

UNIVERSITY OF EDUCATION, WINNEBA

**GHANA BEYOND AID: AN ANALYSIS OF CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN
GHANA'S FOREIGN POLICY GOALS IN THE FOURTH REPUBLIC**

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**A thesis in the Department of Political Science Education
Faculty of Social Science Education, submitted to the
School of Graduate Studies in partial fulfilment**

**of the requirements for the award of the degree of
Master of Philosophy
(Political Science)
in the University of Education, Winneba**

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DECLARATION

Student's Declaration

I, Emmanuel Ofori Ntim, declare that this thesis, with the exception of quotations and references contained in published works which have all been identified and duly acknowledged, is entirely my own original work, and it has not been submitted, either in part or whole, for another degree elsewhere.

Signature:

Date:

Supervisor's Declaration

I hereby declare that the preparation and presentation of this work was supervised in accordance with the guidelines for supervision of thesis as laid down by the University of Education, Winneba.

Name of Supervisor: Thomas Prehi Botchway (Ph.D)

Signature:

Date:

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to Madam Theresa Serwaa, my wife Erica Asamoah, Henrietta Antwi, Miss Margaret Mensah, Collins Ntim and all my kids – Jessica, Anna and Elvis.




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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
AfCFTA	African Continental Free Trade Area
AU	African Union
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ERP	Economic Recovery Programme
EU	European Union
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GNAT	Ghana National Association of Teachers
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Countries
IMF	International Monetary Fund
NCCE	National Commission for Civic Education
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NDC	National Democratic Congress
NLC	National Liberation Council
NPP	New Patriotic Party
NRC	National Redemption Council
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
PNDC	Provisional National Defence Council
PNP	People's National Party
PP	Progress Party
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SMC	Supreme Military Council
UNO	United Nations Organization

ABSTRACT

Ghana depends heavily on foreign aid to implement its foreign policy goals. However, the aid regime has a myriad repercussions on the country. There is the need for pragmatic foreign policies and programmes to extricate the state from its over-reliance on aid. The thrust of the study was therefore to analyse *Ghana Beyond Aid* within the scope of aid-dependency and strategies for independent foreign policy decision making in the Fourth Republic. The study employed the qualitative research approach. The study used a semi-structured interview guide to collect data from state actors and non-state actors in Ghana's foreign policy decision making. The state actors included Members of the Ghana Beyond Aid Committee, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Parliament's Select Committee on Foreign Affairs while the non-state actors comprised of CSOs, Experts in foreign policy analysis, the media and Diplomatic Missions. Data was analysed using thematic analysis. Findings show that continuity and change in Ghana's foreign policy goals are determined by past policies and experiences, national interest, public opinion, natural resources and global factors. The study also finds that Ghana heavily depends on aid for economic growth and national development due to factors not excluding the fragility of its economy, aid conditionality, rented political institutions and policies and show of opulence in policy execution in the midst of crisis. It emerged from the findings that foreign aid plays significant role in the development of critical sectors of the economy. These include democratic consolidation and governance, education, energy, health, agriculture and transportation. The study also finds that the pursuit of pragmatic foreign policies and programmes such as low profile international relations, promotion of Pan-Africanist ideals, active role in African integration to enhance regional and national security, bilateral relations with new and emerging economies, and restructuring of the status of diplomatic missions and ambassadorial roles as part of Ghana's foreign policy goals, namely, economic diplomacy, good neighbourliness policy and promotion of world peace, would move Ghana beyond aid.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

A clear manifestation of international relations is keenly observed under states' foreign policy goals. Foreign policy goals, invariably, determine decisions, strategies and mechanisms of States in international relations. The sorry state of developing countries, as the proponent of the Big Push theories assert, calls for support from the Global North in the form of foreign aid (Abuzeid, 2009). This situation, however, engenders implementation of foreign policy goals that have both positive and negative effects on the economies of developing countries. A study by Veiderpass and Andersson (2007) estimated that the North-South development gap precipitates persistent capital influx, technology and innovation transfer to the developing world. The intent of such financial and material support as Moosa (2016) put it, ranges from funding of official financial loans to military and security operations.

According to Brautigam and Knack (2004), foreign aid has a long-standing history but traceable to the Marshall Plan of 1948 under the Truman Doctrine. The Marshall Plan was instituted to resuscitate the European economies after the Second World War. Japan, West Germany, France, UK and Norway were among the countries that benefited from the programme. Indeed, what started as a political interest by the US to offer economic assistance to European countries in order to rebuild their economies and to gain their support, later turned out to be a humanitarian cause (Izobo, 2020). Even though the Marshall Plan ended in 1951, the US continued to deliver substantial aid to the European countries for several years. A fall in aid inflows globally was recorded in the 1950s. However, the US managed to send aid to South Vietnam,

Israel, South Korea and other countries during the Cold War. To gain the support of African countries during the Cold War hostilities between the US and the USSR, the two superpowers used aid as a bait.

African states have continuously been at the receiving end of aid since their nationhood. The US development assistance programmes, such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the Africa Development Foundation (ADF), have demonstrated uninterrupted results in aid programmes. Programmes such as sustainable agriculture, youth entrepreneurship, security cooperation and improved access to power and energy that stimulate local economies and cause decline in aid-dependency have been implemented in Africa. According to Kwemo (2017), Africa accounts for about 20% of US aid; the biggest recipients being Egypt, Kenya and South Sudan. Asongu (2014) also reports that despite Africa's poor statistics in per capita income, life expectancy, literacy, infant mortality, among others, in the last four decades, the West has shown concern through foreign aid organisations and transnational institutions. Averagely, African countries receive more foreign aid than other developing countries. In July 2005, the West increased aid to save Africa from poverty and diseases. The Group of Eight (G8), for example, doubled foreign aid to Africa from \$25 billion yearly to \$50 billion to not only support its "Big Push" agenda but also cancel aid-loans (Asongu, 2014). Systematic aid to Africa has shown exponential increase but economic growth and development hardly corresponds with it.

Foreign aid, for years, remains an indispensable phenomenon in relations between developed and developing countries. It contributes enormously towards hunger eradication, poverty alleviation, disease control, efficiency and effectiveness of

governance, and a general bridge in the poverty gap between the Global North and the Global South (Izobo, 2020; Brautigam & Knack, 2004). Sollenberg (2012) corroborates Izobo (2020), Brautigam and Knack (2004), and Asongu's (2014) assertion by emphasizing that the millions of dollars sent to Africa as foreign aid intent neither to jeopardize the peace nor economic development of the continent. Rather, it aims to support human development in various sectors of African economies. In spite of the relative success of foreign aid programmes in Africa, scores of experts argue that the provision of aid intensifies all the ills of society; poverty, diseases, hunger and low standards of living on the continent. For instance, Moyo (2009) asserts that aid has rather worsened the economies of Sub-Sahara Africa. On her part, Kwemo (2017) notes that aid to developing countries had at times, cultivated a culture of dependency in Africa. Consequently, Africa's utilization of aid has unfortunately yielded little to no improvements in the areas of Gross National Income (GNI), Human Development Index (HDI), among others.

Easterly (2006) also reinforces the point that foreign aid has done so much ill and so little good. According to the scholar, relatively substantial evidence has proven that foreign aid programmes claw back progress of developing countries and render them continually dependent on the developed world. According to Easterly (2006), this is the reason aid constitutes the Whiteman's burden. Izobo's (2020) study validates Easterly's argument as sound on the basis that indisputably, foreign aid has made many African states over-dependent on external forces. In Izobo's (2020) estimation, even the provision of basic systems and services are administrated through aid. For decades now, the effectiveness of aid to Africa has witnessed conflicting accounts as far as discussions about the development trajectory of the continent is concerned.

The aid and development correlation underpins Ghana's foreign policy goals, beginning in the early periods of independence, until now. In fact, the prevailing conditions at Ghana's independence in 1957 and the period that followed shortly marked the country as a player in international relations. Thompson (1969) argued reasonably in his work on the Congo Crisis that even though a small country, Ghana possessed enough resources to pursue an independent foreign policy agenda. In the words of Rooney (2007), the road had already been prepared by the colonial imperialists for the smooth take off of self-propelling foreign policy goals after independence. Furthermore, in 1964, Dr. Nkrumah at a ceremony to lay the foundation stone for the atomic reactor in Kwabenya, Accra, noted that Ghana had the resources to create a better life for its people (Rooney, 2007).

Indeed, the argument by these scholars was also based on the regional integration models instituted by the British. These included the West African Airways Corporation, the West African Court of Appeal, the West African Currency Board and the West African Cocoa Research Institute (Mba, 2015; Gebe, 2008; Armah, 2005). Also, a reliable and independent judicial service that had inundation of Ghanaian graduates and a reputable armed forces existed. Neither were the economic prospects of the country in limbo as potential industries like bauxite, gold and timber guaranteed economic development and social progress devoid of aid-dependency (Aklorbortu, 2019). For instance, Ghana at independence, as the economists Aryeetey and Fosu (2002) note, held the enviable status as the world's leading producer of cocoa. Cocoa was valued on the international market at over \$850 tons from 1956. Also, the country had an excess of \$151 million foreign investment and £182, 622,000 in external reserves with its per capita income, amongst the highest in Sub-Sahara Africa. That is,

there was enough credence to a solid economy that was supportive of the numerous domestic and foreign policies.

Botchway and Amoako-Gyampah (2021), Armah (2005) and Thompson (1969) have demonstrated in their studies that Dr. Nkrumah did a lot to aid the decolonization of a number of African states. Among Nkrumah's foreign policy goals were the quests to unite Africa and avoid the interference of the Cold War politics between the USA and USSR in African affairs. This agenda culminated in full commitment to the Non-Aligned Movement and the utmost refusal to succumb to being dependent on the superpowers.

Despite enough reasons that could be ascribed for these policies and their financial implications, the independence to exert foreign policy goals, however, waned and the country faced financial recession (Aklorbortu, 2019). Aluko (1977), for instance, has recounted that the national debt before the 1966 coup was above \$400 million with a record deficit of 227 million cedis in 1965. Consequently, the Nkrumah government went to the IMF for US\$14.25 million to shore up balance of payment deficit (Jonah, 1989). This dramatic deterioration in economic conditions and the fall in the living standards of Ghanaians made the Nkrumah Administration liable to military coup on 24th February 1966.

In an attempt to recuperate the economic crisis in consonance with their overall objectives, succeeding regimes after the First Republic prioritized national recovery programmes. Pursuant to socio-economic policies and political decisions obscured by the need to secure more foreign aid to repay external debts, governments after Nkrumah had to fall on "aid to deal with the economic realities of the time" (Tieku & Odoom, 2013, p. 333). Unfortunately, all the governments subsequently left power

after economic conditions had deteriorated further (Agyeman-Duah, 1987). As noted by Goldsworthy (1973), the huge legacy of external debt under the Nkrumah regime and the persistent borrowing after the 1966 coup landed Ghana in over US\$800,000,000 foreign debt. This external debt, however, needed servicing with about a quarter of the country's annual budget. The principal domestic crisis in the country, subsequently, showed high rising costs of goods and services, sky-rocketing unemployment rates, failing commercial sector, a declining agricultural output, among others (Goldsworthy, 1973).

In the midst of the precarious social conditions and economic decline, the IMF was specifically authorized to supervise the economy. Under the influence of the IMF, these administrations after the First Republic cut their expenditures, limited wages and shifted the national budget from agriculture and industrialization to privatizing or abandoning national enterprises (Adedeji, 2001; Libby, 1976). Perhaps, budget-balancing, rather than the transformation of Ghana's economy, was the main purpose of the economic policies of these regimes. Actually, the National Liberation Council, the Progress Party and the National Redemption Council (after the repudiation policy had failed) "became extremely pro-West and anti-communist" (Tieku & Odoom, 2013, p. 331) in anticipation of securing aid to address pressing domestic problems.

The Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) under Rawlings, however, pursued a defiant isolationism as its foreign policy towards the West in the initial stages (Tieku & Odoom, 2013; Chazan, 1984). However, the PNDC had to return to the IMF and the World Bank from April 1983 for economic bailout for survival (Boafo-Arthur, 1999b, 2007). Consequently, Ghana had to depend on other states, multinational corporations and other non-state actors in the form of foreign aid to meet the growing needs of the people. The lingering issue then is whether or not

consistently relying on aid could guarantee the national interest, good neighbourliness, economic diplomacy and the quest for world peace. Foreign aid, nonetheless, continues to record immense contentious reputation in the literature. In view of this, scholars including Sachs (2005) are supportive of aid while others such as Easterly (2007) abruptly detest it.

The New Patriotic Party (NPP) Administration on March 6, 2018 made it categorical that constant and continual dependence on aid could not be the trajectory to pursue to achieve growth and attain developed status. This statement was subsequently backed by a policy document on *Ghana Beyond Aid*. Also, in an interview with CNN in May, 2021, President Akufo-Addo reiterated his standpoint that Africa has to end its dependence on aid from the Western world.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The literature on Ghana's foreign policy attempts a copious narration and description of the country's historical antecedence and dependency. For instance, Gebe (2008) examined the implications of the 1966 coup on Ghana's foreign policy. Sanusi and Adu-Gyamfi (2017) focused on some regional and national interests of Ghana's foreign policy. While Siaw (2015) investigated the foreign policy objectives of Ghana under the Rawlings and Kufuor Administrations, Yeboah (2019) explored the economic diplomacy of the Kufuor Administration. Antwi-Boasiako (2021) also studied Ghana's public diplomacy under Nkrumah. Thus, research tends to concentrate so much on the Nkrumah era, Ghana's role in the decolonization and unification of Africa, military rule and economic diplomacy with the Bretton Woods Institutions.

However, a body of extant literature, including Botchway and Amoako-Gyampah (2021), Asare and Siaw (2018) and Hermann (2014) emphasizes the essence of considering a holistic analysis of foreign policy. These scholars point out that the personal idiosyncrasies of leaders, their interpretations and reactions to perceived threats, challenges and opportunities within the global system, international obligations, the domestic pressures and the institutional structures within a country can impact foreign policy goals.

One significant aspect of Ghana's foreign policy decision making that presents both opportunities and challenges to the state is foreign aid. Siaw (2015), and Hlovor and Botchway (2022) noted that governments in the Fourth Republic employed different strategies in their pursuit of good neighbourliness and economic diplomacy. However, the degree of continuity and change in Ghana's foreign policy persuasion is replicated in the various administration's dependence on aid for economic growth and national development (Boafo-Arthur, 2007). Suffice it to state that some degrees of successes were achieved along the way but in general, records of aid-dependency and its repercussion on the economy were visible.

Scholars posit that aid has some positive impacts on Ghana's economy. Gyimah-Boadi and Yakah (2012) have argued that donors have contributed to the persistent advancement in the competitiveness, peacefulness and credibility of Ghana's multi-party elections. Donor partners have been instrumental in providing the Electoral Commission the needed technical assistance and vital equipment. Gyekye-Jandoh (2017) has also acknowledged the remarkable role of France, Germany, UK and the Bretton Woods Institutions in Ghana's elections since 1992. Buttressing this argument, Cook (2019, p. 3) noted that "USAID and the State Department provided

\$7.4 million in program support for Ghana's 2016 election" and \$2 million support for the Centre for Democratic Development (CDD).

In furtherance of the above assertion, Gyimah-Boadi and Yakah (2012) claimed that donor support to civil society organisations (CSOs) and the media has been exceptional. Expanding further, these scholars pointed out that civil society and the media have been funded by external entities to stage fruitful campaigns on issues of corruption, gender equality, human rights, electoral violence, and social and economic development. This argument is upheld by Botchway (2018) that the UNDP, USAID, NIMO, STAR-Ghana, among others, fund CSOs in Ghana. In a related study, Barfour (2004) averred that aid has assumed significance in Ghana's development because it reflects constantly in government's budget.

Contrary to the foregoing, according to scholars like Jotie (2018), foreign aid has hugely damaged Ghana's reputation in the international system. Ghana must therefore lead African nations in a move beyond aid. Furthermore, experience from Asian countries clarifies the point that developing countries like Ghana need blends of peace and harmony, vibrant civil society and rigorous foreign policy goals and programmes to move away from aid-dependency (Agba & Ozor, 2018; Moyo, 2009). These situations have engendered political leaders to expound a *Ghana Beyond Aid* agenda.

It is imperative to note that Ghana's foreign policy goals are so dependent on foreign aid. Aid, however, has serious repercussions on Ghana's global image and economic development. In the past decade, a stream of studies has concentrated on Ghana's aid trajectory and independent voice in international relations. For instance, Opoku-Dapaah's (2011) study focused on Ghana's economy and how it would experience major setbacks if aid inflows are truncated. Suleiman (2018) concentrated on the

attitude of African leaders, which make the beyond aid agenda a farce. On their part, Botchway and Amoakoh-Gyampah (2021) observed that *Ghana Beyond Aid* is a mere rhetoric. Kumi (2020) also explored public perceptions on *Ghana Beyond Aid* and found that although Ghana needs more than foreign aid to transform its economy, there are serious obstacles to the actualization of the vision. Kumi (2020), therefore, called for clear policy directions on *Ghana Beyond Aid*. Despite these groundbreaking studies, yet to date, little scholarly attention has been devoted to the reasons behind Ghana's over-reliance on aid in the Fourth Republic and how the country's foreign policy goals could extricate the Ghanaian state from the aid trap. This study, therefore, sought to explore how Ghana's foreign policy goals have been donor-driven in the Fourth Republic and analyse how foreign policy goals can make Ghana independent in international relations.

1.3 Purpose of the Study

The purpose of the study was to analyse *Ghana Beyond Aid* under the twin concepts of continuity and change in Ghana's foreign policy goals in the Fourth Republic. The study also aimed to further analyse how Ghana's foreign policy goals can achieve an independent foreign policy persuasion for the country.

1.4 Objectives of the Research

The study was informed by specific objectives, which were to:

1. Identify the factors that determine continuity and change in Ghana's foreign policy goals.
2. Explore why the pursuit of continuity and change in Ghana's foreign policy goals has rendered Ghana over-reliant on foreign aid.

3. Investigate how foreign aid contributes to the development of critical sectors of Ghana's economy.
4. Analyse how Ghana's foreign policy goals can extricate the country from over-dependence on aid.

1.5 Research Questions

1. What factors determine continuity and change in Ghana's foreign policy goals?
2. Why has continuity and change in Ghana's foreign policy goals manifested in Ghana's over-reliance on foreign aid?
3. How does foreign aid contribute to the development of critical sectors of Ghana's economy?
4. How can Ghana's foreign policy goals extricate the country from over-dependence on aid?



1.6 Significance of the Study

The relevance of the study would be realized in a three-fold schema of contributing to knowledge (literature), policy and practice. Indeed, research on foreign aid and its repercussions on the Ghanaian economy in the Fourth Republic has been paltry. The study will therefore fill in the gaps in existing literature in the context of how a country that solely depends on foreign aid for almost all its development programmes and policies could extricate itself from the scourge of over-dependency to the status of self-reliance based on its resources.

The study brings to the fore certain aspects of Ghana's foreign policy that have been relegated to the background, yet so impactful on national development and international relations. Consequently, policy makers would be mindful of the financial

implications of foreign policy goals and the repercussions of donor-funded policies and programmes, and how to wean the country from the aid debacle.

The study is a major contribution to public policy making and a guide to policy makers on bilateral and multilateral relations. In most cases, policy makers succumb to pressures from development partners to formulate policies in certain directions. The study has outlined some repercussions of aid conditionalities, and rented policies and institution, which will assist policy makers to undertake an in-depth evaluation of bilateral and multilateral agreements to ensure they are not at variance with the national interest.

1.7 Limitations of the Study

The conduct of the study was generally successful despite few glitches. First, financially, the researcher was constrained as the scarce resources available hardly met the demands of the study. Coupled with this, rescheduling of dates and times for interviews, especially by state actors, affected other timelines. Most official sources of obtaining information such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Information were either reluctant to give information or showed lackluster support to the study. Initially, the study's proposal was to interview twenty state and non-state actors. However, sixteen interviews were conducted. Although not all slated interviews were honoured, data reached saturation point and the study achieved its purpose.

1.8 Delimitations of the Study

The study was focused on analysis of *Ghana Beyond Aid* with respect to the aid regime and how to attain self-reliance in international relations. It centred on the varied views of aid effectiveness and deficiencies to Ghana's economy as impetus for

an independent foreign policy, *Ghana Beyond Aid*. However, theoretical and empirical literature were reviewed right from the independence era to the Fourth Republic to situate the *Ghana Beyond Aid* agenda within a proper perspective. The study is based on interviewees' subjective perceptions, which affect the generalisation of its findings.

1.9 Operational Definition of Terms

Amortization: Spreading of loan repayments over a period of time.

Belligerents: Persons with aggressive attitudes towards a state which can turn into conflicts.

Defiant isolationism: The policy of separating or alienating one's state from the affairs of others by either declining alliances with them or refraining from supporting other states.

Geostrategic aid: Aid provided by a developed country with the intention of meeting specific purposes at a location other than economic growth and development.

Rented policies: Policies of a developed country copied and implemented by a developing country with little or no changes.

1.10 Organisation of the Study

The study is arranged into five chapters. Chapter One is the introduction to the study. This chapter contains the background to the study, statement of the problem, purpose, objectives, research questions as well as significance of the study, limitations, definition of terms and organisation of the study. Chapter Two of the study focuses on the theoretical framework for the study and a detailed review of relevant literature within realms of the study. Chapter Three deals with the methodology employed in the conduct of the research. This incorporates the philosophical paradigm, research

approach, research design, population, sample and sampling procedure, sources of data collection and data instruments, method of data analysis and ethical consideration. Chapter Four discusses results and findings of the study, which basically focuses on the outcome of data gathered from the field and particular reference to previously identified opinions, especially from the literature review to draw conclusions. The Chapter Five which is the final chapter, offers a summary of the findings, conclusions and recommendations as well as suggestions for further studies.



CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

The literature review centred on the body of knowledge pertinent to the current study. In the first place, the concept of foreign aid and the theoretical framework are deconstructed. Accordingly, issues of global concern on foreign aid, Ghana's aid trajectory and the twin concepts of continuity and change in Ghana's foreign policy orientation especially in the Fourth Republic are duly reviewed. The rationale of this section is rooted in the exploration and analysis of prevailing body of knowledge in the realm of foreign policy decision making. Literature on endogenous and exogenous factors that predispose Ghana to aid-dependency and measures to escape from foreign aid distress are reviewed.

2.1 Definition of Foreign Aid

The concept of foreign aid is ubiquitous and highly susceptible to a torrent of definitions. The study draws deeply on the insights from some extant literature (OECD, 2019; Elayah, 2016; Moreira, 2005) to define and conceptualize foreign aid. Foreign aid, also known as Official Development Assistance (ODA), international aid, overseas aid, economic aid or foreign assistance in international relations constitutes transfer of resources voluntarily from either multinational organisation or one country to another country. From the lenses of Elayah (2016, p. 83), foreign aid is "financial flows from donor to developing countries as well as countries in a transitional status." Elayah's definition is a simplification of Moreira's (2005, p. 26) earlier explanation which asserted that "Official Development Assistance (ODA), more commonly known as foreign aid, consists of resource transfer from the public

sector, in the form of grants and loans at concessional financial terms, to developing countries.” The dearth in this definition, however, is that non-state actors (the private sector), mainly multinational corporations also issue foreign aid to developing countries. To this end, this study subscribes to the definition of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), a subsidiary of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). It defines aid as funds from governments or multinational institutions that have the purpose of promoting economic development as well as the welfare of developing states (OECD, 2019). This definition captures foreign aid as a kind of development assistance and is offered developing countries by the industrialized nations, not only in financial terms (concessional loans or grants) but other resources as well. Obviously, concessional loans and grants given to Africa and Ghana in particular which have arguably impeded, smothered and retarded the national development agenda of Ghana is of precise interest in this study.

2.2 Types of Aid

Elayah (2016) is of the conviction that aid ranges from official loans, economic aid, funding trade, charitable aid, military and security to political aid. According to him, political, security and military aid for example, are programmes geared towards political stability, thereby causing a substantial decline in risks of conflict and war, amplifying the ambiance of peace, advancing the frontiers of democracy and building new dominance or superiority for the donor countries. Indeed, UK aid to Somalia is chiefly aimed at creating a viable political settlement and a more stable, peaceful and prosperous Somalia, ranked as the world’s most fragile state.

In a more elaborate manner, however, foreign aid, in the opinion of Moyo (2009) can also be catalogued into three broad thematic areas: humanitarian or emergency aid, charity-based aid and systematic aid. Emergency aid is for victims of natural disasters

or calamities, rebuilding infrastructures affected by ravaging occurrences. For example, Moyo (2009) cites aid given to persons who suffered the 2004 Asian tsunami and the financial assistance to the cyclone-hit Myanmar in 2008 as emergency aid. Another instance of emergency aid was the assistance provided the victims of the 2010 and August 14, 2021 earthquakes in Haiti. Systematic aid on the other hand is provided from one country to another, technically called bilateral aid or offered through multinational or transnational institutions, popularly referred to as multilateral aid for various purposes. For instance, Gray (2011) argued that the United States donations to Israel and Egypt in support of the Camp David Accords were explicitly dedicated to promotion of peace among hostile countries and not to enhance growth or development. This study is deeply motivated by systematic aid to countries, thus aid from the IMF, World Bank and other bilateral donors like US, UK, Japan, China, among others to Ghana.

2.3 Rationale behind Aid

The foundation of national development is the quality of life of the citizenry of a state. Nonetheless, while citizens of developed states enjoy basic amenities such as potable water, balanced nutrition, quality education, adequate housing and access to reasonable healthcare, among others; the story in developing states poses a gloomy picture of such fundamentals of survival. Sen (1999, p. 14), for example, dilates on economic growth of countries as “concerned with enhancing the lives we lead and the freedoms we enjoy.” In this regard, the institution of foreign aid follows from the economic depression that thwarts human effort at making a living in the Global South observed from the perspective of the developed world. In the empirical studies of scholars such as Vondee-Awortwi (2017) and Edgren (2002), it is apparent that foreign aid was introduced principally into mainstream international relations as a

temporary measure to save lives during emergencies and make contribution to economic growth, social progress and national development as long-term objectives. Hence, its main object is the promotion of the wellbeing of humans as it enhances socio-economic growth and development in recipient countries.

2.4 Origin and Evolution of Aid

The central notion of foreign aid in international relations perspective is not only complex and ancient but also philosophical and theological as it is indeed thoroughly rooted in ancient beliefs. Plausibly, the roots of aid could also be traced to antiquity, in the form of donations and other favours from one king or ruler to another in classical and medieval times (Hjertholm & Howard, 1998).

However, a large catalogue of literature (Izobo, 2020; Brautigam & Knack, 2004; Taher, 1997) affirms that the first most successful economic assistance programme in international relations was the Marshall Plan of 1947, officially termed the European Recovery Programme under the Truman Doctrine. The plan was put together to resuscitate the economies of Western Europe that were hard hit by the Second World War. The provision of aid was therefore based on the presumption that, since the Marshall Plan assisted Europe to reconstruct its social and political institutions as well as infrastructure after the devastation of the Second World War, a shift in focus to developing countries could earn similar results. Complementing this, a study by Ann Veiderpass and Per-Ker Andersson (2007), which focused on efficiency of foreign aid, appraised that the North-South development gap precipitates persistent capital influx, technology and innovation transfer to the developing world.

2.5 Theoretical Framework: Dependency Theory

The bedrock of this study is the theoretical lense of dependency theory. Dependency theory can be traced to the historical account of developing countries. The theory was used to explain underdevelopment, food insecurity, poverty and diseases, balance of payment deficits, and aid-dependency in the 1970s and as response to modernization theory (Matunhu, 2011; Herath, 2008). However, Romaniuk (2017) attributes the development of dependency theory during the late 1950s and later years to Raúl Prebisch, Hans Singer, Andre Gunder Frank, Paul Baran, Paul Sweezy and Immanuel Wallerstein.


According to Motolani and Virtanen (2017), the emergence of the theory was viewed fundamentally as a reaction to growing concerns of the blistering gap between rich and poor countries. It stresses that economic growth in the developed North countries had no corresponding growth in the developing South. Dos Santos (1971, p. 226) offered an explanation of the historical dimension of dependency relationships as:

... an historical condition which shapes a certain structure of the world economy such that it favors some countries to the detriment of others and limits the development possibilities of subordinate economies ... a situation in which the economy of a certain group of countries is conditioned by development and expansion of another economy, to which their own is subjected.

Modernisation theory assumes that the nature of the economic situations, world market integration, and technological development or transfers of technology between the industrialized states and the underdeveloped states is the cause of the economic woes of the latter (Romaniuk, 2017). Thus, western countries are deemed archetypes; proffering precise patterns or models that peripheral countries could follow to attain modernity. Dependency theory vividly dismisses such claims by modernization

theory. In respect of this, Ghana can adopt different strategies to move beyond aid-dependency.

A fundamental issue or core proposition which appears to inspire analysis of most dependency theorists is that the world is delineated into two parts; the centre-industrialized countries and the periphery/the underdeveloped countries (Umeogu & Ifeoma, 2012; Ferraro, 2008). According to Ahiakpor (1985), dependency theory opines that the linkage of developing countries and developed countries has worked rather to the disadvantage of the former. Ahiakpor (1985) is of the view that originated technology, management skills and capital from the developed world that are imported into the developing South do not take cognizance of some internal factors. Therefore, importation of foreign technology and other forms of aid, for example, could decimate local production techniques to create a large pool of unemployable people. This is the situation that has led to Ghana's aid-driven economy since 1983.



Dependency theory has two main strands: The Marxist and the Non-Marxist schools of thought. The proponents of the Non-Marxist perspective include Haq and Prebisch while Andre Gunder, Dos Santos and Wallerstein's views on dependency theory reflect a Marxist inclination (Motolani & Virtanen, 2017). There is, however, a third force on dependency theory, the structuralist school of thought championed by Celso Furtado and Henrique Cardoso. According to Motolani and Virtanen (2017), while the Non-Marxists believe the inequality between the Global North and the Global South emanated from colonialism in the developing countries, unequal trade exchange and industrialization in the North, the Marxists however argue that the underdevelopment of the South was due to capitalist expansion, which sets out economic, political, social

and cultural standards in the dependent states in line with the interest of the dominant states (Kay, 2011; Sekhri, 2009). The structuralist school of thought points out that domestic factors are rather responsible for the dependence of the Global South on the Global North. Interestingly though, foreign aid permeates all three forms of dependency theory and has assumed greater proportions in developing countries, escalating their economic woes.

