be educated to avoid this practice" (Field Data, 2022).

These views align with Aryee et al. (2007) recommendation that the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) should be adequately funded to educate the electorate on the importance of elections, rather than encouraging them to seek bribes from candidates.



4.5.4 Legislation

The study also indicates that a key approach for improving the integrity of parliamentary primaries and reducing the impact of money is the enactment of legislation to address the issue. Without such measures, monetization could undermine the steady political progress Ghana has made. Participant 8 from the NPP commented, "Offering and accepting money in exchange for votes is not ideal, but it is a common practice. I suggest that if the state could implement a law prohibiting the use of money by political parties and candidates to sway voters, it would help to curb or reduce this practice" (Field Data, 2022).

This perspective aligns with Aryee's (2019) recommendation that to combat the issue of monetization, the government should develop thorough legislation to ensure party accountability and curb money laundering in political elections.

4.5.5 Conclusion

The findings indicate that monetization is having severe negative effects on political, social, and economic development. The study highlights how monetization adversely impacts the political process and the perceptions of delegates. It shows that the monetization of parliamentary primaries marginalizes qualified candidates who lack financial resources and exacerbates corruption. Furthermore, the findings suggest that monetized elections pose a threat to democratic principles and the rule of law, compromising the integrity of the electoral process.

To address this issue, the study recommends implementing legal restrictions and enforcing strict regulations to curb monetization. Political parties should also enhance their efforts to promote transparency and accountability, ensuring a fair and equitable electoral process.

In conclusion, the issue of monetization in parliamentary primaries is complex and requires a coordinated effort from all stakeholders. Only through collective action can Ghana achieve a just and democratic electoral process that genuinely reflects the interests of its citizens.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This section provides an overview of the main discoveries, offers conclusions, and outlines recommendations derived from the research. It will reference the views and opinions of the respondents, which may lead to some repetition of previously discussed issues. However, this repetition will be used to contextualize the analysis. Additionally, the chapter will explore the significance of the study.

5.2. Summary of the Study

5.2.1 Purpose of the Study

The research titled "Delegates' Views on Parliamentary Primaries: A Comparative Analysis of NDC and NPP Primaries in the Yunyoo Constituency" was conducted between May 2022 and September 2023. The aim of the research was to assess delegates' views on the monetization of parliamentary primaries in the Yunyoo Constituency and explore measures to mitigate or eliminate this issue.

5.2.2 Research Objectives

The research was driven by four key objectives:

1. To examine delegates' views on the causes of the monetisation of parliamentary primaries in the Yunyoo Constituency.
2. To assess delegates' views on the implications of monetisation of parliamentary primaries for the country's democracy.
3. To understand delegates' views on how monetary influence affects the integrity and fairness of the primary election process in the Yunyoo Constituency.

4. To explore delegates' views on measures that can be implemented to address the problem of monetisation of parliamentary primaries.

Building on the objectives, Research Question 1 centered on identifying the causes of monetization in parliamentary primaries. Research Question 2 explored the implications of this monetization on the country's democratic progress. Research Question 3 aimed to uncover the effects of monetary influence on the integrity and fairness of the primary process, while Research Question 4 sought to explore strategies for addressing and managing monetization.

5.2.3 Research Procedure

The study aimed to understand delegates' views on monetization of parliamentary primaries in the Yunyoo Constituency of the north East region of Ghana. A qualitative approach was used, with the research structured as a case study. Fourteen participants were purposively chosen from both the National Democratic Congress, (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party, (NPP) and interviewed. Data were collected via semi-structured interviews and observations, and then analyzed using thematic template analysis.

5.2.4 Summary of Findings

The key findings of the research are summarized below:

Research Question 1: What are the causes of monetization of parliamentary primaries in the Yunyoo Constituency?

Respondents identified several causes of monetization in parliamentary primaries elections in the Yunyoo Constituency of the North East region of Ghana. These causes include poverty, unfulfilled promises, financial needs of the electorate, viewing politics as a business, and the absence of government funding for political parties. Many respondents argued that candidates who offer material goods and cash demonstrate their

ability to support others. Given the economic hardships faced by many voters, who may struggle to secure their next meal, they tend to be more inclined to accept financial incentives in return for their votes during primary elections. Thus, poverty and the need for money significantly contribute to the monetization of parliamentary primaries.