Romaniuk (2017) underscores the point that dependency theory is fortified by some predictable outcomes for peripheral or dependent countries. According to Romaniuk (2017), for developing countries, attempts at economic development rather result in constant underdevelopment; trying to attain social progress also produces inequality and conflict while political development yields strengthening of authoritarian governments. The IMF's financial assistance to Ghana and its subsequent impacts on the economy due to huge debt servicing supports this claim.

Scholars contend that underdevelopment is caused by the peripheral position of developing countries (Munro, 2018). The putative constraints imposed by the global political and economic order on peripheral countries mostly render them over-dependent on external entities. Proponents of the theory believe that underdevelopment is not a circumstance directly associated with the internal conditions of a state, as peripheral countries are in reality, dominated by the external interests emanating within core countries. Furthermore, the theory asserts that the world trading and monetary systems, the culture and taste of the developed countries that may be adapted by the elites of developing countries work to the detriment of the developing world (Ahiakpor, 1985).

The theorists further argue that industrialized nations send financial support (loans and grants) to developing countries with conditions attached. Some of these aid conditionalities could be opening up their markets to Western countries to intensify the exploitation and dependency. In some cases, the developing countries' effort at implementing policies and programmes that could enhance their economic self-reliance are thwarted with unfavorable international trade terms, prescriptive models from the industrialised nations, glitches on the global scene, among others. For instance, as a result of Ghana's huge reliance on external entities, its economy dwindled as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, the fall in the international commodity market and the Russia-Ukraine War (Bawumia, 2022).

One key assumption of dependency theory is that terms of trade always benefit the industrialized countries (Motolani & Virtanen, 2017). Even after several decades of colonialism, many developing countries still rely mainly on their export earnings for economic growth and development. However, the developed North always coerces these countries to heed certain terms and conditions. Prominent among these terms of trade are the use of hard currencies, imposition of externally crafted policies and programmes, and employment of technocrats from the developed world, which only serve the interest of the Global North. Accordingly, as Ahiakpor (1985) argues, the world production and exchange systems assign roles to both the developing and the developed world. Whereas the developing world engages in the production of raw materials or primary products and labour-intensive processes to export at fairly cheap prices, the latter focuses on relatively capital and skill-intensive goods for export to the developing world at outrageous prices.

Advocates of this theory further assert that provision of foreign aid for a long period of time creates a dependency syndrome with dire consequences for the recipient country's economy. Dependency with associated path dependency therefore stifles development and the needed political and economic reforms as foreign aid schemes dictate the pace of development in the South which is rather modelled along structures of external forces (Frank, 1969). Ghana's foreign policy goals, which have rendered the state so subservient to external policies, are rooted in path dependency. It is in light of this that the country's economic diplomacy can achieve *Ghana Beyond Aid*.

Emeh (2013) argues that the concept of dependency theory could be appreciated from three forms. These are colonial dependency, financial-industrial dependency and the new dependency. Under the first kind, European capitalist powers took full control of pre-capitalist regions and established monopoly over land, mines and labour. They also ensured the subordination of these sectors of the regions to European economies. The second was characterized by the expansion of European industrial capital. It involved heavy investments of big capitalists in developing countries for purposes of producing raw materials cheaply to the core industrialized nations. The new dependency encompasses a post Second World War phenomenon that involves the emergence of transnational corporations such as the IMF that invest in developing countries. In brief, dependency induces underdevelopment through exploitation and repatriation, elite complacency, structural distortion and market vulnerability (Emeh (2013).

The structuralist strand of dependency theory supports the foregoing that underdevelopment has roots in specific connections, fashioned on a particular historical setting between the internal processes of exploitation and the external process of dependency. The proponents of this strand argue further that the

industrialized countries possess certain technical processes that allowed them to historically transplant consumption patterns in the developing world (Romaniuk, 2017). In this sense, the more the flow of new patterns of consumption to the Global South, the more the Global North achieves economic surplus from foreign trade. Thus, unlike a pendulum, increase in external dependency causes rise in the internal rate of exploitation. In the Ghanaian context, conditions attached to aid, policies and programmes established by donor partners and the world economic order largely increases the over-reliance on foreign aid.

The theorists advocate that one strategy of breaking away from the cycle of dependency is for the developing countries to gradually isolate their economies and national affairs from more powerful and developed economies. This can earn economic self-reliance as China did by isolating itself from the West for decades. Other scholars believe that developing countries could also attain self-reliance when they escape from the superior countries at their vulnerable stages. For instance, the devastations of the COVID-19 pandemic in the West and the Russia-Ukraine War instilled economic self-reliance in Ghanaians during the pandemic. In furtherance, some dependency theorists avow that changes in the global economic order is the surest pathway to break the circle of underdevelopment and over-reliance on external forces (Enuka, 2018).

Dependency theory champions a development thinking and practice with the argument that underdevelopment remains a consequence of an archetypical configuration of a global system that benefits the developed world to the detriment of the developing world. The case in point is not, therefore, one of imitating the experience of the Global North or waiting for foreign aid from the developed world

for economic growth and development. Instead, it involves a realistic redefinition of the relationship that produced development for the former and underdevelopment for the latter (Motolani & Virtanen, 2017). As long as the developing world can reorient their position and role within the realm of international trade and division of labour, they would develop. The propositions of dependency theory are limited by a torrent of criticisms. The theory's failure to significantly elucidate the upsurge in the newly industrialized countries of East Asia, the Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore), as well as those of Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand) is a blot on its explanatory power (Romaniuk, 2017). Also, the depiction of countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean as homogenous bloc has now been rendered invalid due to the rise of emerging economies like Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICs). Largely, this development puts the general validity of dependency theory into gross disrepute (Moles, 1999). To Traditional Marxists, the dilemma with dependency theory is one of purporting to be a Neo-Marxism without Marxism. In consequence, the theory is accused of substituting class conflict with national and regional inconsistencies (Namkoong, 1999).

Regardless of the criticisms of the theory, dependency theory is still relevant in international relations. Indeed, it offers a new perspective on International Relations and International Political Economy and puts the underdevelopment status of developing countries, particularly Ghana on the radar for careful scrutiny. In effect, through the lens of dependency theory, scholars are able to understand and appreciate the enduring North-South inequalities. Ideas espoused by scholars of dependency theory act as impetus for global actors to pay heed to the impoverishments and some decisions of the Global South at the international level – international environmental law, the UN system, among others (Kwarteng & Botchway, 2018).

Dependency theory is very relevant to this study. Indeed, it was used as the framework for determining the objectives of the study. That is, the dependence on external entities to continue and change foreign policy goals, the reasons for Ghana's over-reliance on foreign aid, contributions of aid to the development of critical sectors of the economy and how Ghana's good neighbourliness policy, economic diplomacy and promotion of world peace could support the attainment of *Ghana Beyond Aid*, are underpinned by the theory. It also offers appealing theoretical lens for assessing Ghana's development trajectory based on aid. The theory espouses the idea that the developing status of Ghana drives it to seek foreign aid in the form of loans, grants and investments. However, this aid to Ghana has rather worsened the dependency situation, culminating in numerous political, social and economic challenges for the country from the outset of its independence. This is the paupable reason good neighbourliness, economic diplomacy and promotion of peace throughout the world can extricate Ghana from the aid regime. In all, the theory allows for an in-depth theoretical and empirical analysis on Ghana's aid trajectory and the *Ghana Beyond Aid* vision.

2.6 Global Perspective on Aid

The concept of foreign aid is rooted in the UN Charter adopted in San Francisco in June 1945, where Member States affirmed their commitment to promote social progress and improve the standard of living of people in utmost freedom. Member States also showed commitment to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples. The first foreign aid was provided by the US to its European allies to rebuild their economies after the Second World War under the Marshall Plan. The success of the Marshall Plan created a strong optimism about support to developing countries in the world (Aime, 2010) but

factors not precluding corruption and donors' vested interest are making aid deficient to some developing countries. Subsequent to the Marshall Plan, in 1970, the world's wealthy nations agreed to give about 0.7% of their Gross National Income (GNI) as aid annually to the developing world (Shah, 2014). This promise was codified in the UN General Assembly Resolution 2626 (XXV) on 24th October 1970. Since the 1970s, billions have actually been spent on aid to developing countries (Shah, 2014). The US has been a major contributor of aid. In 2019, although Germany, UK, Japan, France, the Netherlands and Canada provided aid to developing countries, the US development assistance amounted to \$33 million. The recipients of the US foreign aid in 2019 included Afghanistan, Jordan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Yemen, Nigeria, South Sudan and Syria.

The European Union, in the mid-2000s, further pledged to spend 0.56% of GNI on poverty reduction projects and programmes in developing countries by 2010 and 0.7% by 2015 (Shah, 2014). Scholars have argued that aid to developing countries can assist these countries to grow out of poverty. For instance, Sachs (2005) contends that aid addresses issues of poverty and diseases in developing countries. However, this is not always the case. In some cases, as scholars have opined, aid is wasted on conditions the recipient countries must comply while substantial aid does not target the poor who would need it the most. In the opinion of Aime (2010), some countries have successfully advanced from Low Income Countries (LIC) and over-reliance on aid while others continue to wallow in disappointing economic performance. Most Far East Asian (FEA) countries belong to the first category while Sub-Saharan African countries portray the second category. Supporting this assertion, scholars have subsequently observed that aid has rather destroyed economies of Sub-Sahara Africa (Izobo, 2020).

Briggs (2021) argues that aid does not target the poorer in the society because, first, poorer parts of the country cannot produce income which may be a prerequisite of aid. Again, aid projects are not sited in rural communities as a result of the seemingly implementation difficulties. Further, through cost-benefit analysis, the World Bank usually fails to approve projects in remote areas. These reasons underpin the assumption of scholars that aid fails to recognize the actual development deficits in recipient countries but rather serves donors' interest.

2.7 The Aid Debate

The impact of foreign aid in donor and recipient countries is yet to be settled in theory, by empirical studies and practice because of the vacillating arguments for and against its effectiveness. Lele and Nabi (1991) noted in concise terms that discussions on aid and other capital flows remain somewhat polemical and vitriolic. In view of this, aid effectiveness has become a topical issue of discussion in the media, social interactions and at major international settings. For instance, the issue of aid effectiveness was brought to the front burner during the endorsement of the Paris Declaration by the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and Development Assistance Committee in 2005 (Alemu & Jin-Sang, 2015).

Empirical studies on aid and economic development nexus such as Nsanja, Kaluwa and Masanjala (2021), Appiah-Konadu et al. (2016) and Burnside and Dollar (2000) have debated the efficacy of aid in recipient countries but findings differ considerably on the subject. The unrelenting aid debate comprises two foremost schools of thought, the proponents/advocates of aid effectiveness on one hand and the critics of aid on the other. There is however a middle ground, which surfaced in the 1980s and 1990s. The

proponents of aid effectiveness are of the conviction that developing countries need the economic contribution of the industrialized world to be able to achieve growth (Akramov, 2006). The notion of aid efficacy is grounded in some theories and evidence from recipient countries. Foremost among them, many scholars hold the view that foreign aid is identical with economic growth as it complements and supplements resources of a state to improve national development (Izobo, 2020). Similarly, scholars argue that aid is a reagent for reforming institutions and policies to facilitate development in developing countries. As observed by Vondee-Awortwi (2017), the IMF and the World Bank in particular instill fiscal and monetary discipline in recipient countries and so by their seal of approval, bilateral donors repose confidence in the economies of recipient countries to merit foreign aid. For instance, through the intervention of these Bretton Woods Institutions, twenty-one creditor countries relaxed financial obligation terms for Ghana during the Second Republic (Goldsworthy, 1973).

In furtherance of the position of advocates of aid, the aid regime is rooted in the Neo-classical Economic Growth and Big Push theories. Commencing from the 1960s, Neo-classical economic growth theorists supported the granting of aid with the argument that self-propelling growth in a country can be obtained with a minimum threshold of capital (Vondee-Awortwi, 2017). This presumption holds that developing countries need substantial injection of external capital in the form of foreign aid to enable them to initiate development in such a turbulent globalized world. In fact, this premise composed the rationale for the big push for aid as far back as the 1960s. Arguably, as Abuzeid (2009) and Easterly (2005) maintain, the Big Push theory also cleaves to the conception that developing countries need enormous support from international donors to improve development. From this standpoint, therefore, foreign

aid has received the needed endorsement as precursor to alleviating poverty, eradicating hunger in Africa and the recurring economic despondency. Contrary to the foregoing, according to critics of aid effectiveness, foreign aid could have debilitating and distorting effects on the very outcomes donors seek to change through aid, such as policy ownership, fiscal sustainability, institutional development and economic growth (Todd et al., 2006). Extant literature further shows some level of negative correlation between aid and development on the African continent. For instance, earlier leftist critics of aid have their argument rooted in dependency theory. The pivot of the dependency school is on the exogenous influences that alter the trajectory of development in developing countries (Ahiakpor, 1985). A classic assumption of this theory is that poverty in the Global South springs from the infiltration of market forces into the periphery from the capitalist centre leading to acculturation with its related impoverishments. In the end, the pillars of development are destroyed and through aid, they are never recouped either. Foreign aid, thus, remains the cancerous disease of which it rather shows pretense of finding therapy, creating lots of challenges including regime change in Africa.

Contributing to this debate, Bauer (1972, p. 100) expressed reservation on foreign aid by underscoring the fact that “if a country... cannot readily develop without external gifts, it is unlikely to develop with them.” By virtue of this description, Bauer (1972, p. 1) further lamented over aid inefficacy when he opined: “In fact, external donations have never been necessary for the development of any society anywhere. Economic achievement depends on people’s own faculties, motivations and mores, their institutions and the policies of their own rulers.” Considering, for instance, a speech delivered by Former President of Tanzania, Benjamin William Mkapa in 2005 in support of Bauer’s argument that, it is scandalous “that we are forced to choose

between basic health and education for our people and repaying historical debt” (Moyo, 2009, p. 37), one is left in no doubt that aid has vast repercussions on national interest.

Notably, for decades now, the effectiveness of aid to Africa has received scholarly attention. This is because the development of most African countries is at the behest of funds procured through foreign aid and so they continue to be spongers of international financial institutions (IFIs) and donor countries, thereby sacrificing their political independence on the altar of foreign aid for development (Tawiah, Barnes, Acheampong & Ofori, 2019). Analysis of effectiveness of aid seems to overstretch its impact and bounds on developing countries to even uncharted terrains. However, scholars who belong to the middle ground school of thought believe that aid effectiveness can only be measured by the policy environment and other factors. Arguing either in favour of aid or against it without recourse to the exogenous and endogenous environments within which aid operates is inappropriate (Izobo, 2020).

One of the high points in this debate is that Roodman (2007) and Dalgaard et al. (2008) identified among a multiplicity of other factors that aid efficacy depends on structural characteristics such as geographical factors. By and large, as they contend, non-geostrategic related aid promotes growth in developing countries while geostrategic aid has no magnitude of significant effects on recipient countries. Ensuing from the claim of these scholars, Djankov et al. (2006) provide a simplification of the issue by arguing that the effectiveness of aid is realized from whether the aid is utilized to raise government investment or used for government consumption, which lays emphasis on the point that while in the case of the former, growth is assured, the latter impedes growth. Unfortunately, evidence from most

African countries suggests that aid channeled into government consumption only leaves traces of negative balance of payments without corresponding outcome on critical sectors of economies (Tawiah et al., 2019). Some clarity on the matter is also achieved by Kin and Diya (2017) who assert that bad governance, rampant corruption, weak democratic institutions, lack of accountability and control of information by government officials often ruin the positive impact of aid. These sometimes result in violent clashes in some countries, which take a number of years and massive financial injection to resolve and so in the end a vicious cycle of hunger, poverty, misery and despair persist in homes of recipient countries. The lack of effective functional governance mechanism and constitutional checks in many states to monitor aid effectiveness have consequently created a situation where states in Africa and Asia especially have become vulnerable to poor governance observed from unbridled corruption, inequalities and regime protection by politicians and their followers to the detriment of societal good.

Also, evidence adduced from the literature further demonstrates that corrupt governments nonetheless receive equal amounts of aid as do governments with low corruption perception index (Alesina & Weder, 2002). Indeed, the situation where aid is given to all forms of governments indiscriminately without recourse to empirical valuations has persisted and exacerbated the clandestine acts of corrupt and despotic leaders especially in Sub-Sahara Africa, creating room for more aid-driven economies in Africa. For instance, Larry Diamond had earlier referred to this assertion when he noted that the provision of aid to most corrupt and irresponsible governments such as those in Cameroon, Angola, Eritrea, Guinea and Mauritania in the 2000s, “each receiving aid equaling or even exceeding the African average of US\$20 per capita” validates no end to their corrupt acts (Moyo, 2009, p. 60).

The aid debate is relevant to this study in a number of ways. First, it puts the aid-driven economy of Ghana on the radar and into proper perspective, hence reasons for the adoption of certain policies by regimes as a result of aid conditionality and the repercussions are extrapolated. Second, it hints on idiosyncrasy of leaders as well as the exogenous and endogenous factors that underpin Ghana's foreign policy.

2.8 Ghana's Foreign Aid Trajectory

Ghana's independence in 1957 was a milestone, not just in terms of being the first in Sub-Saharan Africa and the freedoms of Ghanaians from the shackles of colonization but it also set Africa on another pedestal of economic and political development. The robust economic outlook of Ghana was observed in areas such as the high export prices of cocoa, foreign reserves and human capital available for national development (Ayee, Lofchie & Wieland, 1999). This statement is augmented by Agyeman-Duah (1987, p. 615), who asserts that Dr. Nkrumah "inherited a small national debt of \$20 million and about \$ 200 million in foreign reserves" from the colonial administration in 1957. Ayee, Lofchie and Wieland (1999) further argue that Ghana was a middle-income country with a per capita income roughly the same as that of South Korea. Dr. Nkrumah was poised for actualization of his agenda of African liberation and unity as well as economic development of the country. Hence, he adopted both radical and pragmatic policies to ensure success (Gebe, 2008). Subsequently, the rapid industrialization processes and economic assistance to other African countries such as a contribution of about 10 million dollars to the independence struggle of Guinea (Yeboah, 2019; Asante, 1997) drained the national coffers and the Nkrumah Administration had to resort to external borrowing to succeed.

The solid economic record at independence supported massive infrastructural development in education, health, transport and communication and industrialization of the economy. However, foreign aid from both the West and the East amplified the processes. An instance is that, the Soviets assisted Ghana during the Congo Crisis when the West refused (Thompson, 1969). Further, in spite of the dictates of the Cold War, the Nkrumah regime courted the West; the USA (Kaiser Aluminum Corporation) and the World Bank which manifested in financial support for the construction of the Volta River Project and the Akosombo Dam for generation of electricity (Gocking, 2005).

According to Oquaye (2004, p. 11), Nkrumah's vision of developing the country through government controls, the utilization of state enterprises as vehicles of industrial transformation and growth as well as a sharp reduction in "the influence of western capital in the economy" was met with "tragic circumstances such as poor management, massive foreign goods consumption and falling export price for cocoa." Considering the repercussions of the Cold War politics on emerging economies, Dr. Nkrumah refused foreign aid and its conditions from the IMF and the World Bank in later years. Nkrumah's administration was denied credit from Western sources for development and defraying debts (Boafo-Arthur, 1999b). Oquaye contends that the government was confronted with heavy external debt, a balance of payment deficit and hyper-inflation. This argument is further echoed by the economists Aryeetey and Fosu (2002), who state that there was a significant deterioration of the external reserves of the country between 1957 where the net external reserves were US\$269 million, and 1966 when they stood at negative (-US\$391 million).

The National Liberation Council (NLC) which toppled the Nkrumah regime, took over political power and declared Ghana open for business with Western multinational corporations. It embarked on some tough economic policies championed by the IMF and the World Bank. The Chairman of the NLC, J. A. Ankrah stated that it would actively engage the Bretton Woods Institutions (Boafo-Arthur, 1989). However, as Boafo-Arthur (1999b) posits, the regime's loyalty to the IMF and the World Bank prevented it from exploring fully other potent and viable economic interactions with other countries. Indeed, government delegations visited the US, France and the UK seemingly to strengthen relations but essentially to seek favourable changes to Ghana's debt crisis (Gebe, 2008). Foreign aid came from the West in the form of food, health and security aid. For the entire duration of the NLC Administration, the country received four stand-by credits of \$78.4 million, and \$17.25 million as compensatory financing facility (Jonah, 1989). Furthermore, the NLC's dealings with the IMF and the World Bank culminated in divestiture of some state enterprises established during the Nkrumah era. Jonah argues that all these overtures not excluding a currency devaluation of 30% could not help in the economic recovery. As reverberated by Asante (1997, p. 37), however, the NLC gave prominence to "Ghana's traditional role in African affairs particularly in the anti-colonial struggle."

The Busia Administration which ruled the country from 1969 to 1972 had similar ideological stance as the NLC. The country was virtually managed by the World Bank, the IMF and creditor countries, which engaged in restructuring of the economy (Boafo-Arthur, 1999b). According to Petchenkine (1993), two weeks after the investiture of the administration, Busia made a tour of the Western countries – US, UK and France – and had formal encounters with President Richard Nixon, Prime

Minister Harold Wilson and President Georges Pompidou, and also took the opportunity to meet with the IMF and the World Bank officials. The motive of the administration was to put before these external forces the debt burden of the country and solicit rescheduling terms of payment (Gebe, 2008). Therefore, in Libby's (1976, p. 79) account, "Busia's meetings with Sir Alec Douglas-Home and Lord Lothian, and with Prime Minister Heath, on November 12, 1971," produced an amount of £3.5 million as debt re-financing loan at 2% interest per annum payable within 25 years with a grace period of 7 years.

The Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) and the creditor countries were authorized by the Progress Party government to design measures to recover the economic problems. However, the IGOs relegated the domestic political environment to the background, forced draconian, excessive and politically suicidal measures on the country to survive a devastating deficit in foreign exchange earnings and to secure other financial assistance (Libby, 1976). As a result of this, not even the advice of the Finance Minister, J. H. Mensah could cause any moderation or alteration in the policies of the Busia Administration. Hence, Ghana became profoundly dependent on external bodies regardless of the domestic pressures. On the African terrain, Busia implemented the Aliens Compliance Order (ACO) in line with a business promotion act to offer employment to Ghanaians.

However, the ACO was enacted under the pretext that strangers from Nigeria, Togo, Burkina Faso, Mali, Cote d'Ivoire and other Eastern countries were responsible for crimes and economic hardships in the country (Botchway & Amoako-Gyampah, 2021; Mba, 2015; Goldsworthy, 1973). This, observed in light of stabilizing the economic quagmire to better the fortunes of the citizenry and achieve economic

independence, was certainly not typical of Ghana, a once declared “Mecca of African nationals and liberation fighters” (Tieku & Odoom, 2013, p. 328; Gebe, 2008, p. 179). This situation also infuriated neighbouring countries to Ghana particularly regards its Pan-Africanist credentials (Boafo-Arthur, 2007). Consequently, it created grave aid-dependency and international consequences for the country. In the verdict of Botchway and Amoako-Gyampah (2021, p. 297), the Aliens Compliance Order “defeated the purpose of African unity and made the “Osagyefo’s” trailblazer – Ghana – a laughing stock in global politics.” Moreover, there were retaliations from Nigeria under Shehu Usman Shagari in 1983 (Aremu, 2013) and elsewhere in later years which added to the economic miseries of the PNDC. Inadvertently, since most of these foreigners were the workforce on the cocoa farms (Gocking, 2005), the ACO adversely affected cocoa production and the bedbound economy at large.

The reasons for the government’s dialogue with Apartheid South Africa were clear deviation from the core principles of the positive neutrality policy it so espoused. It was neither in sync with the dictates of the continental body (AU) nor Third World international relations. Fundamentally, this change in the policy direction of the country also stained the reputation and good neighbourliness image of the country. This is because neighbouring African countries saw this as alien to African unity and Pan-Africanism. Thus, although the Busia Administration pursued most of the foreign policy goals enacted under Nkrumah, some revisions in their scope negatively affected the country.

The National Redemption Council (NRC), under General I. K. Acheampong, took over power from Busia through a coup d’état on 13th January 1972. It attempted to put in place stringent strategies to revive the ailing economy. These strategies included

increase in domestic revenue mobilization and repudiation of external debts notwithstanding the apparent dangers. (Boafo-Arthur, 1999b). The austere measures, nevertheless, could not overturn the fortunes of the economy. The NRC embarked on a self-propelling and self-reliant foreign policy after it announced on 5th February 1972, its decision to repudiate the loans owed Britain and other creditor nations (Libby, 1976). In Gocking's (2005) narrative, about \$84 million out of a sum of \$268 million loans payable within the medium term were renounced by the NRC. Regrettably, Acheampong's government was blacklisted for foreign aid and so aid inflows reduced (Tawiah et al., 2019). However, as Libby (1975) has pointed out, due to the repudiation policy, the Western creditors agreed to reschedule the loan terms for Ghana. This was quite a departure from earlier administrations which either had to object to IMF bailouts or pay obeisance to their dictates.

A number of foreign policy dynamics followed after the repudiation policy. Among them, the NRC re-established trade and aid ties with the Soviets (Libby, 1976). In fact, many of the foreign policy goals of the regime, in many respects, was a continuation of the Nkrumah agenda. In essence, the NRC reversed the policy of dialogue with Apartheid South Africa and gave assistance to other African countries (Gebe, 2008). For instance, with initial boom in export prices of cocoa, timber and other export commodities, the Acheampong Administration implemented an anti-West, independent foreign policy of not only preventing the Bretton Woods Institutions from negotiating debt rescheduling schemes for Ghana, but it was also able to extend aid to other African countries such as Uganda. The NRC also provided an amount of \$50,000 to Guinea-Bissau in 1974 to support its freedom fighters and activities towards independence (Boafo-Arthur, 1989). Again, the NRC supported the formation of ECOWAS (Gebe, 2008).

The NRC instituted the “Operation Feed Yourself” policy which helped Ghana to attain self-sufficiency in food production. As a result, most Ghanaians comprising students abandoned the classrooms to work on farms (Gyampo, 2013). This notwithstanding, the wanton dissipation of state finances by the NRC/SMC 1 resulted in economic distress of the country again in 1975. In the mid-1970s, the SMC 11 returned to the IMF and the World Bank for assistance after Acheampong was ousted from power. Events after the overthrow of Acheampong demonstrated the country’s return to the IMF which supported Ghana with stand-by credit of \$53.0 million for a 12-month repayment period (Boafo-Arthur, 1999b). Nonetheless, Debrah (2008/2009, p. 89) opines that the Fred Akufo military government showed no weight on the economy despite attempts to change the economic crisis leading to “greater hardships for the people, profound social malaise and popular discontent.”

On 24th September 1979, the People’s National Party (PNP) led by Hilla Limann, took over from the AFRC after it had won the elections (Boafo-Arthur, 1999b). The PNP government, however, proved quite unequal to the heroic problems that years of laxity, mismanagement, corruption and varied forms of abuse had created in the country. Indeed, Limann appeared to have little or no vision, let alone any realistic programme for social transformation (Agyeman-Duah, 1987). At the dawn of the administration, Dr. Limann was hesitant to consent to foreign aid from the Bretton Woods Institutions. With a cursory look at the tragedy Busia suffered under these institutions, Limann declared that any interaction between Ghana and the global capitalist system must be incumbent on a cost-benefit analysis of policies (Asante, 1997). Against this backdrop, Boafo-Arthur’s (1999b) argued that Limann’s repugnance to the IMF undermined any confidence the country’s trading partners and other donors had in the economy, creating inertia in economic growth and

development of the country. The country's per capita income lowered from 640 cedis in 1971 to 460 cedis in 1981, internal debt was 6.41 billion cedis while the foreign debt also stood at a substantial amount of 3.6 billion cedis (Herbst, 1993). Irrespective of the economic difficulties, Limann gave full support to the enactment of the ECOWAS protocol on free movement of persons, goods and services across West Africa (Boafo-Arthur, 2007; Asante, 1997). Not only did the economic mismanagement initiate migration of some Ghanaians to neighbouring countries like Nigeria but it also truncated operations by most industries and created scarcity of goods on the market with its attendant accentuated prices (Debrah, 2008/2009).

Jerry John Rawlings, in his dramatic return to the reins of power, formed the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC). The PNDC pledged a new Ghana, where the local people would be part of the decision making process and an end would be put to corrupt practices, privilege and abuse of power and exploitation of the natural resources of Ghana by external forces, among others. Rawlings also sought to improve the economic situation of the country so that the quality of life of the people would change for the better. Adedeji (2001) contends that these postulations, existential paradigm in continuity and change in the foreign policy trajectory of Ghana, became the bedrock of the Rawlings regime's foreign policy as the Bretton Woods Institutions had to step in to change the economic decline of the country.

The literature gives intense proof that, initially the economic challenges of the country worsened under the PNDC. The IMF/World Bank and other international donors were, however, reluctant to offer any assistance because of the activities of the radical left wing of the regime and its close links with the likes of Muammar Gaddafi of Libya (Boafo-Arthur, 1999b). Adedeji (2001) upholds Boafo-Arthur's (1999b)

assertion by emphasizing that between 1981 and 1983, the Rawlings' regime faced fierce hostilities from the Western countries, especially the Reagan Administration given its close ties with Cuba and Libya, and Rawlings' imperialist rhetoric. Indeed, Boafo-Arthur (1999b) underscores two schools of thought on the root cause of the economic stagnation among the stalwarts of the PNDC. The leftist elements blamed the capitalist system for the economic problems of Ghana while the moderates and conservatives called for more proactivity on the domestic constraints to the economy. For instance, functionaries of the regime such as Dr. Kwesi Botchway and D. F. Annan of the leftist ideology castigated the capitalist world for the economic mess of the country.

The ideological persuasion, nonetheless, culminated in high level relations with Eastern and socialist states in the formative years of the PNDC regime where leading figures of the revolution like Chris Atim asserted that "socialist countries were the true friends of Africa" (Agyeman-Duah, 1987, p. 636). Against this background, the PNDC was so disappointed that it could not secure economic assistance from its partners such as Cuba, Libya and the Soviet Union (Gyekye-Jandoh, 2017) when its delegation to the Eastern world to appeal for financial support returned home from the Russians empty handed. Onyema Ogochukwu explained that:

The Russians had pointed to their own problems which they said made it difficult for them to offer much help, and had advised Ghana to go to the IMF but try at the same time to hold on to the revolution. It was impractical advice. The government has had to compromise its ideology in order to get help (Agyeman-Duah, 1987, p. 631).

A further weakening of the economy under the PNDC was the populist policies such as confiscation of assets of entrepreneurs, issuance of price control measures and huge fines on persons alleged to have hoarded goods. Again, the withdrawal of higher

denominations of the cedi spitefully affected production, savings and foreign investments (Boafo-Arthur, 1999b).

Additionally, as Boafo-Arthur (1999b) opines, cocoa production witnessed a substantial drop from 450, 000 tons in the early part of the 1970s to a meagre 180, 000 tons in 1982. There was drought, bush fires, low-capacity production of manufacturing industries compounded by influx of expelled Ghanaians from Nigeria (Ahiakphor, 1985) which flared up the economic problem. Following from the economic predicaments and failure of the USSR and other socialist countries to ameliorate the socio-economic and political challenges of the PNDC, such as a budget deficit of around -3% of GDP, the PNDC was pushed to opt for the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) (Debrah, 2017). Indeed, this “ideological suicide” (Boafo-Arthur, 1999b, p. 86) to engage with the IMF/World Bank confirms what Brigadier Mensah noted at the commencement of the PNDC regime:

We are making friends with everyone. We do not intend to take part in big power politics. We are too small and weak to get involved in that. We have stretched out our hands to make friends with everyone regardless of his ideological thinking or his political persuasion (Boafo-Arthur, 1999b, p. 85).

Boafo-Arthur (1999b) and Gyekye-Jandoh (2017) further elaborate that with the signing of the IMF/World Bank Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) often called the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) in April, 1983 nonetheless, the regime adopted pragmatism in its relations with both the East and the West. Foreign aid from all parts of the world became a crucial component of the PNDC’s finances and projects regardless of the ERP. For instance, the PNDC had closer ties with Middle East countries and benefited from the Kuwait Fund to the tune of \$3.5 million as loan (Boafo-Arthur, 1999b). This financial support was meant for extension of electricity

to the northern part of Ghana to be paid within 15 years and under a 3-year grace period. The Saudi Fund also provided Ghana more than \$114 million between 1985 and 1987 for projects like the rehabilitation of the ports in Tema and Takoradi. Again, the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) provided Ghana a loan facility of \$10 million to revamp the cocoa industry (Boafo-Arthu, 1999b). Moreover, Canada forgave Ghana debt burden of US\$77.6 million; Germany, US\$295 million and France, US\$26 million in 1991. Japan on its part, provided an amount of US\$680 million towards economic growth and national development (Siaw, 2015). The Chinese, on their part, assisted in the construction of the National Theatre (Yeboah, 2021).

In fact, the SAP ensured deregulation, privatization, trade liberation, flexible foreign exchange price and an enhanced international cooperation but business owners' profits from price liberalization and external interests also increased (Adedeji, 2001). Ghana became aid-dependent to the extent of earning the accolade as the "largest per capita aid recipient in Africa." Just for 1985, the "total foreign exchange resources including export earnings, inflows of private and official loans and transfer, and IMF drawings amounted to \$1.3 billion" (Boafo Arthur, 1999b, p. 87).

According to extant literature (Tawiah et al., 2019; Siaw, 2015; Sowah, 2011), Ghana's foreign aid flows had a threefold escalation from US\$150.7 million to \$450.8 million within a decade (1985 to 1995). The inflows of official grants and concessional loans also saw a sharp rise "from equivalent of less than 1 percent of GDP in 1983 to 10 per cent of GDP by 1990" (Tawiah et al., 2019; p. 17; Abrego & Ross, 2001). SAP and neoliberal policies, sometimes referred to as the Washington Consensus in Africa engendered dithering debate on the African continent. For Ghana

though, SAP was successful in the interim. At the donors meeting held in Paris in 1984, the country was deemed “courageous” and “an exemplary model” for Sub-Saharan Africa due to its “increased growth rate from 0.7% per cent to 5.5 per cent” (Boafo-Arthur, 1999b, p. 89).

However, the long-run implication of SAP was seen in a matter of less than a decade of its implementation, where the economic crisis began, with inflation rate of 25% in 1985 according to Boafo-Arthur (1999b). To remedy this economic sluggishness and its devastating effect on retrenched workers and others, the Programme of Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD) was implemented in 1988 (Adedeji, 2001; Boafo-Arthur, 1999b). By the end of the PNDC regime in 1992, Ghana’s debt stock stood at US\$4.88 billion from around US\$2.270 billion in 1988 (Siaw, 2015). In all, investments in industrialization processes were marginal, Ghana’s good neighbourliness policy suffered a decline but the nation’s role in world peace was upheld, demonstrating the concepts of continuity and change in the country’s foreign policy.

2.8 Africa and the Aid Regime

Several studies have shown that foreign aid has failed to deliver sustainable economic growth, yet scholars have observed that many African countries still heavily depend on aid. In the estimation of Melesse (2021), over 75% of the world’s poor live in Africa currently despite the fact that in 1970, the figure was 10%. The World Bank (2019) has even projected that the figure could rise to 90% in 2030. Akokpari (2001) posits that even though foreign aid undermines Africa’s economic sovereignty, it has culminated in strengthening relations of African countries with the Global North and international creditors at the expense of intra-African ties. Thus, economic assistance

generally urges African states to gravitate towards the Western world. Agyeman-Duah and Daddieh (1994) made a similar observation that the main purpose of foreign policy for most developing countries has been to secure economic assistance for development projects and programmes. However, a litany of factors which include the escalating debts have exacerbated Africa's insatiable need for foreign aid. Accordingly, the debt debacle vitiates Africa's competence at providing social services (Akokpari, 2001). In fact, committing high percentage of national budget to servicing debts leaves little to nothing for development in African states; hence, foreign aid is seen as a balancing act to be able to honour rescheduled debts and to embark on economic development (Akokpari, 2001).

Studies point out several reasons for which Africa depends on aid for economic growth and development. Africa is the only continent where foreign aid inflows far exceed private capital inflows by wide margin (Melesse, 2021). In the opinion of Akokpari (2001), four compelling reasons engender Africa's resort to aid. Paramount amongst these reasons is the implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in Sub-Saharan African countries. The others include the challenge of human security, the HIV/AIDS epidemic and conflicts in the continent. Melesse (2021) disagrees with Akokpari's proposition on points that, first, Africa's aid-dependency largely is as a result of leaders' misconceptions that aid is "free" money, hence countries fail to take advantage of opportunities provided by the global economy. Second, aid is not the actual problem but the misapplication of resources, corruption and bad governance in Africa that restrain the ability to use aid efficiently and effectively. On that score, aid is ineffective in countries where there is bad governance and unnecessary where there is good governance (Melesse, 2021). Using the Botswana and Somalia examples, Izobo (2020) validates this assertion that the policy

environment affect aid efficiency and effectiveness in a country. Similarly, Kim's (2013) comparative study on aid using Ghana and South Korea, to the greatest extent, makes it explicit that the policy environment could destroy the objectives of aid. In contrast to these propositions, Easterly (2003) advances the argument that research findings that aid promotes development in an effective policy environment is not robust enough to capture new data and other definitions of aid. This therefore invalidates the claim that the policy environment has huge impact on the effectiveness of aid. However, the present study argues that the policy environment has a lot of influence on aid effectiveness in Africa.

Moyo (2009) presents a more delicate account of aid on the African continent. The scholar refutes the assertions of various scholars who attribute the economic quagmire of Africa to a plethora of reasons other than foreign aid. Moyo (2009) claims that a confluence of factors such as the physical environment, historical factors (colonialism), incongruent tribal lineage and ethno-linguistic compositions and absence of strong public institutions ostensibly account for Africa's failure at economic development and so it would sound unfortunate to discredit any of them. The scholar, however, points to other jurisdictions which have survived worse case scenarios of these enumerated factors and argues that "for the most part, African countries have one thing in common – they all depend on aid" (Moyo, 2009, p. 45). In Moyo's (2009, p. 140) view, aid has not merely failed to work but has rather compounded Africa's problems to the extent that "the four horses of Africa's apocalypse – corruption, disease, poverty and war" – are spawns of foreign aid.

In respect of the utilization of aid for economic growth, changes have been effected in the foreign policy decision making process where foreign ministries are now losing

their roles in international affairs to Central Banks and financial ministries, mostly bureaucrats and technocrats. Moreover, the World Bank, the IMF and the representatives of the London and Paris Clubs have occupied pivotal status in the foreign policy decisions of African states in recent times due to the economic assistance they provide. The presence of these agencies, so-called new actors of Africa's foreign policy has indeed scamped "any hopes of a democratic process of foreign policy making" in Africa (Akokpari, 2001, p. 46).

2.9 Aid and Ghana's Economy

The literature shows both positive and negative impacts of aid on Ghana's economy. On the adverse effect of aid, Opoku-Dapaah's (2011) found that the "model nation" accolade given to Ghana by the IMF and the World Bank regarding its economic and political developments as a result of the introduction of the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) in the 1980s was an exaggerated situation. According to these scholars, the Bretton Woods Institutions failed to take cognizance of the perennial challenges Ghanaians faced during the reforms and after decade of its implementation. For example, Debrah's (2008/2009) study revealed that policies towards Ghana's economic recovery in the 1990s only led to more socio-economic challenges for the people. Again, Opoku-Dapaah's (2011) study disproves this "model nation" notion on grounds that Ghana's economy is largely dependent on foreign aid and therefore economic and political reforms would run into stalemate if the aid inflows are truncated. On their part, Appiah-Konadu et al. (2016) observed that Ghana was left in budget deficits, increasing and rampant debts payment burdens, high and explosive inflation, unstable exchange rate and unfavourable terms of trade. All these invalidate the accolades from the IMF. Studies including Agba and Ozor (2018)

dispute the claim that without aid Ghana cannot develop. Using instances of the Asian Tigers and the BRICs, the scholars asserted that development without aid is possible. Several scholars have also averred that the reduction in aid inflow is instilling self-reliance attitude in Ghanaians but at certain costs. For example, Opoku-Dapaah's (2011) study notes that essentially, foreign aid to Ghana has been intermittent and short of expectations, forcing government to reduce its expenditure on economic development. Again, this situation has propelled government to intensify mobilization of domestic resources through increased taxation to augment shortfalls in budgets, culminating in untold hardships for the vulnerable in society.

As Opoku-Dapaah (2011) points out, inconsistencies in aid inflows also amounted to huge domestic borrowing, balance of payment deficits and depletion of foreign reserves in anticipation for aid to defray debts later. The study by Appiah-Konadu et al. (2016), however, argues that the economy regained some level of momentum on account of the HIPC initiative in the early 2000s due to the relief of external debt burden of Ghana. This eventually paved way for enhanced export earnings, poverty reduction and focused economic growth as a result of fiscal and monetary management as well as the availability of development assistance. Regardless of the enormous debt relief grants through Ghana's adoption of the HIPC initiative, the economic despair of the country endeared it to an IMF bailout in 2009. With respect to this, Appiah-Konadu et al. (2016) assert that aid rather than salvaging the feeble economy by promoting economic development, ends up endangering it through corruption and lofty interest payments. On the substantive matter of how Ghana could derive full benefits from aid, Appiah-Konadu et al. (2016) recommend economic aid instead of political aid which could be invested in capital formation and capacity building of labour through education and training.

Again, Ghana should demand more grants and less loans, partly because, interest payments on debts tied with inability of Ghana to invest foreign aid, have alarming repercussions on economic growth and development. Wood and Hoy's (2021) findings support this argument by stressing that foreign aid should be utilized on a real aid project that can be described in tangible terms than any project policy makers identify. This line of argument had early on been alluded to by Easterly (2003), who reported that aid should have more modest goals than trying to take up the responsibility of a catalyst for a society's wide transformation. The literature provides in-depth analysis of the aid-development nexus but fails to identify how continuity and change in Ghana's foreign policy has rendered Ghana over-reliant on aid in the Fourth Republic. However, the stream of studies are significant to this research because they explore the detailed benefits and challenges of aid programmes and policies to the economy. Indeed, the literature has bearing how foreign policy goals can move Ghana beyond aid.

2.10 Alternatives to Aid

Studies from both development and foreign policy literature have outlined a myriad pragmatic processes and systems countries could follow to attain economic self-reliance. As a substitute to aid, Moyo (2009) proposes four key strategies to fund development in Africa. First, the scholar suggests that African leaders should emulate the examples of the Asian giant economies like Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia and South Korea to access the international bond market. This would help African countries to obtain benefits from the falling yields paid by sovereign borrowers to fund their national development. Second, Africa should encourage the Chinese policy of huge direct investment in infrastructure. The scholar argues in favour of the Chinese investment of US\$900 billion in Africa in 2004 as against

US\$20 billion in 1975 which is paying lots of dividends. Third, Africa should demand free and fair trade in agricultural produce to realize increased earnings from primary products. Lastly, Moyo (2009) implores Africa to chart the path of financial intermediation to encourage foreign remittances by providing cheaper and faster means such as innovative mobile phone technology and the spread of microfinance institutions as found flourishing in Latin America and Asia.

In all these, however, Moyo (2009) advocates a decisive benevolent dictator rather than multi-party democracy for poor countries under economic distress to drive reforms towards economic freedom. It is very preposterous for the scholar to advocate that a benevolent dictator could overturn the economic woes of an African state. Although this argument may be sound with respect to other jurisdictions, in Africa, power has the tendency to suffocate freedom. Nobody wishes to live under a laundry list of anti-democratic leaders and ethnic bigotries. Carothers (2007) argues plausibly against Moyo's (2009) assertion that autocrats (benevolent dictators) largely can guarantee the rule of law and national development by stressing that there is a limit to how they could go, even if they are enlightened.

Melesse (2021), corroborating Moyo's (2009) assertions, however, suggests that African counties should delink aid from governments and use it to promote private sector development and entrepreneurship. Further, models of the Marshal Plan of the 1940s could be adopted while redirecting aid inflows from the agrarian-based production to manufacturing and technology. Also, bilateral and multilateral collaborations must be established with countries that have pushed their technology to advanced levels. Moreover, national and foreign policy objectives should target development programmes that would secure growth and reduction in over-reliance on

foreign aid. Again, foreign aid goals should be designed to enhance the vision of the African Continental Free Trade Area and the Eurozone trademark.

Apparently, some of these propositions from Moyo (2009) and Melesse (2021) are deficient to the Ghanaian context since the examples may not be fit for purpose on the African terrain. Again, Ghana has experienced governance under military dictators which worsened the economic plight (Libby, 1976)). For example, the NLC, NRC/SMC and PNDC regimes could not solve Ghana's problem of over-reliance on other nations. Further, the long held democratic credentials of Ghana after 1992 make farce of any autocratic governance under vibrant civil society organizations and opposition parties in parliament. Buttressing the foregoing argument by scholars, Gatune (2010) believes that Africa must dream beyond the shores of current imaginations and learn from Asia's success stories. Gatune (2010) explains that aid cannot be the driving force behind Africa's development. Rather, the continent's development hinges on three important pillars, namely, knowledge, entrepreneurship and governance. Therefore, Africa should institute these pillars with change of attitude as precondition. Considering the enormous role of aid in the development trajectory of Africa, the present study strongly argues on the contrary that aid would still have a part to play in alleviating the African continent from its current state of underdevelopment.

In furtherance of the argument, Janus, Klingebiel and Paulo (2014) also contend that specialization and integration could make the beyond aid agenda of Africa possible. According to these scholars, specialisation of development cooperation, a situation where different developing countries have common or similar motives of dealing with issues like alleviation of poverty and eradication of hunger through collaboration, and

can support independent foreign policies. Again, integration, which focuses on collaborative efforts to deal with challenges could help Africa to attain self-reliance in international relations. Despite the plethora of proposals to support Ghana's quest to attain economic self-reliance, the literature paid little attention to how foreign policy goals of Ghana can support the *Ghana Beyond Aid* vision. Nevertheless, the studies offer varied and general perspectives on how to wean Ghana from the aid trap. The present study takes a lot of inspiration from the literature for the analysis of data.

2.11 Ghana Beyond Aid Policy Paradigm

Scholars around the world have described and provided key pointers to reforms that must take place for Ghana to achieve significant economic growth and development from the *Ghana Beyond Aid* agenda. Kumi's (2020) study observes compelling reasons for the futuristic policy paradigm, *Ghana Beyond Aid*. According to the scholar, the vision seeks configuration of minimal aid with national priorities to promote development and to ensure the country's ownership of its development priorities. Further, the *Ghana Beyond Aid* vision is supported by the assumption that the country has witnessed limited economic transformation as a result of socio-economic and political challenges that have created entrenched route of dependency on foreign aid. Adams and Atsu (2014), and Whitfield and Jones (2009) concur with Kumi (2020) that even though aid plays crucial role in the development of the country, Ghana requires more than aid to meet its aspiring levels of economic transformation and development as well as its role in international relations. Yet, Kumi's (2020) study reveals that a cross-section of the Ghanaian public perceives *Ghana Beyond Aid* as an NPP-led government economic policy designed for its political expediency. The scholar asserts that some people view the agenda as an NPP

economic scheme similar to Planting for Food and Jobs; One Village, One Dam; One District, One Factory, among others, while others see the agenda as mere NPP slogan. The policy paradigm also suffers from a major definitional ambiguity; lumps together so many ideas that are best managed apart (Kumi, 2020). Hence, for a successful implementation of the *Ghana Beyond Aid* agenda, Kumi (2020) urges the government to first, build national consensus on Ghana's development moving into the future; second, outline clear policy directions on *Ghana Beyond Aid* and, third, ensure proper coordination between government and other stakeholders like Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), the private sector and philanthropic organisations. However, Kumi's (202) study refused to acknowledge the role the donor community plays in the vision.

Like Kumi's (2020) study, Suleiman (2018) questions the reality of the self-reliance refrain of Africa. The scholar argues that recent calls by the President of Ghana, Akufo-Addo for an "Africa Beyond Aid" may be mere rhetoric given the nature foreign policy goals are pursued in Africa and Ghana in particular. The scholar argues that while President Akufo-Addo was making international relations declarations at grand ceremonies, his government back home was engrossed in massive alleged corrupt practices and balance of payment deficits. This situation makes the *Ghana Beyond Aid* agenda a rhetoric in diplomatic circles. The explanatory deficit in Suleiman's (2018) argument is that it did not consider the point that the proponents of the beyond aid agenda use a gradualist approach, hence the lapses in governance on the continent could be subjected to rigorous reforms before the *Ghana Beyond Aid* agenda is implemented in 2028. Nevertheless, if countries like Singapore and South Korea competed and outsmarted the existing international system and attained success (Agba & Ozor, 2018), then African leaders can achieve Africa beyond aid by

protecting national and people's interest (Suleiman, 2018). The gap in the literature on the *Ghana Beyond Aid* vision is that all the studies did not capture the vision within the scope of the twin concepts of continuity and change in foreign policy goals in the current republic, which obviously is the crux of the present study. The literature is, however, relevant to the present research as it conceptualizes the *Ghana Beyond Aid* agenda by proposing certain strategies and mechanisms to attain economic self-reliance and outlining public perceptions of the vision.

2.12 Continuity and Change in Policy

Asante's (1997) study makes the case for continuity and change in Ghana's foreign policy. The scholar argues that the niches of Nkrumah's foreign policy remain crucial part of later administrations. Accordingly, governments after Dr. Nkrumah have pursued similar policy goals carved at independence amidst few changes in form, not in substance. Asante's (1997) study argues that Nkrumah's era constituted a different regime and policy environment other than the contemporary international system that has lots of influence on foreign policy decision making. Asante (1997), however, failed to acknowledge the point that the Cold War hostilities that had implications on global politics did affect Nkrumah's policies. In fact, just as current contemporary international relations where the demise of communism, influence of the West and the industrialized Eastern Countries like the Asian Tigers, China and Russia have enormous role on foreign policy goals of the regimes in the current republic, so did the Cold War on Nkrumah's Administration.

Foreign policy objectives are so essential to a country's international image and so in the current dispensation, Ghana should determine its policy goals through needs assessments, cost and benefit imperatives of policy options to be able to realize the

best policy options for the country and not merely copying what others do either within their jurisdictions or on the global stage (Botchway & Amoako-Gyampah, 2021). On this score, Asante's (1997) study makes a strong case for career diplomats rather than political figures to be appointed as ambassadors and high commissioners. According to the scholar, career diplomats are better trained in negotiation to attract foreign direct investment to the country.

Tieku and Odoom (2013) disputes the claim by Asante (1997) that Ghana's foreign policy is continuity and change. According to Tieku and Odoom (2013) Ghana's foreign policy is continuity, not change. While in their studies, Siaw (2015), and Botchway and Amoako-Gyampah (2021) reported that Ghana's foreign policy is determined by global dynamics because it is believed that the country lacks agency to pursue an independent foreign policy, Tieku and Odoom (2013) found that domestic factors and rational choice among competing policy options by Ghanaian leaders, mainly underline Ghana's foreign policy goals. The argument of the Tieku and Odoom (2013) resonates well with the development of the essential elements of Ghana's foreign policy which were carved at independence when the influence of global financial institutions was fragile and minimal, and at the time when the presidency alongside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs formulated and implemented Ghana's foreign policy. Foreign policy was woven as a vital part of a broader national agenda aimed at leading the African dream of independent voice within the scope of an international order shaped by Cold War hostilities. Botchway and Amoako-Gyampah (2021), and Gebe (2008) affirm this argument. According to these scholars, Dr. Nkrumah had to be pragmatic and opportunistic in his foreign policy orientation to be able to attract the needed economic assistance from the western world whilst championing Africa's emancipation. This act of pragmatism to derive benefits from

global partners, even though contradicts Tiekou and Odoom's (2013) claim, exemplified how impactful the international system was on Dr. Nkrumah's foreign policy goals. For instance, as Thompson (1969) avers, the assistance from USSR when the West had failed to aid the Nkrumah Administration during the Congo Crisis partly marked the commencement of socialist policies in Ghana in the 1960s.

At the outset of Ghana's independence, Ghana's foreign policy was formulated on African liberation, Pan-Africanism, socialism and non-alignment towards the rest of the world to attract economic assistance to embark on industrialization and project Africa within the community of nations (Gebe, 2008). Suffice it to state that some alterations do occur in Ghana's foreign policy persuasion due to adoption of strategies and mechanisms by successive governments to suit ideologies and global implications, the three core principles which underpin Ghana's international behaviour – good neighbourliness, economic diplomacy and promotion of world peace – remain resolute in the country's foreign policy goals (Botchway & Amoako-Gyampah, 2021; Tiekou & Odoom, 2013). This lends support to the argument that Ghana's foreign policy is continuity and change (Siaw, 2015). In the view of Asare and Siaw (2018), continuity and change in foreign policy goals in Ghana's Fourth Republic is vivid. The scholars focused on analysis of the foreign policy orientations of Rawlings and Kufuor and found that the personal idiosyncrasies of the two leaders had implications on Ghana's economic diplomacy and security ties with neighbouring countries. From the standpoint of these scholars, in as much as global dynamics and domestic constraints could determine Ghana's foreign policy goals, "analysis of leadership traits and policy decisions are germane and pertinent, in order to understand the actions and inactions of Ghanaian and African leaders in general" (Asare & Siaw, 2018. p. 213). For instance, Kufuor tried to strike significant

economic diplomacy with Nigeria where the good neighbourliness overtures produced economic benefits to Ghana (Yeboah, 2019) but Rawlings, at some point had a very hostile relations with Nigeria (Sanusi & Adu-Gyamfi, 2017).

Corroborating Asare and Siaw's (2018) assertion, Botchway and Amoako-Gyampah (2021, p. 290) observed that Ghana's foreign policy is premised on its neutralist position on matters of diplomacy and foreign policy, which is to "preserve its independence to act" in international relations when deemed indispensable. According to Botchway and Amoako-Gyampah (2021), while successive governments after Nkrumah have maintained non-alignment as a core foreign policy goal of the country, some modifications to foreign policy goals are carried out because of the nature of contemporary international politics. For instance, the scholars note that the Progress Party under Busia essentially pursued pro-West and anti-communist policies and sought dialogue with the Apartheid South African regime which were betrayal of the NAM principles of positive neutrality and non-interference in the domestic affairs of member states. Moreover, the PNDC and the NDC on the other hand courted the Bretton Woods Institutions so as to secure economic assistance at the expense of the country's independence to act in global affairs. Continuity and change is therefore an important feature of Ghana's foreign policy goals.

Botchway and Amoako-Gyampah (2021) further claim that the Akufo-Addo Administration, not quite a departure from the other regimes, particularly, the Kufuor Administration, is focused on economic diplomacy within the framework of the *Ghana Beyond Aid* agenda. In the early stages of the Akufo-Addo regime, though the country's foreign policy hinged on continuity of Ghana's foreign policy goals – good neighbourliness, resolution to political impasse in the West African sub-region –

Togo, the Gambia, Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea, among others, a litany of studies have observed that some changes in policy direction as a result of external factors like the COVID-19 pandemic and others, is a blot on the regime's good neighbourliness policy (Botchway & Hlovor, 2022). For instance, Botchway and Hlovor (2022) reveal that the nature of travel bans particularly the closure of land borders during the pandemic had consequences on international obligations, however, they aimed at promoting the national interest, this also typifies continuity and change in foreign policy goals.

Further, as Botchway and Hlovor (2022) observe, Ghana's non-aligned policy is equally deterred by other recent policy initiatives such as Ghana's military pact with the US where the latter has stationed its troops at the former's airport and has unimpeded access to the airport and radio spectrum. To these scholars, this act constitutes an affront to the non-aligned principles. Nonetheless, in their study, Botchway and Hlovor's (2021) reported that pragmatism in foreign policy goals is key with respect to the drifts in contemporary international relations. Put succinctly, Botchway and Amoako-Gyampah (2021) concurred that Ghana's foreign policy has not constantly followed strict non-alignment and positive neutralist foreign policy goals. In spite of efforts to stay on the course of continuity, pragmatism is key in the country's foreign policy persuasion so that the desires and aspirations of the country are carefully analyzed pursuant to the pathway "that yields the best returns for the moment and for generations to come" (Botchway & Amoako-Gyampah, 2021, p. 301). This is exactly the point Asante (1997) noted in early times as he advocates a cost-benefit analysis of foreign policy goals of Ghana in the 21st century, lending support to continuity and change in foreign policy goals.

The litany of studies focused on Ghana's economic diplomacy, good neighbourliness and positive neutrality but failed to identify the initiatives and programmes under these foreign policy goals to extricate Ghana from the aid debacle. Again, the literature paid little attention to the critical global underpinnings that shape these core policy goals in the Fourth Republic and the corresponding domestic factors that propel them. Basically, the literature reinforces the present study to fill in this literary gap by analyzing both continuity and change in the foreign policy goals of Ghana in the Fourth Republic.

2.13 Continuity and Change in Foreign Policy Goals in the Fourth Republic

Economic considerations and other foreign policy goals implemented by the forbearer of Ghana's independence, have transcended regimes despite some alterations in their mode of execution. Leadership idiosyncrasies and ideology, global trends and domestic circumstances have had great influence on foreign policy choice in the Fourth Republic, hence Ghana's foreign policy goals are modelled around the concepts of continuity and change in policies.

2.13.1 Ghana's foreign policy under the Rawlings Administration (1993 – 2000)

Ghana's Fourth Republic has a long-standing portrayal of continuity and change in foreign policy supported by foreign aid. Beginning with the National Democratic Congress (NDC) under the leadership of Jerry Rawlings, Ghana's foreign policy personified earlier regimes. In the opinion of Bofo-Arthur (2008), the change of Rawlings from a military ruler to a constitutional democrat did not cause significant change to Ghana's foreign policy as the pursuit of foreign policy goals were seen as means to meet domestic needs and fulfill international obligations. Aid dependency at the inception of the NDC regime reduced drastically because the IMF and the World

Bank put on hold financial assistance to Ghana, the Bretton Woods Institutions claimed that Ghana overspent on the drafting of the 1992 Constitution. Further, the NDC regime deferred the implementation of the Value Added Tax (VAT), among others (Whitfield & Jones, 2009). This was also partly due to the already existing democratic institutions prior to the 1992 election which did not need massive capital injection again. Notwithstanding this scenario, during these hard times when the Bretton Woods Institutions reneged on providing aid to Ghana, other bilateral donors took over the mantle to save the economy. Regards the nature of dependency on foreign aid at the time, however, Whitfield and Jones (2009) speak of the inability of the country to devise its own policies but rather operated within an environment of rented policies.

The regime's economic diplomacy assisted Ghana to obtain foreign aid for national development projects. Ghana improved relations with the US under the NDC which led to the high-powered state visit by President Bill Clinton in 1998 (Siaw, 2015). Consequently, Ghana benefited from the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) which sought to grant Sub-Saharan African countries eligible for the offer unrestrained access to the US market (Siaw, 2015; Williams, 2015). Even though the benefits of AGOA to Ghana attained fruition under the Kufuor Administration, the Rawlings Administration spearheaded the process through Ghana's friendly relations with the US (Yeboah, 2019).

Moreover, Ghana was a beneficiary under the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) by the US. Under the initiative, Ghana's military received training in logistics, leadership, human rights, humanitarian law and protection of refugees, negotiation and mediation, among others (Frazer, 1997). ACRI also assisted the Ghana Armed Forces to respond to conflicts in the ECOWAS sub-region – Liberia,

Sierra Leone – and other parts of Africa (Birikorang, 2007). Arguably, ACRI brought to the forefront US vested interest in Ghana and its intrusion in the domestic security architecture which widened the scope of dependency on external forces from food and finance to security.

Further, within the ECOWAS sub-region, the African continent and at the international stage, the Rawlings Administration played critical roles on security matters to either maintain or restore peace and stability in consonance with stipulations of the 1992 Constitution. Accordingly, as Sanusi and Adu-Gyamfi (2017) have underscored, Rawlings spearheaded the formation of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in 1990 to enforce peace in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau in 1990, 1997 and 1998 respectively and then in DR Congo and Rwanda. Conversely, some peace agreements were brokered by Rawlings as Chairman of ECOWAS on 12th September, 1994 at Akosombo, Ghana which have been used in preventive diplomacy in Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Togo, Niger, Cote D'Ivoire and other flashpoints in West Africa (Kehinde, 2011). Ghana was also home for refugees from Togo, Liberia and Sierra Leone.