Additionally, some voters believe that politicians are often deceptive and may not return to their constituents once elected. Consequently, they feel justified in demanding rewards before casting their votes. For these voters, primaries resemble a lucrative season where the wealthier aspirants or the highest bidder have an advantage. This aligns with Ojo's (2008:119) observation that individuals in poverty, who are uncertain about their next meal, may easily compromise their principles by accepting gifts from politicians in exchange for their support. The study found that election winners are often those who offer more money to delegates. Conversely, candidates who lack financial resources or are unwilling to offer bribes may lose elections, even if they are otherwise strong contenders.

Additionally, the CDD's 2016 pre-election survey on Ghana's elections, named "Prospects for Credibility and Peacefulness," highlighted that money and material incentives are commonly used to buy votes. The survey found that politicians often use cash as a key strategy to secure votes. This finding is consistent with Kramon's (2013) study, "Vote Buying and Accountability in Democratic Africa," which observes that cash and other handouts, often called 'chop money,' are commonly used in Ghanaian election campaigns.

The study also highlighted that the absence of public funding for political parties and candidates significantly contributes to the monetization of electoral politics in Ghana. Respondents proposed that government funding for political parties and their

candidates could help level the playing field and decrease the prevalence of monetization in elections.

Furthermore, the report identified the perception of politics as a business as another cause of monetization in the Yunyoo Constituency. Some respondents felt that politicians are primarily focused on advancing their own careers and accumulating wealth, rather than genuinely serving the electorate. Consequently, they view politics as a means of personal gain rather than public service.


Research Question 2: What are the implications of monetization of parliamentary primaries on the democracy of the country?

This research question sought to investigate and assess the sociopolitical implications of monetization of parliamentary primaries on Ghana's democratic development. The data analysis revealed several democratic consequences of monetization, many of which were negative and significant. The key implications identified include:

- 1. Denial of Political Equality and Erosion of Free Choice:** The study found that monetization undermines individuals' ability to make free and informed decisions, infringing upon their fundamental rights as citizens and their freedom of opinion and expression. Additionally, monetization compromises the principle of voting secrecy, effectively undermining the integrity of confidential voting.
- 2. Unqualified and Ineffective Leaders:** Monetization allows individuals who can afford to pay for their positions to succeed without necessarily having broad support from the electorate. This undermines the essence of democracy. The prevalence of monetization raises concerns regarding the integrity of elections and the capacity to elect responsible and answerable official representatives.

This supports Corruption Watch Report (2020) argument that monetized elections deprive citizens of the right caliber of leadership. In this system, political positions are essentially auctioned to the highest bidder, excluding competent and dedicated individuals who lack financial resources from serving.

3. Corruption and Inefficiency: The report highlights that monetization fosters widespread social injustices, inefficiencies, and corruption in public service. Corruption is a pervasive societal issue, with politicians and political actors often being identified as its main perpetrators, especially during elections. This aligns with Aryee's (2019) assertion that monetization in politics serves as a conduit for corruption, impacting democratic administration in all countries. The findings clearly indicate that monetization of primaries has detrimental effects on Ghana's emerging democracy, contributing to public deficits, inefficiencies within the government sector (Hicken & Simmons, 2008; Keefer, 2007) and heightened levels of corruption (Wilkinson, 2007; Kitschelt, H., Kriesi, H., Lange, P., & Toka, G., 2010; Keefer, 2007).



Research Question 3: How does monetary influence affect the integrity and fairness of the primary election process?

The research sought to investigate how financial influence affects integrity and fairness of the primary election process. The findings revealed the following:

Incompetent and Unsuitable Leaders: The study found that monetized primaries often result in the election of candidates who are chosen more for their financial resources than for their qualifications. This aligns with Milbrath's (2005:24) observation that individuals with integrity and a genuine desire to serve, but lacking the financial means to buy votes, may be overlooked, nevertheless, candidates who are

inadequately qualified but possess significant financial resources or corrupt tendencies might still be elected.