Invariably, Ghana upheld its key role in maintenance of world peace through peacekeeping operations in war-torn countries as did previous regimes. According to Asante (2018, p. 186) and Asante (1997, p. 47) following his investiture, Rawlings pledged a foreign policy that will “continue to be the maintenance of friendly relations with immediate neighbours and indeed all the countries of Africa.” However, viewed under the scope of security cooperation under the ECOWAS arrangement, it was a monumental failure on the part of the administration to have pursued a very aggressive security cooperation with Cote D'Ivoire and Togo chiefly,

raising tensions in the sub-region based on an alleged Ghana's military attack on Togo's foremost military barracks which led to the massacre of its Military Chief of Staff, General Mawulikplimi and his deputy, Colonel Kofi Tetteh in 1993 (Sanusi & Adu-Gyamfi, 2017). Rawlings' good neighbourliness policy was pursued amidst hostilities with Togo, Cote D'Ivoire and at a point with Nigeria but issues on border disputes with Togo, among others were carefully managed to prevent conflicts. Indeed, with the demise of colonialism in Africa, African liberation struggle and Pan-Africanism incorporated conflict resolutions and removal of military dictators of which the Rawlings era demonstrated prowess as part of its foreign policy goals to prevent a trigger to the Ghanaian territory (Sanusi & Adu-Gyamfi, 2017). It is essential to note that in the Rawlings Administration's security cooperation, all the peacekeeping operations, ECOWAS summits and establishment and maintenance of refugee camps, involved considerable financial and material resources which called for more foreign aid from the UN, IMF, World Bank and other bilateral donors. At the inception of the NDC Administration, its record on good neighbourliness policies were impressive but its aggressive foreign policy towards Togo and Cote D'Ivoire and at a point with Nigeria, was a complete change in the foreign policy orientation of the country. In all, the Rawlings regime suffered accusations of attacks, massacres and military coups from neighbouring countries (Sanusi & Adu-Gyamfi, 2017). However, Rawlings' role in ECOWAS, ECOMOG, AU and the UN, seeking constant peace and stability of the sub-region, Africa and the world at large amounted to continuity of foreign policy under past regimes (Asare & Siaw, 2018).

In respect of the economy, towards the end of its tenure, the Rawlings-led NDC Administration lacked the wherewithal to resuscitate the ailing economy (Gyekye-Jandoh, 2017). For instance, Debrah (2008/2009) indicates that, among the issues

brought to the front burner accounting for the electoral defeat of the NDC in the 2000 general elections were Ghana's debt to its total export which was 175% as at December, 2000; a per capita income of \$390 and the cedi depreciation of 49.6%. Again, 40% of Ghana's population, corresponding to about 7.2 million people, lived in poverty (Ghana Statistical Service, 1995) whereas the rate of lending increased from 30 - 39.75% in December, 1999 to 39 - 56% in August, 2000. Debrah (2008/2009, p. 101) reveals that aside the shortfall in the export of cocoa, gold and timber and the sharp rise in crude oil prices, by December, 2000, "poor economic performance had placed Ghana in the WB category of the severely indebted low-income countries (SILIC) group" which the NPP capitalized on to win the 2000 elections. However, the succeeding regime needed to implement foreign policy goals that would attract more aid to finance external debts. This definitely is a common feature, continuity of Ghana's foreign policy, a trajectory where all administrations worsened the economic outlook of the country before they leave power.

2.13.2 Ghana's foreign policy under the Kufuor Administration (2001 – 2008)

The New Patriotic Party (NPP) led by John Agyekum Kufuor took power in 2001. Ghana's foreign policy goals were pursued vigorously under Kufuor. Kufuor's administration had great semblance of continuity and change where Ghana's foreign policy goals; economic diplomacy and independence, good neighbourliness, Pan-Africanism, non-alignment, and maintenance of international security, took centre stage within the realms of global dynamics and ideological inclinations. However, these could only be achieved by tackling first the economic challenges bequeathed to it by the NDC under Rawlings.

The country's debt at the time Rawlings left office was \$ 6.6 billion (Siaw, 2015). The debt stock was a major setback to the Kufuor Administration's quest to implement its foreign policy decisions. Therefore, the administration set out to resolve the disparities that had stunted economic growth and development in the country. Kufuor therefore acceded to the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative (Tawiah et al., 2019; Appiah-Konadu et al., 2016; Debrah, 2008/2009). Consequently, Ghana became eligible for benefits from both HIPC and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) (Aklobortu, 2019). The bold step of the administration led to debt cancellation by the Paris Club of creditors and the G8 nations. Indeed, a total debt of \$3.5 billion was written off in 2003 (Jones, 2016) and Ghana benefited from an annual financial support of \$230 million for nine years (2004 – 2013). These amounts were used in funding the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS), a prerequisite under the HIPC agreement and an initiative also deemed as external interference in Ghana's domestic affairs (Mba, 2015).

The merits of HIPC were recorded shortly in areas such as GDP growth of 5.8% higher than a projected rate of 5.2%; a reduction in inflation figures from 40% at the time NDC left power to 11.8%; a 3.5% per capita income and a marginal appreciation of the cedi against major currencies (Debrah, 2008/2009). The HIPC initiative also assisted the Kufuor Administration to embark on human-centred projects in critical sectors of the economy including education, healthcare, drinking water, transportation, among (Yeboah, 2019). Records show that HIPC projects transcend the Kufuor regime as succeeding regimes under Mills and Mahama, invested HIPC funds in the Social Investment Programme (SIP) and others. Contrary to these records, Debrah (2008/2009, pp. 103 – 104) argues vehemently that by 2004, "it had become apparent to Ghanaians that the HIPC was not different from the SAP – the

SAP was its forerunner” because the strong economic outlook last for only a short period because “the more HIPC relieved Ghana of her debts, the more it created new ones.”

The Kufour Administration exhibited pragmatism in its economic diplomacy and policy of good neighbourliness, captured briefly in the NPP’s manifesto for the 2000 election as “Agenda for Positive Change.” This was later changed to “Golden Age of Business” which was persistently pursued. Despite its dealings with the West, the Kufour Administration also saw the need to court the East for some financial assistance especially during the second tenure of office. As acknowledged by Yeboah (2019), the Kufour Administration was able to access loan facilities from different parts of the world with respect to its pragmatic economic diplomacy. These included a concessional loan of US\$270 million, a commercial loan of US\$292 million and US\$60 million from the China Exim Bank for the Bui Dam Project. This project was to supply both hydroelectric power and water for irrigation in the Bui enclave (Water-technology, 2019). However, this agreement was in the form of “natural resource-infrastructure swap,” where proceeds of about 30,000 tons of cocoa annually had to be exported to China and deposited in an escrow account at the Exim Bank as collateral for the loan (Yeboah, 2019). In fact, this policy had the consequence of restraining the administration to trade with other countries as far as export of cocoa was concerned.

This situation restrained Ghana from exerting certain level of independence in areas it had competitive advantage in global affairs. The Bui Dam was completed in 2013 during the Mahama Administration and serving its purpose of generating about 400MW of hydroelectric power to supplement power generation from the country’s

mainstay Akosombo Dam. Improved relations with Japan led to debt cancellation of \$1 billion under the HIPC initiative and support for the construction of major roads such as the Accra – Cape Coast Road (Adams, 2020). Adams (2020) argues that the Ghana Investment Advisory Council (GIAC) established by the Kufuor Administration with huge input from the IMF, UNDP and World Bank had the intent of attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) to aid the economic growth of the country.

Also, Ghana's relations with the United Kingdom secured Ghana an amount of £42 million as support for the free maternal healthcare programme. India also provided a grant for the construction of the Jubilee House, the seat of government. Again, an amount of \$40 billion from the Spanish government was utilized in the revamping of the Cardio Centre at the Korle-Bu Teaching Hospital, Accra. The benefits of AGOA and the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) were all realized from the cordial relations between the Kufuor Administration and the US government (Adams, 2020). This relations between Ghana and the US were strengthened when the US president, George Bush Junior visited Ghana. The George Walker Bush Road (N1 road) in Accra sponsored by the MCA is a product of the US president's visit.

Furthermore, the administration's liberalized economy led to its agreement with the US based Kosmos Energy and the E.O. Group's exploration of the deep waters of Cape Three Points which led to the discovery of oil in large quantities in 2007. This historic experience of the Kufuor Administration opened avenue for economic relations with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and other multinational corporations which inured to the economic growth of Ghana through the establishment of oil and related businesses (Yeboah, 2019). Yeboah (2019) has

vehemently argued that the oil fields under the Kufuor Administration had impact on the economy by increasing GDP from 4.7% in 2009 to 5.9% in 2010 during the Mills' era. Clearly, as Adams (2020) maintains, Ghana's friendly relations with France and Malaysia also brought in \$30 million to enhance the National Identification Authority programme and businessmen and investors respectively. Under the Rawlings regime, Ghana had quite an unreceptive relation with Malaysia due to the rift between Ghana Telecom and Malaysia Telecom but this was addressed under the Kufuor Administration. Ghana – Netherlands relations again culminated in the successful implementation of the Ghana School Feeding Programme (Yeboah, 2019).

In all, debt cancellations from the HIPC initiative and foreign aid from all parts of the world, assisted the Kufuor Administration to institute social protection and economic intervention programmes, not excluding the Metro Mass Transport System, the National Health Insurance Scheme, Capitation Grant and the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) (de-Graft Aikins et al., 2016). The African Development Bank (2015) contends that Ghana received US\$265 billion external aid, corresponding to 3.8 percent of official development assistance (ODA) to Africa from 2003 to 2009. Despite all these, President Mills (2009, p.5) indicated in the State of the Nation Address of 2009 that balance of payment as at 2008 was estimated at $\text{¢}3.42$ billion, 18% of GDP, external debt between 2006 and 2008 “increased from US\$2.2 billion to US\$3.9 billion” while the “rate of inflation accelerated from 12.7 percent at the end of 2007, to 18.1 percent at the end of December, 2008.”

Botchway and Amoako-Gyampah (2021, p. 299) note that the transition from the NDC Administration to the NPP Administration in 2001 “did not involve any significant changes in foreign policy.” Bofo-Arthur (2007) indeed had hinted on this

assertion earlier when he intimated that both the NDC and the NPP formulated capitalist oriented policies, with slight variations, where the NPP placed more premium on economic diplomacy than the NDC. Thus, the Kufuor Administration, just as the Rawlings era after 1983, had the objective of obtaining financial assistance to overturn the fortunes of the economy and therefore had good relations with Western capitalist countries and multilateral conglomerates. On his good neighbourliness policy, Kufuor established cordial relationships with particularly Togo, Burkina Faso, Nigeria and Cote D'Ivoire which surpassed all administrations before him (Yeboah, 2019). In a matter of eight months into his administration, Kufuor had toured all neighbouring countries to Ghana – Togo, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, among others. Even though these good relations with neighbouring countries enhanced security in the sub-region, the financial implications as a result of direct diplomacy, high powered delegations to these countries, among others always had an adverse effect on scarce financial resources, hence demands for foreign aid to support the economy.

Ghana's role in the continental and regional bodies – AU and ECOWAS – alongside its fidelity to Pan-Africanist ideals during the Kufuor era also demonstrated continuity and change in Ghana's foreign policy. Kufuor as Chairman of ECOWAS helped in the resolution of the Liberian Civil War, Ivorian crisis and provided protection for refugees. In October 15, 2003, Kufuor took the opportunity of his meeting with EU delegation to call on the UN to assume central role in restoring peace to Cote D'Ivoire, which helped in the conflict management. Kufuor again exhibited his Pan-Africanist credential, for instance, by refusing to cause the arrest of Charles Taylor of Liberia who was accused of involvement in the Sierra Leonean conflict against the instructions of the Special Court of Sierra Leone (approved by the UN) while

attending ECOWAS peace summit in Accra (Sanusi & Adu-Gyamfi, 2017). Kufuor was criticized for failing to adhere to principles of ECOWAS, the AU and the UN but the justification by the administration was that such act could have had several repercussions on Ghana's status as host of the summit and the good neighbourliness policy. As has been reiterated by Birikorang (2007), as at May 2007, the Ghana Armed Forces and Police Service personnel on peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone, Lebanon, Liberia, DRC, Cote D'Ivoire, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Western Sahara, Burundi and Sudan stood at 3,361. In all these, according to Birikorang (2007), under ECOWAS arrangements, member states are expected to self-finance the first three months of their troops on ECOMOG missions. Birikorang (2007, p. 9) further asserts that costs of accommodation and maintenance of rebels invited for peace talks, travels and sustenance allowance of Ghana's delegations for negotiations outside Ghana, among a host of others are "all borne by Ghana government." The implication is that the economy is persistently under pressure due partly to Ghana's active role in the UN, AU, ECOWAS, among others.

2.13.3 Ghana's foreign policy under the Mills Administration (2009 – 2012)

In 2008, Evans Atta Mills won the mandate of Ghanaians as the third president of the Fourth Republic. Ghana's foreign policy continued its trajectory of seeking world peace through the African Union, ECOWAS, Pan-Africanist programmes, non-alignment and economic cooperation with quite negligible changes in mode of execution. The administration promised in 2009, a cut in government size and expenditure, and to ensure fiscal discipline (Mills, 2009) which culminated in some economic achievements. Under Mills, Ghana attained a single digit inflation rate of 8.4% in 2012 as a result of prudent fiscal, monetary and other austerity measures.

According to the IMF, Ghana's economic growth rate of 20.15% made it the fastest growing economy in the world for the first half of 2011.

Consequently, as Mills (2012) stated in the 2012 State of the Nation Address, the implementation of the Single Spine Salary Structure, among other things posed challenges to the economy which needed resuscitation through external support. Indeed, this exemplified past regimes where domestic policies always had affect on the direction of the country's foreign policy. The Great Recession of 2008 which devastated the Western economies also led the Mills Administration to tilt its economic diplomacy towards the emerging economies like China and Brazil as well. For instance, Ghana's Parliament gave approval for the agreement between Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC) and UNIPEC Asian Company Limited on the Jubilee Oil Fields' extraction and lifting of crude oil (Siaw, 2015). The agreement detailed purchasing and lifting of about 13,000 barrels of crude oil every day. Similar agreement involving a loan facility of \$3 billion to be used in infrastructural development was reached between Ghana and the China Development Bank (CDB).

In relation to Ghana-US relations, in 2009 and 2012, the US and Ghana increased direct diplomatic ties when the presidents of both countries, Obama and Mills paid state visits to each other's country. While projecting the image of Ghana in international relations, these tours also culminated in some aid benefits to Ghana (Mba, 2015). Ghana and the US, for example, reached agreement on the Partnership for Growth Initiative as part of Obama's Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development, earning Ghana financial support for national development. Ghana also took the opportunity to contract General Electric and the Conti Group based in the US, to the tune of \$1.2 billion to solve the energy crisis (The Ghanaian Envoy, 2010).

The cost and benefit analysis of such overtures in the areas of security measures, travel expenses, protocol arrangements and other courtesies create huge deficits in the financial records of the country and the mostly, the available means of recovery had constantly been to seek foreign aid in whatever form.

President Mills, in his response to journalists, particularly Kwami Sefa Kayi on the Ivorian political crisis in January 2011, emphasized that Ghana could not choose a president for Cote D'Ivoire (Sanusi & Adu-Gyamfi, 2017) and that Ghana was minding its own business; well-articulated in Fante parlance as "Dzi wofie Asem." This was certainly a foreign policy paradigm that contravened the good neighbourliness policy and co-operation with all other countries, principles of the AU and the ECOWAS that other regimes had strived to protect. Certainly, this proclamation was a complete change in the foreign policy direction of the country. Although the administration committed more troops to the Ivorian crisis sooner after the unpalatable declaration of the president and even received refugees from that country, according to scholars, those words lacked diplomatic aptness and inconsequential with the wider spectrum of Ghana's good neighbourliness policy (Sanusi & Adu-Gyamfi, 2017).

Aning and Edu-Afful (2017) posit that the reason for the unusual statement of President Mills and the non-involvement was that Ghana was undertaking several peacekeeping operations in Sub-Sahara Africa at the time. Again, they stress that Ghana was mindful of its economic investments in Cote D'Ivoire and could not determine which way the political power would swing and the implications later. Nevertheless, the whole scenario typified the fact that defiant isolationism in contemporary international relations is an unprofitable venture to pursue. President

Mills was, however, able to transact direct diplomatic ties with Equatorial Guinea where he visited President Teodoro Nguema Mbasogo in May 2010 who also reciprocated the gesture by visiting Ghana in September, 2010.

2.13.4 Ghana's foreign policy under the Mahama Administration (2012 – 2016)

John Mahama became president after the death of President Atta Mills. In his address at the 69th session of the UN General Assembly on 25th September, 2014, President Mahama reiterated Ghana's partnership with the IMF to assess the economy to be able to implement "change in pursuit of true progress" (Mahama, 2014, p. 5). It was anticipated that the partnership could bring transformation that will repose Ghana from a low middle income into a middle-income status. In the early part of 2015, Ghana's economy was in crisis, hobbled by flaring current account, lingering budget deficits, rambling inflation and confounding depreciating cedi. The Mahama Administration therefore approached the IMF for \$918 million loan facility for stabilizing the economy (Appiah-Konadu et al., 2016). The economic advisors of the IMF and Government of Ghana then agreed on a three-fold programme of restoring debt sustainability, strengthening monetary policy and cleaning up the banking system. Underlining these were austerity measures such as limited public employment and elimination of subsidies on utility and petroleum products as well as crackdown on tax evasion. In contrast to expectations of a turnover in the prospects of the economy, Ghana still persisted extremely on its reliance on foreign aid which did expose it to fluctuations in investors' behaviours in the country.

The good neighbourliness policy, multilateralism, Pan-Africanism, African unity and promotion of world peace were also remarkably manifested under the Mahama Administration. During the outbreak of Ebola in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea in

2014, Ghana played instrumental role when President Mahama traveled to these West African countries to assist in finding antidote to the disease (Mahama, 2014). Ghana facilitated the UN's fight against Ebola as Centre for the United Nations Mission on Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER). Ghana also contributed 100 tons of food products to Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea (Siaw, 2015). According to Aubyn (2015), Ghana contributed troops towards peacekeeping operations in Mali as part of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). However, while the world celebrated Ghana for its steering role in that regard, the economy was seriously affected and was in distress in the ensuing year 2015. Siaw (2015) also asserts that Ghana was so concerned about the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin and so assisted in fights against them. Ghana therefore had to approach the IMF for a loan facility to save the economy from tumbling.

Furthermore, in 2016, the Mahama Administration accepted to host two Yemeni nationals, Mahmud Umar Muhammad Bin Atef and Khalid Muhammad Salih Al-Ohuby popularly called Gitmo 2, ex-convicts of the US-operated Guantanamo Bay Prison in Ghana for a two-year period. This received a lot of backlashes from opposition elements, who contended that their stay in Ghana could attract terrorist invasions since terrorists had attacked Burkina Faso on 16th January, 2016 (Doudou, 2016). Nonetheless, this security cooperation between Ghana and the US deepened relations.

2.13.5 Ghana's foreign policy under the Akufo-Addo Administration (2017 – 2022)

The election of Akufo-Addo as president of Ghana in 2016 brought a new era of hope in both domestic and foreign policy decisions. The president carried out his foreign

policy decisions mindful of the legacies of his predecessors, demands of the Ghanaian people and global dynamics. With a new administration in place and a clear ideological difference with its immediate forerunner, many scholars projected a new foreign policy direction for Ghana. At his investiture, President Akufo-Addo made an insightful foreign policy statement to the effect that continuity in Ghana's foreign policy with slight changes was imminent. Akufo-Addo declared that:

We will rekindle the spirit that made Ghana the leading light on the African continent, and make our conditions deserving of that accolade. We will work with our neighbours and friends on the continent to enhance peace, democracy and political stability in our part of the world. We will reassert vigorously the Pan African vocation to which our nation has been dedicated. Integration of our region and of our continent will be a strategic objective of Ghanaian policy (Akufo-Addo, 2017, p. 5).

An inundation of pragmatic steps was taken few days after his inauguration to reclaim Ghana's status as the torchbearer of Pan-Africanism. President Akufo-Addo began his Pan-Africanist foreign policy journey by touring neighbouring countries to repose the country to its past spectacle as a global actor (Mustapha, 2020). In furtherance of the Akufo-Addo Administration's policy to cooperate fully with the rest of Africa, the president, in January 2017, did approve of Ghana's participation in the ECOWAS military intervention in the Gambia (the border) when disputes on election results occasioned an insurgency (Nantulya, 2017). This epitomizes continuity in Ghana's foreign policy where the nation has persistently contributed troops to peacekeeping operations in both Africa and the world.

Again, President Akufo-Addo attended the inauguration ceremony of Adama Barrow, President of Gambia, which was organized in the Gambian Embassy in Senegal on 19th January 2017. As Chairman of ECOWAS, President Akufo-Addo was very

instrumental in the regional body's decision to forestall constitutional rule in Guinea, Mali and Burkina Faso after military usurpation of power. Moreover, as Chairman of ECOWAS, Akufo-Addo was in attendance at the swearing-in ceremonies of President-elect of Cote D'Ivoire, Alassane Ouattara and President-elect of Guinea, Alpha Conde in December 2020. The administration is also not relenting on its effort to return Mali and Guinea to constitutional rule. The Akufo-Addo Administration is again pursuing a rigorous African foreign policy through ratification of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Based on this, Asante (2018) notes that in contemporary times, niches to Nkrumah's Pan-Africanism are palpable in discussions and events in Africa and the world at large.

The Akufo-Addo Administration took the matter of the Gitmo 2, the ex-convicts of the US-Guantanamo Bay Prison to Parliament for their stay in Ghana to be ratified by the august house. Scholars were a bit skeptical that this act could derail Ghana-US relations under the Akufo-Addo Administration. However, in 2018, the Government of Ghana initiated a Status of Force Agreement (Military Agreement) with the US. Cook (2019), in defense of the agreement buttresses the US State Department's claim that the recent agreement is a routine defense agreement that offered joint exercise between the militaries of the two countries. It also provided Ghana \$20 million worth military equipment, most of which are being issued under the African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP). In the view of Botchway and Amoako-Gyampah (2021), this military agreement offered the US troops unencumbered admittance to Ghana's airport. Mustapha (2020), however, refutes Botchway and Amoako-Gyampah's (2021) claim fervently that the superseding consideration behind the Ghana-US defense co-operation pact is to reinforce security in the West African sub-region after the attack on the World Trade Centre on 9/11.

Ghana's bilateral relations with the West has always witnessed fascinating outcomes with the most current ones being quite substantial in terms of security, economic and health diplomacies. All strategies to avert citizens succumbing to the deadly COVID-19 were pursued and threw the economic indices of the country off gear. Therefore, Ghana had to seek multilateral and bilateral assistance in a new era of vaccine diplomacy to secure COVID-19 vaccines. In Africa, Ghana was the first country to receive the COVID-19 vaccines through the European Investment Bank (EIB) and European Union COVAX initiative. The 600,000 AstraZeneca vaccines received under the EIB support was dubbed as vaccine support for the poorest countries in the world (GhanaWeb, 2021).

A grand breaking foreign policy statement was made at the 61st anniversary of Ghana's independence celebration, when President Akufo-Addo announced his administration's quest to pursue a 'new' foreign policy paradigm, *Ghana Beyond Aid*. Akufo-Addo reminded Ghanaians of Ghana's per capita income in 1960 (450 dollars), which was similar to that of its peers at independence— South Korea, Malaysia and Singapore (Akufo-Addo, 2018). These countries, the president appreciated, had transformed into economic giants where income per head in Singapore stands at \$51,431; South Korea at \$29,115 and Malaysia at \$9,623 while Ghana still wallows in a per capita income of \$1,512, as at 2018. The President, however, bemoaned that Ghana is still dependent on export of primary products but added that attitudinal change to reflect restructuring of the economy is needed to be able to pursue a *Ghana Beyond Aid*.

Ghana was declared a middle-income country in 2010 and based on IMF prescriptions, aid to Ghana was reduced. The UK government for example, reduced

its donor support to Ghana although it had supported Ghana with about £2 billion of foreign aid since 1999 (Aklorbortu, 2019). As Brown (2017) and Jones (2016) have emphasized, these actions of bilateral donors and the economic distress culminated in Ghana's resort to the IMF for financial assistance of \$918 million in 2015. This loan was based on a conditionality that saw a 17.5% imposition of petroleum tax and embargo on employment in the public sector with the exception of the education and health sectors. As a result of the cuts in aid inflows, the Akufo-Addo Administration finds lots of reason in a *Ghana Beyond Aid*.

2.14 Conclusion

This chapter, in essence, reviewed relevant literature to the study and dealt with the theoretical framework - dependency theory. It explored major concepts of aid in general and the three schools of thought on aid effectiveness. The chapter further dilated on global perspective on aid, aid to Africa and Ghana. The chapter also evaluated some alternatives to the aid regime and expatiated on the twin concepts of continuity and change in foreign policy goals under the various regimes in the Fourth Republic. There was also a review of some scholarly works on the *Ghana Beyond Aid* agenda. The ensuing chapter centres on the research methodology.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

The prime objective of this study is to explore continuity and change in Ghana's foreign policy goals in the Fourth Republic. This objective is underscored by Ghana's foreign aid trajectory and an analysis of how foreign policy goals can extricate the country from over-reliance on aid. This chapter deals fundamentally with the methodology that underlines the study. It captures the approaches, procedures and techniques that compose the study. In this chapter, therefore, the researcher outlines the details of the philosophical paradigm, the research approach and strategies espoused to address issues. Additionally, the mode of data collection and framework of data analysis is dealt with in this chapter.

3.1 Research Philosophy - Social Constructivist Worldview

In Greek, paradigm means pattern while in educational research, it depicts worldviews. Researcher's choice of methodology or approach in the social sciences is dependent on the research philosophy or philosophical issues which are related to ontology (the nature of reality) and epistemology (the nature of knowledge) (Al-Ababneh, 2020). Succinctly put, philosophical worldview or assumption generally represents a set of beliefs that serve as guide to actions (Eyisi, 2016; Creswell, 2009).

In the opinion of Creswell (2014, p. 6), there are four general philosophical orientations about the world and the nature of research. These are post-positivism, social constructivism, transformative and pragmatism. Out of these claims to knowledge, the social constructivist paradigm was chosen as the research philosophy of this study. The social constructivist philosophical paradigm avows that individuals

seek understanding of their world by creating specific meanings, knowledge and understanding that correspond with their experience (Creswell, 2013). These meanings, according to Creswell are not etched or intrinsic in each individual; instead, they are deduced from interactions with others in society. The assumption is that the researcher and subjects participate in shared processes in which they mingle, dialogue, question, listen, read, write and take notes on data (Eyisi, 2016). Indeed, these processes were succinctly undertaken by the researcher to gather data from state actors and non-state actors in Ghana's foreign policy decision making. For this reason, the constructivist paradigm takes inspiration from the celebrated Chinese philosopher, Confucius' quote: "I hear and forget. I see and I remember. I do and I understand" (Adom, Yeboah & Ankrah, 2016, p. 2).

Eyisi (2016, p. 34) hold the view that the constructivist/interpretivist paradigm portrays the following characteristics: "the belief that realities are multiple and socially constructed" and the recognition that "context is vital for knowledge and knowing." These niches of constructivism are so relevant for a study on continuity and change in Ghana's foreign policy goals in the Fourth Republic with specific focus on foreign aid-dependency and how foreign policy goals can support the attainment of *Ghana Beyond Aid*. In this sense, data is focused on the subjective views and context of the interviewees and not a measure of any scientific central tendencies, statistical evaluations, among others.

3.2 Research Approach

The research approach employed in the conduct of this study is the qualitative research approach. Notably, qualitative research approach is fundamentally built within the constructivist perspective. Its strategies of acquiring data encompass

grounded theory studies, narratives, ethnographies, case studies and action research (Kivunja & Kuyini, 2017). Qualitative research largely embroils investigating phenomena in their natural settings (Denzin & Lincoln, 2006). Nassaji (2020) also defines qualitative research as an inquiry that uses naturalistic and non-numerical data. The study was therefore embedded in searching for opinions and experiences of interviewees on foreign aid and the *Ghana Beyond Aid* vision. Yin (2003) opines that the choice of research strategy is decided by the nature of specific research questions. The research questions in this research point to pure description and exploration of issues on aid and Ghana's foreign policy.

3.3 Research Design

The case study exploratory design was utilized. By this design, the study explored one case or issue (*Ghana Beyond Aid*) within a bounded system (Continuity and Change in Ghana's Foreign Policy Goals). The aptness of this design is its ability to assist the researcher in obtaining data from multiple sources on Ghana's foreign policy goals in the Fourth Republic, contributions of aid to Ghana's economy and how Ghana's foreign policy dynamics could impact the quest for *Ghana Beyond Aid*. However, the problem of generalization of findings under the case study design is a pitfall to the study. Indeed, the opinions of interviewees are predisposed to change in other geographical settings. Again, scholars contend that it takes time to build trust with interviewees for a study; hence authenticating data collected from interviewees for a short period affects honest representation of facts.

3.4 Population of the Study

According to Casteel and Bridier (2021), the population comprises the persons, dyads, groups, organisations or entities researchers seek understanding of, which also creates

boundaries for the research. It encompasses the group the researcher intends to gain information from and draw conclusions. Casteel and Bridier (2021, p. 344) further explain that “target population is the specific, conceptually bounded group of potential participants to whom the researcher may have access that represents the nature of the population of interest.” As regards the population for this study, it comprised of both state actors and non-state actors of Ghana’s foreign policy decision making. The state actors are the political elite who formulate and implement policy decisions. Non-state actors are persons in the private sector, opinion leaders, academia and CSOs whose activities influence government’s decisions. Thus, these interviewees were purposively selected. The target population was seventy (70). The target population for the study includes Ghana Beyond aid committee, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration, Members of Parliament’s Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, Experts in foreign policy analysis, civil society organizations, the media, and Diplomatic Missions of Germany, UK, China, India, France, and Nigeria.

The rationale for targeting actors in Ghana’s Foreign Policy decision making is forthright – they are the policy initiators and implementers. Further, the researcher contacted non-state actors due to their in-depth knowledge in the study as practitioners. Specifically, the Ghana Beyond Aid Committee was responsible for drafting the Ghana Beyond Aid Charter and Strategy document and working towards attainment of its set objectives; the five main structures of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration – Finance, Legal and Consular Service, Regional Integration, Economic Diplomacy, and Bilateral and Multilateral Relations – perform various roles on Ghana’s foreign policy goals while Members of Parliament’s Select Committee on Foreign Affairs have both legislative and deliberative powers over foreign policy decision making.

Justification for the use of different non-state actors in the study are explained below. Experts in Foreign Policy Analysis from Ghana's universities (the University of Ghana, Legon and the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology) possess enormous expertise in analysing foreign policy goals of the state. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) – Imani Africa, IEA, CDD, IDEG and the Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition – submitted position papers to the Ghana Beyond Aid Committee. While the media consistently advocate that government should be measured in its over-reliance on external entities, the Diplomatic Missions (US, UK, Germany, China, India, France, and Nigeria) have been very remarkable in offering foreign aid to Ghana.