Lack of Accountability: The study also identified a lack of accountability as a significant consequence of monetary influence on the integrity and fairness of the primary election process. Accountability involves being answerable for the management of public resources according to established legal and ethical standards. It encompasses adherence to governance rules, avoidance of conflicts of interest, and the responsible and competent handling of public trust (Boadi, 2001). This finding supports Nichter's (2008) argument that when votes are bought, voters lose their ability to hold leaders accountable for their development programs. In a democracy where leaders are elected based on their promises, accountability is crucial, and citizens should have the opportunity to make their representatives answerable for their actions and inactions. However, the influence of money in primary politics often leads candidates to disregard their commitments to the electorate.

Corruption: The study suggests that monetary influence in primaries exacerbates corruption rather than eradicating it. The findings reveal that resources intended for the public are often misappropriated by politicians for their personal gain, rather than being used to benefit their constituents. This observation supports Aryee's (2019) assertion that monetization in politics serves as a channel for corruption, thereby weakening democratic governance in all countries.

Research Question 4. What steps should be implemented to eliminate or reduce monetisation of parliamentary primaries?

The monetization of political party primaries, especially within Ghana's two main parties, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP)

has become a well-known issue. This question reviewed current practices to find ways to tackle the issue. The research identified several measures to deal with the issue:

1. Establish a Public Financing System: Implementing a public financing system for political parties and their candidates was deemed essential throughout the study. Respondents suggested initiating open, debates on the funding of political parties with a focus on necessary reforms and regulations to enhance transparency.

2. Expand Voter Participation: Increasing the total account of voters involved in the primary election process could reduce the influence of money. By including more party members as primary voters, grassroots participation is strengthened, which can significantly lessen the impact of money in elections. A more inclusive primary process is recommended.

3. Enhance Education for Delegates and Candidates: Effective education for both voters and political candidates is crucial. State institutions like the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) ought to be better funded to fulfill their role in educating the public on elections and civic responsibilities. Well-informed citizens are more likely to make informed choices and hold leaders accountable.

4. Legislative Measures: Strengthening legislation is another proposed solution. The Electoral Commission (EC) and the judiciary should be empowered to hold political parties and their candidates accountable.

In conclusion, no single measure will completely resolve the issue of monetization in parliamentary primaries. A combination of these strategies is necessary to significantly reduce the problem.

5.2.5. Implications for the Study

The study's findings have significant implications for various stakeholders, including academics, scholars, policymakers, media outlets, civil society organizations, political parties, and electoral commissions. These results underscore the need for a comprehensive examination of how political parties and their candidates contribute to electoral clientelism in both internal party elections and national elections. The study highlights the widespread issue of monetization and its potential threat to democratic processes. By providing empirical evidence, the study advances theoretical understanding of monetization in the context of parliamentary primaries. Additionally, it offers insights that may enhance knowledge of the predictive effects of these phenomena, thereby elucidating the relationship between theoretical assumptions and practical realities.

5.3 Conclusion

Contesting in parliamentary primaries in the Yunyoo Constituency and across Ghana with minimal financial resources is nearly impossible. The critical factor is not an individual's leadership capabilities but rather their ability to leverage money to amplify their message. Unfortunately, candidates who showcase their wealth during primary campaigns are often better positioned to win, while those who lack the financial means to bribe voters, despite having compelling messages and potential for success, are frequently at a disadvantage.

The widespread monetization in Ghana's democratic process undermines the integrity of candidate selection in both primaries and general elections, providing politicians and their financiers with a moral justification for depriving the electorate of their genuine mandate.

Looking ahead, it is crucial for the NDC and NPP to consider expanding the Electoral College to encompass all registered members. Failing to do so could spell disaster. Evidence suggests that broadening the electoral base during parliamentary primaries would mitigate the influence of bribery in party elections, promoting a fairer selection process.

5.4 Recommendations

Based on the research findings, which highlight the connection between economic status and voters' decisions, the following recommendations are proposed:

1. Implement Poverty Reduction Strategies: Successive governments should prioritize and intensify efforts to reduce poverty. Redistributive policies should be developed to reduce the disparity between the wealthy and the impoverished, especially in rural areas like Yunyoo.

2. Strengthen Civic Education: Government bodies like the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) need increased resources to effectively educate citizens on elections and civic matters. An informed electorate is more likely to make informed decisions and demand accountability from their leaders.

3. Enforce Political Party Financing Laws: There should be a focus on enforcing existing laws regarding political party financing. Discussions on state funding for political parties need to continue, with election management bodies and the judiciary taking steps to ensure compliance. Civil Society Organizations and other stakeholders should be supported in facilitating robust debates on the merits and drawbacks of public funding for political parties.

4. Broaden Electoral Roll Participation: Political parties should reform their processes to include all card-carrying members in the electoral roll for primaries.

Expanding participation in party primaries will help democratize the process and reduce the feasibility of vote buying.

5. Examine Political Parties' Role in Electoral Clientelism: A thorough investigation is needed into how political parties reinforce electoral clientelism in both internal and general elections. This analysis will help understand and address the dynamics of clientelism in the electoral process.

5.5 Limitations

The monetization of elections is a widespread issue affecting many countries globally. In Ghana, this problem has recently come to the forefront, especially concerning the monetization of parliamentary primaries. These primaries are crucial for selecting candidates for the general elections, with delegates playing a key role in this selection process. The study aimed to explore the complexities of this issue but faced several limitations:

1. Respondent Engagement: Some respondents were indifferent during face-to-face interviews, largely due to uncertainty about how the collected information would be used and concerns about whether it would benefit or harm their political party.

2. Data Collection Challenges: Gathering and processing data proved difficult. The researcher had to be cautious in questioning to avoid arousing suspicion among delegates from the two political parties. This required careful analytical skills and was further complicated by time constraints, transportation issues, financial limitations, and health problems, which hindered the smooth progress of the study.

3. Demands for Compensation: Some respondents requested compensation for their participation in the interviews. They suspected that the researcher might be conducting

the study on behalf of a political party for financial gain, despite assurances that the study was purely academic.

4. Financial Constraints: Financial difficulties significantly impacted the study. The researcher's illness led to additional expenses for medication, which further strained the study's budget and progress.

5. Time Constraints: The study was hindered by time limitations due to the researcher's health issues, work commitments, and family responsibilities, which disrupted the study's progress.



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APPENDIX A

LETTER OF INTRODUCTION



UNIVERSITY OF EDUCATION, WINNEBA
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE EDUCATION
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE EDUCATION

13th April 2022

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

Dear Sir/Madam,

LETTER OF INTRODUCTION: BAWANI ERNEST

This is to introduce to you Mr. Bawani Ernest from the Department of Political Science Education, University of Education, Winneba.

He is undertaking a study on the topic: **Delegate Perception of Monetization of Parliamentary Primary Elections in Ghana: A comparative study of NDC and NPP Parliamentary Primaries in Yunyoo Constituency.**

This researcher need your help by way of volunteering information on this subject to enable him to complete his research. Please, the research is purely for academic purposes and all information is treated as confidential.

Kindly give him the necessary assistance he may need.

Yours faithfully,



Ms. Francisca Elorm Kughega
For: Ag. HOD, Political Science Education



www.uew.edu.gh

APPENDIX B

INTERVIEW GUIDE

(FOR DELEGATES INCLUDING BRANCH, WARD, CONSTITUENCY AND APPOINTEES)

INTRODUCTION

My name is Ernest Bawanin. I am a student pursuing Master of Philosophy degree programme in Political Science at the University of Education, Winneba. As part of the requirements to complete my programme, I am undertaking a research into Monetisation of Parliamentary Primaries in Ghana. In this study, I would like to learn about the perceptions of delegates on Monetisation of Parliamentary Primaries in Ghana with Yunyoo Constituency of North East Region as a case study. In the following interview, I wish to elicit your views on the perceptions, experiences, and thoughts about Monetisation of Parliamentary Primaries.

You are assured that the responses given will be treated with utmost confidentiality and anonymity and will be used solely and strictly for academic purposes. Please, kindly answer the questions as truly and objectively as possible.

Thank you very much for the help.

QUESTIONS

A. Demographic Data

1. Sex: Male/Female

2. Age:

1. 21-30

2. 31-40

3. 41-50

4. 51-60

5. 61 and above.