3.5 Data Source

In this study, both primary and secondary data sources were utilized. Primary data is for a specific research or study and was achieved through the conduct of interviews and researchers' observations from the field. Secondary data includes existing data from previous studies, books, and other related materials – referred to as literature. Secondary data was therefore sourced from government and prominent sites, official records, books, journal articles, newspaper reports, among others obtained from the Balme Library of the University of Ghana, Legon, the University of Education, Winneba, Internet Library facility and other important internet sources.

3.6 Data Collection Techniques

This study collected data through face-to-face scheduled meetings between the researcher and the interviewees. A letter of introduction obtained from the Department of Political Science Education, University of Education, Winneba (Appendix A) was served on all interviewees a couple of days before the interviews.

Specific dates were then scheduled for the interviews. The researcher did a brief self-introduction to interviewees, communicated his mission to them and sought their consents as a prelude to the interviews. An interview guide (Appendix B), a record book and an audio recorder were used in conducting the interviews. Based on the objectives of the research, interviewees shared their opinions and perspectives.

3.7 Research Instrument

The researcher set out to obtain a highly comprehensive, reliable and credible data relevant to the research questions and objectives. In view of this, the main research instrument used was a semi-structured interview guide for gathering data from the field. There were three sets of interview guide to suit the various categories of interviewees as either state actors, non-state actors or specific groups like the Diplomatic Corps. The semi-structured interview guide items kept the researcher on track, yet to ensure flexibility, interviewees' responses elicited further probes for responses to clarify phenomenon. Moreover, the researcher used observation to gather other equally important data.

3.8 Sample Size

A sample is a set of individuals or participants selected from a population purposely for a survey or a study. Chinelo and Chioma (2019, p. 48) define a sample as “a group of relatively smaller number of people selected from a population for investigation.” According to Casteel and Bridier (2021), and Gravetter and Wallnau (2017) also, the sample consists of the set of units chosen to represent the target population where data obtained from the group will be analyzed and results either inferred (quantitative) or transferred (qualitative) to the target population. Scholars have offered varied opinions on the best sample size under the qualitative approach. For Boddy (2016)

and Becker et al. (2012), the number of interviewees in a qualitative study that are considered appropriate could range between 12 and 30. However, scholars like Guest et al. (2006), argue that the sample size could be altered during the data collection process to consider the principle of data saturation. With respect to the sample size deemed appropriate under qualitative study and the principle of data saturation, the sample size of the study was sixteen (16). Table 2 shows the population of the study, number of interviewees and a brief description of the positions they hold in their establishments.

Table 1: Number of Interviewees and their Positions in their Establishments

Population of the Study	Number of Interviewees	Positions in Establishment
Ghana Beyond Aid Committee	3	Members
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration	2	Director, Africa and Regional Integration Director, Economic, Trade and Investment Bureau (ECTIB)
Members of Parliament's Select Committee on Foreign Affairs	2	A member each from the NPP and the NDC
Experts in Foreign Policy Analysis	2	Senior Lecturers and Experts in Foreign Policy Analysis
Civil Society Organisations (CSOs)	3	Policy Analysts
The Media	2	Journalists with at least 5 years experience in reporting on foreign aid to Ghana.
Diplomatic Missions (China and Nigeria)	2	Media Relations Manager, Chinese Embassy Liaison Officer, Nigerian Embassy
TOTAL	16	

Source: Researcher's Construct (Field Notes, 2022)

3.9 Sampling Technique

Generally, the objective of the sampling technique is to obtain a sample that is representative of the target population. The purposive sampling technique was used to

select all interviewees for the study. Purposive sampling, also referred to as judgment sampling, is the careful selection of interviewees based on the characteristics and qualities the individual possesses (Etikan et al., 2016). The benchmarks for the selection may vary, including seeking a particular narrative to explore, common experience with a phenomenon, membership of association or a culture or being in a specific position to aid the construction of a theory (Creswell, 2013). Purposive sampling is particularly useful in situations where a targeted sample must be reached swiftly for better matching of the sample to objectives of the study to enhance credibility, transferability, and confirmation of data and outcome (Campbell et al., 2020). An alternative purposive sampling technique employed in this study is the expert sampling technique. Anaeke (2002) has opined that expert sampling involves the gathering of persons with the requisite, demonstrable experience and expertise in a field of endeavour. Sometimes, such assembly of broad minds is referred to as a sample of panel of experts.

3.10 Data Analysis

As a prescription of the qualitative method, data analysis proceeds immediately after interview. Primary data were carefully transcribed and coded. Thus, data were prepared manually to identify patterns in replies by interviewees. Primary data was therefore analysed on common identifiable themes (thematic analysis). In this sense, the researcher did a transcription, coding and generation of themes from the data. Subsequent to this, the themes were defined and named appropriately before they were presented, analysed and discussed using the literature to confirm or refute claims from interviewees.

3.11 Ethical Considerations

Ethical issues were adhered to strictly in the conduct of this study to ensure that the findings' reliability and validity are secure. First, a letter from the Department of Political Science Education was sent to all interviewees. In some cases, permission from an interviewee's superior officers/institution was sought. Again, prior to the interview, the researcher informed the interviewees precisely about the motive for the study and participated based on their consent. Interviews were transcribed verbatim. Respect for the confidentiality of the information interviewees provided was also at the heart of this study, as it was to be utilized exclusively for academic purposes. Furthermore, data from the fieldwork was handled in such a way that, if they were found in the public space other than within the perimeters of the research, identity will not be traced to the interviewees.

Trustworthiness of the research findings was achieved through four main elements. These are credibility, confirmability, dependability and transferability of the findings. One method of promoting credibility of the findings was the use of triangulation. Under this, the study used more than one method of data collection and analysis (interviews and observations), and employed multiple sources of evaluating the data such as member checking, peer debriefing and institutional checking on the research. Also, through a wide range description, analysis of situations and portrayal of circumstances, the study is highly transferable and applicable to other African countries. Dependability of the findings was attained when other researchers read and reacted to field notes, and scrutinized the research report. The study achieved confirmability through the use of secondary data to attain precision and accuracy as the primary data were either confirmed or refuted by a stream of extant literature.

3.12 Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter focused on the research approach, the philosophical worldview (social constructivist worldview), strategies and methods employed in the study. This section laid emphasis on the qualitative research approach adopted for the study. It highlighted the data collection methods, research instruments and method of data analysis. The study used the purposive sampling technique. In all, data were collected from sixteen (16) interviewees; seven (7) state actors and nine (9) non-state actors of Ghana's foreign policy decision making. The chapter also touched on thematic analysis as the basis for data analysis and elaborated on ethical considerations. The next chapter deals with data presentation and analysis.



CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

4.0. Introduction

This chapter basically presents and analyzes data collected qualitatively through interviews and related literature. As echoed earlier, the purpose of the study was to analyse *Ghana Beyond Aid* vision as a policy paradigm towards economic self-reliance. The four objectives of the study are to identify the factors that determine continuity and change in Ghana's foreign policy goals, explore why the pursuit of continuity and change in Ghana's foreign policy goals has rendered Ghana over-reliant on foreign aid, investigate how foreign aid contributes to the development of critical sectors of Ghana's economy and analyse how Ghana's foreign policy goals can extricate the country from over-dependence on aid. The chapter provides a thematic analysis of the data based on the objectives of the study.

4.1 Determinants of Continuity and Change in Foreign Policy Goals in the Fourth Republic

International Relations experts argue that foreign policy goals are products of national interest. However, some factors determine both the continuation (continuity) and discontinuation, moderation or alteration (change) of foreign policy goals in Ghana's Fourth Republic. The study finds past policies and experience, leadership idiosyncrasies, national interest, economic conditions, natural resources, public opinion, and global factors as determinants of continuity and change in Ghana's foreign policy goals.

4.1.1 Past policies and experiences

The study finds that the past continues to be the reference point for Ghana's foreign policy goals. Historically, colonialism had tremendous influence on the foreign policy direction of the country. A greater number of the Ghanaian workforce was given tutelage by the colonialist based on institutions, systems and culture of the British. At independence, therefore, Ghana maintained these institutions and systems of heritage. Furthermore, by virtue of British colonial rule, Ghana earned Commonwealth of Nations' status, the national language (English), a partial Westminster parliamentary system of government, the justice system and the civil service structure. These systems and processes continue to influence foreign policy decision making of the country.

Again, it emerged from the findings that Ghana's cordial relations with other sister colonies of the British in West Africa; Nigeria, Sierra Leone and the Gambia, springs from the colonial past. Against this premise, Ghana uses diplomacy in its dealings with each of these countries. In the areas of direct diplomacy, sports, economic diplomacy and implementation of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of persons, Ghana and Nigeria continue to exhibit friendly relations towards each other given their common heritage. One interviewee remarked that:

Ghana's colonial experience with Britain connected it more to its allies in the West than any other. This has constantly been a characteristic of Ghana's foreign policy for years now. The country's friendly relations with African countries especially those within the West African sub-region is rooted in Ghana's past and experiences (Interviewee 4, 2022).

Co-roborating the foregoing data, an interviewee who is an expert in foreign policy analysis asserted that:

... though the trajectory of Ghana's foreign policy goals after the Cold War and the demise of communism has witnessed some changes, largely, it has remnants of non-alignment (continuity) as implemented by the Nkrumah Administration. This is as a result of the long-standing

relationship with the West and West African neighbours (Interviewee 10, 2022).

In the opinion of another interviewee:

Policy change or continuation in the Fourth Republic also takes cognizance of Ghana's past. While continuing effective foreign policy goals in the past, such policies as refusal to accept IMF loans when the economy was in distress, the repudiation policy and the Aliens Compliance Order serve as impetus to change in policy directions (Interviewee 9, 2022).

The data demonstrate the inevitable contribution of Ghana's colonial past as a persistent factor in the foreign policy persuasion of the state given its borrowed political institutions, inherited international allies and global actors. Ghana's strong ties with Britain, US, France and ex-colonies of Britain in West Africa is by extension a tacit endorsement of the political, economic and military relations with Britain, the West and other countries in the past. However, unpopular policies in the past such as the Aliens Compliance Order are normally not repeated. Of course, this lends credence to continuity and change in foreign policy goals. For instance, the demolition of a building at the Nigerian embassy in Ghana and the closure of the Nigerian border to importers including Ghanaian traders in 2020 and 2019 respectively were each not reciprocated giving meaning to continuity of the good neighbourliness policy goal. The inference is that successive governments in the Fourth Republic have replicated this colonial legacy from other regimes by exerting cordial relations with the West, especially the UK and the US. Nonetheless, Ghana engages in the South-South Cooperation with the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and others even under extreme circumstances.

It is obvious that policy makers in the Fourth Republic have not defaulted in embracing the core principles of Pan-Africanism, the Non-Aligned Movement, good neighbourliness and multilateralism which formed the basis of Dr. Nkrumah's African

liberation and unification agenda. However, continuation of policy goals of Dr. Nkrumah is only possible with improved material and human resources of Ghana that could spearhead the change so desirous of the times. Therefore, past policies and experiences sometimes call for change in the direction of policies or pragmatism in policy initiatives to realize economic growth and national development.

In his address at the UN General Assembly, Dr. Busia reiterated that Ghana's historical experiences have landed it in a situation where it shared common interest with some nations, particularly those in the Western world than the rest (Aluko, 1975). Buttressing this, Asante (2018) underscored the fact that resonances of Dr. Nkrumah's foreign policy are continually observed under succeeding administrations. The data corroborates the literature, especially Botchway and Amoako-Gyampah (2021), Tieko and Odoom (2013) and Asante (2018) in that, Ghana's foreign policy goals in the Fourth Republic find expression in Dr. Nkrumah's affirmed stance and commitment to the twin goals of decolonization of the African continent and an eventual continental unity. This vividly exhibits continuity in foreign policy goals. For instance, the neutralist position of Ghana in global affairs was brought to bear when Ghana among fifty-eight (58) countries, abstained from voting to suspend Russia from the UN Human Rights Council in April 2022 due to its attack on Ukraine.

In essence, the regimes in the Fourth Republic have pursued the path of African renaissance and heritage through various contributions and roles of Ghana in the African continent. In fact, this is corroborated by Botchway and Amoako-Gyampah's (2021) claim that Ghana's quest to ensure a neutralist position on matters of foreign policy and diplomacy is unblemished in the Fourth Republic. Consequently, this is

relentlessly supported by the state's power to act independently of the two blocs, the East and West when deemed necessary. Nonetheless, this neutralist persuasion of Ghana, as these scholars argue, is deeply fraught by certain policy changes like the Status of Force Agreement (Military Agreement) with the US, which grants the US unfettered access to vital installations at Ghana's Airport.

Quite a fascinating history of Ghana's foreign policy is the repudiation policy and the Aliens Compliance Order (ACO) as well as Busia's virtual bestowal of the national economy in the hands of the Bretton Woods Institutions. These policies had massive undesirable impact on Ghana's economy and good neighbourliness policy in later years. Conscious of these historical facts, regimes of the Fourth Republic have always been mindful of their financial obligations to the external world. Also, domestic policies that have huge international ramifications on other African states, especially, Ghana's immediate neighbours have obviously been eschewed by regimes of the Fourth Republic to ensure peaceful co-existence in the sub-region, emphasizing Ghana's commitment to peace throughout the world. This is the major reason scholars like Botchway and Hlovor (2022) were so concerned about the manner land borders were closed by the Akufo-Addo Administration in the heat of the COVID-19 pandemic. The consistency with which regimes in the Fourth refrain from obnoxious foreign policy goals lend credence to continuity in foreign policy goals given the country's history. In view of foregoing analysis and discussions, history accounts largely for continuity and change in foreign policy goals in the Fourth Republic.

4.1.2 Leadership idiosyncrasies

The researcher operationalized leadership idiosyncrasy to mean the exceptional values and orientations of leaders that endear them to choose among alternative policies. Leadership idiosyncrasies is another theme that emerged from the findings of the

study as one of the factors that account for continuity and change in Ghana's foreign policy goals. The study observes that implementation of Ghana's foreign policy goals is a function of political leadership. However, leadership idiosyncrasies differ considerably among regimes as a consequence of different belief systems, attitudes and norms of political leaders. Thus, several instances of leadership idiosyncrasies are obvious under continuity and change in foreign policy goals in the Fourth Republic. One of the interviewees captured his viewpoint on leadership idiosyncrasy as follows:

The personal disposition and political ideology of each president in the Fourth Republic ensured continuity and change in foreign policy goals. While all of them embarked on economic diplomacy, friendly relations with neighbouring countries and world peace through peace talks, negotiations and deployment of the armed forces for peacekeeping operations in war zones, there were however differences in their approaches. Thus, the concept of continuity and change in policy goals was demonstrated under all the regimes (Interviewee 3, 2022).

The various presidents of the Fourth Republic implemented their foreign policy goals – economic diplomacy, good neighbourliness, promotion of African unity and world peace as a requirement of the 1992 Constitution. However, their personal beliefs, political ideologies and global allies influenced the directions of their foreign policy. While all these leaders exerted economic diplomacy with the Bretton Woods Institutions, Kufuor's good neighbourliness, economic diplomacy and quest for world peace differed. Mills, for instance, opted for protection of the national interest than the deployment of the military to Cote D'Ivoire for peacekeeping operations as part of the country's good neighbourliness policy. On this score, the personal lifestyle and ideology of political leaders impacted the continuation and redirection (change) of their foreign policy goals.

In his inaugural lecture, Boafo-Arthur (2008) was categorical that foreign policy decision making to the greatest extent is influenced by the idiosyncrasies of leaders of regimes even though the institutions of foreign policy formulation also play critical

functions. This view has succinctly been supported by Asare and Siaw (2018) and Tieku and Odoom (2013). These scholars, for example, have uncovered the idea that critical assessment of leadership idiosyncrasies and foreign policy decisions are germane in appreciating the actions and inactions of Ghanaian leaders in international relations.

In this instance, a comparative analysis of the foreign policy goals of the political leaders may suffice. Apparently, Rawlings' military background, initial socialist inclinations and later democratic credentials as a result of IMF and World Bank conditionality as revealed by Gyekye-Jandoh (2017), oriented his foreign policy goals such as the good neighbourliness policy with Nigeria, Togo and Cote D'Ivoire. Conversely, Kufuor as neoliberal reformist, had an open-door foreign policy with all states regardless of their systems of governance, which contradicted his pursuit of the good neighbourliness policy, economic diplomacy, and African unity sharply with those under Rawlings. This is the reason Yeboah (2019) has established that within just eight weeks of his investiture, Kufuor embarked on state visits to all neighbouring countries – Togo, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, among others.

Kufuor's ideology, a departure from Rawlings', ensured that Ghana pursued economic diplomacy with Nigeria, which attracted a loan of \$40 million on flexible repayment terms as part of the former's contribution towards the West African Gas Pipeline as well as a 90-day credit facility on oil imports from Nigeria. Ghana-Nigeria relations was boosted under Kufuor's administration to the extent that a highway (road network) in Accra was named after General Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria who was also the guest of honour at Ghana's 50th independence anniversary in 2007. Siaw (2015) has acknowledged that the neoliberal predisposition of the Kufuor Administration was demonstrated in renewed relations with the UK, US, China, India,

Malaysia, Germany, the Netherlands, among a host of other states, resulting in enormous economic benefits to Ghana.

On the other hand, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in 2005 the persona of Akufo-Addo ensured that Ghana employed diplomacy in the case where 44 Ghanaians were killed in the Gambia. Later in January 2017, just a couple of days after his inauguration, President Akufo-Addo endorsed Ghana's participation in the ECOWAS military intervention in the Gambia (the border) when there was crisis on election results (Nantulya, 2017). These were further steps in the country's good neighbourliness policy and quest for world peace.

On the contrary, John Mahama, who was the minority spokesperson on foreign affairs and later, president of Ghana (2012 – 2016), urged Ghanaians not to welcome Yahya Jammeh of the Gambia to the AU summit in Accra during the Kufuor regime, which partly made Mr. Jammeh cancel his trip. However, as president, John Mahama visited the Gambia in 2015 (Sanusi & Adu-Gyamfi, 2017). Yet again, President Akufo-Addo was in attendance at the swearing in ceremony of Adama Barrow, President of Gambia, which took place in Senegal, at the Gambian Embassy on 19th January, 2017.

The personal demeanour, peace-loving character and value system of President Mills had intrusions on his foreign policy goals, especially his pronouncement on the Ivorian crisis of 2010/2011 and the need to send troops to that country. Furthermore, the orientation of Akufo-Addo is principally stimulating the *Ghana Beyond Aid* vision (Botchway & Amoako-Gyampah, 2021). To this end, taking a cue from Agyeman-Duah and Dadieh (1994), the study argues that the foreign policy behaviour of both the NDC and NPP, especially in the area of good neighbourliness and economic

diplomacy, has always reflected orthodox diplomacy and ideology, where predispositions of political leadership determined the nation's foreign policy goals.

4.1.3 National interest

Fundamentally, the study reveals that states propound their foreign policies based on their national character and international obligations or dynamics which must inure to national interest. That is to say, the national interest should be paramount in Ghana's quest to cooperate with other states. Territorial integrity, human security, economic growth, national development constitute essential features of Ghana's foreign policy.

On this matter, an interviewee submitted that:

... it has always been the policy of Ghana, despite the regime in power, civilian or military, to pursue a neutralist foreign policy goal in global politics to push for national development and relevance in African affairs. But this positive neutrality is sometimes subjected to changes for its political and economic expediency (Interviewee 11, 2022).

The study further observes that successful foreign policy demands accurate assessment of the interests, intentions and capabilities of a country. However, this normally eludes policy makers in Ghana and deepens the country's dependence on external forces to the detriment of the national interest. An interviewee shared the view that:

... for Ghana, it is about dependency on foreign institutions and foreign aid to be able to achieve targets of national interest, which in most cases, affects national sovereignty, economic growth, provision of welfare services for the people as well as the global image of the country (Interviewee 7, 2022).

The extract re-echoes the argument that the national interest could trigger both continuity and change in the pursuit of foreign policy goals of Ghana. Invariably, the data point out that while implementing policies that protect the interest of the country, certain changes in policy or policy direction as a consequence of aid conditionalities, for example, could have ramifications on the territorial integrity and economic

growth of the country. Impliedly, the national interest of Ghana determines which foreign policies are prudent – continuation of existing policies or change of policy goals – given the resources at hand, the political leadership, influence of external entities and the exigencies of the time.

The nature of economic growth and finances of Ghana hinder the actualization of the foreign policy goals state actors set in the name of national interest. Foreign aid is therefore sought for development but yields more dividends to external forces. An instance is the “natural resource-infrastructure swap” with China which could cause damning pollution to water bodies in the Atiwa and Nyinahin enclaves. Consequently, the national interest is often sacrificed on the altar of economic diplomacy and good neighbourliness.

Pursuant to the above analysis, major state actors prioritize the national interest and would marshal every resource at their disposal to achieve it. Nonetheless, the act of pursuing the national interest sometimes stimulates pragmatism in foreign policy objectives of Ghana, continuity and change of policy directions to achieve such feat. This phenomenon could be observed in Ghana’s foreign policy goals of regimes in the current republic. A number of examples may be given. On 15th June 2006, Mr. Victor Gbeho, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Special Representative of the ECOWAS Chairman in Liberia, disclosed in an interview that Rawlings’ decision to intervene in the Liberian conflict was basically borne out of the quest to rescue Ghanaians trapped at the embassy in Monrovia than peacekeeping concerns (Sanusi & Adu-Gyamfi, 2017).

Sanusi and Adu-Gyamfi (2017) further recount how President Kufuor was chastised for his failure to cause the arrest of Charles Taylor of Liberia at the ECOWAS peace

summit in Accra for his role in the Sierra Leonean conflict when by ECOWAS, AU and UN conventions, he should have done so. Nevertheless, the Kufuor Administration's explanation was that such act could undermine Ghana's national interest, good neighbourliness policy and status as host of the summit. By inference, as part of pursuing the national interest, the country's quest to promote world peace was compromised while the good neighbourliness policy was strengthened.

Essentially, Nigeria, South Africa and Ghana during Kufuor's regime, at a point, took active part in finding lasting peace to the Ivorian crisis in 2002 before an International Working Group (IWG) was set up. Contrary to its good neighbourliness policy, Ghana remained indifferent to the Togolese crises in 2005 based on rational calculation of the national interest. This implies a change in the good neighbourliness policy but a continuity in the desire to pursue the national interest.

To safeguard the national interest of Ghana anchored on the social norms and values of Ghanaians, for example, President Mills further maintained continuity in Ghana's foreign policy that certified his administration's objection to the West's desire to subvert the sacrosanct belief system of the people by legalizing LGBTQ+ in Ghana. Rawlings and Spio-Garbrah vindicated President Mills' statement on the Ivorian crisis that Ghana should mind its own business as reverberating Article 40 of the 1992 Constitution that, in international relations, the national interest of Ghana must be supreme.

Conversely, during the outbreak of COVID-19 in Wuhan, China, there was clamour from a cross-section of Ghanaians for Ghana to evacuate its citizens locked in the debacle. This quest was premised on the fact that France, Italy, Germany, UK, US and others had done so. Rather, on groundswell of national interest and by the application

of Kantian protectionist theory, the diplomatic relations between Ghana and China were triggered to ensure the safety of Ghanaian nationals, especially students at the epicenter, Wuhan. The option of evacuation was rejected. Travel restrictions including the closure of land borders in the heat of the COVID-19 pandemic which scholars like Botchway and Hlovor (2022) so espoused to have dire consequences on international law and obligations and the good neighbourliness policy were demystified by the Akufo-Addo Administration in terms of protecting the national interest.

4.1.4 Economic conditions

Another finding of the study is that the state of Ghana's economy is a huge determining factor for its foreign policy goals. For over six decades of Ghana's nationhood, the economy remains the most conspicuous factor in the foreign policy direction of the state. Economic conditions of Ghana are best understood as the country's infrastructural development, international trade, GDP, cedi depreciation against major currencies, among others. These factors, invariably, either call for intensified economic diplomacy, reliance on domestic sources or both for economic growth and national development. The study further finds that economic assistance from the external world has always been a major consideration for change in foreign policy goals since domestic sources are woefully inadequate to solve domestic problems and also fulfill international obligations. On the weakness of the economy, an interviewee had this to say:

The structure of the Ghanaian economy makes it quite difficult for the economy to withstand global shocks. When prices of local commodities fall on the international market and imports far exceed exports, the cedi will always suffer depreciation with its attendant consequences on inflation, GDP and balance of payment deficits. Based on this, governments implement policy goals that attract economic support to the country (Interviewee 1, 2022).

One of the interviewees, a state actor, concurred with the data by arguing that:

Ghana's economy barely supports the incessant demands of the citizenry and international financial obligations. Therefore, to ensure governance is not halted, state officials seek necessary economic assistance from other states and international financial institutions, especially the IMF, which usually tie conditions with aid that sometimes change our foreign policy direction (Interviewee 4, 2022).

On this subject, another interviewee from civil society avowed that:

Managers of the economy have constantly sidelined domestic contributions to the economy and relied on external entities to solve economic challenges. However, these external sources carry their own policies and programmes that may be at variance with the foreign policy goals of the country (Interviewee 8, 2022).

Ghana's economy plays vital role in addressing issues of good neighbourliness, continental peace and security, and economic diplomacy with the rest of the world. However, the feeble economy calls for support from external sources. Given the fact that annual budgets of Ghana are supplemented by development partners, in most cases, foreign policy goals are tilted towards their schemes and preferences. Consequently, foreign policy goals are suspended or changed to succumb to pressures of donor countries and multinational institutions. This phenomenon has been a key feature of Ghana's foreign policy persuasion in especially the Fourth Republic. Several changes in policy goals in the current republic due to the fragility of the economy could be observed. First, the Rawlings Administration's support for General Sani Abacha of Nigeria against the conventions of the international community because of human rights atrocities such as Abacha role in the murder of the writer, Ken Saro Wiwa, was based on Ghana's feeble economy for which it received oil supply from Nigeria at concessionary rate. Similarly, the economic burden of the country urged the Kufuor Administration to intensify its economic diplomacy with the West by accepting the HIPC initiative in 2002 and had debt cancellation from the

Paris Club of creditors and the G8 nations amidst certain conditionalities. Further, the Great Recession of 2008 which ravaged the Western economies also culminated in the Mills Administration's economic diplomacy with the emerging economies like China and Brazil to solve economic challenges of the country.

Given the current state of the Ghanaian economy, as depicted in the above extracts, it has received several descriptions by prominent Ghanaians. Speaking on the Ghanaian economy prior to the 2016 general elections, Bawumia (2016) described the economy as being made of straws, not concrete. On the fragility of the economy, Bawumia further argued that if the fundamentals are weak, the cedi depreciation against major currencies will expose it. In the State of Nation Address delivered on 30th March 2022, President Akufo-Addo noted that Ghanaians were living in hard times but his administration was doing everything possible to fix it. This statement was paraphrased by the Vice President Bawumia in his lecture on the Ghanaian economy on 7th April 2022 when he said Ghanaians were living in challenging times. On 2nd May 2022, former President Mahama also noted that Ghana's economy was at a crossroad. These are clear admissions of the fragility of the Ghanaian economy, conceding to policies of donor partners which normally demand certain policy directions.

The weakness of the economy which stimulates the need for aid confirms the findings of scholars including Asante (1997) who argued, for example, that due to financial constraints of Ghana, some of its diplomatic missions had to be closed down. An instance was the closure of the diplomatic mission in Belgrade in 2012. In recent times also, during the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, because Ghana had no diplomatic mission in Ukraine but only a consulate general partly due to financial incapability, in a press release dated 26th February 2022, the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration acknowledged that Ghanaian citizens had to be evacuated through the assistance of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania. Logically, Ghana's economy is a setback to the country's economic diplomacy as it limits the number of diplomatic missions and career diplomats to participate in such venture to attract the required foreign direct investment.

The findings also concur with a litany of the literature including Botchway and Amoako-Gyampah (2021), Yeboah (2019), Asante (2018), Gyekye-Jandoh (2017), Tiekue and Odoom (2013), Debrah (2008/2009), and Boafo-Arthur (2007, 1999a, 1987) that Ghana's economic interest accounts for its relations with other states in the international system. Much in a similar fashion, Agyeman-Duah and Daddieh (1994) have acknowledged economic assistance as one prime consideration of developing countries' foreign policy goals. The deduction is that, the recourse to changes in certain policy goals in the current republic such as exchange of natural resources with infrastructure with China, in order to secure external funding for economic growth and national development mainly is therefore a consequence of the debilitated economy, which is not deep enough to augment shortfalls in annual budget estimates.

4.1.5 Public opinion

Significantly, the study reveals that although the people's mandate acts as adhesives to regime's political authority to make policies, it is in the supreme interest of governments to seek and rally public support to policies to be able to fulfill the demands and aspirations of the people who have given them fiduciary roles. The study observes that public opinion, normally aggregated through the many voices on the streets, opinions on matters expressed by opposition elements, the media, professional bodies, religious groups, research by CSOs and Think Tanks, checks

arbitrariness and despotism especially on international relations. It serves as impetus for continuity, discontinuity or change in foreign policy goals. According to an interviewee from civil society:

... the voices of the masses on policies of government can reshape and redirect foreign policy goals. Public opinion usually determine which policies should be continued or changed to reflect the national character. Vibrant CSOs have in the past years contributed to the continuity or change in policies or their directions (Interviewee 8, 2022).

The collective or aggregate opinion of individuals usually reflect the attitudes and beliefs about a specific topic in relation to the national character and aspirations. In the case of Ghana, several professional bodies including the Ghana Bar Association and the Ghana Medical Association proffer opinions on the foreign policy direction of the state. The opinions of the public play enormous role in maintaining certain foreign policies or changing them to reflect the desires of the people. Through some anomalous behaviours like demonstrations, strikes and boycotts, governments in the Fourth Republic have complied with the demands of the people.

It is obvious that due to public opinion, for instance, the introduction of Value Added Tax (VAT) suffered a delay even though it was a prerequisite of the IMF and the World Bank for aid. Significantly, corroborating this line of argument, Whitfield and Jones (2009) established that the deferment of the implementation of the VAT during the Rawlings Administration was as a result of intense public opinion. It was one of the factors for which the IMF and the World Bank suspended aid to Ghana during the Rawlings Administration.

In recent times, the Christian Council of Ghana, the Catholic Bishops Conference, the Ghana Pentecostal Council and a list of other groups put pressure on the Ghanaian Parliament to refrain from passage of the LGBTQ+ bill into law against pressures

from the West. Although other human rights groups made up of some lawyers and influential people in the country showed their unflinching support for the bill, parliament suspended passage of the bill into law for some time.

Clearly, a partial reason for the critical scrutiny of foreign policy goals is in all likelihood the presence of CSOs, the media, professional bodies and opposition elements in the country. To reiterate, certain behaviours of these groups could cause policy makers to maintain or review policies to reflect the national interest or the general will of the public; a factor that contributes immensely to continuity and change in foreign policy goals in the Fourth Republic.

4.1.6 Global factors

The international system and its glut of dynamics emerged from the findings of the study as one of the overriding factors that determine continuity and change in foreign policy goals of Ghana. Ghana's foreign policy goals, just like all others, are responses to the external environment of threats, opportunities and challenges. However, the domestic variables that cause changes in foreign policy goals of regimes are seriously acquiescent to global politics. The study observes that this situation is emphasized by Ghana's position as a developing country with huge natural resources but less technological ability.

Further, the study finds that economic crisis and political conflicts in some parts of the world have had grave consequences on Ghana's economy. The Great Recession of 2008 which devastated the international political economy is of no exception to this situation. The recession had severe consequence on the economy and so Ghana had to resort to IMF bailout during the Mills Administration. The findings of the study also show that quite recently, the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine War had

awful consequences on the economy, redirecting the country's import strategies and quest for IMF bailout. In the view of one interviewee:

... pertaining to the security situation in Africa and for that matter the West African sub-region, foreign policy goals are continued, redesigned or changed, when necessary to protect Ghana's territorial integrity. Ghana had to close its land borders to Togo, Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso on several occasions under the Rawlings Administration due to revolt, allegations of terrorists' activities and coup plots in the sub-region (Interviewee 4, 2022).

Supporting the above assertion, an interviewee from Ghana's Parliament submitted that:

Ghana consented to the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and other security agreements during the Rawlings regime to be able to respond to threats of belligerents and coup plotters in West Africa described in the 1990s as the Theatre of Violence (Interviewee 5, 2022).

Contributing to this subject, an interviewee also claimed that:

Economic crisis in some parts of the world, hostilities between world powers and conflicts in West Africa, the Horn of Africa, the Middle East and other places have always had undesirable effects on Ghana's foreign policy goals. Ghana acts quickly to support other states through participation in peacekeeping operations and offering of other supports as the situation may demand (Interviewee 7, 2022).

Related to the foregoing, the study further reveals that Ghana is a member of different international organisations – continental, regional and sub-regional. The state is signatory to many international conventions and obligations. Against this backdrop, all regimes under the current republic had reiterated Ghana's unflinching belief in and support for the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Commonwealth of Nations, AU, ECOWAS and all other integration the country is a member. Mindful of treaty obligations and sanctions of these organisations, Ghana's foreign policy is critically designed to ensure continuity of foreign policy goals and change of direction as treaties or charters of these organizations may stipulate.

Giving a perspective on the matter, an interviewee argued that:

Ghana's observance of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, the various treaties of AU, Charters of the Commonwealth and the UN and the principles of the African Continental Free Trade Area, in foreign policy formulation stems from treaty obligations which it cannot circumvent (Interviewee 13, 2022).

For developing countries that depend so much on the international capital market, the import and export trade, and world powers to strengthen their national security, global shocks have repercussions on their foreign policy goals. For instance, between 2017 and 2019, a peaceful world order enhanced Ghana's economy which was sustainable and supportive of the good neighbourliness policy and the promotion of African integration. However, the devastating effects of the COVID-19 and the Russia-Ukraine War on the economy culminated in the closure of borders which brought the good neighbourliness policy into disrepute.

Treaty obligations of the state as a result of its membership of several integration also influence policy orientations. Indeed, Ghana belongs to many international organisations which continue to play a crucial part in the formulation and implementation of its foreign policy goals. The essence of the international community in determining the foreign policy goals of Ghana has clearly been outlined under Article 40 of the 1992 Constitution. In many respects, this cannot be circumvented by any government. Nonetheless, certain modifications and changes in policy directions are always possible considering how treaties and pacts at the continental and global levels could be amended.

For instance, in 2010 and 2014, although Ghana had reached a favourable financial agreement with Iran, the UN's embargo on Iran on the basis of its proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear weapons), an affront to UN Security Council Resolution 1540, Ghana revoked the agreement. Again, crisis in Cote D'Ivoire, South

Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda, Burundi, Liberia and Seirra Leone, had enormous influence on Ghana's foreign policy in the 1990s and 2000s. Sanusi and Adu-Gyamfi (2017), and Birikorang (2007) have emphasized that Ghana had to send troops for ECOMOG peacekeeping operations while it did welcome teeming refugees from war-torn countries at substantial cost.

As noted by Birikorang (2007), Ghana considers peacekeeping mission among its foreign policy priorities. The country, therefore, recognizes it as an internal issue since regional conflicts especially constitute potential threats to its territory and could affect internal security. Even though Ghana is non-aligned in global politics, threats posed by terrorists and extremist groups in West Africa require pragmatism in foreign policy goals. Terrorists groups Boko Haram, Al-Shabab, the Lord's Resistance Army, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, among others in Africa, and the increased number of coup d'état in Mali, Guinea and Burkina Faso in recent years, make the pursuit of pragmatic policies like the defense agreement between Ghana and the US under the Akufo-Addo Administration appropriate. Mustapha (2020) underscored this point by arguing plausibly that the overriding idea about the Ghana-US defense agreement is to strengthen security in the West African sub-region with respect to the existential security threats from belligerents in North Africa, especially post 9/11 attack on the World Trade Centre.

Furthermore, the nature of integration in Africa also encourages Ghana to chat economic relations mostly with countries outside Africa. The AU, NEPAD and ECOWAS have the objective of strengthening economic and political relations among African states. Unfortunately, however, these motives which defined integration in Africa now appear to have changed and Africa's integration has vehemently refused to reorder sustainable economic, security and trade relations on the continent.

Akokpari (2001) confirmed this claim when he disclosed that the ineptitude of integration in Africa spearheads African countries' resort to foreign aid.

4.2 Ghana's Over-Reliance on Foreign Aid

Ghana depends on external forces for its economic growth and national development. However, this dependency syndrome has persisted for far too long in the Fourth Republic, hence ravages the country beyond self-reliance. In respect of reasons that account for Ghana's over-reliance on foreign aid, the study uncovers a litany of factors. These factors included the economy, aid conditionality, rented political institutions and policies, show of opulence and bravado in the midst of crisis, political leadership, and the global capitalist economic system.

4.2.1 *The economy*

The study reveals that a compelling reason for Ghana's over-reliance on foreign aid is its ailing economy in relation to the state's numerous economic needs. The fragile Ghanaian economy is unsupportive of the numerous foreign policy goals and economic development. The promotion of good neighbourliness has always been a fundamental policy goal of Ghana. It reflects in bilateral relations, and the general peaceful co-existence between Ghana and neighbouring countries. More practically, the good neighbourliness shows in the maintainance of refugee camps, settlement of border disputes, among others. The country injects lots of financial and economic resources into its good neighbourliness policy goal which affects the national economy. Resources meant for infrastructural development, food and industrial production are squandered on this policy goal. Consequently, the state has to borrow and spend instead of using such aid to invest in critical sectors of the economy.

The study finds that at one spectrum, the economy is unsupportive of the state's huge expenditure on good neighbourliness while on the other; concessionary loans are utilized mostly on consumption, heightening the force of dependency on foreign aid. Moreover, the functions of government in contemporary international relations have shifted and widened to encompass different competing spheres of human development; human security, economic diplomacy, vaccine diplomacy, among others, which hitherto were non-existent or negligible in international relations. This situation imbues in policy makers the need to outstretch fiscal policies to encompass continuous utilization of aid to be able to meet aspirations of the citizenry. To buttress the data, an interviewee said that:

Since 1992, the Ghanaian economy has always experienced shocks due to both domestic policies, foreign policy goals and global dynamics. These call for donor interventions in the form of concessional loans, grants or technical support to prevent total collapse of the economy (Interviewee 3, 2022).

In support of the data, an interviewee, who is from one of the Diplomatic Missions in Ghana claimed that:

The implementation of existing international protocols, establishment of diplomatic missions and pursuit of economic diplomacy demand solid financial engineering. However, Ghana's economy is so weak that it cannot support such endeavours without aid (Interviewee 16, 2022).

The view of one of the interviewees to validate the data was also captured in the following:

Given the status of the economy in recent times, Ghana carries a huge burden of providing and maintaining infrastructure for refugees and regional bodies. It is able to perform such tasks including peacekeeping operations through assistance from the donor community (Interviewee 1, 2022).

Political institutions, bodies and actors require capacity building to serve their intended purposes. Furthermore, change in policies to reflect the country's good neighbourliness policy, economic diplomacy and desire for world peace sometimes

comes with huge financial burdens to build new institutions and empower actors to prosecute the agenda. For instance, Ghana provided the infrastructure (Africa Trade House) for the headquarters of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) in 2019 and held its maiden conference in Accra as well. Again, Ghana had to spend huge sums of money in the determination of the maritime boundary between Ghana and Cote D'Ivoire during the Mahama and Akufo-Addo Administrations. However, the strength of the economy in funding these policy dynamics is quite disappointing. Resort to foreign aid and the consequence of huge debts servicing, therefore, emanate from the fragile state of the Ghanaian economy.

The economy of a state plays critical role in its independence voice in international relations or dependence on other states. The latter, however, has serious repercussions on the activities of states in international relations. As a result, there have been several attempts at reviving the ailing Ghanaian economy in recent times. The Akufo-Addo Administration's desire to move the economy from taxation to production as a means to boost the economy and close the gap on self-reliance, has not materialized. Evidence also shows that the fundamentals of Ghana's economy certainly does not fully support addressing the desires and aspirations of the people. For instance, in 2016, Ghana recorded inflation at 17.5%, 7.2% in 2020; 10% in 2021 and 15.7% as at February 2022 (Bawumia, 2022). The fiscal balance and debt stock in the first and second quarters of 2022 cast gloomy picture of the economy in light of myriad demands such as compensation for workers, payment of road constructors, purchase of hospital apparatus, among others, from the economy and this support supplements from foreign aid.

On the international scene, the cost incurred in the current republic on foreign travels by state officials from Rawlings' regime to the present to enhance economic

diplomacy and maintain world peace also calls for massive donor support. Ghana's management of refugee camps, organization of conferences (UN, AU, ECOWAS, NEPAD, AfCFTA), dispatch of troops to warring countries like Liberia, Cote D'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Lebanon, DRC, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Western Sahara, Burundi and Sudan for peacekeeping missions further aggravate over-dependence on external entities. Ghanaian soldiers' participation in UN peacekeeping missions in Cambodia from 1992 to 1993 and Rwanda in 1993 and 1994 had great impact on Ghana's financial resource. The data corroborates the findings of Yeboah (2019), Asante (2018), Tiekou and Odoom (2013), and Bofo-Arthur (2007) who observed that Ghana's feeble economy validates the state's over-reliance on aid. Tawiah et al. (2019) have also confirmed that aid used for government consumption only creates negative balance of payments without required outcome on economic growth and national development.

According to Birikorang (2007), member states of ECOWAS are expected to self-finance their troops for the first three months of ECOMOG peacekeeping missions. Birikorang (2007) argues further that, costs of accommodating and maintaining rebels invited for peace talks, coupled with travels and sustenance allowance of delegations from Ghana for negotiations outside its borders, among others, are all borne by Government of Ghana. Indeed, assigning all these tasks to a country with a morbid economy clearly justifies its hefty reliance on aid to fulfill foreign policy goals with enormous financial implications.

In respect of the deficiencies of the economy, certain foreign policy actions are taken. For example, Ghana's voting pattern at the UN and other international bodies has always reflected the interests of donor countries/agencies. Ghana voted against Russia's invasion of Ukraine in the UN Security Council on February 25, 2022

though it is a non-aligned country, somewhat as a result of aid tying and the voting trend of its development partners in the West. This is because it could have opted for abstention or refusal to vote as China and India, and the United Arab Emirates did respectively. Again, while admitting that Article 2(4) of the UN Security Council calls for sanctions on members who attack others, and that Ghana must abide by treaty obligations, the study cannot rule out the influence of donor partners like US on Ghana's voting pattern since the IEA (2010) has underlined the US's insistence on such matters.

4.2.2 Aid conditionality

Moreover, it emerged from findings of the study that foreign policy goals keep deepening Ghana's over-reliance on donor partners due to aid conditionalities. Ghana's leading role in the promotion of peace, stability and economic development in Africa requires solid financial resources. However, as a developing country, Ghana engages in bilateral and multilateral agreements to secure funding for such foreign policy objectives amidst unfavourable conditionalities. The study further observes that aid is delivered to recipient countries with strategic plan of implementation of policies and projects, and agreed terms and conditions including mode of disbursement. Most notably, the IMF and World Bank coerce Ghana into accepting aid conditionalities with juicy but untenable and obscured terms that Ghanaian policy makers, often, are oblivious of in the preliminary stages. Thus, the principles underlining granting of aid to Ghana reinforce further the over-reliance on aid. As an interviewee noted:

... regards the prevalence of longevity of aid conditionalities, Ghana finds itself in the terrain of addressing its economic and political challenges under extreme policies, systems and institutions laid down by donor partners. The state is hardly able to implement independent foreign policy goals (Interviewee 2, 2022).

On this issue, another interviewee argued that:

The adoption of the SAP, PAMSCAD, and HIPC initiative under the Rawlings and Kufuor Administrations respectively, foreshadowed economic growth and national development. The mass cancellation of foreign debts and transacting of new loans were on the spree. Initially, records on economic growth and development were good. However, in later years, the level of national debt stock, depreciation of the cedi against major currencies, GDP growth rate and other economic indicators demonstrated their downsides to the economy, rendering the much-gratified Washington Consensus a charade (Interviewee 9, 2022).

The above extracts imply that economic diplomacy with the West especially has worsened Ghana's over-reliance on foreign aid. By logical inference, the claim contains some iota of truth because evidence shows that latter regimes have huge burdens defraying legacy debts. Amortization has become a constant feature in all annual budgets in the Fourth Republic. In this sense, the number of years the country subscribes to implementing policies and repaying loans to donor partners as a consequence of aid conditionality affects the policy dynamics of other regimes and renders the country perpetually dependent on aid. For instance, Ghana's natural resource-infrastructure swap with China spans a period that is more than a decade. Indeed, dependency theorists posit that the developed world use strategies like foreign aid to liberalize markets in developing countries to heighten the spate of dependence on the latter's institutions, which usually thwart efforts at self-reliance.

The data confirm Izobo's (2020) argument that foreign aid normally leads to over-reliance on aid. According to Izobo (2020), since the aid given does not operate in a vacuum, extraneous political and institutional factors that sometimes have repercussions on economies must be followed. As a result of this, Appiah-Konadu et al. (2016) have also underscored the point that aid, instead of reviving the Ghanaian economy through economic growth and national development, endangers it through heavy interest payments on loans. Accordingly, aid is one means by which the

developed world continues to exploit developing countries and renders them dependent on external forces. Notably, conditions attached to aid sometimes require liberalizing the Ghanaian market to accommodate Western companies.

Over the course of history, particularly in the Fourth Republic, a chain of exploitation by foreign entities has shown immense economic and political presence. Ghana, in some cases, has not only collateralized or mortgaged natural resources like gold, diamond, bauxite and cocoa with the US, China and the UK for decades in exchange for concessional loans, but has also given multinational oil corporations like Kosmos Energy, Tullip Oil, Gasop and the E.O. Group, unfettered control of the Jubilee Oil Field and other sites.

The Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) (2010, p. 23), for example, contends that aid tying which comes in the form of “forced purchases from supplying countries and imposition of policy conditionalities” in most cases hampers development in Africa. A vivid example is the Ghana-US defense agreement where the US military has access to Ghana’s territorial borders in exchange for military accoutrements from the US. Blatantly, due to the weakness of the Ghanaian economy, foreign aid has infiltrated the economy to the extent that relegating it to the background will amount to collapsing the entire system. Indeed, Opoku-Dapaah (2011) affirmed this assertion when he reiterated that should aid inflows truncate, it would have dire consequences on the Ghanaian economy. As has rightly been surmised by Namkoong (1999), dependency surpasses mere reliance of the developing world on the developed ones; it equally pervades the domestic affairs of developing countries.

4.2.3 *Rented political institutions and policies*

The study observes that political institutions were bequeathed to Ghana at independence. That in itself created the foremost path of dependency. Again, it emerged from the findings that whether policy goals are continued or changed to suit situations, these rented institutions and policies exacerbate Ghana's over-reliance on the external world. Ghana's political institutions were prudently designed by colonial powers to ensure perpetual dependency on imperialists; their resources, goods and services. In the purview of an interviewee:

... due to borrowed policies, copied programmes and lifestyles from the external world, the poverty trap remains unbroken while economic self-sufficiency is still a mirage. This worsens over-reliance on foreign aid. All our institutions and systems are mere duplications of the Western world (Interviewee 4, 2022).

In sync with the above data, another interviewee from the media claimed that:

Almost all government structures and buildings, reform to policies and programmes are financed through aid and follow patterns designed by donors. Donor partners have more control over most of our foreign policies and programmes because they finance them (Interviewee 12, 2022).

The data depict that underpinning virtually all sectors of the economy; governance, industry, health, education, transport, communication, among others are policies fashioned on designs and structures of donor partners. However, as the proponents of dependency theory argue, monetary systems, the norms, policies and prescriptions of the industrialised countries that are adapted by developing countries rather work to the detriment of the developing world. In respect of the economic support given to the country, donor partners have always been concerned about the policies and programmes that are implemented. Conversely, donors implant certain mechanisms such as their full participation in the policy making process and implementation to obtain the desired goals. The creation of institutions which are semblances of Western institutions and the continuous act of copiously formulating policies in line with

Western institutions like the IMF and the World Bank, and lately Eastern countries like China, as a result of conditionalities attached to such multilateral and bilateral relations, heighten Ghana's over-dependence on aid. Impliedly, Ghana's institutions, financial, human and technological resources are not strong enough to exert self-propelling foreign policy goals, hence the over-reliance on external forces. Established as condition precedent for the HIPC benefits, the Ghana Investment Advisory Council (GIAC), for example, was to attract foreign direct investment under Ghana's economic diplomacy during the Kufuor Administration. However, its membership was dominated by the IMF, UNDP and observers from the World Bank with few members from local companies.

The data affirm Whitfield and Jones' (2009) assertion that Ghana is vulnerable to an environment of rented policies and programmes because of its foreign policy goals. This is further exemplified by the HIPC initiative, US policies like AGOA, ACRI or ACOTA and other military pacts as well as the EU's Interim European Partnership Agreement (iEPA), which were geared towards pursuing the national interest, strengthening good neighbourliness, enhancing economic diplomacy and maintaining world peace.

4.2.4 Show of opulence and bravado in the midst of crisis

The study also finds that the Fourth Republican era is not a period of placid economic windfall for Ghana. Times have changed and so Ghana's continuous pride in the pursuit of African unity, good neighbourliness policy, quest for peaceful world order and then, as a significant player in African integration currently, is substantially unsustainable. The economic outlook of the country does not correspond to requirements of the state. However, state officials spend huge sums of money on social intervention programmes, foreign travels and negotiations in the name of

marketing Ghana abroad, attracting foreign direct investment and showcasing Ghanaian cultural heritage. For instance, an interviewee reasoned that:

... the consistent depreciation of the cedi against the dollar, the high external debt situation and inflation rates make it impossible to satisfy numerous claims from the political system. Foreign support plays a key role in managing the economy. Nonetheless, extravagant policies and programmes keep us still dependent on the developed world (Interviewee 7, 2022).

Similarly, one interviewee from the media fraternity noted that:

... the era of huge returns from the commodity market as a result of boom in cocoa, gold, bauxite and timber prices are gone. In our current situation, Ghana only resort to the international capital market for loans to manage the economy. However, financial resources are spent on some populist policies that keep the economy always under pressure (Interviewee 13, 2022).

Another interviewee, who is also a media personality recounted that:

Regimes in the current republic have maintained the status quo with mistaken belief that the economy is resilient to support every venture of government since foreign aid is always there to supplement annual budgets (Interviewee 12, 2022).

The data indicate how Ghana's fragile economy affects policy decisions. However, as if policy makers are oblivious of the state's fiscal deficits, they exhibit extravagance in executing projects and programmes to achieve the state's domestic and foreign policy goals. Sometimes, these policy makers are illusioned by foreign aid which have far-reaching financial consequences on the economy. Needless to say, this spectacle has unfortunately not only created a culture of dependency but also a despicable international reputation for Ghana. This is because the country now finds itself in the abyss of heavy reliance on international partners to ensure it either retains or recaptures its past glory and continue to be relevant among its peers on the continent.

At independence, Ghana led by Dr. Nkrumah was at the forefront of the decolonization and unification of the entire African continent. More precisely, a chunk of the successful implementation of foreign policy goals was reinforced by

Nkrumah's commitment to resolution of problems on the continent. Some of these commitments were resolution to the Congo Crisis and support for the independence struggle of some African countries. These were, therefore, woven as part of the national development agenda. Yet, profligacy in project execution was controlled to ensure the economic transformation and development of the country. Yeboah (2019) and Antwi-Boasiako (2021) have underscored how Ghana supported the independence struggle of Guinea with a substantial amount of money in the 1960s. Accordingly, studies including Ayee, Lofchie and Wieland (1999), Agyeman-Duah (1987) and Thompson (1969) have also acknowledged the strong economic outlook of Ghana during the early periods of independence that supported domestic and foreign policy goals.

Considering Ghana's progenitor role in Africa, for instance, Busia received criticisms from his counterparts when the Aliens Compliance Order and the Policy of Dialogue with Apartheid South Africa were introduced although the latter policy, especially, paralleled with that of Houphouet Boigny of Ivory Coast (Goldsworthy, 1973) and others. According to Barratt (1971), Prime Minister Chief Jonathan of Lesotho and President Banda of Malawi supported dialogue with South Africa's apartheid regime. At the OAU conference in Addis Ababa in September 1970, President Banda declared that Lesotho's policy on South Africa was *Contact and Dialogue*. However, due to the influential role of Ghana in Africa, Busia was highly condemned while his compatriot African leaders were not. Again, Sanusi and Adu-Gyamfi (2017) have observed that President Mills' undiplomatic comment on the Ivorian crisis in 2011 was met with fierce criticism due to the status of Ghana in African affairs.

Of course, Ghana's position and status, some decades ago, which earned it myriad accolades such as oasis of peace, model of Africa, the Mecca of Africa and others

have waned. The economic prowess of the country then cannot be equated to the contemporary times. Situations have absolutely changed with respect to the economy and the development trajectory. Akufo-Addo (2018) validates this claim when in a comparative analysis, he notes that though Ghana's peers at independence, Singapore, South Korea and Malaysia have remarkable per capita incomes, Ghana lurched with a per capita income of \$1,512 as at 2018.

Regardless of the weakness of the economy, policy makers execute extravagant policies and programmes in the name of economic diplomacy, sustaining the climate of peace and security in West Africa and contributing to regional integration schemes. Therefore, so long as domestic resources do not commensurate with cost of social intervention programmes such as Free Education, Capitation Grant, Maternal Healthcare, School Feeding Programme, free electricity and free water for lifeline consumers during the COVID-19 period, and the pursuit of foreign policy goals, the state depends on foreign aid always.

4.2.5 Political leadership

The study conceptualized leadership as the act of creating the vision, sustaining strategies and providing the enabling atmosphere for the flourishing of an organization or system. Conspicuously, leadership goes beyond mere choice among alternatives to considering all factors, external forces, local inputs and future dynamics that could influence the smooth implementation of a policy. The study finds that most of the foreign policy goals of Ghana in contemporary times are decisions by the political leadership. The Ghanaian policy maker, as the study uncovers, deems it fit to hurriedly employ and empower expatriates to render some services, be it in the extractive industry, education, health or even on democratic processes than Ghanaians

who have equally proven integrity, aptitude and capability to act. With regard to this, one interviewee had this to say:

... political leaders make policies at their will forgetting that sometimes the masses are mostly affected by their actions. Local inputs and dynamics are seldomly factored into decision making at the apex of governance especially when it involves foreigners and their institutions (Interviewee 15, 2022).

Concurring with the foregoing excerpt, another interviewee stressed that:

Government has granted persistent tax holidays and exemptions to too many foreign companies from China, US, UK and Japan. This is because of foreign aid. Nonetheless, local firms suffer in silence. These foreign companies, however, transact their businesses using foreign currencies like the US dollar, which they repatriate directly into their countries. This is one of the reasons the cedi depreciates too often (Interviewee 7, 2022).

The data point out that gradually but steadily, policy makers' preference for foreign products, foreign consultancy network and international policy actors, is relegating the local economy to minor roles. This path dependency suppresses development and the required political and economic reforms in the country. This is simply because foreign aid schemes and development plans are modelled along structures of external entities and now determine the pace of development in Ghana. Obviously, the decisions of political leaders sometimes incur massive debts and other socio-economic hardships. For instance, certain populist policies taken by the Akuffo-Addo Administration in the heat of the COVID-19 such as sharing of cooked meals to the vulnerable on the streets of Accra brought economic crisis in the post COVID era. Often, these situations degenerate into huge adverse effects on the economy and so the state has to frequently secure loans and other economic support from the external environment. Ghana's resort to the IMF in 2022 for a bailout can best be explained within the scope of leadership ineptitude.

Furthermore, instead of policy makers instituting measures to control the wanton importation of foreign goods and the vicious dissipation of local goods through

legislation and regularization, they encourage expatriate firms in their import businesses. Thus, government has guaranteed foreign firms some tax incentives, subventions and liberalized market system based on policies enacted with development partners. While this act supports Ghana's economic diplomacy, it sometimes go against the national interest. According to the data above, foreign policy goals are pursued not in the interest of the masses but rather to promote and safeguard the vested interests of the political class in society. That is, protection of capital accumulation and maximization of profits are the hallmark of the political elite.

One area that continues to baffle many a researcher is political leadership's objection and mistrust in Ghanaians' ability and competences of local companies but its obsession with foreign entities. This superficial lack of confidence in local entities is validated by Botchway's (2018) claim that the Rawlings Administration reposed more confidence in international observers and permitted them to monitor the 1996 general elections, while it found it prudent to object to the presence of domestic observers, especially the Network of Domestic Election Observers (NEDEO). The data is also in line with Feldman's (2019) findings that the policy making process is shaped by persons, groups and entities with the economic potency or those within high echelons of power. In effect, Feldman (2019) argues on policy continuity and change as grounded on the vested interest of influential persons or groups in society. Instead of setting priorities right, policy makers implement with speed conditions attached to economic aid which normally occasion change in policy directions. There is no doubt that this trend has contributed to decimating the Ghanaian economy, deepening the dependency on the foreign aid regime.

4.2.6 *The global capitalist economic system*

The findings of the study show marked disparities between Ghana and developed countries across production, trade policies, technology and industrialization. The world capitalist system has reposed developing countries like Ghana to the periphery. This, vividly, is emphasized by the fact that developing countries are enmeshed in production of primary products for export and chiefly utilized by the industrialized world. As part of the country's economic diplomacy with industrialised world, Ghana's import and export trade as a percentage of its GDP confines it to a peripheral position in international trade. The study observes that Ghana is not yet well integrated in the global capitalist economic system. Considering the ineffective communication network, unsustainable power supply system, unfavourable trade policies and dysfunctional technical advancement, Ghana cannot compete favourably on the international market without support from its development partners. According to an interviewee:

... the Ghanaian economy is caught in the web of the international market which is controlled by powerful multinational conglomerates. The developing status of the country limits its ability to enact independent foreign policies. In many instances, continuity and change in policy objectives only degenerate into over-dependence on external entities (Interviewee 9, 2022).

The nexus between developed and developing world in the capitalist system has been well established in the literature. Accordingly, while the former engages in vigorous industrial activities, the latter is engrossed in production of raw materials, which are exported cheaply to feed the industries in the developed world. As a chief producer of primary products like cocoa, gold and oil without the needed machinery to refine them, Ghana only depends on the international market and the international monetary system to earn foreign exchange. The global capitalist market therefore imposes on Ghana the use of hard currencies for international trade, the prices of commodities,

among others. Consequently, the peripheral state of the country only endears the country to succumb to foreign aid with adverse conditions.

4.3 Contributions of Foreign Aid to the Development of Critical Sectors of

Ghana's Economy

Foreign aid has been eventful in Ghana's foreign policy history. Aid shows its presence in all sectors of Ghana's economy. However, the researcher conceptualized critical sectors of Ghana's economy as the specific domains of the economy that are strategically linked to economic growth, national development and international relations. Findings of the study show that foreign aid contributes immensely to the development of such critical sectors as democratic consolidation and governance, pro-poor social intervention policies and programmes, agriculture, the education sector, health sector, transportation system, and the energy sector.

4.3.1 Democratic consolidation and governance

On democratic consolidation and governance, the study made some significant findings. First, it emerged from the findings that Ghana's return to democratic rule in 1992 was deep-rooted in the internal systems and pressures, activities of opposition elements like Adu Boahen to end the culture of silence and human rights atrocities. However, the end of the Cold War which eventually collapsed communism and elevated liberal democracy paved way for political conditionality as a requirement for granting aid to developing countries. Ghana was a victim of this global system because the international market system had embraced liberal democracy, and prevented autocratic rule under Rawlings to still enjoy aid from the West. Based on this, the Bretton Woods Institutions assisted Ghana using aid as a vehicle to democratize. The PNDC government succumbed in order to enjoy inflow of aid to

resuscitate the bedridden economy. Further, the study finds that since 1992, the influence of aid on the democratic consolidation of the country has been impressive.

In his submission, an interviewee noted that:

Foreign aid is part of Ghana's democratic journey. All support systems by development partners, from the drafting of the 1992 Constitution to elections in 1992, 1996 and others, have widened the democratic frontiers of the country. As a result, Ghana is now rated among consolidated democracies in the world (Interviewee 3, 2022).

Moreover, the study reveals that aid conditionalities have enhanced accountability, transparency, inclusiveness, responsiveness, efficiency and effectiveness and other good governance models in the country. The conditions attached to aid ensures that good governance models are adhered within the state. In a concise manner, one interviewee from civil society avowed that:

... dictates of donor partners ensure that political leaders are accountable and responsive to the people in policy executions. The IMF and other donor partners instill fiscal discipline in policy makers, hence most good governance models are practised to ensure persistent aid inflows (Interviewee 8, 2022).

Giving a different perspective on the matter, an interviewee also held the contention that:

Even the provision of basic services such as hospital equipment, logistics for public sector workers and infrastructure for basic schools has always been deferred due to unfinished negotiations for aid.... This shows the relevance of the aid regime to the country (Interviewee 7, 2022).