3. Marital status: Single, Married, Divorced

4. Highest Educational Level completed:

1. WASSCE/SSSCE,

2. Diploma,

3. Bachelor's Degree,

4. Master's Degree

5. No formal education



B. Knowledge of general elections and primaries

5. Are you a registered voter? Yes/No

6. Which political party do you belong to?

7. Are you a delegate? Yes/No

8. Which executive position have you held or currently holds at the branch, ward or constituency level?
9. Have you voted in the previous primaries before? Yes/No
10. Are you aware parliamentary aspirants give cash or any kind of incentive to delegates to attract or influence their vote choice? If yes, how did you come to this awareness?
11. Are you a beneficiary to some of these gifts?
12. Will you accept money or any form of inducement from political aspirant to vote for him/her? Why do the politicians offer those material rewards to delegates or voters?
13. Will money induce or influence your vote choice?
14. What meaning do you attach to the cash gifts politicians give during primaries?
15. What other considerations will influence your choice of a candidate?
16. In the last primaries, were you ever transported, camped or fed by any aspirant to the detriment of others?
17. Did you openly endorse, support or canvass votes for some candidates against others?
18. Were you paid or given any kind of incentive for doing that?
19. What factors drive monetisation of parliamentary primaries in the Yunyoo Constituency?
20. What in your opinion are some of the implications/effects of monetisation on primaries in the Yunyoo constituency and the democracy of the country?
21. What are the effects of monetary influence on the choice of candidates by the delegates?

22. How can the monetisation of parliamentary primaries be dealt with?
23. Do you know how such politicians who offer material rewards can recover their cost after winning the election?
24. How can the means to recover the cost affect their work and the overall development of the area?
25. If only people who are resourced to shower gifts on delegates who get elected, how can the poor but committed citizens who wish to serve their people get the opportunity to serve?



APPENDIX C

INTERVIEW GUIDE

(FOR PARLIAMENTARY ASPIRANTS)

INTRODUCTION

My name is Ernest Bawanin. I am a student pursuing a Master of philosophy degree programme in Political Science at the University of Education, Winneba. As part of the requirements to complete my programme, I am undertaking research into Monetisation of Parliamentary Primaries in Ghana. In this study, I would like to learn about the perceptions of delegates on monetization of Parliamentary Primaries in Ghana with Yunyoo Constituency of North East Region as a case study. In the following interview, I wish to elicit your views on the perceptions, experiences, and thoughts about monetisation of Parliamentary Primaries.

You are assured that the responses given will be treated with utmost confidentiality and anonymity and will be used solely and strictly for academic purposes. Please, kindly answer the questions as truly and objectively as possible.

Thank you very much for the help.

B. Demographic Data

1. Sex: Male/Female

2. Age: 1. 21-30

2. 31-40

3. 41-50

4. 51-60

5. 61 and above

3. Marital status: Single, Married, Divorced

4. Highest Educational Level completed:

1. WASSCE/SSSCE.
2. Diploma.
3. Bachelor's Degree.
4. Master's Degree.

B. Knowledge of general elections and primaries

1. Are you a registered voter? 1. Yes/No
2. Which political party do you belong to? NPP/NDC
3. Are you an aspirant? 1. Yes/No
4. Have you contested in the previous primaries before? Yes/No
5. Have you given or distributed cash or any kind of incentive to delegates in the last primaries in an attempt to influence or buy their vote?
6. Were you rewarded at polls for giving out money or material things to delegates during parliamentary primaries?
7. Are you aware there are electoral laws against the practice of vote buying?
8. What was your motivation for giving money or material gifts to the delegates?
9. What do you think would happen if you did not offer such gifts to the delegates?
10. Did you transport, camped and fed delegates?
11. Why are politicians complaining about monetisation but still engaging in it?
12. How did you come by the money to provide those gifts?

13. Will you accept any kind of support from friends, political parties or other bodies in your bid to win a parliamentary primary?
14. Were you in anyway supported by friends, political parties or some other bodies?
15. Aside money, what other forms of rewards did you offer to delegates?
16. How much money do you spend on a delegate and on the campaign as a whole?
17. What factors in your opinion drive monetisation of parliamentary primaries in Yunyoo Constituency?
18. What in your opinion are some of the implications/effects of monetisation on primaries and the democracy of the country?
19. What are the effects of monetary influence on the choice of candidates by the delegates?
20. From your own perspective, how can the monetisation of parliamentary primaries be dealt with?