Foreign aid has been remarkable in Ghana's democratic journey since 1992. External support to democratic institutions such as the Electoral Commission, CSOs, ThinkTanks, the National Commission for Civic Education, among others, has enhanced protection of human rights, the rule of law, respect for minority views, and a host of others. Consistently, development partners support Ghana to bridge the gap between income and expenditure so that the economy does not collapse. For example,

even though Ghana's economy was in severe crisis in 2000, it rebounded after 2004. This was as a result of the HIPC initiative with regard to relief of substantial portion of the foreign debt stock which ensured the country experienced improved export earnings, poverty reduction, economic growth and governance in general.

Again, when Ghana's economy was in deep turmoil in 2009 due to the Great Recession of 2008, and 2015 respectively, foreign aid from the IMF assisted the Mills and Mahama administrations to address governance challenges. Specifically, in 2015, when the economy was at the brink of collapse, Ghana approached the IMF for a financial support of \$918 million. The Akufo-Addo Administration in July 2022, also sought a bailout from the IMF due to the economy crisis. All these external support systems were to ensure that Ghana's economy was in good shape to support effective governance.

The impact of aid on Ghana's democracy has been underscored in the literature. Gyekye-Jandoh (2017) emphasized that foreign aid has played an influential role in the democratic consolidation of Ghana. According to Gyekye-Jandoh (2017), bilateral and multilateral donors, particularly Canada, Britain, France, Germany, the World Bank and the USAID contributed enormously in the conduct and quality of elections in 1992, 1996, 2000 and in later years by supporting the budget on operations and logistics of the Electoral Commission and CSOs in monitoring the elections. Botchway (2018) has also established the intense support CSOs garner from donor partners during elections. These forms of aid help in the smooth conduct and management of elections, reposing Ghana to its status as the oasis of peace in Africa. Thus, through aid, Ghana democratized in 1992 and with aid, the country has achieved democratic consolidation since the year 2000 and now engaged in effective governance.

Aid is a strong pillar in the governance process of Ghana, as a large proportion of development projects and programmes are donor-driven. The data affirm the conventional argument that a significant percentage of Ghana's annual budget, almost 45% of recent budget estimates, is financed by donor partners. As noted by Opoku-Dapaah (2011, p. 31) more than a decade ago, "about 25% of budget support comes from donors, should the inflow of assistance cease or dwindle to very low levels it will not only dent economic growth, Ghanaians can expect profound consequences including scarcity of medicines and food." Tawiah et al. (2019), for example, revealed that the development of most African countries, including Ghana is at the behest of funds secured through foreign aid. Foreign aid from the UK, US and the IMF exemplifies this assertion.

Former President Mahama's speech at the 69th session of the UN General Assembly on 25th September 2014 is quite revealing on the role donor partners play in the governance architecture of Ghana. In the address, Mahama reckoned that Ghana was in talks with the IMF to strike a partnership for it to assess the Ghanaian economy in order to implement "change in pursuit of true progress." The deal was to transform Ghana from a "low middle income into full-fledged middle-income status" (Mahama, 2014, p. 5). In the DFID's (2012, p. 11) report on UK aid to Ghana, the British aid agency asserted that approximately 60% of the aid was provided by "general budget support," whereas 25% was offered as "sector budget support" for health and education needs. Barfour (2004) alluded to this assertion by arguing that aid supplements annual budgets of governments in the Fourth Republic.

4.3.2 Pro-poor social intervention policies and programmes

Another finding of the study is that foreign aid has so far been a major driver of pro-poor social intervention policies in Ghana. Numerous donor schemes, projects and programmes in the social sector have alleviated hunger, reduced poverty, and prevented diseases by educating the public on a myriad health issues. On this matter, an interviewee expressed the view that:

Social intervention policies in the area of health, education and agriculture supported vastly by donor partners have assisted many homes in Ghana, especially those in the rural communities. Consistently, what the state could not offer are now being provided by agencies like USAID, the EU, the Chinese EXIM Bank and a host of others (Interviewee 2, 2022).

Another interviewee reinforced the data by averring that:

... aid from the IMF, the World Bank and other development partners like UK focus on Human Development, especially in the areas of healthcare, education, poverty and hunger eradication (Interviewee 5, 2022).

Social intervention policies and programmes underlie mostly how the vulnerable in society are catered for. Unfortunately, quite often, the governance process fails to deliver this mandate. Even when social intervention policies and programmes are adopted in Ghana, soon they are distorted at the implementation phase. However, donor funded and initiated social intervention policies and programmes thrive as a result of the huge financial resource allotted to the projects, and the effective monitoring and regularization of project schemes. These social interventions have contributed diversely to a more equitable and peaceful Ghanaian society by reducing poverty, fighting diseases, among others.

The data refutes the claim by Briggs (2021) that aid does not target the poor but corroborates the findings of Vondee-Awortwi (2017) and Edgren (2002). According to Vondee-Awortwi (2017) and Edgren (2002), aid was instituted in international relations first, as momentary measure to save lives during disasters and second, to

contribute to economic growth, social progress and national development as long-term plan. These include capacity building of the human resource, removal of all obstacles that obstruct enjoyment of human rights, fight against diseases, among others. For instance, as de-Graft Aikins et al. (2016) have confirmed, through the HIPC initiative, Kufuor's administration instituted social intervention policies like the Metro Mass Transport System, the National Health Insurance Scheme, Capitation Grant and the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP).

In their study on Sub-Saharan African countries, Armah and Nelson (2008) asserted that increased foreign aid inflows were one means by which developing countries like Ghana achieved portions of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Moreover, through aid, Ghana's record on achieving targets of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in the area of poverty, hunger, education, and gender equality is remarkable. Brautigam and Knack's (2004) depiction that aid plays immense role in hunger eradication, poverty alleviation, disease control, effectiveness of governance and a gross bridge in gaps between the affluent and the vulnerable in society has rightly been affirmed.

4.3.3 Agriculture

On the contributions of aid to agriculture, the study reveals substantially that Ghana's agricultural sector is supported by development partners to be able to act as the engine of growth of the economy. Ghana as an agrarian economy produces large quantum of primary products to ensure food security, offer employment to people and contribute significantly to GDP growth. The study finds that greater portion of the flowery statistics on the agricultural sector hinges on aid and investment from development partners. In earlier times, farmers utilized elementary farm implements and orthodox farming methods and practices in the cultivation, harvesting, processing and

marketing of primary products. However, with support from aid, farming systems have drifted to use of highly technological devices and machines. An interviewee shared her view on this subject as follows:

Historically, orthodox methods of cultivating the land and grazing farm animals were used until aid from donor agencies changed the narrative. With the intervention of development partners, there have been shifts in focus to modernized crop production and animal rearing systems that yield good returns. These modern approaches include ways of overcoming climate-related hazards such as drought, degradation and erosion of arable land to ensure agribusiness thrives throughout the year (Interviewee 12, 2022).

In addition, another interviewee argued that:

... in Ghana, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) provides support to the country's Shared Growth and Development Agenda, which targets accelerated agricultural modernization to improve livelihoods of smallholder farmers, rural folks and others (Interviewee 5, 2022).

The data illustrate in detail the contributions of aid to the development of the agricultural sector in Ghana. International agencies like the World Food Programme and the Food and Agricultural Organisation help Ghana by providing technical support to enhance effective use and management of land, water bodies, forestry and other resources. They also train farmers on ways to adapt to climate change. Moreover, through Ghana's economic diplomacy with the West, agricultural extension and veterinary officers are well-equipped to educate farmers on farm animals as well as crop cultivation. Budgetary support from donor partners for the construction of cocoa roads further aids transportation of raw materials to market and processing centres. As the engine of national development and economic growth, these measures have ensured that agriculture continues to earn Ghana foreign direct investments, foreign exchange through the export of cocoa, coffee and other products. It has also reduced unemployment rates and ensured food security for the country.

Agriculture is largely acclaimed as the mainstay of Ghana's economy and accounts for about 35% of GDP while employing almost 55% of the working population (Adedeji, 2016). According to Yusuf (2017), agriculture secures Ghana against famine through buffer stocks in specific areas of the country. The number of livelihoods agricultural activities sustain in Ghana cannot therefore be measured in a single empirical study. For instance, Asumadu et al. (2021, p. 1967) observed that agriculture generated foreign exchange earnings of US\$2,197 million in 2009 compared to 2007 figure of US\$1,549 million where cocoa produced 84.9%, timber, 8.2% and other non-traditional agricultural exports secured 6.9%. As noted by Asumadu et al. (2021, p. 1967), "agriculture contributed 35.27% of Ghana's GDP in 2000, decreased to 22.13% in 2002, and 18.24% in 2020", suggesting a dwindling effect of the agricultural sector on economic growth due to reduced aid inflows. It is against this backdrop that the Maputo Declaration implored African states to commit at least 10% of national budgets to agriculture (Asumadu et al., 2021).

4.3.4 The education sector

On the education sector, the study finds that major policies at the pre-tertiary education level in Ghana are among the achievements of donor partners. Components of the education sector such as infrastructure, enrolment, capacity building and recruitment of teachers, procurement of teaching and learning resources, curriculum development, among others, which are usually scarce in supply are often beefed up through donor assistance. It emerged from the findings of the study that, in some cases, development partners initiate policies in the education sector to suit global trends so that the education system does not alienate learners from the globalized world. Offering a perspective on the matter, one of the interviewees, an expert in foreign policy analysis retorted that:

... policies and programmes that demand huge investments to improve enrolment and retention of students in schools, especially in rural Ghana, largely emanate from initiatives of development partners. Ghana's friendly ties with Britain and the US have a lot of influence on the education sector. In fact, external support in the education sector has helped to increase school infrastructure and improve the quality of education (Interviewee 10, 2022).

The substantial investment in and provision of quality education has been identified as one way of reducing poverty, eradicating hunger and solving unemployment challenges. However, Ghana's feeble economy as a result of weak tax administration system, high external debt servicing and unfavourable global economic order cannot entirely support the education sector. According to the data, support from external bodies has boosted some components of the education sector, not excluding enrolment drive, infrastructure, accessibility and quality of education. In essence, external assistance from the IMF, the World Bank and other industrialized countries ensures that the citizens are provided quality accessible education. Various initiatives of development partners have therefore culminated in curriculum change, improvements in enrolment figures, quality teaching and learning resources, infrastructure and capacity building of teachers especially at the basic level. Several empirical studies including Nsanja et al. (2021), Asiedu (2014) and Keller (2006), have observed that the stock of human capital and kinds of investment in the educational sector of an economy, have positive correlation with economic growth. The World Bank (2003) also stressed that sustainable economic growth and national development hinge on a knowledge-based economy, a product of effective educational system. The data affirm the findings of Nyarkoh and Intsiful (2018) that foreign support from international stakeholders on education policy has impacted positively on Ghana's basic education system in terms of access, financing and expansion of infrastructure. Further, Nyarkoh

and Intsiful (2018) note that educational policies that demand huge financial resources are mainly championed by international financial institutions like the World Bank.

Scholars have underscored the support of international financial institutions to the education sector. For example, the World Bank financed the construction of more than 8,000 classroom blocks and purchased more than 35 million textbooks for basic schools in Ghana in the last two decades (Nyarkoh & Intsiful, 2018). Other bilateral and multilateral donors such as the Netherlands and the World Food Programme also assisted the implementation of the Ghana School Feeding Programme which seeks not only to reduce hunger and malnutrition among children but to increase student enrolment, improve access and quality of education (Palmer et al., 2009). All these support systems are assisting the country to achieve targets of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Buttressing the analysis and discussion, DFID (2013), in its operational report of June 2013, indicated that aid was instrumental in retaining 70,000 girls in school and supporting 140,000 children in basic schools in Ghana through its “School for Life” project. The USAID (2011) report has also intimated that USAID spent a sum of \$87 million on Ghana in 2011, of which \$11.7 million was spent on education and social services. As de-Graft Aikins et al. (2016) note, the Capitation Grant, which improved student enrolment, was a by-product of the HIPC initiative.

4.3.5 *The health sector*

On the health sector, the study uncovers an elaborate support system by development partners. Specifically, the study reveals that Ghana’s economy is assisted by donor assistance towards disease control, capacity building of health staff (doctors, nurses and others) and infrastructural development. Development partners usually donate

medical apparatus and equipment such as ventilators, incubators and other medical kits to health facilities in the country to improve medical practice. To put it bluntly, sharing his opinion on the matter, one interviewee disclosed that:

In Ghana, aid has improved maternal health, devised mechanisms to improve public health by combating diseases – cholera, measles, chicken pox, polio, whooping cough, HIV/AIDS, malaria and serious pandemics. It has also supported the training of healthcare practitioners; doctors, nurses and other paramedics to be abreast with modern technology (Interviewee 7, 2022).

Ghana's health sector, just like other sectors of the economy, is funded through three main sources. These are Government of Ghana (GoG), budget and internally generated fund (IGF) and funding from development partners. The massive donor support in ensuring that health posts, health centres and clinics, district and regional hospitals, and tertiary hospitals in the country deliver efficient and effective healthcare for all Ghanaians cannot be underrated. For over three decades, foreign support has improved infrastructure, investments in health personnel, and improvement in access to medicines, equipment, among others. These have enhanced the healthcare system in the country.

In the estimation of the USAID, the US spent an amount of \$52.6 million for the health sector in 2011 (USAID, 2011). The UK on the other hand gave Ghana an amount of £42 million for free maternal healthcare during the Kufuor regime. An amount of \$40 billion secured from the Spanish government also aided the refurbishment of the Cardio Centre at the Korle-Bu Teaching Hospital in Accra (Adams, 2020). Just recently, through multilateral and bilateral aid, under the European Investment Bank (EIB) and European Union COVAX initiative, Ghana was the first country in Africa to receive the COVID-19 vaccines, which included 600,000 AstraZeneca vaccines (GhanaWeb, 2021). The EIB also supported Ghana with EUR

82.5 million for healthcare and COVID-19 Health Response Plan in Ghana. Other vaccines were secured through vaccine diplomacy with other international partners. In line with supporting Ghana to address challenges in the health sector, Bawumia (2022) aptly noted that the China Exim Bank has committed an amount of \$60 million to aid local pharmaceutical companies in Ghana, of which 75% of the approved amount of money has already been disbursed to these local companies.

4.3.6 Transportation system

The transport system has continuously played the enviable role of being a conveyer belt of raw materials and the haulage of goods to industrial sites of the economy. The findings reveal that Ghana owes greater number of its road infrastructure to foreign aid. Donor partners had either partnered Ghana or solely embarked on road construction in the country to facilitate easy transportation of people and raw materials to urban areas and market centres. In the opinion of an interviewee:

Apart from rural or feeder roads, almost all major roads and railways in Ghana are either funded solely through aid or by donor-government partnership. This is due to financial constraints of the country. Moreover, since road and railway constructions demand expertise and technology and our leaders have no trust in local contractors, we normally fall on development partners and other external sources (Interviewee 14, 2022).

The transportation system has received major improvements as a result of the intervention of development partners. Motorable roads and other transportation systems are now able to support economic activities in the country. Hitherto, farmers, for example, had to suffer post harvest losses due to poor road network. However, the situation has changed and agribusiness is flourishing. Indeed, most observed evidence of aid effectiveness in Ghana point to donor funding of road network in the country. In all, foreign aid has supported the revamping of the road infrastructure in cities and towns like Accra, Kumasi and Cape Coast. This contributes immensely to the

development of the Ghanaian economy as it does not only promote trading but also facilitates easy access to healthcare systems and education delivery.

The data is in line with the findings of Adams (2020) that good relations with Japan culminated in debt cancellation of \$1 billion under the HIPC initiative. This provided funding for the construction of principal roads such as the Accra – Cape Coast Road and the George Bush Highway in Accra. Also, under the Master Project Support Agreement (MPSA) between Ghana and China, road construction in the Eastern, Ashanti and Northern Regions are ongoing. Construction of Interchanges in Ghana including the Pokuase, Circle, Asafo and Tamale Interchanges were funded by donor partners.

4.3.7 The energy sector

Furthermore, it emerged from the findings of the study that massive infrastructure network in the energy sector of Ghana is attributed to donor funding. Financing of projects and equipment in the energy sector by development partners has minimized power outages in the country. The study also observes that foreign aid has contributed to a sustainable energy system that has positive impact on governance, manufacturing and marketing, and provision of social services like healthcare and education. On this subject, an interviewee maintained that:

In various forms, Ghana's energy sector receives technical and financial support from donor partners. All processes in the energy sector; production, distribution and trade, are facilitated by external entities. Companies from the US particularly continue to assist the extraction and export of crude oil from the Jubilee Field and others. Nigeria also supported Ghana to pay its contributions towards the construction of the West African Gas Pipeline (Interviewee 15, 2022).

Yet, in the view of another interviewee from the Diplomatic Missions in Ghana:

... donor partners have contributed to energy security in Ghana. The financial support from the China Exim Bank aided the construction of the Bui Dam Project which supplements the Akosombo hydroelectric power

system to give the country a sustainable energy sector (Interviewee 16, 2022)

Ghana has a robust power generation sector. Hydro generation and thermal generation fueled by crude oil, gas and diesel, continue to be the main source of energy for the country. With the support of development partners, as the data have argued, Ghana enjoys a relatively stable energy supply and is able to export power to Togo, Benin and Burkina Faso. Support from the US government, especially, ensures that power supply in Ghana is sustainable for economic growth and national development. The energy sector contributes in diverse ways to the economy of Ghana. In fact, industrial and domestic activities demand hydroelectric power and petroleum products to ignite machineries to undertake production. On that score, aid has contributed enormously to the development of the energy sector through sponsored projects, financing of projects and procurement of equipment.

During the Mills Administration, the government contracted General Electric and the Conti Group of the US an amount of \$1.2 billion to solve the energy crisis (The Ghanaian Envoy, 2010). Furthermore, Yeboah (2019) has underscored the point that the Kufuor Administration took a concessional loan of US\$270 million, a commercial loan of US\$292 million and US\$60 million from the China Exim Bank for the construction of the Bui Dam Project to supply hydroelectric power and water for irrigation in the Bui area. The Bui Dam, completed in 2013, provides a generation of about 400MW of hydroelectric power to augment power generation from the Akosombo Dam.

Again, under the Kufuor Administration, the Ghana National Petroleum Commission (GNPC) and the US based Oil Company, Kosmos Energy prospected and explored for oil in 2007. The results was that about 75 miles of offshore oil was discovered and

named Jubilee Fields (Asumadu et al., 2021). Later, more oil fields were discovered and Ghana is now ranked among oil producing countries in the world. The discovery and eventual production of oil in commercial quantities in 2010 through the support of donor partners, contributed to Ghana's attainment of a middle-income status a decade prior to the Vision 2020 national agenda.

Recently, the US provided an amount of \$64.7 million to fund the Pokuase Bulk Supply Point which was inaugurated on 21st October 2021 and others to supply electricity to Accra and its environs (U.S. Embassy in Ghana, 2021). The US Ambassador to Ghana, Stephen Sullivan, remarked that the project aims at delivering more reliable electric power to the people, places and businesses in Accra and the Southern part of Accra and acts as vehicle for increased economic activity (U.S. Embassy in Ghana, 2021). According to the US Ambassador, the Pokuase Bulk Supply Point is currently the largest electricity capacity substation in Ghana with 580 megavolt amperes (MVA). It has reduced power outages that hitherto were frequent in parts of Accra. It is also expected to stabilize voltages, resolve technical losses in the electric power system and aid over 350,000 utility customers. Indeed, through improved power supply, the government's agenda of moving the economy from taxation to industrialization is on course and would support the *Ghana Beyond Aid* agenda.

4.4 How Ghana's Foreign Policy Goals can move Ghana Beyond Aid

In fulfillment of the *Ghana Beyond Aid vision*, some institutional reforms and programmes are being implemented by the Akufo-Addo Administration. However, the study finds that a successful implementation of *Ghana Beyond Aid*, an independent foreign policy, is incumbent on Ghana's foreign policy goals. Ghana's

foreign policy goals, which include good neighbourliness, promotion of world peace and economic diplomacy are instrumental in the country's drive towards an independent foreign policy. The study therefore reveals some pragmatic policies and initiatives under these foreign policy goals that can move Ghana beyond aid-dependency.

4.4.1. Low profile international relations

One key finding of the study is that Ghana should keep low profile international relations. According to this view, policy makers must exude humility and tact in international circles not to, for instance, preach with opulence in the international media *Africa Beyond Aid* and offer financial support to other states and sooner than later turn to the IMF for bailout. This is not to say the country should adopt isolationism, but rather, as the study finds, pragmatism in the country's economic diplomacy, good neighbourliness policy and the desire for world peace would ensure that Ghana's economy can either sustain or disregard policies with huge financial resources. Of particular interest to one interviewee:

... Ghana spends so much on foreign travels and negotiations but gets little in return. Indeed, over expenditure on foreign travels that add virtually nothing to economic growth and national development must be curtailed. The economy is not vibrant enough to accommodate foreign policies with huge costs. We should lower expectations in international relations and control our expenditure as well (Interviewee 5, 2022).

The economic situation of Ghana does not fully support financially intensive foreign policy objectives. However, over the years, the country has been pursuing policies that require massive financial resources to execute. For, instance, peacekeeping operations under Ghana's foreign policy goal of promoting world peace, maintenance of refugee camps as a result of the good neighbourliness policy, among others cost the country a lot of financial resources. In most cases, these policies are financed through

foreign aid, which affect the state's sovereignty and desire to exert neutralist foreign policy goals. Indeed, these policies drain the fragile economy so much that foreign assistance has become almost inevitable. It is about time Ghana adopted a low profile international relations as preparatory grounds for the *Ghana Beyond Aid*.

According to the Ghana Beyond Charter and Strategy Document: "All aid in the form of loans (i.e. concessional loans) will finance infrastructure and growth-promoting activities in the economic sectors, or skills development and technological capacity-enhancement at the post-secondary levels" (Ghana Beyond Aid Committee, 2019, p. 32). Analytically, this does not depart completely from the status quo where aid contributes significantly to the development of critical sectors of the economy. All development paradigms adopted by previous regimes including the *Golden Age of Business* and the *Better Ghana Agenda* utilized massive external support to the country. However, it is this same aid trajectory that has resulted in debt crisis, undermining Ghana's sovereignty for which the *Ghana Beyond Aid* vision, of course, seeks rectification. The *Ghana Beyond Aid* vision cannot, therefore, be portrayed as a drastic change in foreign policy goals. A low profile international relations is key in pursuit of the agenda.

Ghana cannot isolate itself from the state system. As scholars including Sanusi and Adu-Gyamfi (2017) contend, defiant isolationism in contemporary international relations is quite an unprofitable venture due to international trade, global security, obligations of states in international organisations, among others. Nevertheless, it is sometimes better to keep a modest foreign policy to protect the economy. The economic diplomacy under Kufuor and Mills, for instance, demonstrated that the country displayed humility in international relations, hence the enormous financial

support during the periods. As affirmed in the literature by Agba and Ozor (2018) and others, India, the Asian Tigers and China in particular, kept low profiles in their early stages of economic quagmire. Leadership of these countries strategized, avoided profligate expenditures, cut down size of government, earned more from the export-import trade through pragmatic policies by their governments such as value addition to primary products and exhibited ownership of policies supported by donors. Through modesty, China and the Asian Tigers are ranked among the best economies in the world today.

Kufuor's *Golden Age of Business* did prioritise economic growth with a conducive environment just like the Asian Tigers but portrayed a modest global image of the country. From the data, these measures are niches of *Ghana Beyond Aid*. Such examples from the Asian Tigers and the Kufuor Administration could be adopted by the Akufo-Addo Administration as part of its economic diplomacy. Against this backdrop, borrowing from the Bretton Woods Institutions for consumption would rather give way to investments in productive sectors of the economy such as agriculture and industry. Moreover, the pursuit of good neighbourliness would foster trade and economic relations, and reduce political instability that would require foreign support to address.

4.4.2. Reliving Pan-Africanist ideals

The findings reveal that Pan-Africanism is an essential mechanism to achieving beyond aid. Pan-Africanism manifests in varied forms in integration on the African continent and in other activities outside the continent. The formation of the Organisation of African Unity, now African Union, was pivoted on the ideological foundation of Black African solidarity, the Pan-Africanist Movement. The definite

goals of the movement encompassed total independence for the entirety of the African continent; fraternal cooperation between African states; establishment of a united Africa spun on a federation of sub-regional African states and rejection of exploitation of Africa by imperialists in all forms.

Against this backdrop, the study observes that the tenets of Pan-Africanism could harness an independent foreign policy if nurtured in contemporary international relations. Put differently, the objective of Ghana's good neighbourliness policy should be the encouragement of intra African trade and other economic activities as well as promotion of peace, stability and security as the ECOWAS protocol on free movement of persons, goods and capital envision. This way, as the study notes, policy makers could make conscious effort to continue a rigorous good neighbourliness policy but with the intention of securing economic growth, national security, world peace and African unity so as to obtain enough economic resources that would extricate Ghana from its over-reliance on foreign aid. Briefly, one interviewee underlined the point that:

Africa has rich natural resources and other sources of revenues, culture and heritage. Hence, if the force behind the Pan-Africanist spirit is rekindled by uniting all states on the continent in the areas of well branded trade systems, fiscal policy, economic growth and national development, it could accumulate enough human capital and fiscal resources for economic growth in Africa, which will inure to Ghana's move beyond aid. The most important thing is how to implement pragmatic policies to suit both the changing trend of contemporary global politics and Africa's integration (Interviewee 1, 2022).

Some scholars contend that Ghana is at the crisis of development and governance. This is a setback to the *Ghana Beyond Aid* agenda, an independent foreign policy paradigm. It is therefore important to fashion out a clear and holistic approach using Pan-Africanism to be able to wean the country from aid-dependency. First, even

though various opinions have been advanced to explain African identity based on races and diversity, cultural beliefs, language and traditions, what constitutes real African identity in contemporary international relations could be observed under Africa's feeble economic systems, dependence on foreign aid, generosity and hospitality which could support the beyond aid agenda. In fact, it was these elements that made Africans welcome slavery, colonialism and neocolonialism. These elements build consciousness in Africans about a common beginning and some future goals, which are usually expressed under African solidarity in international relations (Pan-Africanism). Invariably, this could imbue in Ghanaian policy makers the eagerness to strengthen relations with neighbouring countries and improve economic diplomacy in Africa.

Furthermore, Africa's political leadership in the current century including Paul Kagame and Akufo-Addo, have the opportunity to cast the African identity in light of uniting Africans globally to build the continent and secure social capital while disintegrating it from exploitation and neocolonial bondage. Put succinctly, what constitute Pan-Africanist ideals and African identity could be rebranded using contemporary concepts and approaches to support the beyond aid agenda. If prior to Africa's independence, the continent was run with unity of purpose devoid of any selfish interest, this could be replicated by African states to extricate Ghana from aid-dependency.

According to the data, through a formidable drive for self-determination of the African people, cognizant of the African identity and crisis such as value systems and norms, development deficits, over-dependence on aid, among others, Ghana could attract Africans in the Diaspora and the Caribbeans to invest in the Ghanaian

economy and Africa at large. This would also boost confidence in the economy, reduce aid-dependency and build the human resource required for fruitful implementation of *Ghana Beyond Aid*. The successful implementation of all these Pan-Africanist ideals is largely dependent on continuity and change in Ghana's good neighbourliness policy and economic diplomacy as implemented by the Rawlings, Kufuor and other succeeding administrations to attract more foreign direct investment from both Africans in the diaspora and others.

A number of Pan-Africanist programmes by the current administration offers hope to the *Ghana Beyond Aid* agenda and must be sustained. For instance, as Aaryan (2020) notes, Akufo-Addo's launch of the Year of Return Programme in Washington DC in 2019, revived the zeal in Africans in the Diaspora and the Black race in the Caribbean to reconnect to their ancestral roots to invest in Ghana and Africa. Mustapha (2020) also contended that President Akufo-Addo's speech at the UN General Assembly in September 2017 reawakened the Pan-Africanist spirit. There should be a concerted effort by Ghanaian policy makers to operationalize Pan-Africanism during global crisis and not the adhoc closure of borders to neighbouring countries when crisis emerge (Botchway & Hlovor, 2022).

4.4.3 Ghana's active role in Africa's integration

The study observes that the continuous role of Ghana as an active player in the AU, AfCFTA and ECOWAS could guarantee both regional and national security and augment an independent foreign policy. Despite the country's economic decline and over-dependence on foreign conglomerates and bilateral relations to address national development, Ghana's democratic credentials put the country and a few African giants like Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt as vanguards of Africa's integration. The

study finds this as a mechanism that can boost Ghana's good neighbourliness policy, ensure effective advancement of economic diplomacy on the continent and promote security and political stability. An interviewee argued that:

.... a strong African integration could demonstrate areas each state has competitive advantage to ensure all states benefit through cooperation. Ghana can benefit immensely from its active role in the economic and political development of Africa. If economic systems on the continent thrive, the frequent resort to the international capital market for loans will reduce and the country would be able to implement foreign policy goals that are independent of external influences (Interviewee 8, 2022).

Corroborating the data, one of the state actors interviewed argued that:

Ghana Beyond Aid is not an absolute rejection of aid. It is rather a reduction in the amounts of loans that the country would secure for development projects. Most projects would be financed from domestic resources (Interviewee 2, 2022)

The data aptly capture the essence of the *Ghana Beyond Aid* vision that it not a rejection of aid. In effect, the vision is not quite different from other development paradigms such as the *Golden Age of Business* and the *Better Ghana Agenda* that utilized aid for economic development and the implementation of foreign policy goals. Considering how the implementation of foreign policy goals in the Fourth Republic have always been supported by foreign aid, the *Ghana Beyond Aid* cannot deviate fervently from this situation since the structure and state of the economy in recent times do not support any probable independent foreign policy goals. At this critical juncture of its economic growth, Ghana should play a principal role in collective efforts by all African states to seek economic advancements, peace and stability in the continent. It has been part of Ghana's foreign policy trajectory to pursue an African agenda: solidarity and unity of all states. However, due to financial distress, some governments reneged on such functions of the state. This notwithstanding, with effective communication, negotiation and other strategies of public diplomacy, Ghana's good neighbourliness policy could ensure that African

states remain peaceful. This will reduce the huge financial resources Ghana injects into resolving conflicts on the continent, receiving and managing refugees and organizing peace talks and summits to redress military interventions in West Africa. As a results, instead of thinking about combating one another, African states would compete in intra-Africa trade, good governance models, among others. Viewed from a plethora of perspectives, this situation would propel Ghana towards economic independence in international relations.

In the foreword of the National AfCFTA Policy Framework and Action Plan for boosting Ghana's trade with Africa, launched in August 2022, the Minister of Trade and Industry, Alan Kyerematen (2022) noted that Ghana's successful participation in AfCFTA is in line with the *Ghana Beyond Aid* vision. Further, among the three priority areas espoused by Kwemo (2017) to make Africa resolute in international relations again, is regional integration. According to Kwemo (2017), some regional integration schemes, so vital to Africa's sustainable development is intra-African trade, a catalyst for economic growth, local infrastructural development and competition in industry. Additionally, the data showed that Ghana's active participation in ECOMOG peacekeeping operations while strengthening security cooperation in the sub-region, would also ensure minimal intervention if not total rejection of military pacts with the external world that affect territorial integrity.

4.4.4. Diplomatic missions and career diplomats

The study reveals that diplomatic missions and the position of career diplomats should be an avenue for the promotion of economic diplomacy and an independent voice in international relations. On this, the study finds some pragmatic foreign policy initiatives to augment the attainment of *Ghana Beyond Aid*. First, the establishment

of diplomatic missions in strategic countries to secure direct foreign investment is key to the realization of the *Ghana Beyond Aid* vision. Thus, in the opinion of interviewees, it is time to look beyond the West for strategic partnership. Ambassadors appointed to these strategic locations could enhance trade relations and viable markets for primary products such as timber, cocoa and coffee. This could be done by laying bear the social value systems and economic challenges of Ghana to these countries before trade and investment agreements are reached. On Ghana's diplomatic missions as the vehicle for securing economic support to enhance the drive towards economic self-reliance, an interviewee said that:

... we need to look beyond the West. Other countries with solid economies can assist the nation's drive towards self-reliance through effective diplomatic alliance. By this, Ghana would gradually wean itself of external loans and debt distress (Interviewee 4, 2022).

Additionally, the study observes that although diplomacy is a delicate issue in international relations which requires well trained staff and career diplomats to attain success, in most cases, politicians or pseudo career diplomats are appointed as ambassadors by the president, are given orientations for few days and accredited to fill vacancies and positions they may be unacquainted with. In the assessment of one of the interviewees from the Diplomatic Missions in Ghana:

One untapped area that can contribute to Ghana's economic independence is foreign direct investment through the power of economic diplomacy. The mode of appointment of ambassadors and high commissioners, and their competencies however cannot secure the state such investments. If political leadership could depoliticize diplomatic missions and positions, other countries and businessmen will garner more investor confidence in the economy (Interviewee 15, 2022).

Diplomats communicate, negotiate, gather intelligence, and project the image of their countries in international relations while implementing policies of their home country. The collection of information from the host country assists diplomats to determine domestic challenges and how to shift foreign policy goals to address them.

Unfortunately, Ghanaian diplomats are appointed mostly based on political affiliations and not competence. This situation which the political leadership including Rawlings, Kufuor, Mills and Mahama, allowed to aggravate for a long period must change. Career diplomats should rather be appointed to ensure that the state maximizes enough dividends from other states through economic diplomacy. Diplomats who would be able to communicate and negotiate trade deals, think critically to use their medium to solve problems at home and seek sustainable investment arrangements are the personalities that could support the state's quest to implement the *Ghana Beyond Aid* agenda.

Consequently, the foregoing data and analysis validate the point that siting diplomatic missions in strategic countries and assigning well-trained career diplomats other than politicians to manage same would facilitate the beyond aid vision through trade and investment. The situation where an ambassador appointed to one country has additional responsibility over other countries or relations between Ghana and other states is virtually anchored by Honorary Consuls must be eschewed. For instance, currently, Ghana's High Commissioner to South Africa, Charles Asuako Owiredu, has oversight responsibility over Seychelles, Mauritius, Lesotho and Eswatini but resident in Pretoria, South Africa. During the Russia-Ukraine War in 2022, Ghana's Mission in Berne, Switzerland and the Honorary Consul in Ukraine had to take charge of Ghanaian students. Furthermore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration, based in Ghana, negotiated with authorities in neighbouring countries such as Turkey, Moldova, Poland, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia to aid the evacuation process of the students. This had severe ramifications on their human rights as well as Ghana's reputation in international circles because the students had to walk miles away to other countries to be evacuated.

The data affirm Asante's (1997) position that career diplomats are better placed to be given ambassadorial positions in order to attract foreign direct investment through their tactful negotiations. In a report on the Uruguay round of Trade Negotiations which took place within the scope of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) between 1986 and 1994, Debrah (2003) expressed worry that inadequate skills and training of diplomats in negotiations, understanding of complexities of issues that hinge on national interest among others accounted for African states, especially Ghana's inability to negotiate tactfully at international fora to reap benefits.

4.4.5. *Bilateral relations with new and emerging economies*

It also emerged from the findings of the study that Ghana can extricate itself from the aid debacle through bilateral relations with new and emerging industrialized economies in Africa, the Middle East, the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and others in Latin America. Invariably, the new and emerging economies in Africa, Asia, the Caribbeans and the Middle East have trade systems and economic potentials that fit Ghana's economy. The study finds that although Ghana can still pursue an effective economic diplomacy with the West and its institutions, other sources of funding national projects and investing in the economy should be sought throughout the world. In the view of an interviewee:

While not reneging on the traditional economic diplomacy with the West, there should be frantic effort to have promising relations with states in Asia, Africa and Latin America which have been through Ghana's experience as a developing country. These countries which share in our norms and value systems are psychologically equipped to assist Ghana's move beyond aid through direct foreign investment (Interviewee 6, 2022).

With enhanced bilateral relations with new and emerging economies, Ghana can direct capital obtained from such ventures into manufacturing. Indeed, the focus of the One District, One Factory is to move the economy from taxation to manufacturing. Just like the Mills and Mahama Administrations' *Better Ghana Agenda* that

concentrated on a strong and resilient economy, a vibrant macroeconomic fundamentals, manufacturing and industrialisation, agricultural modernization, among others, using foreign direct investment, the capital accumulation and investments from bilateral relations with emerging economies can improve the economy. Through this mechanism, Ghana would enjoy food security, boost production of raw materials to feed industries, reduce unemployment figures, and improve social services so that the incessant demand for foreign aid that weakens the economy would minimize.

For example, Gatune (2010) investigated Eritrea's train system and observed that the country was able to revive the train system that was abandoned for two and half decades. The train system, which was refurbished using local ingenuity, currently, not only facilitates transportation but also serves as tourist attraction sites. Obviously, bilateral relations with such a country, just as the Mills Administration did with Equatorial Guinea to boost agriculture in Ghana, can support the vision. It would also instill in policy makers, sheer hunger for creative minds and knowledge locally to harness the potential of redirecting the state's export and import trade.

Again, bilateral relations with emerging economies would secure large pool of resources to embark on job creation, among others for the smooth implementation of *Ghana Beyond Aid*. As noted by Janus et al. (2014), knowledge sharing is a unique feature of beyond aid. Tiekou and Odoom (2013) have also confirmed that rational choice has always been part of Ghana's foreign policy goals, hence mutual benefit could be realised from these bilateral relations. Kwemo (2017) contended that a long-term investment scheme in the private sector, infrastructure and manufacturing industries is an antidote to food insecurity and unemployment. Emphasizing the point, the scholar argued that African leaders must seek commercial and trade engagements just as Morocco has had fruitful free trade agreement with the US leading to upsurge

in US exports to Morocco and making the latter a gateway for US companies to Africa and European markets.

4.4.6. Improved direct diplomacy

The study reveals that some issues at the international stage require the actual presence of the president rather than representation by ambassadors or delegations of any kind based on the fear it may pose to national security, the reputation it could bring and the maximum profit to realize. Again, findings of the study show that certain economic, trade and governance issues demand the actual presence of the president to facilitate smooth pacts or compromise on issues. Hence, direct diplomacy must be improved and utilized to enhance the quest for independence in foreign policy decision making. The study notes that direct diplomacy has the advantage of improving good neighbourliness, enhancing economic diplomacy, and preventing conflicts and military interventions especially in the West African sub-region. Commenting on how foreign policy goals can disentangle Ghana from the aid trap, an interviewee said that:

Using direct diplomacy to address economic and security issues works better than many forms of diplomacy. Presidential visits to other parts of the world would improve negotiations on economic matters and security issues. Through this, conflicts in Africa can reduce and Ghana's expenditure on peacekeeping operations and camps for refugees, peace talks and conferences to ensure that the military in some parts of West Africa give return power to civilians could be channeled into economic growth. The country could follow the good examples of Kufuor and Mills' administrations (Interviewee 8, 2022).

Diplomacy remains the chief instrument of foreign policy. It ensures peaceful relations between countries. Trade deals, security concerns and new policies between countries remain at the centre stage of diplomacy. In the Ghanaian context, improved direct diplomacy can promote exchanges that boost culture, trade, wealth and knowledge. In fact, the focus of the *Ghana Beyond Aid* vision is the desire of the state

to shift from production to manufacturing, thus, redirecting capital into industrialization and other economic viable ventures, Using the vehicle of good neighbourliness and economic diplomacy, the president's visits to other countries could be used to showcase the Ghanaian culture, democratic consolidation and human rights record to attract foreign direct investment.

There is therefore the need to pursue continuity and change in other development paradigms such as the *Golden Age of Business* under Kufuor Administration as far as the country's foreign policy goals are concerned. This development philosophy under Kufuor aimed at using domestic resources and foreign direct investment from most West African neighbours to make Ghana economic self-reliant. Thus, the focus of direct diplomacy, however, should not be on only the West and West African countries that have been traditional allies of Ghana. Rather, countries in the Caribbean, Asia and Europe should be considered in the president's overtures as well to be able to secure the required economic assistance other than foreign aid with lots of conditionalities. Consequently, a blend of economic diplomacy and good neighbourliness, and change in policy directions could earn investor confidence in Ghana's economy. This would boost the economy and support the country's desire to escape the aid trap. For example, according to Yeboah (2019), Former President Kufuor's visits to all neighbouring countries and others few months into his assumption of office contributed to the economic growth and development of the nation in later years.

The state system largely presents challenges, threats and opportunities to all states. Thus, international relations pose lethal mix of fear, honour and profit to states (Chittick & Freyberg-Inan, 2001). Presidents and Heads of State of great nations even in times of huge economic challenges, show commitment to their nations by changing

their foreign policy directions to tour other countries or continents in search of resources. In fact, President Obama, for instance, had to visit Cairo, Egypt in June 2009 to strike new understanding between the US and leaders of Muslim countries. In a similar fashion, Obama visited Ghana when supply of oil from the Gulf Region was in short supply to the US partly due to the US attack on Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Somalia and Pakistan as well as its role in quelling the Arab Spring uprising in the Middle East and North Africa in 2011. Again, in March 2023 the US Vice President, Kamala Harris visited Ghana, Tanzania and Zambia for bilateral talks. In Ghana, the issue of sexual minority rights was discussed with President Akufo-Addo.

As Botchway and Amoako-Gyampah (2021, p. 301) have confirmed, even though the state should pursue continuity in its foreign policy goals, it should be pragmatic in its foreign policy decision making to obtain a deal “that yields the best returns for the moment and for generations to come.” In this regard, it is quite prudent for President Akufo-Addo, in recent times, to have engagements with world leaders such as Emmanuel Macron of France and others in the West. However, this must be pushed a step further, not in terms of travelling with huge entourage but purposely to seek partnership in the areas of economic growth and national development. This would only replicate past pragmatic policy measures under Nkrumah, Rawlings and Kufuor when both continuity and change in foreign policy goals supported economic growth and national development.

4.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, data collected through interviews which were transcribed and coded, were thematically presented and analyzed in consonance with relevant literature. This

chapter has dealt tremendously with four key issues. Foremost, determinants of continuity and change in Ghana's foreign policy goals were identified. The reasons these twin concepts have also rendered Ghana over-reliant on aid were explored. The chapter also investigated the various ways aid has contributed to development of critical sectors of the economy. Finally, the chapter analyzed how Ghana's foreign policy goals can move Ghana beyond aid. In the final chapter, the summary, conclusion, recommendations and suggestions for further research are presented.



CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Introduction

This chapter expounds the summary of findings of the study, makes recommendations, draws conclusions and offers suggestions for further studies. The chapter, in part, highlights the research findings that can be drawn from the data, the analysis and new knowledge realized from the research. Foremost, the chapter provides concise findings on the objectives of the study. The chapter also proves the degree of confirmation or otherwise of the objectives of the research. At the concluding segment of this chapter, not only does the researcher proffer a plethora of recommendations which are imperative for policy makers but also suggests areas that need further studies.

5.1 Summary of Research Findings

At the introductory section of the research, some objectives with corresponding research questions were set to guide the study. The study was informed by specific objectives, which were to identify the factors that determine continuity and change in Ghana's foreign policy goals, explore why the pursuit of continuity and change in Ghana's foreign policy goals has rendered Ghana over-reliant on foreign aid, investigate how aid has contributed to development of critical sectors of the economy, and analyse how Ghana's foreign policy goals can extricate Ghana from the aid debacle. General and precise findings have been made with regard to each of these objectives.

In essence, on the foremost objective that sought to identify the factor that determine continuity and change in Ghana's foreign policy goals in the Fourth Republic. The

study reveals that past policies and experiences, leadership idiosyncrasies, national interest, economic conditions, natural resources, public opinion, and global factors determine continuity and change in Ghana's foreign policy goals in the Fourth Republic. The findings show that all regimes in the current republic have used these factors to continue the pursuit of Ghana's foreign policy goals or change in their directions or adoption of other policy objectives to achieve set targets. Given the point that the study has been able to outline, analyse and discuss the various factors that determine continuity and change in Ghana's foreign policy goals in the Fourth Republic, the first objective has been achieved.

On the second objective, which was to explore why the pursuit of continuity and change in Ghana's foreign policy goals has rendered Ghana over-reliant on foreign aid, the study finds that the ailing Ghanaian economy is hardly able to support the huge expenditure of government on foreign policy decisions, hence the country's over-reliance on aid to be able to meet the demands of the widened scope of contemporary international relations. It emerged from the study that aid conditionality keep Ghana always dependent on foreign aid. Also, the study reveals that, rented political institutions and policies, as part of continuity and change in foreign policy goals, have degenerated into incessant path of dependency on donor partners. Even though the Fourth Republican era is a period of little economic fortune for Ghana, yet, it emerged from the findings of the study that there is continual exhibition of opulence in foreign policy decision making by policy makers amidst the economic quagmire, which has regrettably created a culture of dependency on development partners. Other findings of the study on over-reliance on aid include actions and inactions of political leadership, and Ghana's uneven integration in the global capitalist system. In view of the fact that, in pursuit of continuity and change in foreign policy goals in the Fourth

Republic, this sequence of factors as outlined, account for Ghana's over-reliance on aid, by and large, this objective has been met.

In respect of the third objective, which encompassed investigating how aid has contributed to development in critical sectors of the economy, the study reveals that aid has contributed immensely in multi-sectoral spheres of the economy. These include democratic consolidation and governance, pro-poor social intervention policies and programmes in the social sector, agriculture, the education sector, the health sector, the energy sector and the transportation system. On democratic consolidation and governance, the study finds that Ghana's return to democratic governance in 1992 was as a result of strings attached to aid. Further, aid constitutes a strong force behind the governance architecture of Ghana by supplementing annual budgets and enhancing democratic principles like the rule of law, accountability, transparency, responsiveness, inclusiveness, efficiency and effectiveness in governance.

The issue of pro-poor social intervention policies and programmes in the social sector were highlighted. On this, the study uncovers that aid has also resulted in the implementation of pro-poor policies and programmes on education and health which include the School Feeding Programme, Capitation Grant, among others to ensure social inclusion and social justice. These pro-poor policies and programmes have reduced poverty, increased school enrollments, eradicated hunger and diseases in especially rural communities of Ghana.

On the education, health, energy, agricultural and transportation sectors, the findings of study show that the massive infrastructural development, capacity building of staff or employees in the sectors and technology transfer can be attributed to aid. In view of

the improvements in these sectors, they are supporting economic growth and national development by offering employment to the youth, increasing GDP, attracting tourists and enhancing the import-export trade of the country to earn foreign exchange. With regard to the fact that foreign aid has aided the development of critical sectors of the Ghana's economy as adduced, substantially, the third objective has been achieved.

On the *Ghana Beyond Aid* agenda, it emerged from the findings of the study that pragmatic policies and initiatives under Ghana's foreign policy goals – good neighbourliness, economic diplomacy and promotion of world peace – can support its successful implementation. These policies and initiatives include the adoption of low profile international relations, promotion of Pan-Africanist ideals, bilateral relations with new and emerging economies and improved direct diplomacy. The study also finds that Ghana's active and coordinated role in regional integration in Africa, and proper restructuring and utilization of diplomatic missions and ambassadorial positions could attract investments and trade relations to propel the beyond aid agenda. The study has offered a detailed analysis of how Ghana's foreign policy goals could extricate Ghana from the aid debacle which indicates that the fourth objective has also been met.

5.2 Conclusion

Resulting from findings of the study, the following conclusions were drawn. Foreign policy goals in the Fourth Republic are underpinned by the twin concepts of continuity and change, fraught by incessant demand for foreign aid to meet growing demands of the people and the international community. Aid contributes immensely to the development of critical sectors of the economy. However, due to the fragile economy, aid conditionalities, borrowed institutions and rented policies, among

others, the pursuit of continuity and change in Ghana's foreign policy goals have worsened the spate of over-reliance of the Ghanaian economy on foreign aid.

Despite the myriad challenges that militate the *Ghana Beyond Aid* vision, pragmatic policies and initiatives under Ghana's foreign policy goals can move Ghana beyond aid. From the experiences of Asian and African countries; Singapore, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, China and Botswana, which passed through similar or worse historical experiences as Ghana, it is evident that their ability to eschew parochialism, over-politicization of issues, corruption and exploitation, and move into first and middle class industrialized societies never occurred until their leaders rejected foreign aid and domination. Similar concrete steps can be adopted by the political leadership in Ghana through continuity and change in Ghana's foreign policy goals. Regardless of the resource paucity, intensified local revenue mobilization and change of attitude to reinforce economic growth and national progress within the new age of Africa's integration, could make *Ghana Beyond Aid* possible, if not now, in the long run.

5.3 Recommendations

The study has analyzed continuity and change in foreign policy goals in the Fourth Republic with specific reference to foreign aid and the *Ghana Beyond Aid* agenda. It explored the dynamics of aid, its contributions to critical sectors of Ghana's economy and subsequently analysed how economic diplomacy can make *Ghana Beyond Aid* feasible. In respect of the findings of the study, some recommendations are put forward.

First, the study recommends that even though Ghana cannot renege on its inviolable role as a dynamic actor in international politics, especially in Africa integration, it has to measure its political abilities to act with its economic capacity. As a developing

country, Ghana should avoid resort to foreign aid but foreign direct investment to assist other countries even when it is lethal to its sovereignty, societal values, economic growth and national development. In furtherance of the foregoing suggestion, Ghana must set its priorities right on development of critical sectors of the economy rather than placing them under the ambit of donor partners who usually subject them to changes as and when issues are triggered by external forces.

Generally, with the ever-increasing cost of production in Ghana, the question whether local industries are ready to support the implementation of *Ghana Beyond Aid*, has risen. In many respects, accessing raw materials, payment of remuneration, tariffs on electricity and water, and honouring tax obligations combined with fluctuating power (electricity) supply have adverse effects on local industries. It has consequently become imperative for government policies to be streamlined to protect and promote local industries for them to compete equitably with foreign firms in Ghana to be able to act as backbone of the economy. If foreign firms owned by Americans, the EU, Chinese, Lebanese, Indians, and South Africans, for example, enjoy tax holidays as part of Ghana's foreign policy economic diplomacy, same gesture could be extended to Ghanaian local industries to defray some of their cost items.

Again, one major flaw in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy goals in the Fourth Republic is inadequate public education. Obviously, the immense public perceptions about the *Ghana Beyond Aid* vision is borne out of uninformed position of the populace. Often, as many scholars have asserted, instead of policy makers rallying public support behind intended policies and programmes, the public are rather left in oblivion. Yet, the public are called upon to support such decisions at the extreme end of the policy making cycle. Although this phenomenon has been part of

Ghana's political history, it is more pronounced in the Fourth Republic. The public therefore have no option than to reject most economic policies of the government. Classic examples include the SAP, HIPC Initiative, Value Added Tax (VAT) and the Electronic Transaction Levy (E-Levy). Against this backdrop, the study suggests capacity building and empowerment of state institutions like the National Commission for Civic Education, the Information Services Department and the National Communications Authority, to be able to engage in thorough public education on the *Ghana Beyond Aid* agenda to aid smooth implementation.

The study adheres to the clarion call by experts that the Ghanaian economy needs serious restructuring to withstand shocks posed by the external environment. Under the present circumstances, as the study has emphasized, a little glitch in the global system and the economy incurs massive pejorative repercussions. An instance is Ghana's return to the IMF due to COVID-19 and the Russia-Ukraine war. The study suggests that the earlier policy makers revamped the political economy through commercialization of agriculture, boost in the service industry, check on profligate expenditures, and widening the tax net to embrace properly the informal sector, the better it would inure to the attainment of *Ghana Beyond Aid*.

The Fourth Republic is further riddled with sourcing aid from a multiplicity of donor countries and institutions. Admittedly, recent events have called to question the many donor partners who provide aid to Ghana and its attendant conditionalities which often hamper the smooth running of the economy. While encouraging the contracting of purposeful loans and grants from donor partners to support actualization of *Ghana Beyond Aid*, the study deems it quite indispensable to recommend that the government exercises restraint on the number of development partners.

Additionally, policy implementation suffers greatly in Ghana due to partisanship in decision making and non-adherence with national development plans and strategies. Extant literature, for example, has dilated extensively on this matter; yet, the Fourth Republic is fraught with infrastructural deficit due to abandonment of projects started by previous regimes. Uncompleted road network, sports facilities, educational and health infrastructures make a laundry list of abandoned projects owing to change of administration or regimes. As the state peruses critical issues towards the attainment of the beyond aid vision, over politicization in governance circles at the expense of securing the national interest must be lowered. There should be desperate effort by policy makers, regardless of their political persuasions, to follow national development schemes with little or no variations. Economic development and independence to act in international relations as espoused by Saudi Arabia, China, India, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong, for example, were steeped, though, in long term rule by a single political leadership, but adherence to structured economic schemes and national strategies, played crucial role.

5.4 Suggestions for Further Research

The researcher offers a number of suggestions for further studies against the milieu of critical scrutiny of extant literature and data on the study as well as its findings and conclusions. The role of the Bretton Woods Institutions (IMF and World Bank) in the foreign policy persuasions of regimes in Ghana post Nkrumah era is not only inexorable but also indispensable. The study notes specifically the alacrity with which policy makers approach these institutions for assistance whenever the economy suffers a meltdown. The study therefore proposes a research to uncover the nuances, the scope and nature of these institutions in foreign policy orientations in the post PNDC era.

The study also suggests a full-scale study on the nexus between the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) and the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative in the development trajectory of Ghana. Whereas this study appreciates the incalculable role of these foreign policy initiatives in addressing pressing economic and political demands at various stages of the political history of the country, it is weighty that the controversy surrounding their contributions towards the economic dilemmas of Ghanaians in the current regime is settled through rigorous research.


The *Ghana Beyond Aid* vision is pivoted on change of attitude of Ghanaians. Change of attitude is as vague as it is susceptible to many interpretations. The study therefore recommends that research on the influence of attitudinal change of the citizenry towards an independent foreign policy goal should be conducted to ascertain its authenticity or otherwise. In diverse forms, such a study could examine various attitudes and their underpinnings on past independent or dependent foreign policy goals and the *Ghana Beyond Aid* vision.

Another recommendation of the study is a comprehensive study on the Ghana-China Sino-hydro deal. This agreement, undeniably, has yielded some dividends in reducing the road infrastructure deficits in the country. For instance, the the construction of the Tamale Interchange and other road network in Kumasi and the Atiwa area of the Eastern Region are attributed to the deal. This notwithstanding, actual correlation between the collateralized bulk deposit of bauxite for more than a decade and infrastructural development requires critical study to serve as blueprint for policy makers in future endeavours.

The establishment of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) in 2019 fetches some economic and financial relief to Africa. It is projected to strengthen

trade among African states. However, whether or not AfCFTA can support the AU, ECOWAS and NEPAD to encourage inter-African trade is empirically not yet verifiable. In fact, due to the differences in economic and ideological persuasions of African states, the study recommends that a study should be conducted to ascertain the degree of financial freedom AfCFTA would offer Africa to dissuade the continent from the aid regime.

Africa is currently engaged in South-South cooperation, economic diplomacy with China and a host of industrialized Global South countries. Yet, it is also on the continuous trajectory of utilizing foreign aid from the West. A comparative analysis of the aid regime under the Western Countries, IMF and the World Bank on one hand, and the South-South Cooperation under the China Exim Bank, among others, will uncover which of these systems has the wherewithal to address African economic challenges without compromising on African institutions, customs and value systems.



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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A



UNIVERSITY OF EDUCATION, WINNEBA
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE EDUCATION
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE EDUCATION

P. O. Box 25, Winneba, Ghana psed@uew.edu.gh
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13th April 2022

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

Dear Sir/Madam,

LETTER OF INTRODUCTION: NTIM EMMANUEL OFORI

This is to introduce to you Mr. **Ntim Emmanuel Ofori** from the Department of Political Science Education, University of Education, Winneba.

He is undertaking a study on the topic: **Ghana Beyond Aid: An analysis of continuity and change in Ghana's Foreign Policy Goals in the Fourth Republic.**

This researcher needs your help by way of volunteering information on this subject to enable him to complete his research. Please, the research is purely for academic purposes and all information is treated as confidential.

Kindly give him the necessary assistance he may need.

Yours faithfully,



Ms. Francisca Elorm Kugbega
For: Ag. HOD, Political Science Education



www.uew.edu.gh

APPENDIX B

INTERVIEW GUIDE

UNIVERSITY OF EDUCATION, WINNEBA

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE EDUCATION

GHANA BEYOND AID: AN ANALYSIS OF GHANA'S FOREIGN POLICY GOALS IN THE FOURTH REPUBLIC

The rationale of this interview is to collect data on the topic above for a study in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the award of Master of Philosophy degree in Political Science Education by the University of Education, Winneba. I respectfully crave your indulgence to respond to the cataloged questions candidly as possible. All information provided will be used solely for the purpose of this study. I consent to treat the data with utmost confidentiality and anonymity. I am honoured by your support to make this study a success.

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR STATE ACTORS

Determinants of Continuity and Change in Foreign Policy in the Fourth Republic

- How are foreign policy decisions made in Ghana?
- What factors do you think account for continuity and change in Ghana's foreign policy goals?

Ghana's Over Reliance on Aid due to Continuity and Change in Foreign Policy in the Fourth Republic

- Would you say that continuity and change in Ghana's foreign policy goals attract aid?
- Do you think that continuity and change in Ghana's foreign policy goals have resulted in the country's over-reliance on aid? Why?

Foreign Aid and Ghana's Economy

- What are the components of Ghana's economy?
- Would you say that aid has positive effects on Ghana's economy? Kindly justify your answer.
- In your view, how does foreign aid contribute to the development critical sectors of the economy?
- Would you say that there are direct adverse effects of foreign aid on Ghanaians? Why?

The Ghana Beyond Aid Vision

- What is your interpretation of *Ghana Beyond Aid*?
- How involved is the donor community, the diplomatic corps, civil society and the citizenry in the vision?
- How can Ghana's foreign policy goals and programmes extricate Ghana from the aid trap?
- Do you think that Ghana's foreign policy goals can support the *Ghana Beyond Aid* agenda? How?
- Would you say that the vision constitutes continuity and change in Ghana's foreign policy?
- How different is the vision from the *Golden Age of Business* and the *Better Ghana Agenda* under Kufuor and Mills' Administrations?
- How feasible is *Ghana Beyond Aid* with regard to the existing economic situation of Ghana and the timelines for the vision?

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR NON-STATE ACTORS – FOREIGN POLICY EXPERTS/CSOs/THE MEDIA

Determinants of Continuity and Change in Foreign Policy in the Fourth Republic

- How are foreign policy decisions made in Ghana?
- What factors do you think account for continuity and change in Ghana's foreign policy goals?

Ghana's Over Reliance on Aid due to Continuity and Change in Foreign Policy in the Fourth Republic

- Would you say that continuity and change in Ghana's foreign policy goals attract aid?
- Do you think that continuity and change in Ghana's foreign policy goals have resulted in the country's over-reliance on aid? Why?

Foreign Aid and Ghana's Economy

- What are the components of Ghana's economy?
- Would you say that aid has positive effects on Ghana's economy? Kindly justify your answer.
- In your view, how does foreign aid contribute to the development critical sectors of the economy?
- Would you say that there are direct adverse effects of foreign aid on Ghanaians? Why?

The Ghana Beyond Aid Vision

- What is your interpretation of *Ghana Beyond Aid*?
- How involved is the donor community, the diplomatic corps, civil society and the citizenry in the vision?
- How can Ghana's foreign policy goals and programmes extricate Ghana from the aid trap?
- Would you say that the vision constitutes continuity and change in Ghana's foreign policy?
- How different is the vision from the *Golden Age of Business* and the *Better Ghana Agenda* under Kufuor and Mills' Administrations?
- How feasible is *Ghana Beyond Aid* with regard to the existing economic situation of Ghana and the timelines for the vision?

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS

Determinants of Continuity and Change in Foreign Policy in the Fourth Republic

- How are foreign policy decisions made in Ghana?
- What factors do you think account for continuity and change in Ghana's foreign policy goals?

Ghana's Over Reliance on Aid due to Continuity and Change in Foreign Policy in the Fourth Republic

- What are your country's major contributions to Ghana's foreign policy goals in the Fourth Republic?
- Would you say that the relations between your country and Ghana have resulted in Ghana's over-reliance on aid? Why?

Foreign Aid and Ghana's Economy

- What is your country's contribution to the development of critical sectors of Ghana's economy?
- Would you agree with the assertion that your country's aid to Ghana have had direct positive effects on Ghanaians? Why?

The Ghana Beyond Aid Vision

- What is your interpretation of *Ghana Beyond Aid*?
- How involved is your country or the diplomatic mission in the *Ghana Beyond Aid* vision?
- Do you think that Ghana's foreign policy goals can support the *Ghana Beyond Aid* agenda? How?
- Would you say that the vision constitutes continuity and change in Ghana's foreign policy? Why?
- How feasible is *Ghana Beyond Aid* with regard to the existing economic situation of Ghana and the timelines for the vision?